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The youthful engineer-in-charge Henry J.E. Reid sits at his desk, April 1928. 
ENGINEER IN CHARGE 
.. -.....__, 
ERRATA 
(Author's corrections to NASA SP-4305, Encineer in Cha~oe: A 
His~cry of the Lanaley Aeronautical Labo~atorv. 1917-1958.) 
page 15: "A high altitude view of Langley Field in the 1950s." 
Label four. "NACA West Area, created 1940s" should be ·1 1/4 
inches to the left of where it is. 
page 47 :·  l,ines 24 and 25. Should read "Reid was thus compelled to 
use the ~ACA's translation of Ludwig Prandtl's 1921 paper 
"Applications of Modern. 
page 62: 
Johnson, 
Reiser. 
bottom photo of "NACA Nuts." Man at far left is 
chief of the Technical Service Division, not 
Ernest ' 
Walter 
page 100: Diagram of the VDT. Labels for "open throat" and 
"closed throat" are reversed. Top sketch should read closed 
throat: bottom sketch spould read open throat. _ Last sentence of 
caption should read "Notice in particular the change fr~m a 
closed-throat to an open-throat test -eetion." 
page 100: line 5 of text. 
open-throat test section. 
Should read "and rebui1d it with an 
" 
page 183: Photo of Stinson Reliant a~rplane. Aircraft designation 
should read SR-SE instead of SR-7. 
page 315, last paragraph, and p. 317, caption. ~ransonic b~mp in 
the Hioh-S p eed 7 X 10-Foot Tunnel, not in che 300-MPH 7 X 10-Foot 
Tunnel. · 
page 358: drawing of hypersonic research airplane 
Becker. Wing taper ratio . should read 0.14. "Cu ft" 
feet) should be deleted. 
concept by 
(for cubic 
page ~66, caption: air~launching ~f ~orth American X-15 being 
investigated in the 300-MPH 7 X 10-Foot Tunnel, not in the Rich-
Speed 7 X 10-Foot Tunnel. 
'I:\ 
page 457: Two-Dimensional Low-Turbulence Tunnel. "Circuit• and 
, pressure" should read: "single return, atmospheric" 
page 468: Photo of V/STOL tunnel. Caption should read, "Langley's 
first V/STOL (V~rtical/Short Take Off and Landing) Tunnel (shown 
above) was built by NASA in 1969. In 1956, though, NACA Langley 
had created a modest V/STOL research capability by providing the 
settling chamber of the 300-MPH 7 X 10-Foot Tunnel of 1945 with a 
spacious 17-foot square test section." 
James R. Hansen 9-3-87 
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Foreword 
Langley has had a remarkable history, not only during three decades 
as NASA Langley Research Center, but in an earlier period as well: during 
Langley's four decades as the flagship research facility of the National Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). Long before spaceflight, Langley 
Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory (later, Langley Aeronautical Labora-
tory) began its work incubating the ideas and hatching the technology that 
made American aviation take off and fly. James R. Hansen here offers us 
that story. 
More than just an outlining of historical facts is to be found here, 
for Hansen has captured the very culture of Langley. He has done so by 
illustrating what I see as the four major aspects of the laboratory: people, 
facilities, program, and customer relations. 
People, of course, have always been the most important aspect of this 
unique place, so it is good to see the people themselves studied so carefully in 
its first complete history: people like Eastman N. Jacobs, who energetically 
engineered many of the early programs, and Theodore Theodorsen, whose 
powers as an applied mathematician and theorist made him sometimes the 
rival but always the complement of men like Jacobs; or like Max M. Munk, 
the brilliant and difficult prodigy of Langley's early years; or like Fred E. 
Weick, an aviation pioneer for most of this century; or like the skilled 
makers of special instruments, tools, and models who practically invented 
the various fields of supporting work for aerodynamical research; or like 
John Stack, Richard T. Whitcomb, Robert T. Jones, Robert R. Gilruth, 
John V. Becker, and all the other engineers and researchers whose names 
permeate this book. Hansen is seriously concerned with the motivations, 
the training, the personalities, the hopes of people who cause aeronautical 
science and technology to evolve. Indeed the very title of the book, in 
stating his theme of the practical-minded engineer moving the laboratory's 
work toward feasible, useful solutions of aviation problems, shows Hansen's 
respect for the importance of people in the story of the laboratory. No 
doubt there are many benefits for the rest of us in the work of historians; 
surely the chance to see and know as individuals the people who preceded 
us must be one of them. 
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The people who lead a research institution, and the people who do the 
work, always to a greater or lesser degree face the same kinds of choices 
regarding the next two of the four important aspects of Langley: facilities 
and program. How, for instance, can the allotted budget best be used? 
How much money will there actually be? How much risk should be taken 
in building a machine that may not help you learn precisely what you need 
to learn? How good is the chance that it will help you learn answers to the 
questions you do not at present even know enough to ask? Should resources 
be committed to investigation of this or that possibly bright but predictably 
expensive-to-study idea? How far should you stray from the planned path 
of a research program to seek for possible extra benefits when they appear 
attainable? 
Engineer in Charge conveys a wealth of Langley's institutional experi-
ence in dealing with these kinds of questions about facilities and program. 
Hansen tells how Langley's first wind tunnel came to have an open circuit-a 
safe and proven design, but much less useful than the closed-circuit tunnels 
then coming into their own. The rapid subsequent evolution of wind tun-
nels, much of which took place at Langley, involved further choices that 
required commitment of funds and time and effort without certainty of get-
ting the hoped-for results. And always the facilities needed to be stretched 
to maximize the benefits of the research program. Readers of Hansen's book 
will all but hear the Langley engineers of a half-century ago saying, if only 
we can build this or that new tunnel, or try this or that new piece of gear, or 
get permission to work on such-and-such new technology, we might really 
get somewhere . . . . Readers will find themselves watching the evolution 
of the facilities and program at NACA Langley, from the early quantum 
improvements in aircraft design to the pre-NASA work that foreran the 
various space programs. 
Hansen also traces Langley's fourth important aspect, its relations with 
the industrial, scientific, and technical community it was built to serve. 
While the laboratory has a strong tradition of independent research, it also 
has a tradition of solving the problem of the moment-of "fighting fires." 
During my tenure as Langley director, the most striking example of this 
ability was the work of over 300 Langley engineers and technicians on the 
space shuttle thermal protection system, the tiles that protect the shuttle 
from the intense heat of reentry into the atmosphere from space. But there 
have been many other examples of Langley's ability and readiness to apply 
concerted effort in overcoming aeronautical development problems. Readers 
will find them here. 
Readers will also find here the background of these customer relations-
not only the "what" of Langley's work with the larger aeronautical 
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community of which it has been a part, but the "how" and the "why" as 
well. While Hansen has defined for himself the primary task of telling Lang-
ley's story in terms of Langley itself, he has nonetheless devoted extensive 
effort to showing how Langley worked with Washington, with aircraft man-
ufacturers, and with the armed services and others. He brings to life such 
episodes as the old annual manufacturers' conferences, the pre-World War II 
affairs that were for Langley part business, part public relations, even part 
fun; he shows how the laboratory coordinated its various efforts for military 
aviation; he even probes the various ways in which Langley drew on inter-
national resources, from individual aerodynamicists in friendly countries to 
captured research results at the end of the second world war. 
The importance of a history such as this book is to better understand 
the character of an organization and what it will mean to the future. There 
is a living memory at Langley, an awareness of the triumphs, and for that 
matter the failures, of the laboratory's past. But a living memory is in 
most respects an incomplete and anecdotal memory, a mixture of hearsay 
and hand-me-down impressions, a collection of stories embellished by time 
and imagination, an awareness of some of the facts, a misunderstanding of 
others. What is needed is a systematic arrangement of what is known, a 
synthesis of what is recorded on paper and film with what is remembered 
by surviving participants-in short, what is needed is a sort of accurate 
rejuvenation of the living memory. 
Langley has only just begun to be called upon by the aerospace 
community for the things only Langley can provide. NASA has called upon 
James R. Hansen for an accurate rejuvenation of Langley's living memory. 
Here it is. 
January 1986 Donald P. Hearth 
Director 
Office of Space Science and Technology 
University of Colorado 
and Director {1975~1985) 
Langley Research Center 
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Introduction 
On the most superficial level the title of this book refers to the officer 
who first headed Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, the original and, until 
1941, the only research center of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics. In all of NACA history-1915 to 1958-there were only two 
such officers: Leigh M. Griffith (b. 1882, d. 1940) and Henry J. E. Reid 
(b. 1895, d. 1968). Griffith served as engineer-in-charge from 1923, when 
NACA headquarters created the position, through 1925; Reid succeeded 
Griffith in 1926, filling the top position at the lab until his retirement from 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)* in 1960. 
For the last twelve years of his career, however, Reid managed Langley 
not as the engineer-in-charge but as the "director." In 1948 the NACA 
changed his twenty-two-year-old title in anticipation of Public Law 167 
(passed 13 July 1949, 81st Congress, first session). This law authorized 
the chairman of the NACA to create "ten positions in the professional 
and scientific service" of the federal government, "each such position being 
established in order to enable the NACA to secure and retain the services 
of specially qualified personnel necessary in the discharge of the duties of 
the Committee to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems 
of flight with a view to their practical solution." 1 Before this time Reid's 
salary as engineer-in-charge was boxed in below $9,000 per annum by civil 
service criteria which discriminated against engineers in favor of scientists. 
The decision in 1948 to change Reid's title to director was thus part of 
a larger NACA scheme to increase annual pay to its top executives, and 
enhance their social and professional status, by giving them academic-
sounding titles like those borne by individuals in the higher grades of the 
federal bureaucracy. As Vannevar Bush, chairman of the NACA from 1939 
to 1941, had once said, a scientist may sell a bill of goods to Congress when 
an engineer could not get a street car token on Capitol Hill.2 
Despite the increased pay, Reid was privately reluctant to have his 
official identity changed after so many years. Like Griffith before him, he was 
• Usage varies on the pronunciation of the names NACA and NASA. In this book, NACA 
is meant to read as four individual letters ("the N-A-C-A"), while the acronym NASA reads 
as a two-syllable word. 
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an engineer and proud of it. He had earned a bachelor's degree in electrical 
engineering nearly half a century before at Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
in Massachusetts, and much of his work, both before and after becoming 
Langley's engineer-in-charge in 1926, truly classified as engineering. To have 
worked in the field of aeronautics in the 1920s and 1930s was to have been 
a participant in what was indisputably one of the greatest and most rapidly 
successful engineering adventures in all history. Born into a world without 
flying machines, his generation had known the airplane at a time when it 
barely worked, yet lived to see it perform wonders. These achievements, 
Reid believed, had been largely the result of practical engineering solutions 
to the outstanding scientific and technical problems of flight. Congress had 
created the NACA in 1915 "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the 
problems of flight with a view to their practical solution." But in practice at 
Langley, the keystone of the organization's charter had rested chiefly in the 
end of that phrase, "with a view to their practical solution." This meant 
that aeronautics had been treated not so much as a scientific discipline, but 
as an area for engineering research and development. Most Americans did 
not know how significantly the NACA laboratory of which Reid had been 
in charge had contributed, and was continuing to contribute, to solutions of 
this sort; most Americans did not even know that the NACA existed. This 
anonymity frustrated Reid occasionally-though he knew it had certain 
political advantages. However irritating it had been to hear the unknowing 
public frequently giving scientists all the credit for accomplishments he 
felt rightfully belonged to engineers, the irritation never prompted him to 
question his organization, profession, or identity as the engineer-in-charge. 
Neither Reid nor anyone else who knew anything about Langley ever 
doubted that at nearly all levels of laboratory research activity, not just at 
the top, it was the engineer who was in charge. Novelist James Michener 
picked up on this fact in the late 1970s during interviews with veteran 
NACA employees. In his book Space, Michener has a crusty, white-haired 
wind tunnel jockey scolding a new employee for crediting a scientist with 
the design of the 16-Foot High-Speed Tunnel: "Scientists are men who 
dream about doing things," he reprimanded the young man. "Engineers 
do them. This [tunnel] was designed by engineers, built by engineers, and 
is run by engineers. You're an engineer, young fellow, and you're to be 
proud of it." 3 Wind tunnels and other test equipment-which required 
engineering talents for design, development, operation, and exploitation-
formed the laboratory's backbone. By the end of the 1930s, fifteen of the 
eighteen aerodynamics sections at Langley were named after wind tunnels 
or other specific experimental setups. The only parts of the lab with 
names suggesting a theoretical approach to research were the Mathematical, 
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The mature Henry J. E. Reid, admires Langley's first Collier Trophy in 1955, 
twenty-six years after the NACA won it for the development of the low-drag engine 
cowling. 
Flutter and Vibration, and Propeller Sound and Noise research sections, all 
of which belonged to the small and somewhat isolated Physical Research 
Division. 
Langley's penchant for experimental programs was in fact very appro-
priate for the actual state of aeronautics in the period 1915 to 1930, the 
years when the NACA developed its own operating style. To a considerable 
degree, the empirical approach for which the agency became well known 
seems to have been dictated by the nature of the aircraft design problems 
confronting the laboratory after World War I and by the inadequacies of 
theory in addressing them. 
The generation of airplane designers responsible for some of the most 
famous World War I aircraft had used an intuitive, daring empirical 
engineering loosely connected at best with any theory of aerodynamics or 
structural integrity. Geoffrey de Havilland (1882-1965), Anthony Fokker 
(1896-1939), and Gianni Caproni (1886-1957), among others, produced 
stable and maneuverable airplanes using essentially a job-shop approach. 
The British designer Thomas Sopwith (b. 1888) never put his early planes 
through a single stress test. One of his prototypes could be designed, 
constructed from full-size chalk drawings on the factory floor, and test flown 
in less than three months. 
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Curtiss JN4H Jennies prepare to take off from Langley Field for NACA flight 
research in the spring of 1919. 
During the 1920s frail wooden biplanes covered with fabric, braced by 
wires, powered by heavy water-cooled engines, and driven by hand-carved 
wooden propellers still ruled the airways. This meant that very large gains 
in aerodynamic efficiency-perhaps even the biggest payoffs then possible-
would follow almost immediately once the aviation establishment possessed 
correct answers to just a few questions, such as: 
Can drag be reduced without degrading cooling? If so, how? 
How can wings be shaped to increase lift at low speeds and decrease 
drag at high speeds? 
How and when do flaps work best? 
How can effectiveness and control force be accurately predicted for 
ailerons, elevators, and rudders? 
Is it worthwhile to retract landing gear? 
In essence, each of these questions was asked as a result of someone's prac-
tical concern and thereby fell into the category of applied fundamental re-
search. For the most certain progress toward practical solutions, engineering 
talents were required, along with wind tunnels and other sophisticated ex-
perimental equipment which, at the time, only the federal government could 
afford. Because it was staffed and managed mainly by engineers and ex-
perienced an early proliferation of large and unique test facilities, like the 
Variable-Density, Propeller Research, and Full-Scale wind tunnels, Langley 
laboratory was admirably suited to handle the technological problems at 
hand. 
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OF POOH Introduction 
Although the NACA 's original laboratory was 
named after scientist Samuel P. Langley, the 
hero of most NACA engineers was Orville 
Wright. Th£s photograph was taken during 
Wright's visit to Langley in July 1922. Wright 
was a member of the NACA for nearly thirty 
years. 
On the other hand, the professional disposition of the Langley staff 
might have assured the victory of empirical approaches regardless of the 
nature of the aeronautical research problems of the day. George Lewis, the 
director of research for the NACA in Washington from 1919 to 1947, was, 
like Griffith and Reid, also an engineer. Though he respected theoreticians 
and employed a few at Langley, Lewis wanted "his boys" at the lab to look 
for practical solutions. It should come as no surprise that a laboratory in 
which engineers prevailed formulated problems in a way that required for 
their solution just those methods, techniques, and apparatuses in which the 
engineer himself was especially skilled. 
In a famous paper on wing section theory published by the NACA in 
1931, Langley physicist Theodore Theodorsen suggested that the laboratory 
staff sometimes tied the progress of their work so completely to the use of 
test equipment that the equipment started to use them.4 For example, while 
possession of the world's first full-scale propeller research tunnel presented 
Langley in 1926 with a unique opportunity to explore systematically the 
potential of dozens of different cowling shapes and arrangements, having 
this large and costly research plant also obligated the lab's researchers to 
make full and routine use of the facility. 
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Nearly every chapter of Langley history involves the design or utilization of wind 
tunnels. But the lab's story also demonstrates that no research facility, however 
superb its design, can be productive over the long haul without a staff that learns how 
to use it wisely and in ways new and different from those originally conceived. One 
Langley facility whose record benefited greatly from the work of a creative engineering 
staff was the Propeller Research Tunnel. From left to right, in 1929: Fred E. Weick, 
PRT section head, Ray Windler, William H. Herrnstein, Jr., John L. Crigler, and 
Donald H. Wood, assistant section head. 
The symbiosis between engineer and wind tunnel would grow so strong 
over the years that it was often almost impossible for management to put 
a machine out of business. The closing of some tunnels that had reached 
the point of diminishing returns-like the Propeller Research Tunnel in 
the 1940s-was accomplished only by overpowering stubborn defenders. 
Sometimes even after equipment was formally abandoned, old operators 
tried surreptitiously to run tests with it. Demolition proved the only sure 
way to end a tunnel's life. 
Whether it was the professional disposition of the staff or the nature 
of the aircraft design problems then confronting it that gave the NACA 
laboratory its strongest dose of empirical flavoring, engineering was what 
NACA Langley was all about. Once by the late 1920s it had settled into its 
niche in the American aeronautics community, it never really intended to 
do anything else. Langley did little "basic" or "scientific" research in the 
usually accepted senses of those words; rather, almost every investigation 
XXXll 
Introduction 
done there, whether "fundamental" or "developmental," aimed at a useful 
aircraft application. 5 
Though empiricism clearly predominated at the laboratory, a careful 
study of Langley history also shows that some NACA researchers were more 
than willing and more than able to resort to theoretical analyses when nec-
essary. Demonstration of this should lead to revision of some current his-
torical interpretations of the NACA, such as the one expressed by Edward 
Constant II in The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution. Professor Constant 
argued in one chapter of this deservedly prizewinning and influential book 
that the NACA performed "first-rate empirical work" but accomplished 
"minor work, or no work at all, on fundamental theory." His interpretation, 
partly accurate only if one uses a strict construction of the term "funda-
mental," implied that the NACA accomplished its empirical work without 
the help of any theory, an oversimplification which the history of several 
Langley programs-most notably the development of laminar-flow airfoils 
in the late 1930s (see chapter 4) and of slotted-throat transonic tunnels in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s (see chapter 11)-shows to be misleading, 
if not wholly incorrect. The NACA might have been "widely recognized 
for the excellence of its experimental data and for little else," as Constant 
stated, but this recognition was based on a popular misunderstanding of 
the subtle but often necessary interplay between theory, experiment, and 
design in successful engineering science. 6 In any case, the "little else" had 
its profound effects upon aviation. 
The unwritten rule for the work of any engineer is to bring everything 
to bear on solving the problem of the moment. This means bending every 
effort, be it cut-and-try, experimental, theoretical, or any combination 
of the three. The bias of an engineer against theory is not that of 
the philosophic doctrinaire; the engineer simply knows from his working 
experience that theory has its limitations, that there are too many things 
in life that draw one aside from the charm of a theory, and that facts 
often murder a theory. Nonetheless all of the better engineers at Langley 
ultimately realized that they needed some solid theoretical ability-because 
one never knew when it might be essential. They understood more and 
more, especially as the time arrived when flow velocities over parts of 
aircraft approached the sonic regime, that aerodynamic refinement could 
not go on endlessly on a purely empirical basis. Without some constant 
theoretical guidance, they would seek answers to too many ill-conceived and 
unnecessary questions. Motivated by an awareness of this potential danger, 
several Langley engineers worked hard from the mid-1930s to master such 
subjects as applied mathematics. This mastery enabled them to make some 
notable theoretical contributions and to provide valuable consultation to 
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the rest of the staff. Consequently, the theoretical analysis necessary for 
lifting an experimental series beyond the occasional impasse was usually 
accomplished in-house. 
To say that the NACA employed some researchers with excellent 
theoretical capabilities is not necessarily to say that it had a sufficient 
supply of them. Theoretical aerodynamicists were hard to find in the United 
States. American aeronautical programs by and large produced engineers 
of the practical sort described earlier. Stanford University's aerodynamics 
professor Elliott G. Reid, who worked at Langley from 1922 to 1927, 
complained in the preface to his 1932 textbook on Applied Wing Theory that 
"the average graduate of an American technical school cannot be expected 
to be very familiar with fluid mechanics, to have a working knowledge 
of potential theory, or to have facility in the use of either the complex 
variable or Fourier series" because neither the teachers nor the textbooks 
were there to instruct about such advanced information or problem-solving 
methodologies. 7 If more crackerjack theoretical aerodynamicists had been 
available, the NACA would have hired them. But to hire people and call 
them theoreticians when they were not really very good at theory would 
have served no useful purpose. Thus the most influential theoreticians 
at Langley before World War II were Max Munk and Theodorsen, two 
accomplished European imports, and the most influential theoretician at 
Langley after the war was Adolf Busemann, the accomplished German 
aerodynamicist who had fathered the swept-wing concept. 
Without a doubt, the NACA could have benefited from more theoret-
ical capabilities. But it is equally true to say that the NACA could have 
benefited from more experimental capabilities. The problem for manage-
ment besides acquiring a sufficient number of talented experimentalists and 
theoreticians was motivating the two types of researchers to work together 
productively. I. Edward Garrick (1910-1981), a talented mathematician 
who worked closely with Theodorsen in the 1930s and 1940s, believed in 
retrospect that NACA management might have stimulated a more gain-
ful exchange between theory and experiment if fewer researchers had been 
organized around use of any given experimental facility. If not for this clus-
tering around equipment, Garrick suggested, theory might have come to the 
aid of experimentation more quickly and less accidentally than it typically 
did.8 One can thus wonder, as some veteran Langley researchers now do, 
whether the NACA might have improved its total performance by forcing 
direct interaction between different types of research sections more often, 
no matter how this might have upset those temperamental individuals who 
headed them. One can also wonder whether the NACA might have achieved 
more by fostering a few small groups of imaginative individuals possessing 
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A Langley engineer inspects his installation of a model of the Bell X-1 supersonic 
airplane in the new slotted test section of the 16-Foot High-Speed Tunnel in March 
1951. 
both inventive engineering skills and creative theoretical talents, and then 
encouraging these groups to consider the possibilities lying beyond contem-
porary technology. 
The title of this book suggests a final meaning. Despite the influence of 
economic, political, and military objectives over NACA programs, Langley 
engineers enjoyed considerable freedom to advance research as they, not 
others, wanted. To a great extent, then, they were themselves "in charge" 
of what they did and how they did it. In this respect one may compare the 
position of a Langley engineer to that of an architect. Though "dependent 
upon commissions from patrons for the opportunity to work out his ideas," 
an architect "can usually design a building which reflects his personal 
artistic ideals and intentions as well as serving the client's needs." 9 The 
best architects are also great artists, and so also are the best engineers. 
It is thus important to address not only the bureaucratic circumstances 
in which Langley engineers worked, but also the engineers' personal drives 
and intentions. As historian Arnold Pacey wrote in The Maze of Ingenuity: 
Ideas and Idealism in the Development of Technology: 
Economic or military needs may give the engineer or inventor his opportunity, 
but they can rarely provide much stimulus to his imagination. To understand 
where that came from, we must ask what it is that really excites him about 
technology. 10 
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We just may find that what excited Langley engineers most of all was the 
spirit of adventure and exploration. 
* * * 
Engineer in Charge is basically a technical analysis of NACA history 
from the perspective of Langley laboratory to complement Alex Roland's 
headquarters-centered institutional study, Model Research. I first read 
Roland's manuscript in October 1980; this was six months after he com-
pleted the first draft of his book and eight months before I would spend 
my first day under NASA contract researching Langley history. Quite nat-
urally, his scholarship guided my endeavor greatly. But Engineer in Charge 
will hopefully do more for the reader than gloss Roland's previous work. 
From the beginning, I tried to move the analysis of NACA history in en-
tirely different directions and to offer new ways of looking at some of the 
same things. By this I certainly do not mean to say that my intention was 
to build a rival interpretation between which readers of the two books could 
choose. Rather, my purpose was to add another dimension to Roland's 
overall story. 
Neither was it my idea to recite in detail all of Langley's technical 
achievements. There were too many research programs, major and minor, 
conducted at the lab over too many years for that end to be achieved, even 
if I had thought it desirable. Instead, my plan was to explore the histories of 
( 1) the most technologically significant research programs associated with 
the lab, and (2) those programs that, after preliminary research, seemed 
best to illustrate how the lab was organized, how it worked, and how it 
cooperated with industry and the military. 
In looking back over this book, I can see how informed readers might 
think that my approach resulted in a somewhat positive distortion of the 
Langley record. Citing my emphasis on the most technologically significant 
research-i.e., programs that led to the low-drag cowling, laminar-flow 
airfoils, wartime drag reduction, supersonic flight, transonic tunnels, the 
area rule concept, and spaceflight-they might argue that little if any room 
was left for the many draws and defeats of NACA research (like the NACA 
Langley "failure" in early jet propulsion research, the subject of chapter 8). 
They might wonder whether the projects whose histories I have presented 
are just those that Langley veterans trotted out before me to demonstrate 
how good they were. 
I acknowledge these concerns. Nevertheless I stand by the approach 
I have taken, for I believe it has led to the most useful understanding of 
Langley. After some months of preliminary research and oral interviewing, I 
discovered that there was much more to the supposedly well known projects 
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than what had been published in contemporary newspaper and magazine 
stories or in George W. Gray's book Frontiers of Flight: The Story of NACA 
Research (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). And what was known was 
often misleading. More astonishingly, I found remarkably little agreement 
even among NACA veterans over how these projects had come about, 
how they had been conducted and managed, and what they ultimately 
signified. Moreover, previous historical treatments of these projects (with 
the exceptions of Roland's book and Richard Hallion's Supersonic Flight: 
The Story of the Bell X-1 and Douglas D-558 (The MacMillan Co., 1972]) 
had not benefited from significant research in Langley's correspondence and 
research authorization files. 
I thus felt the need to clarify important episodes in Langley history that 
have been imperfectly apprehended, not only to document these episodes 
more completely but also to put them together, as had never been done 
before, in the context of an overall thesis-that of engineer-in-charge. I 
considered examination of outstanding research programs not only a way of 
giving credit where credit was due, but also a means for institutional and 
technological case study. This dual function could only be accomplished, 
however, if the outstanding programs were demythologized and understood, 
not for what the NACA's publicists said they were, but for what they were 
in fact. 
My intent was not hagiographic; I did not mean to tell a story of 
heroic engineers and their triumphant research. Nonetheless my book has 
strong central characters-George Lewis, Max Munk, Henry Reid, Eastman 
Jacobs, Theodore Theodorsen, John Stack, Robert T. Jones, Robert R. 
Gilruth, Richard T. Whitcomb, John V. Becker, and Floyd L. Thompson, 
to name some of the more prominent. I made a real effort to bring these 
personalities to life. Those men who are deceased I came to know by reading 
their correspondence and transcripts of interviews made with them while 
they were alive, and by listening to what friends, colleagues, and even some 
rivals had to say about them. Most of those still living I was able to meet 
or at least talk to over the telephone. 
By thinking about all of them as the kind of people one might meet 
and know, naturally I began to like some more than others. My preferences 
no doubt show up-I liked Max Munk in spite of what I learned about 
him-but after hearing from NACA veterans who have read the book in 
manuscript, I believe that the portraits are fair overall. In any case, I doubt 
that the reader will find any of the portraits "heroic." In fact, my depiction 
of Stack is somewhat iconoclastic. 
Readers should also be aware that my account of Langley's past is what 
historians of science call internal history. I tell Langley's inside story and 
XXXVll 
Engineer in Charge 
do it largely from Langley's own documents. The object is to illuminate the 
meaning of those often obscure day-to-day in-house practices, procedures, 
and technical demands that determine so much of the life of any research 
laboratory. And I also tend to emphasize the laboratory's local rather than 
its national or international setting. Instead of comparing and contrasting 
Langley's experiences with those of other research institutions, such as the 
Na val Research Laboratory or the Bell labs in this country or the National 
Physical Laboratory in Great Britain, I stay more "at home" to see how the 
personality of the NACA's oldest laboratory evolved within its own setting 
in Tidewater Virginia. 11 
This approach has obvious drawbacks. For one thing, it tends to 
overly parochialize the history. If my object had been to make a complete 
evaluation of the NACA-what the military, industry, and general public, 
in both the United States and Europe, thought about the agency's overall 
research record-then my local focus on Langley might have detracted 
greatly from my study. Obviously I would have had to give far greater 
credence, as did Roland, to what outsiders thought of, and how they 
influenced, Langley. But in any case I trust that the reader will not 
think I have treated the laboratory as a closed system. The book does 
analyze Langley's relations with NACA headquarters, the other NACA 
laboratories that were eventually created, and the NACA's clients, even 
if not as completely or as theoretically as some readers might prefer. 
The manner of my written presentation may not suit all readers, for 
it is something of a hybrid. Those who do not know the fundamental 
principles of flight may find parts too technical for their liking; experts 
in aerodynamics will no doubt find many of my technical explanations 
simplistic or inadequate. Wanting both the layman and the aeronautical 
engineer to enjoy my book, I tried to steer a middle course. 
Finally, in a book whose theme is the engineer in charge, there should be 
plenty of pictures to stimulate the mind's eye, a vital organ for creating, un-
derstanding, and retaining technology. There are around 300 photographs 
in this book, an uncommonly high number for what is meant to be a schol-
arly publication. But I believe, as Mark Twain once wrote: "Dates are 
hard to remember because they consist of figures; figures are monotonously 
unstriking in appearance, and they don't take hold, they form no pictures, 
and so they give the eye no chance to help." For Twain, likewise for me and 
the Langley engineers I know best, pictures are the thing. 
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The parent organization of Langley laboratory was the National Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics. Congress established the NACA in 1915 
"to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight with a 
view to their practical solution." This establishment did not happen easily. 
It took years of active politicking by dedicated, well-connected scholars and 
government officers to grease the bureaucratic machinery for the creation of 
a new federal agency devoted to advancing the state of the art in aircraft 
design and operation. It also took a world war to convince a skeptical Amer-
ican public that aeronautics was not the province of cranks and dreamers. 
Finally, it even took a legislative contrivance to get the authorizing legisla-
tion through Congress. 
Establishing the NACA 
The idea to establish a national aeronautical organization having a 
central research laboratory had been discussed earnestly in April 1911 at 
the inaugural banquet of the American Aeronautical Society. During this 
meeting, several members called for the federal government to endorse the 
idea of creating a national aeronautics laboratory. This laboratory might be 
directed by the Smithsonian Institution, the members suggested. Whirling 
arms and other pieces of experimental equipment from Samuel Pierpont 
Langley's earlier aerodynamical laboratory lay dormant in Washington 
behind the castle building on the Mall; that lab could be expanded to 
include wind tunnels, shops, and instrument and model rooms. The prestige 
of the Smithsonian's secretary could foster the kind of cooperation among 
scientists requisite to the creation and proper maintenance of an effective 
advisory body. 1 
Forceful opponents killed the idea, however. Rear Adm. David W. 
Taylor, chief constructor of the navy, declared that the experimental model 
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basin at his Washington Navy Yard and the Engineering Experiment Station 
at Annapolis already performed aeronautical research. A civilian laboratory, 
Taylor charged, would duplicate military work at needless public expense. 
The admiral's unworkable alternative was for the government to assign 
all of its aeronautical research to the navy~-a proposal not as odd then 
as it may seem today, considering the admixture of hydrodynamic and 
aerodynamic theory before 1920. But others also complained. Richard C. 
Maclaurin, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argued 
that the lab should be located at or near a university or technical school, 
according to the successful European example. Why not at his institute, 
he implied. Samuel Stratton, director of the National Bureau of Standards, 
also dismissed the idea of any leading role for the Smithsonian. He felt 
that his bureau could supervise an aeronautical research facility, just as 
the National Physical Laboratory in England oversaw the operations of the 
Royal Aircraft Factory. 2 
It was paradoxical that bureaucratic politics could stand in the way 
of creating an aeronautical research organization in America, the country 
where powered flight had been first achieved. The Wright brothers had made 
their pioneering first flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in December 
1903. In the succeeding eight years, progress in American aeronautics had 
been wonderful, due largely to the magnificent work of the Wrights. The first 
truly practical passenger-carrying airplanes capable of three- to four-hour 
flights were developed during this short period. In 1909 the Wrights sold 
their Type A Military Flyer to the army, and the navy expressed interest in 
launching airplanes from platforms atop its ships. In 1911 Glenn H. Curtiss 
introduced the first practical seaplane, and the first transcontinental flight 
took place. 
To those close observers of aviation who called for a central aeronautical 
research laboratory in 1911, however, the direction of aviation progress 
in the United States seemed "halting, haphazard, and fortuitous." 3 They 
argued that despite the successes, the leaders of American government were 
still treating aeronautics as a passing fancy rather than as a new technology 
which would change the world. In comparison with chemical and electrical 
research programs, which were helping profits to soar at General Electric, 
American Telephone and Telegraph, Westinghouse, Du Pont, Eastman 
Kodak, and other American corporations, some solid aeronautical research 
projects had stalled shortly after takeoff. In early 1904 the regents of 
the Smithsonian had closed Samuel Langley's aerodynamical laboratory in 
response to public criticism stimulated by news reports of the ignominious 
crash of the professor's full-scale "aerodrome" into the Potomac River. 
Ironically, this crash had occurred nine days before the Wright brothers' 
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flight, a landmark success, which, in comparison with Langley's ridiculed 
failure, would be largely ignored by the American press. One reporter, either 
reacting ignorantly or playing to the ignorance of his reading audience, 
described Langley as "wandering in his dreams ... given to building castles 
in the air"; and a congressman from Nebraska charged, in a newspaper 
article entitled "Fads, Frauds, and Follies Cripple Nation's Finances," that 
the only thing the Smithsonian ever made fly was government money.4 
Before Wilbur Wright displayed his Flyer to astonished and enthusiastic 
European audiences in 1908, another pioneer American facility had shut 
down. Albert F. Zahm's wind tunnel at Catholic University in Washington, 
D.C., an impressive, uniquely instrumented machine for the study of airflow 
about dirigible hulls, was discontinued for lack of money.5 
The situation in Europe was different. National traditions there 
caused scientific activities to be quickly institutionalized; thus governments 
convinced of the revolutionary importance of aircraft were able to build 
major aeronautical research programs before the start of World War I. Even 
as Wright toured Europe, Frenchmen studied resistance of various surfaces 
in free air at the new Central Establishment for Military Aeronautics 
at Chalais-Meudon, near Paris, and were about to begin experimenting 
in Gustave Eiffel's wind tunnels at Champs de Mars and Auteuil. The 
University of Paris authorized an "aerotechnical" institute in 1912 at St. 
Cyr. Across the Channel in 1909 the British prime minister appointed 
an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics with physicist Lord Rayleigh as 
president. This committee supervised the aeronautical work of the National 
Physical Laboratory (NPL) and the expensive new Royal Aircraft Factory 
at Farnborough. The Germans, in their tradition of highly organized applied 
scientific research, built their major facility at the University of Gottingen. 
American aeronautics progressed more slowly than European because it 
had not yet managed to win the political support necessary for its national 
organization. Outgoing President William Howard Taft had appointed a 
commission in 1912 to investigate the sorry situation of American aeronau-
tics, but the lame duck body accomplished nothing.6 The situation seemed 
to improve when, a month after the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 
1913, the Smithsonian Board of Regents authorized the reopening of Lang-
ley's laboratory. Charles Doolittle Walcott, secretary of the Smithsonian, 
even presided over a meeting of "The Advisory Committee of the Langley 
Aerodynamical Laboratory" on 23 May 1913. Several distinguished men be-
longed to the committee, including Orville Wright, Albert F. Zahm, Samuel 
W. Stratton, Glenn H. Curtiss, Capt. W. I. Chambers, USN, and Brig. 
Gen. George P. Scriven, USA, plus representatives from various depart-
ments of government. Sixteen subcommittees were formed on paper. But a 
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Left, Samuel Pierpont Langley 
{1834-1906} had more reason to 
show confidence in his chief me-
chanic and pilot, bespectacled 
Charles M. Manly, than Manly 
did in the Smithsonian's distin-
guished scientist of flight. The 
Langley Aerodrome crumpled into 
the Potomac River shortly after 
being catapulted from its position 
on top of a houseboat, not because 
of any problem with Manly's 
power plant design, but because 
Professor Langley's framework for 
the tandem wings was too weak. 
(National Air and Space Museum) 
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congressional act of 1910, preventing executive agencies "from requesting 
the heads of departments to permit members of their respective departments 
to meet at the Institution and serve on an advisory committee," forced the 
board to disband the committee and reshut the door to the Langley labora-
tory. (The elite composition of the committee and the distribution of work 
among numerous subcommittees nevertheless presaged the first meeting of 
the NACA in 1915, as well as its subsequent approach to organizing its 
work.)7 
Constant pressure from Walcott and like-minded men, the Progressive 
impulse for economy and efficiency in government, and, above all, the war in 
Europe, led finally to the creation of an advisory committee for aeronautics. 
On 3 March 1915, on its last working day, the 63d Congress passed a 
Smithsonian proposal to create such a body.8 Though the authorizing 
legislation slipped through Congress largely unnoticed, success still hinged 
on compromise. First of all, the Smithsonian proposed only to form a 
committee to coordinate basic aeronautical research already being done at 
existing facilities. By not creating a national laboratory, the legislation 
eased President Wilson's fear that such a facility would endanger American 
neutrality. The legislation did provide, however, that "in the event of a 
laboratory or laboratories, either in whole or in part, being placed under 
the direction of the committee, the commtttee may direct and conduct 
research." Second, the Smithsonian woulq not dominate the program. 
Rather, the act established a broadly representative unpaid panel, modeled 
after the British Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, consisting of "two 
members from the War Department, from the office in charge of military 
aeronautics; two members from the Navy Department, from the office in 
charge of naval aeronautics; a representative each of the Smithsonian ... , of 
the ... Weather Bureau, and of the ... Bureau of Standards; together with 
not more than five additional persons who shall be acquainted with the needs 
of aeronautical science, either civil or military, or skilled in aeronautical 
engineering or its applied sciences." Finally, success rested on legislative 
contrivance. A friendly House Committee on Naval Affairs attached the 
NACA's charter as a rider to a naval appropriation bill, greasing the 
machinery for quick approval. Congress appropriated $5000 to the NACA 
for fiscal year 1915. 9 
Research by Committee 
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was to be a rather 
simple government agency, as agencies went, with a unique composition 
and hierarchy. A Main Committee, composed of seven government and five 
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private members, would meet in Washington, D.C., semiannually-and oc-
casionally more often-to identify key research problems to be tackled by 
the agency and to facilitate the exchange of information within the Amer-
ican aeronautical community. This body would be independent, not under 
any department, but reporting directly to the President, who appointed its 
members. These members would receive no salaries. A smaller Executive 
Committee of seven members, elected by ballot from the Main Commit-
tee for a term of one year, was to act as the real governing body of the 
N ACA. * It would control "the administration of the affairs of the com-
mittee," exercise "general supervision of all arrangements for research, and 
other matters undertaken or promoted by the Advisory Committee," and 
collect aeronautical intelligence. It also appointed technical committees-in 
effect subcommittees, since the NACA itself was a committee-to provide 
expertise to the parent committee in one of the larger fields of aeronau-
tical inquiry, such as aerodynamics, power plants for aircraft, or aircraft 
construction. These technical committees, in turn, created subcommittees 
of their own to give specialized advice. The Executive Committee also au-
thorized the formation of special committees, usually ad hoc, to deal with 
problems even more specific-for example, the Special Committee on the 
Design of the Navy Rigid Airship ZR-1 ( created in 1923). In later years, the 
problems giving rise to special committees were often more political or insti-
tutional in nature, as in the cases of the Special Committee on the Relation 
of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to National Defense 
in Time of War, and the Special Committee on Future Research Facilities 
(both created in 1938). The composition of the NACA and its Executive 
Committee changed over the years; however, it should be obvious from the 
above description that any use of the term committee when referring to the 
NACA must be careful and precise.t 
In theory, the committee system belonged to and represented a powerful 
intelligence network. Each member was chosen because he was thought to 
possess a special knowledge. Though early NACA policy made it clear that 
appointees from private life served as individuals and not as representatives 
* Until 1933, members of the Executive Committee "were chosen annually by vote of 
the Main Committee. The usual practice was to elect all members of the Main Committee 
who resided in the Washington area and who could devote a reasonable amount of time to 
Committee work. After 1933, all members of the Main Committee automatically belonged 
to the Executive Committee, but that did not greatly alter the situation. The Washington 
members-usually the government members-still dominated the Executive Committee." 
Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, 
NASA SP-4103 (Washington, 1985), p. 424. 
t The author will use the capitalized term Committee to refer to the NACA. The Executive 
Committee and the specific subcommittees will be so identified. 
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The Main Committee of the NACA met in Washington, D. C., twice a year,. 
the annual meeting being held in October and the semiannual meeting in April. 
Among the matters discussed at this semiannual meeting on 18 April 1929 was 
the forthcoming construction of a full-scale wind tunnel and a seaplane channel 
at Langley. Left to right: John F. Victory, secretary; Dr. William F. Durand; 
Dr. Orville Wright; Dr. George K Burgess; Brig. Gen. William E. Gillmore; 
May". Gen. James E. Fechet; Dr. Joseph S. Ames, chafrman; Rear Adm. David W. 
Taylor, USN (Ret.), vice chairman; Capt. Emory S. Land; Rear Adm. Wilham A. 
Moffett; Dr. Samuel W. Stratton; Dr. George W. Lewis, director of aeronaut£cal 
research; and Dr. Charles F. Marvin. (One member, Dr. Charles G. Abbot, was 
absent.) 
of the institutions from which they came, it was hoped that each member-
private or governmental-would come to NACA meetings with a briefcase 
of extraordinary personal and professional experiences, connections, sources 
of information, and reference points. Military officers would arrive with 
ideas provoked by recent intelligence reports, university professors with 
word of yet-to-be-published papers announcing new theories or experimental 
findings. By pooling their information, which was already high-level, and 
as a group assessing its practical effects for American aeronautics, NACA 
members would produce a new body of knowledge even better than the 
sum of its parts. They could then translate this knowledge into effective 
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technical advice and wise government research policy. In this synthesis, 
many would say, lay the genius of the committee system. 
In practice certain committee members fell short of the ideal roles 
described. Over the years some members were in effect only honorary, some 
did not understand research, and some just did not put forth a good effort. 
On the whole, however, the committee system worked. (Decades later, the 
system was abandoned by NASA as anachronistic, but recently there have 
been movements to revitalize it.) 
During the Great War, the young NACA fulfilled its advisory function, 
but reached slightly beyond it. The Committee sponsored tunnel tests 
at the Navy Yard model basin, propeller tests at Stanford University, 
and cooperated in engine testing and instrument development by the 
Bureau of Standards. It evaluated aeronautics-related inventions for the 
War Department and elaborated a plan by which an Aircraft Production 
Board became a branch of the Council of National Defense. It helped 
the young aircraft industry in particular, coordinating meetings between 
manufacturers and the armed services, and bringing order to the procedure 
by which the military procured aircraft. The Subcommittee on Motive 
Power worked to stimulate production of a high-performance airplane 
engine. The NACA's greatest wartime success, however, may have been its 
mediation of the bitter and complicated patent dispute between the Wright-
Martin Company and Glenn Curtiss over the wing-warping technique for 
lateral control. 10 The cross-licensing agreement that resulted from the 
Connnittee's intercession facilitated immediate construction of more and 
better American combat planes. Critics complained, though, that it also 
reduced competition in the aircraft industry. At the least, the consolidation 
of patent rights sacrificed the interests of the small inventor to those of the 
big corporation. 11 
Until the NACA possessed its own technical staff, wind tunnels, and 
other experimental facilities, however, its contributions would be limited 
and its future dubious. One historian has charged that the wartime 
Committee spent most of its time and energy trying to carve out a 
permanent niche in American aeronautics and, in fact, paid little attention 
to calls for immediate service. 12 Yet the NACA never hid its priority. 
Executive Chairman Walcott conceded in the Third Annual Report of the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1917 that the preceding 
three years of activity had been "preparatory for the more effective service 
which the Committee hopes to render through its laboratory facilities 
. . . and through the enlarged technical and scientific staff contemplated 
in connection therewith." 13 Until then, employees could have only the 
haziest idea of what was expected of them. Leigh M. Griffith, a War 
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Department engineer detailed to the Committee in 1917 ( who would become 
the first engineer-in-charge of the NACA's Langley Memorial Aeronautical 
Laboratory) lamented that "until it is known what we are trying to do, 
it is impossible to formulate any system or build any organization for the 
doing of that thing." 14 To fulfill the vision of its early proponents and 
founders-indeed, to complete that foundation-the NACA had to have its 
own laboratory. 
The NACA had to defend its idea for a central laboratory against 
the old charge that its research activities would duplicate work at existing 
facilities. This bone of contention carried little meat, for the rival research 
institution usually in mind-the Washington Navy Yard model basin-
was small, largely devoted to development, and "backward in its use of 
advances in science and engineering." 15 Charles Walcott advised the House 
Naval Affairs Committee in 1916 that safeguards against duplication were 
in place. If a problem before the NACA required investigation, he told 
the congressmen, informed Committee members like the army's chief signal 
officer (Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven, the first chairman of the NACA and ex 
officio head of army aviation) and the commander of the Navy Air Service 
(Capt. Mark L. Bristol) would ascertain whether that investigation should 
be carried out by the navy, the War Department, the Bureau of Standards, 
or the NACA laboratory. 16 
In defense of its campaign for a laboratory, NACA leaders also pointed 
out that no one in the government had assumed responsibility for civilian 
aviation research. Present needs bore on military preparedness, wrote 
General Scriven in the Annual Report for 1915, but "when the war is over 
there will be found available classes of aircraft and a trained personnel for 
their operation, which will rapidly force aeronautics into commercial fields, 
involving developments of which today we barely dream." 17 The Committee 
needed to be ready with its laboratory to meet this coming civilian challenge. 
Building the Laboratory 
Lacking money to purchase and develop a site for its laboratory, the 
Committee circulated the idea of a joint civil-military experimental station. 
Interservice rivalry, however, defeated the original proposal to combine the 
aeronautical research of the NACA, the Weather Bureau, and the aviation 
sections of the armed forces. The idea was unwise at any rate if the 
Committee intended to maintain autonomy in the future. General Scriven 
advised his colleagues on the Committee to support a request for $50,000 
from Congress, to be included as part of the fiscal 1916 navy budget, to 
build the lab. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels objected strongly. 
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A party from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers surveys the future site of Langley 
Field in the fall of 1916. (National Air and Space Museum) 
Planning an enormous new naval research facility at that moment, Daniels 
may have been worried about increasing an already fat budget request. 18 
Regardless of motive, navy leaders never endorsed a joint laboratory and 
proving ground, although they did continue to participate in meetings about 
a mutual site, and did not obstruct the NACA's budget request. 19 On 
29 August 1916 Congress appropriated the full $87,000 asked for by the 
Committee, of which $53,580 was earmarked for laboratory construction. 
The Committee's best chance to obtain land for the laboratory was to 
cooperate with an Army Air Service project. Congress had directed the 
War Department in 1915 to identify a military reservation to house an ex-
perimental facility with airfield. If that quest failed, the secretary of war 
could authorize up to $300,000 for the purchase of a new site. General 
Scriven, as head of army aviation, appointed a board of officers, including 
four members of the aviation section of the Signal Corps, to investigate lo-
cations for the proving ground, "agreeing to give the Advisory Committee 
the benefit of its inquiries and conclusions" and to make any land chosen 
available to it. The board considered such factors as climate, proximity 
to industry, accessibility, health of environment, availability of local me-
chanics and other technicians, character of land for experimental flying, 
and general location as affecting attack by enemy from land or water. 20 
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After considering 15 tracts of land (six in Maryland, four in Virginia, 
and one each in West Virginia, Tennessee, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri), 
board president Lt. Col. George 0. Squier informed the NACA of the army's 
choice-1650 acres in Elizabeth City County, Virginia, just north of the 
town of Hampton.21 Following an inquiry to the surgeon general concerning 
health conditions in the Hampton area and an inspection of the site by one 
of its subcommittees, the NACA recommended that "this site be obtained 
for the use of the Government at as early a date as practicable." 22 Stanford 
University professor William F. Durand, Scriven's successor in 1916 as 
chairman of the NACA, summarized the rationale behind the Committee's 
endorsement of the site for "Langley Field"* in the Annual Report for 1916. 
Hampton, close to the Chesapeake Bay but reasonably immune from attack, 
stood in relative proximity to Washington, D.C. (an overnight steamer ride) 
and to the shipbuilding and repair industries at Newport News, Norfolk, and 
Portsmouth. Temperate but changeable climate, plus location alongside a 
tidal river, permitted experimental flying above both land and water and 
under nearly all conditions that aircraft would meet in service. The site, 
the NACA chairman believed, left the door open to a plan for a combined 
facility, sponsored by the War and Navy departments.23 
Climate and topography seemed to bless the site, but shrewd Hampton 
businessmen sold it. Political boss Harry H. Holt, clerk of the court of 
Elizabeth City County; Hunter R. Booker, president of the Hampton-
Phoebus Merchants' Association; Col. Nelson S. Groome, executive officer 
of the Hampton Bank; and Capt. Frank W. Darling, vice-president of two 
local banks and head of J. S. Darling and Son, the third largest oyster 
packer in the United States, saw a chance to revive a dying economy while 
making a small fortune for themselves. This local elite brought Hampton 
to the government's attention. 
Elizabeth City County had a population of around 5000 during World 
War I. Until a referendum in December 1914, a significant number of its 
citizens had earned their livelihood from the liquor industry. Then the 
* The idea to christen the new installation "Langley Field," in honor of Prof. Samuel 
P. Langley of the Smithsonian, appears to have originated either with General Scriven 
or Lieutenant Colonel Squier. On 13 October 1916 Scriven proposed Langley's name to 
Walcott, who answered the same day: "The suggestion is a fine one and we can bear it in 
mind when the field is obtained." In a speech to the annual meeting of the Aero Club of 
America, held in New York City on 12 January 1917, Squier declared, "If I have any influence 
in the matter, we are going to call that proving ground on the Atlantic 'Langley Field,' 
and I cannot conceive of any better monument to the rhemory of Professor Langley." The 
N AC A's resolution to call its field installation "Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory" 
was approved at the semiannual meeting of the Committee on 22 April 1920. 
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A Langley map of the Tidewater Virginia area from the late 1930s. The bridge 
at Newport News over the five-mile-wide James River was built in the late 1920s. 
Dming World War I, U.S. highways 17 and 60 were primitive dirt roads. 
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The river harbor at Hampton, Virginia, 1899. (Courtesy of Vintage Virginia 
Photographs, Inc .. Norfolk, Va.) 
Commonwealth of Virginia went dry. Harry Holt recalled the parching 
effects of Prohibition: 
The cutting off of this source of support seemed certain to doom our community. 
In the city of Hampton alone, hundreds of families emigrated ... , scores were 
made jobless. houses were empty and business generally suffered. 24 
The most severe blow fell upon holders of real estate. Holt approached 
banker Groome, his closest associate, with news of the government's interest 
in buying land for an airfield, and assured him that there were "ideal sites 
in the plantations of the Sherwood, Lambington, Pool, Morefield, Blumfield 
and Shellbank properties." Quietly, so as not to attract attention to the 
speculation, the two proceeded to secure cheap 90-day options on large 
parts of these properties. 25 
Between Halloween and Thanksgiving 1916, a Hampton committee, 
spearheaded by Holt and Groome, met once at home and once in Washing-
ton with Squier's army site selection board. "We had just the right place 
to offer," Holt recalled in 1935, "and after repeated visits here, and agree-
ments by us to build a railroad line onto the property, a price of $290,000 
was finally agreed upon." The entrepreneurs were forced to sink $17,000 
into some unexpected purchases of right-of-way-$3000 of which was 
defrayed by a stock subscription by the Newport News, Hampton, and Old 
Point Railway-but they had walked off with all but $10,000 of the $300,000 
authorized by Congress and the War Department for the land purchase. (In 
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Oyster baron Frank W. Darling owned one of the plantations, "Sherwood," sold to 
the federal government in 1916 for construction of Langley Field. In this photo from 
about 1910, Captain Darling prepares his wife and son for a carriage ride from their 
magnificent waterfront estate "Little England" along Hampton Roads. (Courtesy of 
Hampton Center for Arts and Humanities, Hampton, Va.) 
fact, the local men received $5645.31 more from the government in 1917 for 
an additional sale of land on Plum Tree Island in York County north of 
Langley Field. The army eventually used this marshy property for exper-
imental bomb-dropping, demolition training, and target practice. During 
and after World War II, the NACA used it for drop-body tests.) A deed, 
executed 30 December 1916, transferred the land from "H. R. Booker"-the 
name of one of the Hampton businessmen involved-to the government. 
The land gamble paid off handsomely for Holt and confreres, but it also 
benefited the entire northern shore of Hampton Roads, across from Norfolk 
and Portsmouth. A small group of men had made about $175 an acre 
on typical Tidewater fringe land-low-lying land next to shallow water. 
(By April 1918, in fact, when the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Company 
concluded dredging a channel in Back River to allow larger boats to dock, 
it had deposited 1,791,320 cubic meters of fill onto Langley Field at a cost 
of half a million dollars.) The entire community cheered the venturesome 
heroes and the expected business boom, and many privately laughed at 
the government for having bought such a questionable bill of goods. The 
Newport News Daily Press announced a "fine Christmas for the entire 
Lower Peninsula ... the future of this favored section of Virginia is made." 
Public works-road, bridge, and electric railway construction-reverberated 
around Langley Field for many years to come. Prior to these projects, it 
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had been "almost impossible to get ... to Newport News, or for that matter, 
to get anywhere" from Hampton.26 Many residents were not exactly sure 
what was going on at Langley Field ( even today, many do not differentiate 
between air force and NASA activities there), but all recognized the life-
giving energy of the thousands of federal dollars poured into their midst. 
Construction Bottleneck 
The chaos of war finally forced the army to abandon its plan to make 
Langley Field its aeronautical research and development center. Capt. 
John T. Sloan, building inspector for the War Department, arrived in 
Hampton on 8 February 1917-the day the Kaiser announced unrestricted 
submarine warfare within specified blockade zones and President Wilson 
broke diplomatic relations with Germany-to supervise field construction. 27 
American entry into the war a month later upset all schedules. Sloan 
and Capt. John 0. Steger, the original constructing quartermaster at 
Langley Field, went to France. The J. G. White Engineering Corporation 
of New York City, the major construction contractor, could not find 
enough laborers or obtain materials when needed. Too many bosses and 
too nrnch division of responsibility exacerbated the confusion. To the 
War Department it seemed that the contractors put up any and every 
type of structure, without consultation with or authority from the proper 
government officials, the usual explanation for such structures being that 
they were only "temporary." Contractors, on the other hand, complained 
of work-order cancellations, red tape, and improper use of their equipment 
and supplies by soldiers. 28 
As soon as the United States had declared war, Britain and France 
hit their new ally with an immediate request for an air armada of 20,000 
airplanes and 30,000 engines. In May 1917, the shocked War Department 
chose the British DeHavilland 4 as the multipurpose battle plane it would 
build under license; however, a commission headed by Col. Raynaul C. 
Bolling and Capt. Virginius E. Clark, sent to Paris by the secretary of war 
to consult with the Allies' aviation experts, determined that not only was 
the DH-4's standard engine underpowered for the airplane to perform as well 
as the U.S. Army wanted it to do, but that so too were all other existing 
American and European engines. The Bolling-Clark group identified the 
need for development of a new engine for the DH in June 1917, precisely 
the time that an initial layout plan for Langley Field was being finished 
by Albert Kahn's architectural firm of Detroit. Within the month, an 
engineering design of the new "Liberty" engine was ready. By 17 July 1917, 
the day the NACA broke ground for its first laboratory building at Langley 
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In July 1918, the Hampton Monitor published a special aviation edition featuring 
the construction of Langley Field. 
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Field (and exactly one week before a 640-million-dollar aviation bill became 
law, the largest appropriation bill for aviation in American history up to 
that time), Henry Ford and the Packard Motor Company had a prototype 
Liberty engine running. 29 
Had its dynamometer been ready, Langley could have tested the new 
Liberty engine. But, in fact, not one permanent building was completed on 
the post until the end of the summer. Construction of the flying field was 
an ordeal. One of the first soldiers to arrive there recorded that it was 
Nature's greatest ambition to produce [for Langley Field], her cesspool, the 
muddiest mud, the weediest weeds, the dustiest dust and the most ferocious 
mosquitoes the world has ever known. Her plans were so well formulated and 
adhered to that she far surpassed her wildest hopes and dreams.30 
One person who experienced the ordeal of constructing Langley Field 
was Thomas Wolfe. In his autobiographical novel Look Homeward Angel 
(1929), he described how young Eugene Gant (Wolfe in fictional clothing) 
spent the summer of 1918. From Norfolk 
he went by boat once more to Newport News, and by trolley up the coast to 
Hampton. He had heard, in the thronging rumor of Norfolk, that there was 
work upon the Flying Field, and that the worker was fed and housed upon the 
field, at company expense. 
In the little employment shack at the end of the long bridge that led across 
into the field, he was signed on as a laborer and searched by the sentry, who 
made him open his valise. Then he labored across the bridge ... staggered at 
length into the rude company office and sought out the superintendent .... 
He was given a job as a personnel checker, a horse to ride, $80 a month, 
and room and board. 
Three times a day he rode around the field to check the numbers of two dozen 
gangs who were engaged in the work of grading, levelling, blasting from the 
spongy earth the ragged stumps of trees and filling interminably, ceaselessly, 
like the weary and fruitless labor of a nightmare, the marshy earth-craters, 
which drank their shovelled toil without end. The gangs were of all races and 
conditions: ... part of the huge compost of America. 31 
Forty-six Langley workers died of influenza between September 1918 and 
January 1919. So severe was the epidemic that the undertaker who had 
the contract for burying the government dead was unable to secure enough 
coffins to take immediate care of the bodies. 32 
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The wartime Aircraft Production Board, needing an instant change in 
the miserable outlook for American aircraft manufacture, as well as a place 
to test the new Liberty engine, observed the infernal delays in construction 
near Hampton with great anxiety. Its representatives at the site reported 
sadly that it would be "a considerable time before the permanent construc-
tion at Langley Field [would] be in effective operation." 33 The army had 
to respond. Pointing a finger at Langley as "the bottleneck of the aircraft 
program," the army dropped the plan to share an installation with the 
NACA and reassigned aircraft research and development to the engineering 
division at McCook Field, near Dayton, Ohio, operational since early 1917. 
Captain Clark returned from Paris to Washington in August 1917; in Octo-
ber he assumed command of the new aeronautical experimental station at 
McCook. 
It took Albert Kahn's designers through the end of 1917 just to 
complete the first twenty buildings at Langley Field. But by then Liberty-
powered DH-4s were flying regularly above Dayton; a few months later they 
were in transit to European airfields for action alongside the already battle-
hardened fleets of Spads, Sopwith Camels, and Nieuports. Then the army 
changed its thinking about Langley's mission~the field was now to be used 
for training pilots, aerial photographers, and observers. After the Armistice 
in November 1918 (ironically, with the Liberty-powered DH-4 playing no 
major role in winning the war) construction at the field virtually ceased. 
The NACA was left in the lurch, "a disappointed tenant having little in 
common with its landlord." 34 The laboratory would have to make its own 
way. 
But the military did not want an independent NACA presence at Lang-
ley. In December 1916, the Committee had asked the army for an official 
designation of property on which it could build its own laboratory buildings, 
but the army failed to respond. Air Service commanders wanted to main-
tain control not only over Langley Field but over all experimentation at the 
field, including that conducted by the NACA. (Col. Thurman H. Bane, chief 
of the Air Service Technical Command, opposed the idea of dual military-
civilian control so much that he recommended to the army's director of 
military aeronautics, in January 1919, that all NACA personnel at Lang-
ley Field "be subject" to his orders.) The Committee repeated its request 
three months later, but the army answered that formal assignment of land 
would be postponed "until [the] work of preparing Langley Field [was] in a 
more advanced state." The army used the same delaying tactic to ward off 
similar appeals made by the NACA in August 1917 and December 1918.35 
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The one thing that impressed nearly every visitor to the original LMAL adminis-
tration building was the mud that surrounded it. 
After the war the military could continue to put off the NACA only so 
long. On 22 April 1919 Acting Secretary of War Benedict Crowell approved 
an Air Service recommendation that "the portion of Langley Field known 
as Plot 16 be definitely set aside for use by the NACA for their purposes 
in constructing laboratories or other utilities necessary in scientific research 
and experiments in the problems of flight." 36 Although welcomed by the 
NACA, the army's offer was hardly generous. The NACA had already 
acquired Plot 16 unofficially in 1917. By the end of 1918, the Committee's 
first building on this land had been erected, and work there on its first wind 
tunnel had been started.37 And there was another problem with this tardy 
token of army generosity: it was too small to accommodate the building of 
any living quarters for NACA employees. Suitable housing close to work was 
for the NACA a major problem that only the military could help to remedy. 
In July 1919, after repeated requests from NACA chairman Walcott, the 
army did agree reluctantly to make primitive housing, along with heat, light, 
and telephone services, available to a certain number of civilian Langley 
employees. This arrangement, though unpleasant, was better than nothing, 
but it lasted only a short time. In the fall of 1919, based on a ruling by 
its judge advocate general, the army informed the NACA that it could no 
longer furnish Langley's civilian employees with housing or utilities. 38 
Isolation, mosquito bites, flu, inadequate housing, and poor relations 
with the military-where but Langley Field could things be so bad? This 
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question began to plague one NACA employee after another early in 1919 
until feelings against the place festered into a mutiny. The NACA engi-
neer in charge of building and construction, John DeKlyn, complained to 
Executive Committee Chairman Joseph Ames on 9 July 1919 that "Lang-
ley Field can never be an efficient or satisfactory place for the Committee 
to carry on research work." John Victory, NACA executive secretary in 
Washington, concurred and recommended that the lab be moved to Bolling 
Field, a base under construction in the District of Columbia. The Commit-
tee, in its Annual Report for 1919, formally requested congressional approval 
of the relocation from Hampton.39 
Dedication 
The reluctance of Congress to change the lab's location and its cutting 
of the Committee's postwar budget requests forced the NACA to make the 
best of a bad situation. All too aware that army research at McCook Field 
was already showing signs of production (including the development of the 
Sanford Moss turbosupercharger, a siphon gasoline pump, several different 
leakproof tanks, and fins and floats for emergency water landings), the 
NACA pushed its workers in 1919 and 1920 to finish an atmospheric wind 
tunnel, dynamometer lab, administration building, and small warehouse. 40 
It hired an executive officer, and preliminary research began-a flight 
investigation of the lift and drag characteristics of the Curtiss JN4H Jenny 
airplane.41 The full-time Langley complement grew to eleven persons: four 
professionals and seven nonprofessionals. Meanwhile, an inquiry by the 
Committee revealed that Bolling Field had serious shortcomings of its 
own.42 
Formal dedication of the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory 
on 11 June 1920 guaranteed that the NACA would remain at Hampton. 
Ceremonies included an aerial exhibition highlighted by a 25-plane forma-
tion led by Brig. Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell, addresses by prominent 
military and civilian officials congratulating the NACA and giving it best 
wishes, and a tour and demonstration of the wind tunnel-all of which im-
proved morale. A speech by Rear Adm. David Taylor, a former opponent 
of the laboratory, greatly bolstered NACA confidence.· "One of the party, 
on approaching the wind tunnel building with me," Taylor asserted, "ex-
pressed the thought that the Committee had probably been a little lavish 
in its expenditures .... I do not agree . . . as the building is only a fitting 
housing for ... the shrine to which all visiting aeronautical engineers and 
scientists will be drawn." 43 An exaggeration in 1920 of the research sig-
nificance of the NACA's original tunnel-an almost obsolescent design (see 
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Langley's first wind tunnel, completed in 1920, was essentially a replica of a ten-
year-old tunnel at the British National Physical Laboratory. 
chapter 3)-Taylor's overstated prophecy was exactly what the pediatrician 
ordered for ailing, infant Langley laboratory. 
Relations between the NACA and the Air Service seemed to improve 
immediately. Ten days after the dedication, Dr. Ames sent a warm letter to 
Col. William N. Hensley, the commanding officer of Langley Field, thanking 
him for courtesies extended the Committee at the ceremony. "The efficiency 
of our work at Langley Field," wrote Ames, "depends in the end to a great 
extent upon the degree to which you give us your support, and I feel that if 
your cooperation on June 11 was an indication of your attitude toward us, 
we can rest assured as to the future." 44 
In reality, however, things had not been settled. Colonel Hensley had in 
fact not even attended the dedication. A few days later, the LMAL senior 
staff engineer informed NACA headquarters that Hensley had prevented all 
but one of his officers from attending the ceremonies by issuing "specific 
orders to remain at their posts until after 5 p.m.," and had called a meeting 
on 15 June to discuss the "possibility of ousting the NACA from the field," 
promising "to do everything in his power to bring this about." 45 
World War I was over, but there were still many tough battles left for 
the NACA to fight. 
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Formative Years 
In some ways, an institution seems to be organic. Its parts live and 
communicate, develop attributes of survival and adaptation, mature, age, 
weaken. In a way that cannot be demonstrated objectively, an institution 
develops a personality. As with a person, heredity and early environment 
are the critical influences. Because institutions manifest persistent stylistic 
or expressive traits, generations of Americans can easily and consistently 
discriminate between the distinct personalities of such similar organizations 
as the army and marines, IBM and Apple, the New York Yankees and New 
York Mets, or the University of California-Berkeley and Texas A&M. 
Most people involved with American aeronautics between 1917 and 
1958 saw a distinct personality in Langley laboratory. Langley's most 
striking physical feature was its unique collection of wind tunnels, many 
of which were of unprecedented design and capability. To a few observers, 
Langley's tunnels might have looked like huge, ungainly, wormlike creatures, 
washed ashore perhaps after a battle of primordial monsters in the nearby 
tidal river. But the tunnels were no less fascinating to those whose gaze was 
less imaginative. Some tunnels might have looked only like big warehouses 
with jointed appendages and rounded corners, but they were all in fact 
complicated mechanized marvels, national resources, great and powerful 
monuments to the modern age. 
The impression that stuck in the minds of people who knew Langley 
best, though, was not only that of the wind tunnels, as impressive as they 
were, but also that of the human beings who built and operated them. In 
the 1920s and 1930s, Langley researchers earned an international reputation 
for finding practical solutions to urgent aeronautical problems. They did 
it largely through a careful management of technical and bureaucratic 
details-management which, among other things, turned individual talents 
into team capabilities and balanced the requirements of laboratory self-
sufficiency with those of responsiveness to clients' needs. It was the 
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overall research environment that shaped the perception of most visitors 
to Langley. Where else but in this tremendously interesting place, most 
visitors thought, could one find dozens of government employees working so 
energetically, demonstrating their equipment with such extraordinary pride, 
and discussing experimental results with outsiders so openly? 
The evolution of the Langley personality over the course of the two 
decades between the world wars is the subjec;t of this chapter. 
Management 
A committee is better suited to giving advice than exercising control. 
As the NACA changed from a solely advisory and coordinating body, the 
need for an executive office staffed by full-time civil servants became clear. 
Chairmen Charles Walcott and Joseph Ames recognized from the start 
that someone had to be on the job for day-to-day business in Washington, 
and that someone had to take charge of Langley Memorial Aeronautical 
Laboratory in Hampton. 1 
The two individuals who first took firm control of routine NACA affairs 
were John F. Victory and George W. Lewis. More than anyone else at 
NACA headquarters, these men left their lasting, if contrasting, impressions 
on Langley. Needing an office clerk, the Committee hired Victory as its first 
employee in June 1915, only three months after congressional approval of 
the enabling act. In fact, Victory had been doing some NACA paperwork 
earlier as secretary to Committee member Holden C. Richardson, officer in 
charge of the experimental basin at the Washington Navy Yard. Born in 
New York City in 1892 and orphaned early, Victory had worked continuously 
and indefatigably from boyhood. He began his federal service career as a 
messenger in the Washington patent office at age 16, studying shorthand 
and typing at a night school (which he later bought and operated). At 18, 
he recorded proceedings of courts-martial and courts of inquiry for the navy. 
To help support his younger sisters, he earned extra money on his annual 
leave days recording congressional hearings. While working for Richardson, 
he became familiar with some of the basic principles of aeronautical research 
and cultivated a finesse in public relations. He took a keen delight in showing 
lady visitors around the Yard, taking them into its wind tunnel, shutting 
the door, and turning on the breeze.2 Victory's first task after going on the 
NACA payroll (at $1200 a year on 22 June 1915) was handling requisitions 
from NACA contractors, depositing them with the bureau of supplies and 
accounts. The secretary's lean and tenacious constitution mirrored that of 
the upstart organization he was joining. 
24 
Langley Personality) Formative Years 
John F. Victory {1892-1974) was the NACA 's first employee and the only executive 
secretary it ever had. 
George W. Lewis, on the other hand, was a portly, relaxed, college-
educated engineer from a secure family living in Ithaca, New York. He 
became executive officer of the NACA in November 1919-he was 37-and 
director of aeronautical research in July 1924. In both capacities, Lewis 
was subject to general research policies and budgets set by the Committee, 
which sometimes also issued instructions on specific projects. His respon-
sibility was to implement these policies and report results directly to the 
Committee. He supervised the preparation of technical papers for pub-
lication and their distribution to users in the military services, industries, 
universities, and various government departments. His hard work, great dis-
cretion, and shrewd combination of modesty and forcefulness enabled him 
to win the confidence and blanket support of most members of the NACA. 
Over the years, Lewis maintained a happy and successful relationship with 
them even while criticizing some of their policies and implementing many of 
his own plans independently. A 1910 master's graduate in mechanical engi-
neering from Cornell University, he possessed considerably more technical 
competence than John Victory. He had taught engineering at Swarthmore 
College for seven years (1910-1917), done research on superchargers at the 
Clarke-Thomson Research Foundation in Philadelphia during the war, and 
first served the Committee in 1918 as a member of the Subcommittee on 
Power Plants. 3 
George Lewis's ability to befriend and influence politicians and to 
circumvent bureaucrats was another of his assets. Originally, the Committee 
had meant to install him in an office at Langley Field, but Lewis thought 
it more effective to manage "his boys" from Washington, where he could 
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George W. Lewis, director of research for the NACA from 1919 to 1947. 
deal with admirals, generals, and congressmen-spending long hours in 
conference in the back rooms of the Army-Navy and Cosmos clubs-and 
still be only an overnight steamer ride, or 90-minute airplane flight, from 
Hampton. He subscribed to the notion that a little distance between himself 
and his Langley staff gave the researchers an important sense of freedom 
and autonomy, while his almost weekly visits to the laboratory and careful 
daily communiques kept him on top of all the important operations. A 
warmly gregarious and charismatic man, Lewis's protective approach to 
laboratory administration suited both his personality and the NACA's 
frequently precarious public situation. For his men at Langley he acted as 
benevolent guardian, making sure that they did not get involved in things 
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that damaged the integrity of the Committee's work and cut their own 
throats. In return, Lewis demanded loyalty. Some say he demanded it 
above all else. 4 
Lewis's attitude toward organization charts illustrates one formative in-
fluence on Langley's personality. Once in the 1930s a certain young Langley 
personnel officer could not find an up-to-date chart of the laboratory. So, 
since he had taken a course in industrial engineering at Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute, he drew one up and took it in to show the Langley engineer-in-
charge. It was not a very elegant chart, only some boxes with the names 
of people in them, but it was the young man's opportunity to show the 
boss that he had a little something extra to offer. The personnel officer 
had no more than started to explain the chart when George Lewis arrived 
from Washington for a routine visit. A man of great dignity and presence, 
Lewis could assume a formidable appearance, and he was not above using 
it to intimidate or coax his researchers. On the other hand, he was also 
the type of man who could say "No" and make you feel he was doing you a 
favor by rejecting your idea. The young man naturally stood up and tried 
to excuse himself from the meeting. The director told him to sit down and 
carry on with what he was doing. In fact, Lewis soon took a look at the 
chart and turned to the employee and said, "Son, do you know what they do 
with boxes?" "No, sir," the young employee answered. "They bury people 
in them," said Lewis. 5 (An ironic note to this story: George Lewis would 
reject one last box. After his death in 1948, his body was cremated and the 
ashes were scattered over Langley Field.) 
Of course, George Lewis knew that any organization had to have struc-
ture. In fact, Langley had provided NACA headquarters with organization 
charts from the start. The charts helped the Washington office to concep-
tualize and describe laboratory activities, prepare budgets, and write job 
descriptions for the civil service. Part of Lewis's objection to charts may 
have been political. A private and protective director who ran a tight ship 
and remained extremely sensitive to the external forces affecting the NACA, 
he viewed a chart as a potential wedge entering his operation. If published, 
a chart could show outsiders where to enter and whom to get to promote 
their pet interests. In the hands of opponents, it might also serve to under-
mine the cause of the NACA. In 1936, for example, Lewis warned a friend 
in Congress who was involved with a Brookings Institution study of the 
organization of the federal government that 
it is rather difficult to evaluate the importance of the different organizations 
purely from a paper standpoint, and I am quite sure that the analysis of 
the Government organizations will be made entirely from statements and 
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organization charts rather than from an intimate knowledge of the value of 
each organization. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is almost impossible to 
put everything into an organization chart.6 
Another part of Lewis's distaste for organization charts was managerial. 
He wanted to ensure research leeway by encouraging his staff to cooperate 
irrespective of nominal boundaries. When he visited the lab, he often held 
informal meetings where junior engineers could meet with section heads, 
division chiefs, and even the engineer-in-charge, to exchange ideas without 
fear of overstepping formal rank. 
This democratic practice had a liberating effect on the staff. Even 
in the lunchroom, the newest members of the staff could share their 
ideas with veterans by drawing curves, sketches, and equations in pencil 
on white marble-top tables. Kitchen attendants wiped away evidence of 
the lunchroom conversations at the end of the meal, but not until after 
freewheeling inquiry and expression had run their course, been postponed 
until noontime tomorrow, or carried over for the walk back to office, tunnel 
building, or shop.7 
The earliest organization chart of "Langley Field Station" appeared 
11 June 1920, the day of the Langley dedication ceremonies. A draftsman 
prepared it with standard engineering lettering. The senior staff engineer 
and the chief physicist, according to the chart, were of equal rank. The 
Executive Committee in Washington considered the lab's administrative 
load light enough for Lewis to handle from Washington with a minimum 
of clerical staff at the lab, and with no on-scene, overall leader there 
at all. Perhaps such an in-house executive might have implied a degree 
of independence that the Executive Committee was not yet ready to 
acknowledge. 
The matter of the NACA field executive, his role at Langley, and his 
relationship to the Washington office had had a troubled history before 
June 1920. George Lewis had split top research authority at Langley 
between the senior staff engineer and chief physicist earlier in the year 
after the stormy departure of John DeKlyn, engineer in charge of buildings 
and construction. Like Griffith, the first engineer-in-charge, DeKlyn had 
been employed by the NACA originally in Washington, as a draftsman, 
before moving down to Hampton. Three years of thunderous construction 
headaches-aggravated by the general nastiness of life and work at the field 
during World War I-prompted DeKlyn to campaign in 1919 for moving 
the NACA facility to Bolling Field. Chronic jousting with the Committee's 
efficient if fastidious secretary, John Victory, over such petty administrative 
details as the mechanics of submitting travel vouchers, completely soured his 
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First organization chart of the LMAL, 11 June 1920. (See also appendix F.) 
taste for the job. (Some routine correspondence between DeKlyn's staff and 
Victory's had been mismanaged, and Victory concluded that the Langley 
staff showed a lack of "courtesy and cooperation" in righting the matter. So 
the bureaucrat undertook to lecture DeKlyn on interoffice etiquette, even 
though DeKlyn, an engineer in the professional ranks of the civil service, was 
above Victory in both salary and prestige.) "Not about to be dictated to by 
a pompous place-filler in Washington," DeKlyn resigned in February 1920, 
preempting his dismissal by only a few days.8 Bureaucratic bickering aside, 
DeKlyn was a draftsman and a construction engineer, and not a man to 
assist George Lewis in directing a comprehensive program of aeronautical 
research. 
In 1920 Leigh Griffith, a 39-year-old mechanical engineer from Cali-
fornia, became the senior staff engineer. The NACA had hired him some 
three years earlier as a "technical expert," upon the recommendation of 
its chairman, William F. Durand, professor of mechanical engineering and 
aeronautics at Stanford University. A power plants man, Griffith possessed 
little capacity to direct aerodynamic study. At Langley, his senior rank 
rested on his age, experience, and ability to manage the then-critical de-
velopment of a high-performance aircraft engine, especially the testing of 
superchargers and fuel injection systems. The post of chief physicist was 
temporarily vacant in June 1920. Edward P. Warner, a Ph.D. in physics 
who lectured on aeronautics at MIT, his alma mater, had just left Langley 
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Leigh Griffith, Langley's first engineer-in-charge, far right, receives, from his 
immediate right to Ms far right, visiting NACA members William F. Durand, 
John F. Hayford, and NACA secretary John F. Victory in front of the LMAL 
administration building in 1923, 
for a summer tour of European aeronautical facilities. Warner had com-
muted to the Hampton facility for brief stints since early 1919 to oversee 
the Committee's preliminary flight research programs and design of its first 
wind tunnel. 9 He returned to MIT full time in the fall of 1920 as an associate 
professor, and another graduate of the prestigious school, Frederick Norton, 
became Langley's chief physicist. Norton was at something of a disadvan-
tage in dealing with the senior staff engineer, for Griffith was 15 years older, 
had served the NACA in Washington, and was a friend and engine-research 
colleague of George Lewis. Norton, on the other hand, knew aerodynamics. 
He could also claim to be the NACA's first permanent employee at Langley 
Field, having arrived there in the autumn of 1918.10 
By the time Langley produced a second organization chart in 
October 1923, the Executive Committee had already named Griffith the 
"Engineer-in-Charge." 11 He received the position (which paid the lab's high-
est annual salary, $4800) in large part because he had taken more executive 
initiative than had Norton and had formally communicated to the Wash-
ington office detailed plans as to how Langley should be organized and 
managed. Griffith managed a fully operational lab that had grown both 
vertically and horizontally since 1920 and included 5 working divisions, 
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Instrument Sect. (Mechanioal Engineer) 
Drafting Soot, ( Chief Drartenanl 
Flight Operations Soot. l Ohief ieet Pilot} 
Photographic Soot. l Chief Pbotogra.,J:erl . 
J.laohina & Instrument Sbo:p Seot, (L,11, Maohiniotl 
Wood & Pattern Sho:p Seat. l L,M, Carpenter) 
Variable Density Tunnel Seot, {Meohanioal ~•r,l 
.A.tmoapherio 'l'unnel Sec,t. ( Jr. Aerona.utioa.l Eng'r.) 
Hea.Vier-thatrAir Seat. (Jr. A.erom.utical Eng'r.} 
Lighter-than-Air Seat, ( Jr. Aeronautioal .ling'r.) 
llew 'fypee Soot. ( Meaha.nical J:;ngineer l 
Aooeaeoriea Seat. {Jr. Meobanioal .Engineer) 
Laboratory Maint, Seot, l L,J.1, Engine l.!eohanio I 
Second organization chart of the LMAL, October 1923. {See also appendix F.) 
17 sections, and some 60 employees. For the next two years he generally 
maintained favor with both his staff and NACA headquarters by restrict-
ing personal research supervision to his own field of technical competence, 
engine development; by virtually keeping his hands off the work of the 
aerodynamics sections; and by effectively handling interoffice relations with 
Victory. 12 
During 1925, however, Griffith too succumbed to the rigid bureaucratic 
discipline of the NACA executive secretary. A dispute with Victory over 
correspondence ( over the writing of letters deemed by Victory "unneces-
sary" and lacking in "etiquette") precipitated a nasty exchange of even less 
necessary and polite letters. Victory sought to end the matter with a letter 
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to Griffith dated 19 March 1925: "In the further interests of economy and 
efficiency in correspondence, it is directed that argumentative matter, un-
necessary matter, and impertinent or irrelevant matter be eliminated from 
official correspondence in the future." Griffith responded in a handwritten 
note: "Suggest that you consider the points mentioned ... and rewrite your 
letter with them in mind." Victory, tough as steel when it came to paper-
work, made the note a matter of official record. Finding Victory's attitude 
"good evidence of ignorance," Griffith soon requested an extended leave of 
absence, ostensibly to devote himself to pressing family business in Cali-
fornia. One Langley employee remembered long after the episode that the 
Washington office had informed Griffith before his leave began that he could 
not return to the NACA. Twenty-nine-year-old Henry J. E. Reid, a 1921 
graduate in electrical engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute who 
was in charge of Langley's instrumentation research and development, suc-
ceeded Griffith as engineer-in-charge. Reid remained at the helm of Langley 
lab until his retirement from NASA in 1960.13 
Henry Reid survived for so long-unlike DeKlyn and Griffith-in part 
because he always understood the idiosyncrasies of John Victory and abided 
by the secretary's insistence upon a centralized correspondence system. Less 
than a year after Griffith's departure, Reid instructed Langley secretaries 
to send 
no letters directly to the Washington office from anyone excepting [Langley 
Chief Clerk] Mr. [Edward R. "Ray"] Sharp or myself. Anyone wishing to 
communicate with the Washington office will do so by preparing a memorandum 
for forwarding by myself or Sharp or shall prepare a letter for my signature. 14 
Employees carried out this close-to-the-vest policy for as long as Reid and 
Victory shuffled papers between Langley and Washington; that is, for the 
rest of the NACA's history. Outgoing correspondence was reviewed and 
revised up through the division level until sanctioned in its final form by 
the office of the chief of research or its equivalent; then it was signed by 
the engineer-in-charge. Letters could be taken off the premises only with 
approval, and no copies could be made without the approval of the head of 
the lab or his designated agent. Incoming letters to individual researchers 
were routed directly to them, but only after being opened by the mail clerks. 
Copies of these letters were made for central files and for distribution to top 
researchers and research managers in the relevant technical fields both at 
Langley and in Washington. New personnel discovered that "we don't say 
that" or "we don't say it that way here at Langley." NACA correspondence 
policy was so strict that some people worked at the laboratory for 30 or 
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Langley administrative office, 1921. 
40 years without ever sending a work-related letter directly to an outside 
address. 15 Similar regulations restricted telephone calls. 
Despite the constraints Victory obligated him to impose on the labora-
tory, Reid was considered a model supervisor by most thoughtful employees. 
He usually did not mind qualified personnel going around him with their 
ideas to Washington, and when he did mind, he did not object in a way 
that made enemies. Perhaps Reid's greatest strength was his willingness to 
let young researchers be themselves; he did not try to make them all fit the 
same mold. This was an essential leadership quality for the man in charge 
of Langley, the acknowledged center of American aeronautical research in 
the late 1920s and 1930s, where talented, highly motivated researchers seek-
ing national and international reputations in science and technology needed 
elbow room in order to produce the results wanted by both the NACA 
and its many clients. With temperamental individuals rocking the boat for 
resources, respect, and reputation, Reid deserves great credit for keeping 
Langley on an even keel. 
Because employees viewed Reid as a model supervisor, his (and Vic-
tory's) strictness in regard to correspondence was duplicated up and down 
the organizational line. Nearly all correspondence between sections, for ex-
ample, required the section head's signature. One section head extended the 
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LMAL division chiefs confer with the engineer-in-charge in April 1929. Left to 
right: E. A. Myers, Personnel Division; Edward R. Sharp, Property and Clerical 
Division; Thomas Carroll, Flight Test Division; Henry J. E. Reid, engineer-in-
charge; Carlton Kemper, Power Plants Division; and Elton Miller, Aerodynamics 
Division. 
policy so far as to list himself as an author on a majority of the technical re-
ports from his research group, apparently believing that routine suggestions 
and reviews of reports justified the claim of authorship. 16 
The system of prepublication editorial review that George Lewis origi-
nally instituted for technical papers seems to have been equally strict. The-
oretically it worked as follows: After a researcher at Langley had finished a 
rough draft of a technical paper, an editorial committee-consisting of three 
or four members of the Langley staff-met to offer constructive criticism of 
its accuracy, soundness, and clarity. The chairman of that committee-----who 
did not have the authority to kill a report, although his power was tanta-
mount to that if he was a man of real prestige-----routed his appraisal of the 
paper through the author's division chief, stating whether the author had 
revised it in accordance with the suggestions of the committee. When the 
report finally reached the editorial office, its content had been rigorously 
checked and its form properly manicured. All preliminary copies of the pa-
per were collected from editorial committee members and usually destroyed 
to prevent any use of unrevised work. In selected cases, the laboratory then 
circulated copies of the paper to members of the concerned NACA subcom-
mittees for further suggestions for revision. After 1941 Langley also sent 
copies to its sister labs in California and Ohio for comment. Typically, the 
author received his paper back from reviewers several times in the organiza-
tion's effort to ensure the validity and credibility of its research publications. 
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REPORT No. 519 
SPINNING CHARACTERISTICS OF WINGS 
I-RECTANGULAR CLARK Y MONOPLANE WING 
lly M. J. B.nlBtH and C.H. irn111:::tt11.>.:-. 
SUM!\lARY 
A serfrs id wi11d-t1011ul fe8t.-: of a rectan{lular Clark Y 
wing was 11wde with the.\' . • 1. ('_ .A. spi1111i11g balance 
as pa,f of (l general program of re:sear-ch on airplane 
spinning. .·lll sir compo11e11ts of tla• <Wrodynamfr force 
ond 11w111e11t were measuNd tlirou![hout the ra11ye of an!fles 
of attack, angles of sideslip, awl mlw's of nb/21' likely 
to be attaimd by a spinning airplane; the results were 
reduced to coeffieient form. 
The latter part of the report contains an a11alysis 
illusfratiny tlu npplirntion ttf dota from the spinning 
balance to 1111 estimation of tl1e 1111yle <tf sidt'slip 1u:ca-
sary for spi1111ing lquilibri1u11 at any angle of aitadt. 
Tiu r111alysiN also shows the (llllOUtd of yau:ing moment 
that mw;t be supplied by the fuselage, tail, and inter-
Jenner e_tfects in a stmdy spin. Tice e./ftds of rariation 
of 1rnch fartors as mass distribution, attitude, wing 
loading!?, etr., upo11 tlie li!..-eliJ,oml l.!.f 11 111011opla11e with 
a rectangulttr {'for/,: Y 1t1i11y attaining (l sttady i;pin as 
reaalnl by lite ana/yljis are considered iti the discUs8ion. 
It is concludul that a conrentional monoplane 1rith a 
rectangular Clar!..· Y u1 i11g can be made to attain spintting 
equilibrium throll!Jhout a 1cide ra11gt of angle~· <l attack 
but tliat pro11isio11 (d a yuwi11g~mome11t cotj/icie,d of 
~0.02 (i.e. agai11st the spin) by the tail,fustlage, am! 
i11tnjerenrts will insUJT fl!Jrlin11t aft11i11111,,,it l(f 111uilibrium 
in a ::deady spin. 
INTRODUCTION 
Estimations of the prolmhility of au uirplmw's 
nttniuing H stt'at!y spin nnd ah:o of the t•a.se and 
quiekHe.ss of l't'('oYl'l'.Y l"Hll he mnde \\he11 till' nirplnrn' 
is being designed ouly if llt11tl 011 the 1wrrnlyn11111ie 
ehfirn.dt•ristit"s of thf' t'<llll}lOil<'llt purb, to~l'tht•r with 
iutf'rferellet' t•fft1l'ts1 nn' 11Y11il11bl{' for all spin11i11g atti~ 
tndes and eonditio11:-- \\·itbin tlw po:o,.;ibk• l'Hllg'l'. The 
Natiouul .\thi,;01T ('orn111ittl'L' for .\t•ronnutil',; has 
undt•rtnken nn t•xt:•nsin• 1H·ogrnm of n.•st•areh u,;ing tht• 
spinning hnlaBl't' to ohtuin .such dntu for a lllllllht'r of 
wings nntl wiug eL1mhinutio11s. .\-; rnpidly ii,.; con-
<lit.ions permit the tests will h(\ extended to l'O\'er tail 
and fusplage combinations and interferenc·t• elft•et:-.. 
The first. part of this repmt. pn•sents the 1terndy-
nnmi<' dwrnct,•risties of ft rednnguhr CJar].; Y mono-
pbne win~, whil'h was the first wing tested on tlw 
spinning lwhmce, throughout tlw ru.ng{'S of nngle of 
attaek, angle of sideslip, find P.b/:2 \·likely to he nttui1wd 
in steady spins by fin nirplnne of rnnYentionnl type. 
In the second part of tlw report the data are tuia]yzt'fl. 
to show the sideslip nt the center of graYit_y find tl1t• 
yawing-monH'nt l'Oeltlf'it:>nt l\N'essnry from pnrts of 
the airplane other than the wing for N1uilihri11rn in 
spins at ntrious angh,s of uttaek for Ynrious londing-s, 
rnnss distrihutions, and n1lues of the pikhiug-monH'Ht 
rneffirient. 
The arnilysis illustrates the use of n method of esti-
mating the t•ffeds of the wing c-harncteristies upon the 
conditions necessnry for steady spinning equilibrium. 
\n1f'n suffkient. data are 1waihtblc on the 1H'rndyw1mi1· 
dinrncteristics of various comhinntions of hlils nnd 
fuselnges throughout the spinning rnnge, th£> metliod 
can be used to ealculnte aetual spinning attitudes for 
sp<>dfic eomhinn:tions und, if extend rd, to rstimate tht• 
time 1wee~snry for rernYery from those ft.ttitudes with 
specific contr~] rnonment~. The method of fitrnly::ai:-s 
is similar to tlrnt dt>Yeloped by Briti:-sh im·l·sti~ntor:-s 
{rt'fprern·{' l) hut differs from it it1 th•tnil lH'l'11t1se of 
ditferenees in the form of the nrniluhlL' data. 
AEHOD\'NA::\UC DATA 
.... 1--'l'.-\UATIIS AND MOflEI. 
.\{'rody1:111nil' forn•s Hll<l lllOH:l'llh in tlw , llrio11-, 
spin11i111; 11ttit1Hks \\Nl' 111t'u:s11red \\itl1 tl1e :spi11Hiu)! 
hulann \rl'ft'l°l'IH'I' :?) in thl' X. ~\. (' .. \. 5-foot Hriicul 
wind tunnel (n•frn•1we :) l. 
The ( 'Iud.;: Y wing modl'I is n'etnuµnlar, .3 irtdH':, 11., 
:rn inches, with squan' tip:,;. lt i:- nuuil' of lluninutl'd 
111nho~llll:,V nnd eut out ut th(• l'l'Ilt.'r fot· u lwll-cbrnp 
ntt1whmc11t to tltl' lrnhtm·t•. The 111ndi•l is :--hnwn in 
pln,·e on the :-.pinning !wl1111c1• l1i Jigim• l. 
First page of a typz"cal NACA report, 1934. 
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In practice, however, the system was less strict than in theory. Com-
pliance with reviewer comments varied greatly, depending on the author's 
inclinations and the attitudes of the editorial committee chairman. Rarely 
did an editorial committee reconvene, which meant that members other than 
the chairman seldom saw either the outside comments or the revised report 
prior to its publication. Moreover, comments from other labs generally had 
little effect on the finished product. According to one Langley veteran, it 
was easy to give these comments, which usually came in weeks after the 
editorial committee meeting, "a polite weasel-worded brush-off." 17 
Research policy was in fact quite lenient. According to written instruc-
tions, Langley was supposed to have a research authorization, or RA, signed 
by the Executive Committee chairman for each of its investigations; but, 
in reality, approval of a research idea was very often just a formality. The 
Washington office turned down a Langley concept rarely: "Any scheme for 
research that survived peer discussion [at the lab] and gained section and 
division approval was likely to be implemented." Sometimes an engineer 
even went ahead with an idea without formal approval. George Lewis and 
Henry Reid looked the other way from this "bootlegged" work in the early 
days because they understood that it sometimes produced as much of value 
as did the best-prepared programs. Furthermore, the NACA worded its ini-
tial RAs using vague general terms like "similitude testing," "controllability 
testing," or "tests on wings," and kept authorizations operating as long as 
possible. This practice allowed researchers at Langley the flexibility to do 
almost anything they wanted under the umbrella of the formal program. 18 
When NACA management was not sure of the urgency of research 
in a new field or special subject, it went only so far as to give a few of 
its more talented personnel the freedom to educate themselves in it, to 
teach its basics to colleagues, and perhaps even to build simple, low-cost 
experimental equipment. This happened several times at the laboratory-
especially before World War II changed research priorities-and sometimes 
without the approval, or even the knowledge, of headquarters. 
After returning from the Volta Congress on high-speed aeronautics in 
late 1935, for example, Eastman Jacobs, one of the lab's most brilliant 
section heads, decided that Arthur Kantrowitz, a young physicist from 
Columbia University, could contribute the most to the NACA by studying 
the principles of supersonic flow. Jacobs made this decision on his own, in 
defiance of a cautious NACA management stance against supersonics. A 
few years later, after both men had concluded that there was no physical 
prohibition of supersonic flight, Jacobs gave Kantrowitz an open job order 
to design a small supersonic wind tunnel. With the help of engineers 
in Jacobs's section, Kantrowitz finished this job successfully in less than 
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Copy 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 
RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION No, ·••-··3;;J5 __ 
Tide _ln_veatigaUQn o_:[ __ J;he. Causes of 
~irplane Crash Fires 
Approved__ JUIW H , 19;!30 
Approved ________ JJlD.e _24 19:!30 
By Li.n_gle_y __ ;.i_em9xial _Mx_o_nautJ_oal _ 
Laboratory 
s_._ ;7, __ Stratton 
Chairman, Suh-commi({ee an ... :P.5-d.Y!~.r .. PJ~xrt_s 
for Aircraft 
______ Jo_s_e_ph _S. _.AillfLS ______ _ 
Chairman, &«utit-t Comm/Ut(. 
Purpose of investigation (Why?) In order to increase the saf et;r of airplanes it is 
necessary that all factors influencir:g the cause of crash fires be in-
veetigated in or(ler to detE'Tmine the cause of crash fires and also possi-
ble methods of engine installation ant exhaust manifold construction 
which will reduce the crash fire hazard. 
Briefdes<riptionofmethod (How?) Tl:.is investigaticn will include the follcvling: 
1. Con:piling t,1.e bii;liography. (Special attention t0 tests made to 
determine the operating tempe1·ature of exhaust valves, rate of cooling 
of exhaust :nanifold and valves, and ignition temperatures of various 
materials used in aircraft oonstruoticn). 
2. Additional laboratory tests which previous work would indicate 
need to be made. 
3. Survey of exhaust manif9ldsi exhaust gases, oil and crankcase 
temperatures in a commercial airp ane. 
4. Determination of the reduction in temperature of exhaust gases 
and exhaust manifolds obtained by inducting- excess air into the 
exhaust manifold of a commercial air;'.)J.ane. 
Remarks: 
suc·,;ested by Society of Au'corr.Jti ve En[>ineei:s in letter dated April 28, 
vl930, on 1·eco1m:.1endati0::1 of its Airc::.:2~:ft-Engine Activities Oonir.:ittee. 
Dates of reports -----------------------·-------------
~opiee to: 
Chief Power Plants Div. 
O·onnNo,is Sunercharger Section 
Files v 
Publication, _________ _ 
Example of an NACA research authorization (RA), June 1930. 
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Langley old-timers ref er to unauthorized testing as "bootlegging." Some of their 
stories about bootlegged tests are apocryphal, however. According to one of these 
tall tales, a group of employees wondered out loud during a lunchroom conversation 
in 1.932 about the aerodynamic characteristics of some of the birds that flew over 
Langley. One of the men who took the subject most seriously, Tom Collier (left), 
shot a buzzard, and froze it with its wings outstretched for unauthorized testing in 
the NACA towing tank. The test results indicated that the frozen bird could not fly 
because it was inherently unstable (birds are, in fact, unstable, but this has never 
stopped them from flying)! The teller of the tale never mentions, however, that 
tests of soaring birds in the NACA tank had been proposed by Victor Lougheed 
of the U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. Moreover, in May 1.932, the Virginia 
Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries had issued a permit for Lougheed "to 
possess and transport for use in connection with flight investigations, ten sea gulls." 
At right, one of these gulls is being tested on the carriage of the towing tank. 
18 months. An unauthorized order from Jacobs thus led to the pioneering 
9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel for the NACA, one of the first supersonic tunnels 
in the United States.19 
Special independent studies like those done by Kantrowitz in super-
sonics during the late 1930s were permissible at Langley as long as they 
were not too exotic, did not require too many agency resources, and did 
not draw adverse public attention. One study that the NACA ultimately 
did cancel for being too far-out involved the first American experiment de-
signed to achieve thermonuclear fusion. Kantrowitz and Jacobs read in a 
newspaper in 1938 that Westinghouse had just bought a Van de Graaff gen-
erator. The two men knew that this huge electrical device, which produced 
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sparks several feet long, was being used in atom-smashing experiments, so 
they suspected that Westinghouse had bought the machine to begin explor-
ing ways of making nuclear power a reality. While discussing the news item 
( which led both of them to study the works of Hans Bethe), Kantrowitz and 
Jacobs got the notion that if a very hot plasma (e.g., an electrically neutral, 
partially ionized gas) could be confined magnetically, a fusion reactor could 
be built. Jacobs, who had good rapport with NACA headquarters because 
of his promising work on laminar-flow airfoils (see chapter 4), managed to 
get $5000 from George Lewis for construction of a big aluminum torus with 
a coiled magnetic device whose purpose would be, Jacobs said, to study 
the potential of atomic power for aircraft. Using the drive motor of the 
Variable-Density Tunnel as the power supply for the magnetic field, away 
went Jacobs and Kantrowitz, trying to excite the plasma to a high enough 
temperature to produce X-rays. But before they could achieve the necessary 
temperature, Lewis came by the laboratory one day and happened upon the 
fusion apparatus. Knowing that nonaeronautical experimental equipment 
of so radical and dangerous a nature was not appropriate for the NACA, 
Lewis canceled the project on the spot. Jacobs and Kantrowitz* both con-
sidered the cancellation a tragedy since experiments with the torus had led 
to several important discoveries. 20 
The personality, long-term directions, and aspirations of an organiza-
tion like NACA Langley are seldom revealed by formal policy statements. 
Goals emerge more often as a set of constraints defining acceptable per-
formance. The NACA correspondence and editorial review policies clearly 
demonstrate the influence of the strictness of John Victory and George Lewis 
on the development of the Langley personality. Neither wanted anything 
* During World War II Kantrowitz worked at Langley on airfoil cascades, axial-flow 
compressors, and the dynamics of gas turbines. Then he began to devote himself more 
and more to exploring the connection between quantum physics and fluid mechanics. 
The first connection that he established was in an NACA paper on heat-capacity lag 
that demonstrated how the vibrational energy of a gas (CO2) lagged behind changes in 
temperature occurring in a gas flow ("Effects of Heat-Capacity Lag in Gas Dynamics," 
Advanced Restricted Rept. L4A22, 22 Jan. 1944. There is an earlier version of this paper 
by Kantrowitz, dated 8 Dec. 1941, in the Floyd Thompson Memorial Library, LaRC, 
Code 5070-184. An abbreviated version of it appeared in the Journal of Chemical Physics, 
14 Mar. 1946, pp. 150-164). Kantrowitz left Langley in 1946 for a professorship at Cornell 
University. A year later Columbia accepted a revision of his paper on heat-capacity lag as his 
doctoral thesis. In the 1950s Kantrowitz went to work for the AVCO Research Laboratory 
in Everett, Massachusetts, where he worked on various ICBM concepts. Later he studied 
the science of blood clotting with his brother, a famous cardiologist, and designed a series of 
cardiac assist devices, including an artificial heart. Obviously, it was wise for a man with as 
many rich and different scientific interests and talents as Arthur Kantrowitz not to restrict 
his career to aeronautics only, at Langley only. 
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imperfect to come out of the laboratory and be associated with the Com-
mittee. Victory wanted all routine business conducted by the book, down 
to the smallest detail of epistolary style and grammar. Lewis wanted pub-
lished reports to be accepted as holy writ. S. Paul Johnston, former editor of 
Aviation (1931-1940) and an employee at NACA headquarters (1940-1942), 
remembers that Lewis "was so afraid that he would get caught with a mis-
take in a report that wind tunnel results-all research results~would be 
hung up down there at Langley until all the i's were dotted and t's crossed 
and he was damn sure that the results were what they said." Russell G. 
Robinson, a more veteran headquarters employee, argues that this was not 
fear on Lewis's part, just extreme insistence on technical integrity. Lewis 
recognized that only the most highly respected scientific and technical pa-
pers could buttress the Committee's public positions.21 
One can debate the long-term value and significance of such strict con-
trols on the laboratory. They were tough, time-consuming, and occasion-
ally traumatic. Victory's bureaucratic tenacity cost the NACA two senior 
engineers ( DeKlyn and Griffith), but their resignations caused barely a rip-
ple in the flow of research. Lewis's editorial policy may have prevented the 
prompt publication of an occasional paper on the ground that the lab would 
"at some later date in the indefinite future be able to check and amplify 
the work and so make a more valuable report." 22 In terms of institutional 
behavior, the policies of Lewis and Victory, the long-lived father figures of 
the lab, seem to have promoted a certain conservatism, a caution against 
prematurely announcing research results, and a reluctance to embrace for 
publication research writings and ideas from other than the NACA's rigor-
ously scrutinized sources. 
On the other hand, in the constraints imposed upon Langley there 
was freedom. Lewis's attitude about organization charts, for instance, per-
mitted researchers in the field to communicate through informal "shadow" 
networks. His editorial policy heightened self-confidence in the NACA prod-
uct and method of quality control and freed researchers to work creatively 
on novel ideas without the fear of preliminary reports building up too much 
industry anticipation of and pressure for future advances. Victory's cen-
tralized correspondence system, as instituted in Henry Reid's offices, freed 
employees from bothersome paperwork. In sum, the organization exhibited 
throughout its history a delicate blend of careful bureaucratic constraint 
with research freedom. 
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The Family 
The most vital arena for aeronautical research was the human mind, 
not the wind tunnel. No facility could substitute for talent and creativ-
ity. Without employing enough individuals who possessed "knowledge of 
the existing state of aerodynamics, experiences in the study of its funda-
mental problems, and who combine[d] engineering training with profound 
mathematical knowledge, the rare gift of originality, and demonstrated abil-
ity in the conduct of research," the best NACA leaders understood that 
Langley could not accomplish its assigned duties no matter how good the 
management. 23 
The first thing that needs to be remembered about the Langley staff 
in the early years of the NACA was that it was very small. The total 
complement did not reach 100 until 1925, and the complement of research 
professionals did not reach that number until 1930 (see the table below). 
Research members of the various aerodynamic sections numbered only 23 
in 1927: 12 in flight research, 6 in the atmospheric wind tunnel, 4 in the 
propeller research tunnel, and 1 in a prototype ice tunnel. The power 
plants sections had 16: 7 in engine research and 3 each in fuel injection, 
supercharger testing, and engine analysis. Four people worked in a physics 
lab. Between 1927 and 1930-the crucial period when Congress increased 
NACA appropriations from half a million to over a million dollars-Langley 
hired 55 new professionals. Through the worst years of the Depression, the 
Committee was able to get enough money to keep the lab's professional and 
nonprofessional staff levels steady. In 1936 Langley employed three times 
the staff it had in 1925, but that expansion still amounted to only 230 more 
employees. The staff size was such that members from junior engineering 
aide to engineer-in-charge could know each other personally. 
The arrangement and apparel of the Langley staff in the accompanying 
photograph (p. 43), April 1921, reflect Langley's original social structure. 
The photograph shows 34 employees: 33 men and 1 woman. Leigh Grif-
fith, senior staff engineer, stands on the loading dock seventh from the left. 
Posed second to his right ( on the other side of white-shirted David Ba-
con, head of the Variable-Density Tunnel section) is Frederick Norton, chief 
physicist. Though the two men held equal rank at the time officially, the 
photographic impression suggests seniority: Griffith over Norton. A me-
chanic, a physicist, and an engineer stand to Norton's right, with Henry 
Reid, future engineer-in-charge, at the very end. Kneeling in front of these 
men are the four members of flight operations. All four had World War I 
military experience. The moustached man resembling actor Errol Flynn, 
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Growth of Langley Staff, 1919-1939 
Fiscal 
year Professional Nonprofessional Total 
1919 4 7 11 
1920 12 15 27 
1921 12 32 44 
1922 18 38 56 
1923 23 52 75 
1924 36 62 98 
1925 39 72 111 
1926 44 92 136 
1927 45 104 149 
1928 60 108 168 
1929 79 110 189 
1930 100 128 228 
1931 102 155 257 
1932 111 159 270 
1933 110 150 260 
1934 109 140 249 
1935 111 164 275 
1936 138 203 341 
1937 149 253 402 
1938 166 260 426 
1939 204 320 524 
Source: ''Growth of Langley's Staff," 16 Sept. 1965, Langley Historical Archive, 
Milton Ames Collection Box 2. 
test pilot Thomas Carroll, had served in France teaching air tactics to pilots. 
Two of Griffith's power plants engineers crouch in front of Norton, Bacon, 
and Griffith. The five men ( two kneeling, three standing) in the middle 
of the photo wearing coats with vests made up the drafting section. Two 
men and, standing between them, one woman composed the property and 
clerical staff. Finally, the right side of the picture shows the technical service 
employees in rolled-up shirt sleeves and work clothes. 
The median age of the Langley staff in 1921 was roughly 28. The 
professionals especially were young: power plant engineers Gardiner and 
Ware were 23 and 27, respectively; assistant physicist Brown was 24 and 
electrical engineer Reid 26. Morgan, head of the drafting room, was 41; 
his boys called him "Pop." Only two men had significant aerodynamical 
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LMAL staff, April 1921. Front row, left to right: J. Turon, mechanic; Robert 
Mixson, airplane mechanic; Fred Hunsecker, airplane mechanic; Thomas Carroll, 
test pilot; Marsden Ware, power plant engineer; Robertson Matthews, power plant 
engineer; E. Tasso Morgan, draftsman; Arthur Webster, draftsman; Percy Keffer, 
patternmaker; Harwood Moore, toolroom attendant; J. D. Shurtleff, toolmaker; 
Harry Downs, leadingman machinist; Howard Morris, toolmaker; Charles Wolf, 
mechanic; and Samuel Eakin, mechanic. Back row, left to right: Henry J. 
E. Reid, electrical engineer (later to become engineer-in-charge}; Wilham G. Brown, 
assistant physicist; Arthur Gardiner, power plant engineer; H. M. Metz, engine 
mechanic; Frederick H. Norton, physicist; David L. Bacon, mechanical engineer; 
Leigh Griffith, senior staff engineer (later to become engineer-in-charge); C. H. 
Masters, draftsman; William C. Morgan, mechanical engineer; Benjamin Bennett, 
draftsman; Frank Herbert, property officer; A. M. Campbell, stenographer; Joseph 
McManus, chief clerk; William Adams, carpenter; Edward Raub, toolmaker; Ernest 
Gay, chief carpenter; John Hanks, mechanic; John Evans, mechanic; and Edward 
McDonald, fireman. 
experience: physicist Norton and engineer Bacon. Norton had done "a little 
work" in the MIT wind tunnel. This qualified him at age 25-and only three 
years after his graduation-to be Langley's chief physicist.24 Twenty-six-
year-old David Bacon had worked between 1918 and 1921 for the Gallaudet 
Aircraft Corporation doing design, development, and a certain amount of 
research work involving pressure distribution tests on seaplanes in free flight. 
Hired fresh out of school with a minimum knowledge of aerodynamics and 
little practical experience of any kind, the majority of these early Langley 
researchers learned nearly everything on the job. Because they were so 
young, they had not yet learned that a lot of things just could not be done, 
so they went ahead and did them. 
Members of the technical staff who supported the research effort with 
various services, such as carpentry and mechanics, or making wind tunnel 
models and special tools, were older and more experienced. Most of these 
people came from the immediate vicinity of the lab. The communities 
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Engineer David L, Bacon (Jar left) and physicist Frederick H. Norton, escorted 
Orville Wright, in hat, around the laboratory during his visit in July 1922, To the 
far right is George Lewis. 
of Hampton, Newport News, Portsmouth, and Norfolk possessed a large 
population of craftsmen and artisans skilled in the operation of machinery, 
in wood, metal, and concrete construction, in marine and auto repair, in 
toolmaking, and in the design and uses of various instruments and electrical 
equipment. The Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 
located at the terminus of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railways, was one 
of the largest firms of its type in the world. Its apprentice programs 
attracted young workers from as far away as South Carolina and New 
Jersey. During World War I, the fine harbors of Hampton Roads-where 
the ironclads Monitor and Merrimack had fought their famous battle during 
the Civil War-became the home of America's largest naval base and port 
of embarkation, their shores lined with naval workshops, shipyards, depots, 
cantonments, and fortifications. Back at Langley Field another cadre of 
technicians, including engine mechanics, aerial photographers, and aerial 
and ground observers, worked for the army. The NACA recruited most 
of its technical service personnel from such local talent. These craftsmen 
were prized highly by the professional staff, for they provided the essential 
support services on which all the research programs depended. 
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The work of talented mechanics and other technical employees was instrumental to 
the NACA 's success. These three photographs show some of the everyday activities 
of early LMAL hangar personnel. Left, a mechanz'c stands on a stool to work on 
an air-cooled radial engine. Right, metalworkers weld a piece of pipe. Bottom, two 
mechanz'cs measure wing ordinates on a Curtiss Jenny airplane. 
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Unlike the nonprofessionals, the majority of professionals came to 
work at Langley from outside the local community, in particular from 
the industrialized states of the Northeast and Midwest which had the 
major engineering schools. This resulted in a clique of New Englanders 
at the lab who had studied at such places as MIT, Cornell, Yale, and 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, as well as a large group of graduates from 
the University of Michigan.* 
These young men had chosen to go to work for the NACA for various 
personal reasons, most of which centered on an attraction to airplanes and 
flying. Smith J. "Smitty" DeFrance, one of the Michigan graduates, went 
to work at Langley in 1922 after completing his degree in aeronautical 
engineering. He had left college temporarily during World War I to train as 
an aviator with the Canadian Flying Corps and later, after America's formal 
entry into the conflict, had flown with the U.S. Army's 139th Aero Squadron. 
For DeFrance, taking the civil service junior aeronautical engineer's exam 
that led to NACA employment was simply "a matter of getting a job," as 
in 1922 there was still a serious postwar recession plaguing the country. 25 
Floyd L. Thompson decided to come to Langley because DeFrance, a fellow 
Michigan alumnus, told him that the Virginia lab was "a good place to 
work." "He said they have roses for Christmas," Thompson remembered 
in 1973, and, coming out of a long and snowy Ann Arbor winter, "that 
impressed me too." Thompson took the qualifying exam, but because he 
heard nothing of his application for a long time, he also applied for a job as 
a field representative at the Pontiac plant of General Motors: 
The day came when I got a response from General Motors which said report 
up to Pontiac for duty, and I was just about to go there when ... I got a letter 
from Langley .... 
Thompson chose Langley over Pontiac because he felt it "was the only 
opportunity that I knew of anywhere to get into interesting work in 
aeronautics" ~his true passion. (In 1918, Thompson had been a member 
of the first class of the U.S. Navy's Great Lakes aviation mechanics school, 
and had then spent a year at Pensacola serving as a member of the first 
* The New England clique was led by Edward P. Warner, Fred Norton, and John Crowley 
from MIT; David Bacon from Yale; and Henry Reid from Worcester. The Michigan group 
included Starr Truscott, class of '09; Robert G. Freeman, class of '21; Clinton H. Dearborn, 
Smith J. DeFrance, Elliott G. Reid, and Kenneth M. Ronan, class of '22; George J. 
Higgins, Ernest D. Perkins, and Maurice D. Warner, class of '23; Maitland B. Bleecker, 
George L. Defoe, and Karl J. Fairbanks, class of '24; Millard J. Bamber, class of '25; Floyd L. 
Thompson, class of '26; Howard W. Kirschbaum, class of '27; and Robert J. Woods, class 
of '28. 
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naval torpedo plane squadron. One of his most memorable experiences in 
late adolescence was seeing a Larsen monoplane flying from Milwaukee to 
Chicago. )26 
The stories of DeFrance and Thompson, besides being indicative of 
the motives of many others who chose to come to work for the NACA in 
the early years, are of special interest. These two Michigan aeronautical 
engineers spent their entire careers with the NACA and NASA, becoming 
directors of Ames and Langley laboratories, respectively, each leaving his 
distinctive stamp on the character of his research center. 
The great majority of professionals who reported to work at Langley 
in the 1920s came to the lab with engineering training not specifically de-
signed to prepare them for doing advanced aeronautical research. Only a 
few had specialized in aeronautical engineering. The University of Michi-
gan, MIT, and New York University had degree programs in aeronautics 
by 1926, but only three schools-Caltech, Stanford, and the University of 
Washington, each a continent away from Langley Field-offered any aero-
nautics option for mechanical engineering students. And even the outstand-
ing education at these few schools had serious limitations, especially in the 
teaching of aerodynamic theories. According to Stanford's aerodynamics 
professor Elliott G. Reid, existing textbooks in English on such subjects 
as airfoil theory were "too advanced, too academic or too condensed for 
maximum usefulness in the classroom." As the principal text for his pre-
sentation of wing theory to graduate students in aeronautical engineering 
during the early 1930s, Reid was thus compelled to use the NACA's 1921 
translation of Ludwig Prandtl's classic 1904 paper "Applications of Modern 
Hydrodynamics to Aeronautics." Reid found this a "difficult experience" 
for everyone involved, not only because the NACA's translation of Prandtl's 
work lacked clarity and precision, but because the translation retained the 
German aerodynamic symbols and coefficients and also included somewhat 
superfluous sections devoted to airship hulls and propellers.27 
Nonetheless, the aeronautical, mechanical, and electrical engineering 
programs at American universities and polytechnical schools did a relatively 
good job of preparing young graduates to adapt to advanced aeronautical 
research. Mechanical engineering was a broad subject in the 1920s, covering 
nearly everything pertaining to prime movers, generation of power, and 
manufacturing. It interlocked with all other branches of engineering and 
dealt with the design, construction, testing, and even sales of machines 
and mechanical devices, together with the arrangement of the plants in 
which they were produced. With concentrated reading in aerodynamics 
and a postgraduate exposure to aircraft, wind tunnels, and aeronautical 
instruments, there was no reason why bright young mechanical engineers 
47 
Engineer in Charge 
Engineering al/d Arcliitut1trt 
5. AERODYXA"\!lC LAeORATffRY, One !1our. Second se~ester._ • 
An elementary course covering use of instr~ments, 1;1vest1gah~n 
of aero<lynamical properties of the vanous bodies used in 
aeroplanes and airships, test of propellers. 
:-.rust be preceded or accompanied by Courses 2 and 3, and pre· 
ceded by M. E. 7. 
6. DESIGN" OF AERONAUTlCAl. }.[OTORS. Lectures nnd drawing. Two 
hours. Second semester. 
Complementary course to ~f. E. 15, dealing with special features 
of the aeronautical motors, critical study of various types of 
motors and design of a complete motor of certain type. 
Must be preceded by M. E. 15. 
7. THEORY OF B.\U.OONS AND DIRlGIBlES. Lectures and recitations. 
Two hours. 
Study of equilibrium and stability of spherical balloons and 
dirigibles; description of French, German and Hillian types; 
resistance and propulsion, dynamical stability of dirigibles; 
operation and maintenance of balloons and dirigibles. 
Must be preceded by Courses r, 2, and 3. 
8. DESIGN' OF BAl.l.0ONS A~D DIRIGIDI.FS. Lectures and drnwing. 
Two hours. 
Investigation of the design of a balloon and a dirigible from 
the aeronautical and strength standpoints. Questions of 
strength and design of all the details of the non-rigid, semi-
rigid, and rigid types are discussed and a completed design of 
one type prepared. 
Must be preceded by Course 7. 
9. THEORY AND DESIGN OF KITES, Lectures, recitations and draw-
ing. Two hours. 
Critical study of various types of man-carrying kites and the 
launching devices. Investigation of the design from the nero· 
nautical and strength standpoints. Completed design of a kite 
train of one type is prepared. 
Must be preceded by Courses 1, 2, and 'J. 
IO. DESIGN OF AERODR011ES AND HANGARS. Lectures, recitations 
and drawing. Two l1oure. 
Planning and equipment of aerodromes and aero-ports; con-
struction of transportable, stationary, re.valving and floating 
hangars. Completed d(:sign of one type is prepared. 
Must be precedrd hy Course 2 and 7. 
ADYA~C£D SrAilll.ITY. Lectures anr! recitations. Advanced study 
of more complkaterl phenomr.na of stability according to Fer-
ber, Bothesat, Ilr)'an, and Bairs!ow. 
M~st be preceded by Course 2 and Math. 9 (Differential Equa-
tmns-). 
QUALITY 
College of E11ginuring 
139. PROGRAM VI. AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING 
First Year 
nasT SIIU:ST.!lt 
•Modern Language 
Gen. Chem.(2E) 
Or Shop 2 and Eng. t 
Alg. and Anal. Geom.(Math. 1) 
Drawing I 
Tota.I houu 17or 16 
SECOND SE.MESTER 
.lcI\fodern Language 
Gen. Chem.(:zE) 
Or Shop :z and Eng. 1 
Alg. and Anal. Geom.(Math. 2) 
Drawing :z 
Total hours 
Second Year 
•Language 4 
Calculus (Math. 3) 5 
Mech.,Sound, Heat (Phys. 1E) 5 
Surveying 4 2 
•Language 
Calculus 11 (Math. 4) 
Magn., Elect., Lt. (Phys. 2E) 
Statics (E.1J. 1) 
Drawing 3 :I 
Total hours 18 
Total hours 18 
Summer Session 
Shop 3 4 
Elect. App. I (E.E. 2a) 4 
Total hours 
Third Year 
Shop 4 
Strength, Elasticity (E.M. 2) 
DJnamics (E.M. 3) 
El. Mach. Des. (M.E. :z) 
Heat Engines (M.E. 3) 
General Aeronautics (Aero 1) 
Total hours 
-4 Hydromechanics (E.M. 4) 
3 Thermodynamics (11.E. S) 
3 Machine Design (M.E. 6) 
3 Eng. Materials (Ch.E. 1) 
-4 Theory of Structures (C.E. :z) 
:z Theory of Aviation (Aero. 2) 
19 Total hours 
Fourth Year 
Mech. Lab. (M.E. 7) 
Internal Com. Eng. (M.E. 15) 
Theory and Design of Pro-
pellers ( Aero. 3) 
Aeropl. Design (Aero. 4, ,ta) 
Group Options 
Tc,tal hours 15 
English 5, 6, g, 10, or 14 
Mech. Laboratory (M.E. 32) 
Aerodynam. Lab. (Aero. 5) 
Design of Aeronaut. Motors 
(Aero. 6) 
Group Options 
To?al hours 
17 
The University of Michigan created one of the first and finest aeronautical engineer-
ing programs in the country. Left, a page from the university catalog, 1916-1917, 
showing course offerings; right, the specimen curriculum from the university's 
1922-1923 catalog. (Courtesy of Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical 
Library, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor) 
could not turn into insightful, productive aerodynamical researchers. In 
fact, many did at Langley laboratory. 
Electrical engineers were even better prepared for careers in aerody-
namical research. Along with instruction in the fundamental applications 
of electricity, they were trained to develop and use recording instruments like 
those necessary to measure the forces acting on an airplane in real or sim-
ulated flight. Moreover, electrodynamic theory, its symbols and equations, 
translated nicely into aerodynamic theory. Finally, the effective operation of 
laboratory machinery-especially the wind tunnels-depended upon electric 
power and the engineer's ability to tend power systems, generators, trans-
formers, and the like. (Henry Reid, Langley's engineer-in-charge from 1926 
to 1960, was an electrical engineer.) 
The training of engineers specifically for aeronautics, then, was not 
the most serious problem. The problem was attracting and keeping a 
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sufficient number of engineers with even the basic requirements. A Langley 
power plants engineer, on returning from an unsuccessful recruiting trip to 
Swarthmore College in 1924, reported to the engineer-in-charge that seniors 
had been surfeited with propositions from commercial concerns. Many such 
representatives had been proselytizing at the college and offering great induce-
ments, especially as regards advances in the sales field with only enough prepara-
tory training to give them a basis for sales talk. One commercial organization 
had gone as far as to give three separate talks, a week apart, in order to arouse 
and maintain interest. 
The net result was that Langley's recruiter found most of the Swarthmore 
men either signed up for jobs or practically so and not, therefore, in a 
receptive frame of mind. The chief disadvantage for the NACA-besides 
its generally lower starting pay-was the requirement of a civil service 
examination before appointment, while the degree sufficed for commercial 
concerns. 28 
The NACA knew that some of its research professionals planned to 
stay at Langley for only a brief time, like graduate fellows at a university, 
until they could secure more attractive employment in the aircraft industry. 
In 1926 George Lewis wrote to Alexander Klemin, New York University 
aeronautics professor, about the value of an NACA apprenticeship: 
I feel that an engineering graduate who obtains a position with this Committee 
has an excellent opportunity to extend his theoretical knowledge, and, in 
particular, prepare himself as a research engineer. The opportunities for 
advancement are good, as evidenced by the fact that all of the activities at 
Langley Field are in charge of engineers who are recent graduates. All of the 
men who have left the Committee and who were in charge of major activities 
at our laboratory are now in charge of research laboratories. 29 
Lewis and the rest of NACA management accepted the abbreviated length 
of many tenures grudgingly, however, and embraced those who decided, 
because the work proved sufficiently interesting and challenging, to stay 
longer than planned. 
The frequency of such resignations in the 1920s constituted a real threat 
to the operation of the laboratory. A survey of staff service cards shows 
that no fewer than 37 men of professional grade left Langley between 1920 
and the end of 1931 after relatively brief stays on a professional staff that 
took until 1930 to total 100. The median age of these departing employees 
was only 28. Fifteen had graduated from the prestigious aeronautical 
engineering programs at MIT and Michigan. Both the aerodynamics and 
power plant divisions suffered serious losses of key personnel. Two chief 
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LMAL staff, August 1926. The number of female employees has grown from one 
in 1921 to seven. George Lewis and Henry Reid {his mouth and chin not visible) 
are sitting in the middle of the third row. To Lewis's right is chief test pilot Tom 
Carroll; to Reid's left is chief clerk Edward R. "Ray" Sharp. 
physicists resigned in a period of less than two years (1923~24). This led 
Leigh Griffith, who himself was soon to leave the NACA, to say, "The 
aerodynamics research has not been subject to the same detailed guidance 
that it received previously ... so that the research work in flight and in the 
two tunnels has not progressed as rapidly as I desired." 30 Resignations seem 
to have climaxed in 1927 and involved such major figures as Marsden Ware 
and Arthur Gardiner, Langley's top power plants engineers; Elliott Reid, 
the head of the Atmospheric Wind Tunnel section; Paul Remke, physicist; 
Paul King, test pilot; and Max Munk, the aerodynamicist imported by the 
Committee from Germany soon after the end of World War I. (Munk's 
resignation was a special case that will be studied in detail in the next 
chapter.) 
Several events in the mid-1920s stimulated American aviation and 
created a highly mobile market for aeronautical engineers. Henry Ford 
started the first regular commercial air freight line (between Detroit and 
Chicago) in 1925, and in the same year Congress passed the Kelly bill 
authorizing contract air transport of mail. In 1926 President Coolidge 
signed the Air Commerce Act, the first federal legislation regulating civil 
aviation; the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics 
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made its initial university grant; and NACA Langley hosted its first annual 
manufacturers' conference. Lindbergh flew the Atlantic in 1927. This rapid 
series of events awakened Americans to the potential of flight, and the 
aircraft construction industry took off. During this "Lindbergh boom," 
nearly everyone became interested in flying. As a result, worldwide sales of 
American-built aircraft shot up from 789 units in 1925 to over 6000 units 
in 1929.31 
The resulting stiff competition for qualified aeronautical technologists 
caused wage wars that cost Langley several of its most promising re-
searchers. Twenty-five of the 37 men mentioned earlier as having left the lab 
between 1920 and 1931 resigned during the Lindbergh boom. We know the 
immediate post-NACA employment of fourteen of this group:. nine joined 
industry, four academia, and one the military. We can guess that industry 
coaxed most of the others also. Two of the Committee's recruits from the 
University of Michigan in 1924, Karl J. Fairbanks and Maitland B. Bleecker, 
resigned to take jobs with industry within two years of Langley employment. 
Bleecker went to work for Wright Aeronautical Corporation in New Jersey, 
and Fairbanks became a stress analyst for Consolidated Aircraft in New 
York (and later a technical adviser to the board of directors for AVCO and, 
during World War II, management coordinator for Brewster Aeronautical 
Corporation). Robert J. Woods, Michigan class of 1928, resigned his Lang-
ley post after barely one year at the lab to take successive jobs with Towle, 
Detroit, Lockheed, Consolidated, and Bell aircraft companies. With them 
he made major contributions in the field of military aircraft design, espe-
cially for the P-39 Airacobra, and helped to initiate the Bell X-1 supersonic 
research airplane program. Fred Weick, who had taken a B.S. in mechan-
ical engineering from the University of Illinois in 1922, resigned in 1929 to 
become chief engineer of the Hamilton Aero Manufacturing Company in 
Milwaukee. He returned in 1930 and left again in 1936 to fulfill his dream 
of putting a small private-owner airplane into commercial design. Charles 
Zimmerman, a 1928 University of Kansas graduate, left Langley in 1937 
for a similar reason. After growing increasingly devoted to a "flying wing" 
concept, he moved from the NACA to Chance Vought. (He returned to 
Langley in 1948.) Both Zimmerman and Weick had worked on their air-
plane concepts while at Langley, but could not bring their plans to fruition 
there.32 
As serious a problem as the turnover of employees and their trans-
plantation within industry and academia was in Langley's early years, it 
also had some real advantages. Qualified researchers who remained at the 
lab advanced more quickly when their superiors left. Richard V. Rhode, for 
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While employed at Hamilton, veteran NACA engineer Fred Weick made a series of 
propeller tests with Charles Lindbergh. (This was at Hamilton's west coast factory 
in Glendale, California, where Lockheed also had a plant.) In early 1930, Lindbergh 
was pruning his new Lockheed Sirius for an attempt to break the cross-country record 
from Los Angeles to New York. He wondered whether Weick might find him a 
propeller that would give his plane a little more speed. After learning what propeller 
the Sirius had, Weick informed Lindbergh that the most he could hope for would 
be an increase of about one mile per hour, and that to make the tests accurately 
would probably take a number of flights. Lindbergh surprised Weick by deciding that 
the one mile per hour was worth going after. For three days the two aeronautical 
pioneers flew the Sirius through a series of runs along a speed course that Weick 
had laid out along a railroad track between Burbank and Van Nuys. The results 
were quite accurate, but they were a great disappointment to Lindbergh. In earlier 
speed trials, which had not been carried out with Weick 's painstaking accuracy, the 
Sirius had supposedly attained 177 MPH. The speed obtained in Weick's tests was 
eight miles per hour less -only 169 MPH. In the final run, with the best propeller 
and optimum pitch setting, Lindbergh's new plane did reach 170 MPH. From 169 to 
170 MPH - this was an increase of one mile per hour, y·ust as Weick had predicted. 
In the photo to the left, Weick is the man to the left with hands on hips; 
Lindbergh is to the right. In the photo to the right Weick is in the rear cockpit, 
Lindbergh is in the front, and Tom Hamilton is standing. 
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instance, fell heir to the PW-9 flight loads project-which was in its planning 
stages between 1926 and 1929-because of key resignations in the flight 
research section.33 And though the personnel losses may have retarded the 
successful execution of a few NACA research projects, the larger American 
aeronautics effort-the raison d'etre of the NA CA-probably benefited from 
them. Langley provided a training ground for some dozens of aeronautical 
experts at a time when American universities were not stimulating their 
growth and development. An apprenticeship at Langley seems to have 
been excellent preparation for other jobs in the design and manufacturing 
of aircraft and the teaching of aerodynamic principles. Conversely, and 
probably more importantly, understanding and appreciation of NACA goals 
and working procedures by former employees definitely facilitated closer 
contact among the various organizations concerned with aeronautics. 
The career of Elliott G. Reid provides an example of this important 
liaison. Reid began working at Langley in July 1922, one month after 
graduating from the University of Michigan's aeronautical engineering 
program. By 1925 he was in charge of research in the Atmospheric Wind 
Tunnel section. In August 1927 he resigned his Langley post to teach 
aerodynamics at Stanford University. While teaching at Stanford, Reid 
maintained a close and cordial relationship with his old friends in the 
NACA. He and Prof. Everett P. Lesley cooperated on propeller research 
under contract to the Committee ( as well as to the Army Air Corps and the 
navy's Bureau of Aeronautics). Reid had married a Virginia woman while 
at Langley and sometimes called at the lab during occasional visits to his 
wife's family farm. Though he never actually recruited for the NACA, Reid 
encouraged his students to consider research for the Committee as a career. 
Numerous Stanford-educated engineers, in fact, went to work at Langley in 
the 1930s and at NACA Ames lab in the 1940s.* 
The importance of this liaison can be seen at its highest political level 
in the career of Edward P. Warner, whose early service with the NACA-
he was Langley's first chief physicist-surely had an impact on his later 
dealings with the Committee. After resigning from the NACA in June 1920, 
Warner became aeronautics professor at MIT, assistant secretary of the 
navy in charge of aviation, editor of the journal Aviation, adviser to the 
* At Langley, this group included H. Julian "Harvey" Allen, Carl Babberger, Ogden W. 
Bodenheimer, Ralph B. Miller, John F. Parsons, Warren D. Reed, Russell G. Robinson, 
Francis M. Rogallo, and John B. Wheatley. At Ames, it included George B. McCullough, 
Henry Jessen, Charles W. Frick, Jr., Ralph F. Hunsberger, and Walter G. Vincenti. On the 
origins of the Stanford propeller research for the NACA, see Vincenti's "The Air-Propeller 
Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Study in Technological Method," Technology 
and Culture 20 (Oct. 1979): 712-51. 
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Civil Aeronautics Administration, and a leading member of the influential 
NACA Aerodynamics Committee. Though Warner's role in helping the 
NACA politically has not been studied thoroughly enough to make definitive 
conclusions, it is clear that he often used his strong voice to promote NACA 
research. In the late 1930s, for example, as head of a group responsible for 
writing the specifications for the Douglas DC-4 transport plane, Warner 
asked specifically that Langley provide the basic data on stability and 
control. 
Two external factors in the late 1920s and early 1930s helped to 
ease Langley's major personnel problems: (1) Guggenheim's philanthropic 
support of aeronautical education at various American universities from 
1926 on increased the quantity and improved the quality of the manpower 
supply, and (2) the Wall Street crash of 1929 brought on the collapse of 
several of those aircraft manufacturers that were out-competing the NACA 
for trained manpower. During the Depression that followed, the NACA 
was better able to select and retain qualified researchers, even when it had 
to give a few of its college-educated employees nonprofessional ratings and 
the majority of its veterans minimum professional pay.34 Langley researcher 
John V. Becker recalls that upon his graduation from New York University 
in 1936 his first job offer came from Grumman: $25 a week in the company 
shop. Becker opted for the NACA, better pay ($38.50 a week), and a chance 
to work with unique research equipment.35 As a result of a number of such 
decisions, the Depression became the golden age of NACA recruiting. In 
consequence, a larger, better trained, and more stable research staff at 
the Hampton installation performed aerodynamic research in many ways 
superior in quality to the NACA product of the earlier decade. 
Specialization and Innovation 
A common predicament among researchers is not knowing in advance 
whether general knowledge or specific knowledge will prove most valuable in 
the process of discovery. Faced with this dilemma, many people decide that 
it is better to look far and wide in pursuit of solutions and new knowledge 
than it is to focus exclusively on one given object. An individual can become 
a pure specialist, after all, by staying confined to a chosen field of ignorance. 
For the most part, Langley would avoid excessive specialization and 
succeed as a research institution because it did so. NACA managers as a 
group must have felt that it would be unwise for Langley to specialize: Since 
a succession of unpredictable new problems more diverse than those already 
existing at the end of World War I could be expected to emerge from the 
embryonic field qf aeronautics, practical solutions would likely require the 
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effective assimilation and combined use of many different kinds of scientific 
and technological knowledge, both specific and general. In any case, the fact 
of the matter for NACA managers was that Langley had too few personnel 
to disperse among many specialized duties. 
Before its tremendous expansion during World War II, the NACA's 
staff was large enough to specialize only where the promised rewards were 
substantial. In the 1920s and 1930s the biggest payoff was in refining 
the aerodynamics of the airplane, and that quickly became the job that 
Langley excelled in. Aerodynamics as practiced at the laboratory during 
the interwar years ( and later) was not limited to the usual fields of that 
discipline, however. Besides the study of the fundamentals of fluid flow, 
wings, bodies, and propellers, aerodynamics also included a great deal 
of work in hydrodynamics, meteorology, instrumentation ( electrical and 
otherwise), research equipment and techniques, and, most importantly, in 
propulsion (e.g., engine cow lings, engine cooling, nacelle placement, air 
intakes and exits, fuels, friction and lubrication, and noise) and in structures 
(e.g., loads, vibration, and flutter). 
Within the fields of aerodynamics~loosely defined, as above~attention 
to special subjects waxed and waned. In the 1920s and early 1930s, for 
example, Langley conducted extensive experimental and theoretical work 
on lighter-than-air (LTA) craft. The army had assigned its 19th Airship 
Squadron to Langley Field at the end of World War I. From 1922 on, this 
outfit was stationed in a large hangar located on the northwest side of the 
airplane runway. NACA flight personnel assisted the squadron with speed 
and deceleration runs for several classes of army airships and helped to 
determine improved takeoff, landing, and docking procedures. The NACA 
also detailed Langley personnel to assist in the flight trials of the navy's 
lighter-than-air craft.36 
As a result of this practical "hands-on" experience, many Langley flight 
researchers became outspoken advocates of airships. It was not clear at all 
to them or to anyone else at the time that the airplane would win out over 
the airship, let alone as totally as it soon did. Airplanes of the early 1920s 
were slow and small~an aerodynamicist who favored airships over airplanes 
even went to the bother of "proving" that airplanes larger than those of the 
day could never be built. LTA advocates believed correctly that airships had 
enormous unproven capabilities: they were not much slower and could carry 
many more passengers in far greater comfort than airplanes, most of which 
still had open cockpits; they were much more forgiving than airplanes during 
instrument flight; and with their extreme range and low operating cost, they 
could be used not just as military weapons but also for transportation of 
heavy commercial and industrial loads. 
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A camera obscura situated 
on top of a plat/ orm at 
the edge of the flying field 
measures the turning ra-
dius of the navy dirigi-
ble U.S.S. Los Angeles in 
1928. 
Despite these capabilities, the age of the airship ended on 6 May 1937, 
the day of the Hindenburg disaster. The gaseous explosion of Germany's 
greatest zeppelin killed 36 people-of whom 13 were passengers, the only 
passengers ever lost in 20 years of commercial travel by airship-and 
the tragedy became one of the greatest news events of its time. Stark 
public memory of the big dirigible going down in flames at its mooring at 
Lakehurst, New Jersey, and of the extraordinarily emotional live reporting 
of an eyewitness radio announcer, guaranteed the death of LTA flight as the 
losses of the Roma, Shenandoah, Akron, and Macon had not. 37 
Though some men at Langley remained interested in solving the prob-
lems of LTA flight even after the Hindenburg disaster, the NACA knew that 
further advocacy of comprehensive LTA flight studies would be politically 
foolish. Langley did use airship models for a brief time in association with a 
Propeller Research Tunnel program designed to explore improving the drag 
and propulsive efficiency of aircraft through boundary-layer control. 38 But 
after this work was completed in 1938, Langley carried out no more research 
relating to airships. Researchers who had specialized in LTA studies quickly 
translated their backlog of particular skills and experience to the study of 
airplanes. This translation happened rather easily, because those who had 
been most involved in airship research had been forced by· the pressures 
of the busy NACA agenda to remain active all the while in more general 
aerodynamic testing. 
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A 1/40th-scale model of the navy airship U.S.S. Akron being prepared for aerody-
namic testing on a ground board at zero degrees of yaw in the Full-Scale Tunnel in 
1935. 
The NACA's involvement in the airplane-airship competition con-
tributed more to its understanding of aerodynamics than most people today 
can imagine. Airship design leaned more heavily on aerodynamic theory 
than had airplane design because there was little empirical knowledge of 
airships, since few had been built. Larger and more expensive than air-
planes, completed airship structures could not be modified for experimental 
variations as readily; hence flight testing was extremely limited. At the 
same time, wind tunnel tests of airships had been less persuasive than of 
airplanes because of the relatively greater difficulties caused by scale effects. 
The history of the NACA's attention to airships demonstrates that 
there can be a wonderfully productive cross-flow between disciplinary spe-
cialties which only the enthusiast or visionary can anticipate. In 1936 
Max M. Munk, who had been a technical adviser at NACA headquarters 
(1921-25) and chief physicist at Langley (1926-27), predicted that 
since airship design draws on the whole domain of aerodynamics and since 
special airship aerodynamics should contain as its most notable problem the 
full analysis of airship drag, it seems quite possible that from airship theory 
may some day come forward such fundamental progress as shall revolutionize 
our technique of air travel. 39 
In a way, Munk's intuition proved correct: airship theory became extremely 
valuable when NACA researchers like Robert T. Jones began to extend 
airfoil theory to the near-sonic and supersonic speed ranges. In 1945 Jones 
used as the basis for a new slender-wing theory a linear theory formulated 
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by Munk in 1924 for the approximation of specified forces acting on airship 
hulls. Jones's approximation avoided severe mathematical difficulties in 
determining the lift distribution of wings-difficulties involving, among 
other things, the solution of an equation containing a double integral. Near 
the end of World War II, Jones recognized the indirect value of such a theory 
for the design of delta (triangular) and swept wings; soon after the NACA's 
publication of his theory, so did many others. (See chapter 10.) 
The NACA mobilized its staff for a special research effort, generally 
speaking, in one of two ways: either by adding a new unit to the formal 
organization, or by fostering an unofficial shadow organization that oper-
ated perpendicularly to the formal organization's mainly vertical lines of 
organization. "Small teams or task groups would be set up in these cases, 
relieved of their normal duties and exempted from normal lines of author-
ity, burdens of paperwork, etc.-that is, freed from the restraints of the 
large parent organization, while taking advantage of its services and facil-
ities whenever possible." 40 Laboratory management usually chose between 
the formal and informal response more instinctively than consciously. 
The Product of Environment 
One might have thought that the cosmopolitan character of modern 
aeronautics called for locating America's research center in the industrial-
ized Northeast, in the nation's capital, or perhaps on the campus of a major 
university. None of these had happened. The NACA had built its laboratory 
on flat plantation fields near Hampton, a sleepy and isolated small town on 
the southwestern shore of the Chesapeake Bay, in an area known to many as 
"Tidewater" and to a few as "the Asia Minor of Virginia." Airplanes circled 
over Langley Field, where crops of wheat and alfalfa had recently grown, 
while provincial watermen farmed oysters in the waters of Back River. The 
NACA installation, the adjacent army airfield, and the growth of Hampton 
Roads as a center of American naval power and shipbuilding during and 
after World War I combined to transform much of the antebellum character 
of the area. But the area had its effects upon the character of Langley as 
well. 
As stated earlier, research professionals came to Langley largely from 
great distances beyond Hampton, from the northern states that possessed 
the major engineering schools. Many of the engineers who left Langley in 
its formative years resigned discontented, not with the NACA, but with 
Hampton. In the eyes of the newly arriving northern professionals, the 
community appeared a cultural backwater, an isolated place surrounded by 
large bodies of water on three sides and a wilderness of marshes and tall 
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pines on the fourth. With the exception of regular steamboat lines on the 
Chesapeake Bay and a few river ferries, travel into or away from the secluded 
peninsula was difficult. Unlike today's citizens, Hamptonians then enjoyed 
neither a tunnel under Hampton Roads to Norfolk nor bridges spanning the 
wide James River at Newport News or the York River at Yorktown. 
Langley Field itself rested at the northern frontier of Elizabeth City 
County as an island within an island. A few miles of farms and swamp-
land separated the airfield from the small town. Only bad roads-some 
made from crushed oyster shells-linked laboratory to living room. The 
most attractive residential areas were the farthest from Langley, along the 
boulevards paralleling Hampton Roads, the James River, or Buckroe Beach 
on the Bay. The old families who lived in these neighborhoods, however, 
did not welcome newcomers from the North into their midst. One young 
Langley arrival, after failing to find a room-for-rent sign in a pleasant neigh-
borhood, went to the door of a private home in order to ask advice of its 
owner. The homeowner, besides informing him that he knew of no rentals, 
growled that the newcomer was the first "Yankee" ever to come through 
that gate.41 
Langley management was very aware of this and other housing prob-
lems. It had pleaded with the Army Air Service in the early 1920s to provide 
suitable on-base quarters, but nothing permanent or satisfactory was ever 
arranged. A number of the earliest employees slept on cots in the Research 
Laboratory Building. Several unmarried men herded together in board-
ing houses, while others slept at hotels. Some NACA recruits even turned 
down job appointments because they could not find suitable residences for 
themselves and their families in Hampton. Late in the decade the lab tried 
to influence some local businessmen to finance the building of new houses 
and apartments for its employees, and even took surveys on what rent its 
employees would be willing to pay, how many rooms and what kind of fur-
nishings were required, etc. 42 This effort to motivate the local construction 
industry met with some success, but the problem of finding satisfactory 
housing remained severe for Langley employees into the 1950s. 
The environment oppressed the newcomer in at least one other way. 
One of the aeronautical engineers from Michigan (Floyd Thompson) re-
ported to work at Langley in the summer of 1926 in 98-degree temperature 
and high humidity. People told him that it was unseasonably hot, but 
the young man subsequently discovered that •it was unseasonably hot there 
almost every year at that time.43 What was worse, Prohibition was in ef-
fect! At first glance anyway, the Langley professional perceived local life as 
painfully provincial and unfulfilling. 
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LMAL map of the Hampton Roads area from the late 1930s. The James River 
bridge at Newport News was completed in the late 1920s. (The map is not drawn 
to scale.} 
The professionals who stayed on adjusted to their new environment by 
learning to embellish and enjoy their distinction from the established Tide-
water community. They formed an activities association, which sponsored a 
lunchroom at the lab and maintained a "Shore Camp" for fishing, picnick-
ing, and other vacation activities, and they even created a fraternal social 
club known as "The Noble Order of the Green Cow." 44 Extracurricular ca-
maraderie translated into an important esprit de corps during workdays. 
Some freethinkers and loners did not fit too well into this active brother-
hood of living, working, and playing together, but the majority seem to have 
enjoyed it. The intensity of interaction between Langley personnel, distinct 
from established Hampton society, caused a real sense of family to develop. 
The feeling became so deeply rooted in the small NACA community that 
it flourished long after the original population had been assimilated into 
native life (largely through marriage to local girls). In 1976, 18 years after 
their parent body went out of existence, over 600 members of the NACA 
family celebrated a reunion. A larger number attended "Reunion II" in 
1982. These conventions of former employees of a defunct agency are rare 
happenings in the social history of American government. 
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Langley's staff of young engineers wearing shorts to beat the summer heat of 
Tidewater in 1930. From left to right: Harvey Herring, Irvin Coates, Warren 
Weiss, Clindon Glass, W. M. Martin, Ray W. Hooker, W. K. Ritter, Eastman 
Jacobs, Robert Mixson, John Stack, George Hammeter, Joseph A. Shortal, Kenneth 
Ward. R. E. Tozier, C. D. Waldron, Charles H. Zimmerman, Gilbert Strailman, 
Melvin Gough, Everett Johnson, Elton W. Miller, Fred Schultz, Ira H. Abbott, and 
Addison Rothrock. 
The intensity of interaction within what was a small professional com-
plement, numbering only 44 in 1926, led in a few cases to a certain peculiar 
personality-the so-called "NACA Nut." This "acceptable eccentric" was 
a technical sophisticate par excellence, who wanted to know the RPM of 
his vacuum cleaner and asked that his lumber be cut to the sixteenth of 
the inch. In local lore, this person was dreaded by every hardware and 
automobile salesman in Hampton and nearby Newport News. 
Though most locals regarded the NACA Nut with humor, they were not 
fond of certain other NACA types. In fact, the reluctance of the local people 
to accept the strangers may have resulted in part from the "smart-alecky 
behavior of some of the Langley professionals, who regarded themselves as 
intellectually superior to the natives." When asked to make a few remarks to 
the Hampton Rotary Club in 1923, engineer-in-charge Griffith, for example, 
used the opportunity to tell everyone exactly what he thought was wrong 
with the town.45 Eventually Henry Reid, Griffith's successor, developed 
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The NACA staff held an annual Christmas party in the Langley boat house, 
December 1928. 
NACA Nuts supervise cleanup operations after a 1933 hurricane. From left to 
right: Walter Reiser, chief of the Maintenance Division; Henry Reid, engineer-
in-charge; Ray Sharp, chief clerk and property officer; and Elton Miller, chief of 
the Aerodynamics Division. 
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more solid rapport with the Hampton citizenry, largely by being active in 
community affairs and belonging to many local service organizations. 
Those researchers who came to stay at the Hampton facility into the 
1930s gradually realized that to work at the NACA laboratory was in fact to 
be at a cosmopolitan hub of world aeronautics. At Langley, the Committee 
brought together men from the best engineering schools and fostered their 
cooperation and intellectual cross-fertilization. (The number of women with 
professional grades at Langley before World War II can be counted on one 
hand, with fingers left over.) It gave its researchers a chance to work in 
the most advanced wind tunnels and supplied them with translations of the 
most important scientific and technical papers from around the world. The 
annual NACA-sponsored aircraft manufacturers' conference (see chapter 6) 
kept them in touch with leaders of the aircraft industry and gave them a 
regular chance to publicize their work. One engineer who worked at Langley 
in the 1930s later recalled that 
it wasn't a matter of NACA going out to find out what somebody else was 
doing. It was a matter of other people trying to find out what we were doing.46 
The successful research programs at Langley in the late 1920s and 1930s, 
especially the systematic airfoil and cowling programs ( described in chap-
ters 4 and 5) enhanced the public reputation of the NACA and strengthened 
feelings of satisfaction with Hampton and self-sufficiency at the lab. Here, 
too, was a source for the family feeling at Langley. 
Many Langley veterans say that the laboratory operation ultimately 
benefited much more than it suffered from physical isolation. Because of 
its distance from Washington and its strong sense of individual identity, 
"Langley did not think of itself as part of the federal bureaucracy." The lab 
thus kept paperwork to a minimum, staff meetings brief, program reviews 
relatively simple and straightforward, and attention focused on technical 
and scientific rather than political matters.47 In other words, employees 
were better able to concentrate on their real work. 
A major part of this real work, and much of the human drama that 
accompanied it, was carried out in the wind tunnel buildings. 
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Wind Tunnel 
Langley first built its reputation as an outstanding aeronautical re-
search institution on the strength of the variable-density wind tunnel. 
Max M. Munk, the NACA's German aerodynamicist, proposed this unique 
and, in some respects, revolutionary piece of experimental equipment in 
1921. Two years later Munk's so-called VDT went into operation at the 
lab. The test results it yielded were so superior to those obtained with any 
previous tunnel design, especially regarding wing performance, that they 
made the NACA a world leader in aerodynamic research for at least the 
next ten years. Aircraft companies, engineering schools, and even foreign 
research establishments, such as the National Physical Laboratory of Great 
Britain, sent crews to Langley to study the VDT and return home with 
ideas for building improved versions of it. 
Considering this achievement, it is curious that the history of the VDT 
involves as much controversy as it does. There is the controversy over 
credit for inventing the tunnel: Was Munk the true father of the VDT 
concept, or was it the Russian Wladimir Margoulis, who in 1920 was working 
as an aerodynamical expert and translator for the NACA's Paris office? 
Even if Munk does deserve credit as the originator of the design concept, 
does credit for actually designing a feasible VDT rightfully go to Munk 
or to the engineering staff at Langley? There is also the controversial 
"revolt" against Munk at Langley, which, though secondary to the VDT 
achievement, is important for what it reveals of the Langley personality and 
for what it suggests about the intercultural transfer of technology. Also 
somewhat controversial in retrospect are the quality of the tunnel design 
and the quality of its test results. Was the VDT the total aerodynamic 
triumph trumpeted in the NACA brochures, or was it in fact riddled by 
shortcomings? Finally, at the end of VDT history, there is the matter of 
laminar-flow airfoils (which allowed drag to be reduced and speed to be 
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increased; to be discussed in chapter 4). Was their practical achievement 
by Langley researchers a reality or a myth? 
The Development of 
Wind Tunnel Technology 
Many of the major developments in early aeronautics depended largely 
on findings achieved through intelligent use of research equipment. The lab-
oratories that pioneered aeronautical research and development possessed 
a surprising panoply of tools, many primitive but a few highly sophisti-
cated. They included whirling arms, dynamometer cars, water channels 
( also called towing tanks), engine test beds, as well as flying machines. 
In a given lab, various technical departments supported the work of this 
experimental equipment. One department might devise and calibrate pres-
sure gauges, balances, recording dynamometers, chronographs, and the like, 
while another built and repaired test models. Mechanics tuned engines and 
maintained drive units. Photographers developed cameras to visualize air-
flow and techniques to measure aircraft movements in real and simulated 
flight. Successful research and development required careful planning and 
management of this intricate, expensive, and bedeviling equipment, with 
personnel organized into teams. 
Within the diversity of facilities, the wind tunnel predominated. Francis 
Wenham built the first known tunnel at Greenwich, England, for the 
Aeronautical Society of Great Britain in 1871. The tunnel consisted of 
a steam-driven fan that blew air through a wooden box 12 feet long and 
18 inches square, and open at both ends. All succeeding tunnels shared 
certain features of the Wenham design: a drive system turned a fan that 
produced a controlled airstream, the effects of which on a scale model 
mounted in a test section of the tunnel were precisely observed. Balances 
and other instruments measured the aerodynamic forces acting on the model 
and the model's reaction to them. 1 The progressive integration of improved 
versions of these wind tunnel components rendered all other experimental 
aerodynamic research tools, with the exception of full-scale experimental 
aircraft in free flight, secondary or obsolete by the end of World War I. 
Subsequent advances in aerodynamics have generally been closely linked to 
the course of tunnel development. 
The physical law behind the wind tunnel was not fully understood 
until the late nineteenth century, though it had been deduced by da Vinci 
and refined quantitatively by Newton: a fluid flowing past a stationary 
object produces the same interactions as those that occur when the object 
moves through the fluid at rest. 2 For aeronautical researchers, this meant 
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that flight conditions could be simulated by holding an aerodynamic surface 
stationary within an airstream moving at flight velocity. And a tunnel was 
the ideal place to conduct and observe such simulations. A tunnel was 
relatively versatile, safe, and economical. A full-size experimental airplane 
cost a great deal more money than a wind tunnel test model. Reconfiguring 
as testing progressed cost more at full size, too. And flying experimental 
planes could cost lives. Moreover, some test conditions could be measured 
and controlled more accurately on the ground than in flight, and some 
instruments could be mounted and read more easily, and lasted longer, in a 
tunnel. 
Though the invention and early (pre~Kitty Hawk) evolution of tunnel 
technology provided vital knowledge of the forces affecting wing surfaces 
(specifically about the surface area required to support a given weight, as 
well as the surface's optimum shape), the wind tunnel's full potential was 
not entirely obvious in aviation's earliest days. Several developments led to 
recognition of its importance. First, the Wright brothers relied heavily on 
wind tunnel data to design, build, and fly the first powered manned airplane 
in 1903. Second, the electric power industry developed a cleaner and more 
compact motor to replace older steam-driven monstrosities powering wind 
tunnel fans. Third, between 1908 and 1915, German aerodynamicists at the 
University of Gottingen leapfrogged earlier designs when they built the first 
closed-circuit tunnel. 
The real significance of the wind tunnel became gradually more appar-
ent beginning with aviation's dramatic event of 1903. Legend depicts the 
Wright brothers as simple bicycle mechanics whose hard work led to success, 
but in truth engineering knowledge underpinned their flying achievements. 
After their 1901 glider tests revealed major inaccuracies in published aero-
dynamic data, the Wrights turned to the wind tunnel for reliable design 
information. (Only one tunnel seems to have operated in America before 
1900-that at MIT, built to check drag measurements Samuel Langley had 
made with a whirling arm in his Washington lab.) In their Dayton shop, 
the Wrights first built a makeshift tunnel from an old starch box and later 
a more sophisticated wooden one (with a 16-square-inch test section). By 
testing the lift of each of nearly 200 airfoil models, they obtained much of 
the critical information needed to build the highly successful 1902 glider and 
its derivative, the landmark airplane of 1903. The wind tunnel had proved 
indispensable to the first successful powered flight. 3 
Electric power also contributed to the growth of the wind tunnel's 
importance. No wind tunnel before 1910 had more than 100 horsepower. 
Steam engines powered most of the early tunnel drive systems, at relatively 
low speeds. After the turn of the century, however, electric motors powered 
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more and more of the tunnels at faster and faster speeds. The first tunnel 
fan driven by electricity in the United States was most likely Albert Zahm's 
at Catholic University in 1901. Zahm's later 8 x 8-foot tunnel at the 
Washington Navy Yard attained airspeeds in 1913 of up to 160 miles per 
hour, equivalent to the diving speed of World War I military aircraft.4 
Cheap and increasingly available, electricity permitted precise adjustment 
of tunnel speed and reliable performance at higher horsepower in a quieter 
and cleaner environment. (The availability of electric power was to become 
a very important factor in the planning and operation of wind tunnels at 
Langley, especially during the facilities boom of the World War II era.) 
Nearly all of the pre-World War I wind tunnels, starting with Wenham's 
and including the Wrights', had open circuits; that is, they drew air into 
the test passage directly from the atmosphere and released it back into the 
environment. The classic examples of the non-return, open-circuit tunnel 
are those Gustave Eiffel (1832-1923) built in and around Paris in the early 
1900s. His 1.5-meter-diameter tunnel at Champs de Mars, completed in 
1909, sucked air through a test section at 20 meters per second (roughly 
45 miles per hour). Eiffel's later tunnel at Auteuil, built in 1911 and 
1912, improved the design. Producing an airspeed of 32 meters per second 
(roughly 72 miles per hour), it was the last great open-circuit design of the 
era. 5 ( Open-circuit tunnels are still used today, for special purposes.) 
The aerodynamics research staff of the great German physicist-engineer 
Ludwig Prandtl (1875-1953) changed the direction of tunnel development 
in 1908, when it finished the first continuous-circuit, return-flow ma-
chine at the University of Gottingen. This new tunnel had three inher-
ent advantages over open circuits: first, it reduced power requirements 
( through partial recovery of the kinetic energy of the air leaving the dif-
fuser); second, by incorporating improved screens and honeycombs, it pro-
duced and maintained airflow that was much more uniform than that in 
open circuits; and third, it permitted pressurization and humidity control. 
The primary problem peculiar to the closed circuit~turning the airflow 
360 degrees~was solved by introducing efficient turning vanes. A settling 
chamber upstream of the test area in Gottingen's second-generation closed-
circuit tunnel, completed in 1916, further dampened airstream turbulence, 
and a contraction cone at the test section entrance further increased its 
velocity.6 Thus, the new closed-circuit tunnels produced faster, smoother, 
drier, and more reliable airflow than any tunnel had produced before. 
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NACA Wind Tunnel No. 1 
By the time Langley laboratory came to life in 1920, the closed-circuit 
tunnel had proved its superiority over the open-circuit type. But the NACA, 
cautious because its original staff had so little wind tunnel experience, still 
chose to design its first tunnel with an open circuit. It patterned the design 
after that of a successful tunnel which had been in operation for some time 
at the British National Physical Laboratory. The leaders of the Committee 
apparently felt that it was better to improve the NPL tunnel design and to 
get some immediate firsthand operating experience with the proven machine 
than it was for novices in the field to proceed boldly with the creation of 
newer experimental technology. In fact, NACA engineering personnel were 
so inexperienced that they were told to construct and operate a one-fifth-
scale model of the English tunnel before going ahead with the design of the 
actual facility. 
In the fall of 1920, very soon after completing the tunnel that resulted 
from experience with this model, Langley researchers discovered that results 
from tests in Tunnel No. 1 could not really be applied to the performance of 
full-size airplanes. Because the circular test section of the new facility was 
only five feet in diameter, it was impracticable to use models wider than 
three and a half feet, or about one-twentieth scale. NACA engineers and 
other informed aerodynamicists knew how to convert or "scale up" data 
determined from airflow over such a small object, but systematic testing 
now made it clear to them that the empirically derived factor customarily 
used to approximate full scale was largely unreliable. 
The problem concerned Reynolds number. In the 1880s, Osborne 
Reynolds (1842-1912) of the University of Manchester had identified this 
crucial scaling parameter. In a classic set of experiments dealing with the 
flow characteristics of water through pipes, Reynolds had demonstrated that 
the responses of an object to that flow depended on the object's size, the 
speed with which it (or the water) was moving, the density of the water, 
and the viscosity of the water. He concluded from a mathematical study 
of the relationship between the flow patterns over a scale model and those 
patterns over the same shape at actual size that if in both cases a certain 
flow parameter (the ratio pV d/ µ, where p = density, V = velocity, d = 
diameter, and µ = fluid viscosity) was the same, the flow pattern in both 
cases would also be the same. Understanding and using this ratio, known 
thereafter as Reynolds number, soon became vital to wind tunnel work 
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Langley's first wind tunnel was a modest open-circuit device which, by the time its 
construction began in 1919, had been made virtually obsolete by Germany's closed-
circuit tunnels. The NACA built a one-fifth-scale model tunnel (top) to give LMAL 
researchers some design and operating experience before moving on to the real thing. 
In the bottom photograph, two LMAL mechanics pose near the entrance end of 
the actual tunnel, where air was pulled into the test section through a honeycomb 
arrangement to smoothen the flow. 
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The 5-foot-diameter circular test section and control room of NACA Tunnel Na. 1. 
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because it provided a rational basis for extrapolating experimental data 
from scale-model testing. The closer a tunnel's airflow came to producing 
the value of the full-scale Reynolds number, the closer its test measurements 
came to indicating the aerodynamic forces of actual flight. 7 
In the older form of atmospheric wind tunnel the Reynolds number 
usually amounted to only about one-tenth that of actual flight. This 
limitation was critical in the aerodynamic region known as maximum lift, 
which determines landing speed, and equally critical in the region near zero 
lift, or minimum drag, which determines maximum speed. (According to 
some aeronautical engineers, minimum drag is "mostly fictional" and thus 
strongly dependent on Reynolds number.)8 Since NACA Tunnel No. 1 was 
a low-speed facility which necessarily involved one-twentieth-scale models, 
the Reynolds numbers of its tests were recognized as being too low by a 
factor of 20 for comparison with flight performance of the actual aircraft. 
Though the researchers at Langley knew that it was possible theoretically to 
increase Reynolds number in their tests by increasing model size, increasing 
the speed of the airflow, or by increasing the density or decreasing the 
viscosity of the air, none of these alternatives seemed feasible given the 
nature of the existing facility. 
In 1921 Max Munk, working as a technical assistant in the NACA's 
Washington office, suggested to the Committee that experimental results 
comparable to full-scale flying conditions might be realized in a sealed 
airtight chamber, the air in which would be compressed "to the same extent 
as the model being tested." His basic idea was simply to achieve higher 
Reynolds numbers approximating the flight values of contemporary aircraft 
by using denser air. Specifically, he proposed immediate construction at 
the LMAL of a variable-density tunnel. This facility, Munk argued, would 
compensate for the small size of the one-twentieth-scale models by increasing 
the density of the air in the tunnel up to 20 atmospheres. Though the 
chief physicist at Langley argued that through flight research his staff could 
obtain airfoil data at high Reynolds numbers without this expensive new 
facility, the NACA Executive Committee authorized construction of Munk's 
compressed-air tunnel in March 1921.9 
Max Munk 
By the time he arrived in 1920 at the port of Boston from his native 
Germany, en route to Washington, D.C., to confirm his appointment as 
technical assistant to the NACA, Max M. Munk, just 30 years old, was 
already a prominent aeronautical engineer. His aptitude in mathematics 
and the sciences was such that Munk as a young teenager had convinced 
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A wooden 1/20th-scale model of a Curtiss Jenny for tunnel testing. 
A Curtiss Jenny in flight with trailing Pitot-static tube for airspeed calibration, 
August 1922. 
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his parents-lower-middle-class Jews from the worldly old Hansa city of 
Hamburg-that he should leave rabbinical school for German academe. In 
1914 he earned an engineering diploma at the Hanover Polytechnical School 
(where to sound more Germanic he started to use his middle name Max in 
place of his first name Michael) and in 1917 two doctorates at the University 
of Gottingen, one in engineering and one in physics. 
At the university he had been one of Ludwig Prandtl's most gifted 
students, assisting Prandtl in his effort to achieve higher Reynolds numbers 
by using oversized models in the new closed-circuit tunnel. During World 
War I, a significant number of Munk's analyses of wind tunnel experiments 
appeared as secret military reports. "Nevertheless," according to Munk, 
"they were translated in England a week after appearance and distributed 
there and in the U.S." In his doctoral thesis, "Isoperimetrische Probleme 
aus der Theorie des Fluges," Munk used shrewd intuitive mathematics to 
solve the problem of how to make the induced drag of a wing ( a concept 
originated by Munk) as small as possible. (He showed that the minimum 
induced drag of an airfoil was obtained mathematically if the distribution 
of the lift over the span corresponded to an ellipse.) At the end of the war, 
he worked a short time for the German navy and then became an employee 
of the airship manufacturing company Luftschiffbau Zeppelin, where he 
designed a small atmospheric wind tunnel and proposed the design of a 
much larger (1000 horsepower) one for the testing of large airship models. 
This incredible facility was never built, but according to Munk's plan, would 
have produced a Reynolds number equivalent to the flight conditions of a 
full-size airship by having a 152-kilometer-per-hour (nearly 100 miles per 
hour) closed-circuit airflow pressurized to 100 atmospheres. 10 An airflow 
of this speed under such high pressure would have produced a Reynolds 
number much higher than that produced by any other wind tunnel at that 
time. 
Leaders of the NACA were greatly impressed with what they thought to 
be the scientific orientation of European aeronautical researchers like Munk 
and of their parent organizations. Joseph Ames, professor of physics at 
Johns Hopkins University and chairman of the NACA Executive Committee 
from 1920 to 1937, wrote in January 1922 that 
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a branch of pure science. Those countries have developed the best airships and 
airplanes which have devoted the most thought, time, and money to scientific 
studies. 11 
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Future NACA member Jerome C. Hunsaker had spent a few weeks in 1913 
at Prandtl's Gottingen laboratory as a representative of the U.S. Navy 
while touring several major European aerodynamic labs. On his return 
he reported his special admiration for this particular German research 
organization, where a steady stream of promising young doctoral candidates 
under an accomplished academic mentor provided the lifeblood of the 
research effort. 12 Thus after the war and despite its residual ill will, the 
NACA generally and Hunsaker specifically would be predisposed to listen 
closely to any request by one of these young aeronautical scientists for 
employment. According to Munk's own version of his 1920 migration from 
Germany to the United States, Prandtl had contacted Hunsaker soon after 
the end of the war about a job for Munk. (Munk was interested in going 
to America partly because a distant uncle had made a fortune in mining 
here.) 13 Hunsaker informed Ames of Munk's interest and availability, and 
Ames persuaded the rest of the Committee, which was then hard pressed 
for talented aerodynamicists (Edward P. Warner having just resigned as 
Langley's chief physicist), to offer Munk a position as technical assistant. 
Munk's employment required two orders from President Woodrow Wilson: 
one to get a former enemy into the country, the other to get him a 
job in government. 14 (At the end of the next world war, another special 
arrangement would bring the German rocket specialists led by Wernher 
von Braun to work for the American government as part of "Operation 
Paperclip." )15 
For six years Munk was stationed in Washington, where he worked 
mostly on theoretical problems. He contributed theories of flow around 
airships, and of moments and positions of center of pressure on other 
aerodynamic shapes. He introduced a significant advance in airfoil theory, 
in the form of a linearization that permitted the calculation of certain airfoil 
characteristics in terms of easily identified parameters of the profile. During 
the six-year period the NACA published over 40 of Munk's papers. His 
contributions were considered so outstanding by the Committee that in 
1925 it published a paper (TR 413) by Joseph Ames entitled "A Resume of 
the Advances in Theoretical Aerodynamics Made by Max M. Munk." 
Simultaneous Discovery 
Munk had arrived at his idea for pressurizing air to increase the 
Reynolds number in wind tunnel experiments at just about the same time 
that Russian-born Wladimir Margoulis (former collaborator of aerodynam-
icist Nikolai E. Joukowski) considered the feasibility of a closed-circuit wind 
tunnel using carbon dioxide as the test medium. Though the ideas of Munk 
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Munk became an employee of the NACA principally through the efforts of Jerome C. 
Hunsaker (left), a future chairman of the NACA (1941-1956) who was, at the time 
of Munk's immigration, chief of design in the navy's new Bureau of Aeronautics, 
and of Joseph S. Ames (right), executive chairman {1920-1937) and later chairman 
(1927-1939} of the NACA, seen here, in about 1920, at his desk at NACA 
headquarters. 
and Margoulis were elaborated in different ways, their basic concept was the 
same--that dynamical similarity between scale models and full-size proto-
types could be achieved by using a fluid that had a lower density /viscosity 
ratio (the p/ µ term in the Reynolds number). The virtual simultaneity 
of the two men's thinking has, since the 1920s, prompted some people to 
question the priority: Who had the idea first, Munk or Margoulis? 
Margoulis first proposed using carbon dioxide for wind tunnel test-
ing in his paper "Nouvelle methode d'essai de modeles en souffieries 
aerodynamiques," which appeared in the Comptes rendus de l'Academie des 
Sciences, Paris in November 1920. Five months later, the NACA published 
Margoulis's own English translation of his paper as Technical Note (TN) 52, 
under the title "A New Method of Testing Models in Wind Tunnels." Munk 
proposed his idea for a compressed-air tunnel in NACA Technical Note 60, 
"On a New Type of Wind Tunnel," which appeared in June 1921. Thus, 
it appears that the first published proposal to increase Reynolds number in 
wind tunnel experiments by using a fluid of low kinematic viscosity came 
from Margoulis. On the other hand, Munk had proposed for Zeppelin the 
design of a pressurized tunnel even before 1920. 
The Munk-Margoulis priority issue was not energetically debated in 
aeronautical circles until the British began to design their own variable-
density tunnel at the National Physical Laboratory in the late 1920s; 
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The tank for the Variable-Density Tunnel arrived at Langley by railway from its 
manufacturer, the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, Newport 
News, Virginia, in February 1922. 
Max A1. Munk inspects the Variable-Density Tunnel, summer 1922. 
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then the British-American competition for the lion's share of credit for 
developing the tunnel concept began. In the twentieth Wilbur Wright 
Memorial Lecture, delivered in England in May 1932, H. E. Wimperis, vice-
president of the Royal Aeronautical Society, claimed that British engineers 
had extrapolated the variable-density tunnel idea from Margoulis's paper 
and had put forward a considered design for a compressed-air tunnel before 
hearing a word about the NACA design suggested by Munk. Spokesmen 
for the American aeronautical research establishment disputed this BritisJ1 
claim. Walter S. Diehl of the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, for example, 
wrote: "While it is quite natural for Mr. Wimperis to argue in favor of 
the British equipment, I get the impression from his lecture that there is a 
lot of 'sour-grape' background and that he is being unfair to the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in his statements and comparisons." 
In Diehl's mind, there was "no doubt whatever ... that Munk originated 
the idea" and that the British were trying to steal the credit for Margoulis 
and themselves. 16 
The Method of Airfoil Research 
Though all manner of aerodynamic studies were attempted in the 
VDT, the facility's primary purpose was to test airfoils. Wing design 
was one of the most important aeronautical research problems facing 
NACA Langley in its early years. From the time that Sir George Cayley 
(1773-1857) had identified the inclined plane as "the true principle of aerial 
navigation by mechanical means" in the 1830s, aerodynamicists had tried 
in earnest to know better the complex flow phenomena through which 
the airfoil generates the lift necessary for flight. In the eight decades of 
sporadic aeronautical development between Cayley's major work and the 
establishment of the NACA, they had tried everything from crude cut-
and-try to rather sophisticated experiments. All of the successful methods 
of wing design had been empirical. Cayley had feared that the whole 
subject of aeronautics was "of so dark a nature" that it could be more 
usefully investigated by experiment than by theoretical reasoning; thus he 
had tested various airfoil shapes on the end of a whirling arm. In 1879 
the Aeronautical Society of Great Britain had reinforced this commitment 
to empiricism, opining that mathematics had been "quite useless to us in 
regard to flying." One of the Society's most prominent members, Horatio 
Phillips (1845-1924), had conducted primitive wind tunnel tests "of every 
conceivable [wing] form and combination of forms." 17 The Wright brothers 
had later used a rough version of experimental parameter variation to 
determine how much lift and drag could be expected from various wing 
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sections. (Parameter variation has been described as "the procedure of 
repeatedly determining the performance of some material, process, or device 
while systematically varying the parameters that define the object or its 
conditions of operation"; see chapter 5.) 18 During World War I, European 
research teams at the NPL in England, the Eiffel Institute in France, and 
Prandtl's laboratory in Germany had refined this method. Their five or six 
best shapes, plus close derivatives, provided nearly every wing section in 
use at the end of the conflict. 
Ironically, the empirical method had been providing designers with 
some basic misinformation about wings. Since the tests were made at 
the low Reynolds numbers then available in the small atmospheric wind 
tunnels, thin, highly cambered (arched) wing sections seemed to have the 
most favorable properties. At low Reynolds numbers, airflow over thick 
sections "separated" early and resulted in unsatisfactory performance.* 
Furthermore, the Wrights had achieved their successful flight in 1903 with 
a long, slender airfoil. Convinced that the longest span with the thinnest 
sections generated the greatest lift, some German designers of propellers 
even went so far as to make their blades from mere fabric stretched by 
centrifugal force. Nearly all World War I aircraft, with the important 
exceptions of some advanced aircraft designed by Junkers and Fokker, 
employed extremely thin wings requiring for external strength and rigidity 
a messy conglomeration of wires, struts, and cables. 19 
In its first Annual Report to Congress in 1915, the NACA called for 
"the evaluation of more efficient wing sections of practical form, embodying 
suitable dimensions for an economical structure, with moderate travel of 
the center of pressure and still affording a large angle of attack combined 
with efficient action." The Committee could not carry out this work itself, 
of course, because Langley laboratory was at that time no more than a 
dream. The best the NACA could do toward improving wing design was 
to support wind tunnel tests at MIT, which were under the auspices of the 
airplane engineering department of the Bureau of Aircraft Production. This 
experimental program resulted by 1918 in the introduction of the U.S.A. 
series, the largest single group of related airfoils developed in America up 
to that time. 20 
The NACA supplemented its support of the MIT wind tunnel program 
with a laborious effort by its small technical staff in Washington to bring 
* "At small angles of attack the flow has little difficulty in following the surface. As 
the angle is increased, however, the air finds it increasingly difficult to maintain contact, 
especially on the upper surface, where it has to work its way against increasing pressure, 
and it separates from the surface before reaching the trailing edge." Theodore von Karman, 
Aerodynamics (Ithaca, N.Y., 1954), pp. 46-47. 
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together the results of airfoil investigations at the European laboratories. 
In June 1919 the Committee opened an intelligence office in Paris to collect, 
exchange, translate, and abstract reports, and miscellaneous technical and 
scientific information relating to aeronautics. Then, through its Committee 
on Publication and Intelligence, the NACA planned to distribute this 
information within the United States.21 
One of the early fruits of this labor was NACA Technical Report 
(TR) 93, "Aerodynamic Characteristics of Airfoils," a comprehensive and 
handy digest of standardized test information about all the different airfoils 
employed by the Allied powers. The report, published in the NACA Annual 
Report of 1920, offered graphic illustrations of the detailed shapes and 
performance characteristics of over 200 airfoils, as well as four index charts 
that classified the wings according to aerodynamic and structural properties. 
The intention was to make it easier for an American designer to pick out 
a wing section suited to the particular flying machine on which he was 
working. In retrospect it is plain that many of the plots were totally 
unreasonable~no doubt because the NACA personnel who interpreted 
the collected data, like those who made the original tests, did not really 
understand how and why certain shapes influenced section characteristics 
as they did. Despite the flaws, however, the effort that went into the 
preparation of this report and others like it mobilized the NACA staff to 
manage a solid program of airfoil experiments once research facilities were 
ready at Langley. 22 
When the LMAL began routine operation in June 1920, the empirical 
approach was by far the most sensible way to better wings. Wing section 
theory, as developed before World War I by Europeans Martin W. Kutta 
(1867-1914) and Nikolai E. Joukowski (or Zhukovski, 1847-1921, director of 
the Eiffel laboratory during World War I and consultant to the NACA's 
Paris office after the war), permitted the rough determination of lift-
curve slopes and pitching moments, but little else. It was possible to 
transform from the pressure distribution around a circle, which was known 
theoretically, to the flow distribution usually measured around an airfoil, 
and thus create an approximate airfoil shape, but the mathematics required 
for the transformation was too abstruse for the average engineer. Further, 
there was no way to measure the practical value of the mathematical 
formulations other than via systematic wind tunnel testing. Prandtl had 
refined the Kutta-Joukowski method, but his refinement still allowed only 
for the rough calculation of wing section characteristics. 23 
Some of the most popular airfoils of the 1920s were produced by highly 
intuitive methods~cut-and-try procedures based neither on theory nor on 
systematic experimentation. For the wing section of his successful seaplane, 
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Grover Loening took the top curvature of the Royal Air Force's 11umber 15 
wing section and for the underside drew a streamlined curve with a reverse 
in the center, which enclosed the spars. The net result of this cut-and-try 
method was so good that Loening, who did not want other people to copy his 
product, decided not to submit the wing for tests anywhere. Col. Virginius 
Clark, USA, designed one of the 1920s' most popular airfoils for wings, 
the Clark Y, simply by deploying the thickness distribution of a Gottingen 
airfoil above a flat undersurface; he chose the flat feature only because it 
was highly desirable as a reference surface for applying the protractor in 
the manufacture and maintenance of propellers.24 
The cut-and-try method, though successful in the hands of a few 
talented practitioners, had too spotty a success record. Aeronautical 
engineers understood that a wide range of effective airfoils would be created 
only by using some more systematic analytical method involving tests in a 
significant and reliable wind tunnel. 
VDT Testing 
From the standpoint of significant and reliable research results, Lang-
ley's original atmospheric wind tunnel had been largely unproductive; how-
ever, the earliest tests in the new Variable-Density Tunnel, which began 
operation in October 1922, demonstrated that the NACA's experimental 
equipment had come of age. Tests in the compressed air of the VDT raised 
the dynamic scale significantly, validating Munk's design principle and mak-
ing it possible to estimate full-scale performance more correctly by observing 
small model wings. 
Langley began its first experimental investigation of a series of wing 
sections in the VDT in 1923. Though the research approach was to be 
essentially empirical, the idea behind the design of the series derived from 
a highly intuitive theoretical statement. In the "General Theory of Thin 
Wing Sections," published by the NACA in 1922, Max Munk had reversed 
the classic Ku.tta-Joukowski method. Convinced that contemporary aerody-
namicists would fail to produce significantly improved airfoils if they contin-
ued to let the wing section be dictated by this mathematical method, Munk 
decided to "start with a wing section, any technically valuable wing section, 
and fit the mathematics to the wing section." Even though the method 
required some simplifying assumptions and did not permit the calculation 
of maximum-lift coefficients, Munk's idea was still a major breakthrough, 
if not a watershed in the history of airfoil design. 25 By replacing the airfoil 
section with an infinitely thin curved line, it permitted the calculation of 
certain airfoil characteristics (e.g., lift-curve slope, pitching moments, and 
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Top, an LMAL carpenter prepares full-scale wings for flight research, 1920; bottom, 
workmen in the patternmakers' shop manufacture a wing skeleton for a Thomas-
Morse MB-8 airplane for pressure distribution studies in flight, June 1922. 
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Standing on wooden boxes in order to peer through small portals, two LMAL 
engineers read balances located inside the Variable-Density Tunnel, 1923. VDT 
section head David L. Bacon stands to the far left leaning against the railing. 
chord-wise distribution) directly in terms of easily identified parameters of 
the shape. 26 
Munk's analysis suggested to the NACA that a design having a slight 
upward camber near the trailing edge would result in a stable center of 
pressure travel. So, starting with a mean line pulled out analytically from 
one of the better contemporary airfoils, the VDT research team wrapped 
a thickness form about the upper and lower surfaces of an airfoil. Then, 
by pulling the mean line or camber out, going to a symmetrical section, 
and changing all of the ordinates to correspond to the correct proportion of 
thickness, it prescribed a family of 27 related airfoils. The NACA named 
the members of this experimental series "M sections" after Munk. 27 
The range of parametric variation having been determined and the 
shapes prescribed, the wind tunnel program then followed a rather typical 
course. First, technicians prepared the precious scale models from a heat-
treated aluminum alloy strong enough to take the stresses to be encountered 
in 20 atmospheres of pressure.* Second, an instruments expert fine-tuned 
* In the early days of the VDT, Langley ordered most of its models from the W. H. 
Nichols Machine Company, Waltham, Mass., which possessed a piece of equipment perfect 
for cutting metal airfoils. Later the NACA bought this machine from Nichols and made 
many of its own models. Because precision in construction of a model was essential for an 
accurate experiment, with special attention necessarily being paid to exactness of contour, 
fineness of the polished surface, and the chance o{ error resulting from excessive machine-
tool wear, LMAL managers felt that this essential manufacturing job should not be left in 
the hands of contractors. 
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the tunnel balance and other pieces of recording equipment. Third, an 
engineer mounted the carefully prepared model in the test section, using a 
sensitive inclinometer to set its chord parallel to the airflow and calibrating 
the given angle of attack. In successive tunnel runs, he would change that 
angle in increments of approximately 1.5 degrees. Finally, someone hit the 
switch to compress the air in the tank to the desired pressure. 
As the test began, two researchers peered through small glass portals in 
the side of the tank, operating a signal system that triggered different lights 
as the airspeed became constant or when a problem arose. These men called 
out their readings of the balance scales to a recorder who simultaneously 
read aloud, from his panel of instruments, tank pressure and temperature 
of the manometer liquid. For scale-effect comparisons, the VDT staff made 
the tests at a constant airspeed ( approximately 50 miles per hour) and at 
five different tank pressures (usually 1, 2.5, 5, 10, and 20 atmospheres) 
and then tested airfoils of closely related characteristics at 20 atmospheres 
only. Modifying a particular feature of a model while keeping all its other 
characteristics constant enabled the staff to compare the aerodynamic effects 
on each new shape with those on the original. When all the necessary 
readings had been taken, someone shut the drive motor off and opened a 
blow-off valve which released the pressurized air. The calculation, plotting, 
and final processing of data took weeks. "Computers" existed in those 
days~but being human, they had to eat lunch, and wanted coffee breaks! 
The NACA reported the results of its "Model Tests with a Systematic 
Series of 27 Wing Sections at Full Reynolds Number" in 1925, declaring that 
they showed "remarkable agreement" with Munk's theory and had resulted 
in the design of several sections (especially the M-6 and M-12) with excellent 
characteristics.28 Langley's VDT had established itself as the primary source 
for aerodynamic data at high Reynolds numbers in the United States, if not 
in the world. 
The Revolt Against Munk 
In 1926, following the initial success of the airfoil research program in 
the VDT, the NACA transferred Munk to Langley full time as chief of the 
Aerodynamics Division. Munk was to supervise the work of all the wind 
tunnel, flight research, and analytic sections. 29 The only man above him in 
the laboratory organization was the engineer-in-charge. 
Within a year the engineers who worked for Munk were in full revolt 
against him, and he chose to resign. 
Serious tension between Munk and Langley engineers dated back to the 
design and construction of the Variable-Density Tunnel in 1921 and 1922. 
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Munk visited Langley occasionally during this period to monitor the work. 
Leigh Griffith, Langley's first engineer-in-charge, was apparently grateful for 
this assistance. At one point he informed George Lewis that "the results of 
Dr. Munk's [recent] visit to the laboratory have clearly demonstrated that 
such visits are very desirable as a means of securing a correct understanding 
of the conditions in the wind tunnel and of harmonizing the opinions of the 
men immediately concerned with his work." Griffith recommended that 
Munk visit Langley again in two or three weeks.30 
But it was easier for Griffith, an engine man, to feel this way about 
Munk than it was for Langley chief physicist Frederick Norton, in charge of 
the aerodynamics sections, who detected in Munk a stubborn unwillingness 
to take personal responsibility for transforming the idea of the compressed-
air tunnel into reality. In 1921 Norton complained to Washington about 
the chaos brought on by Munk's vague yet overbearing direction of the 
construction of the Variable-Density Tunnel. He reported that the work of 
designing the interior and balance system of the VDT was being carried out 
very inefficiently, due chiefly, he believed, to the lack of sympathy between 
Munk and the Langley draftsmen and engineers. "Dr. Munk does not seem 
to have any clear idea as to what he wishes in the engineering design," 
Norton reported, "excepting that he is sure that he does not want anything 
that [I or my men] suggest." According to Norton, many portions of Munk's 
design were quite unsatisfactory: 
For example, the foundations were laid out here under my direction; they were 
then considerably altered in Washington [by Munk], without my knowledge, 
and contracts let. As far as I know, no one has checked up these foundations 
and there is quite a possibility of serious mistakes. Changes in concrete work 
are very expensive. The conduit for the electrical wiring should be cast into 
the foundations, but except in one case I believe this has not been done. There 
has also been little thought given to water piping and drainage. These are just 
a few of the hundreds of small things that no one seems to be responsible for. 
Later, Norton lamented that he was "getting so disgusted" that he wanted 
the NACA to keep as much of the tunnel design work as possible in 
Washington. By this, he meant also for the Committee to keep Munk away 
from Langley as much as possible, no matter how dissatisfied the German 
was to stay in Washington working entirely on theory.31 
The NACA did not listen to Norton's appeal. When the VDT was ready 
for operation in late 1922, George Lewis began sending Munk to Langley 
for periods of four to eight weeks to take charge of the device. During these 
stays at the Tidewater facility Munk was "responsible for the preparation 
of the research program, the control of the operation of the apparatus and 
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Frederick H. Norton, LMAL chief physicist, observes an airplane flying above Ms 
speed course station {top}, and works on recording manometers (bottom), about 
1922. 
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the preparation of reports." 32 In 1923 Norton resigned as Langley's chief 
physi~ist to work in industry (and later, academics). His successor, David 
Bacon, an engineer, opposed Munk's presence at Langley even more actively 
than had Norton. According to an order from the NACA in Washington, 
Bacon was to turn over the direction of the VDT to Munk during 1924 for 
a period of four weeks. The order read: 
Dr. Munk ... will report directly to the Engineer-In-Charge .... Mr. Bacon 
will supply to Dr. Munk such information as shall be requested pertaining to 
the construction and operation of the tunnel, as well as all data of previous 
tests. 
Bacon would not do it. Munk wired George Lewis in Washington: BACON 
REFUSES TO SURRENDER THE TUNNEL AND FILES. PLEASE SEND 
INSTRUCTIONS. 33 Bacon relented, but one month later he too resigned from 
the NACA. 34 
To understand why the Langley engineers ultimately found it impossible 
to work with a man like Munk, hardly anything else is needed than an 
account of their troubles with him over the design of a balance for the lab's 
Propeller Research Tunnel. When Munk began his full-time duty at Langley 
as chief of aerodynamics in January 1926, engineer Fred E. Weick was busy 
designing a support and balance system for the aircraft components and 
models to be placed in the new tunnel. Weick, a former employee of 
the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, had known Munk in Washington. In 
fact, Weick and Munk were in different ways originally responsible for the 
NACA's decision .to build the propeller research equipment.* Weick had 
* In response to a request from George Lewis in 1923 about how the NACA might better 
help naval aviation, Weick (B.S., University of Illinois, 1922) mentioned the need for full-scale 
propeller tests at high tip speed, where compressibility losses became evident. ( Compressibility 
is the physical property by which the volume of matter-air, in this case--decreases to some 
extent as pressure is brought to bear on it.) According to Weick, the British had made 
high-tip-speed tests on two-foot models in a wind tunnel, but the Reynolds number was so 
low that the results were questionable when applied to full scale. At that time, however, 
Weick could not envision any practical way of making full-scale tests other than in flight. 
About a year later, Lewis asked Weick how he would like to see a wind tunnel capable 
of making the tests. Weick laughed, remarking that in order to make practical tests on a 
ten-foot propeller at speeds up to 100 miles per hour, the diameter of the tunnel's throat 
would have to be at least 20 feet, or four times the largest wind tunnel at Langley up to that 
time, with a drive unit capable of providing at least a couple thousand horsepower. "Yes," 
Lewis agreed, "but I've been talking it over with Dr. Munk, and we think that such an 
arrangement might be practical." Asked if he would like to come down to Langley Field and 
run the propeller tunnel for the NACA, if built, Weick agreed without hesitation. Weick, 
"Historical Reminiscences," tape 3 (side 1); transcript in the Langley Historical Archive 
(LHA), p. 6. 
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great respect for Munk's abilities. On the other hand, he did not want his 
balance design turned down at the last minute, so he had taken the pain to 
take each detail of design- which was mostly on cross-section paper-up to 
Munk to get his approval, and got his initials on every single one of them. 
This, Weick thought, would certainly assure Munk's final approval. 
Weick proceeded to build the tunnel balance atop a structural steel 
framework. A couple of days before Weick planned to try out the balance 
using a little Sperry Messenger airplane with its engine operating, Munk 
made an unannounced visit to the PRT building. Just as he walked into 
the bare-walled 50-foot cubicle that housed the test section, a loud horn 
squawked, calling someone to the telephone. According to Weick, 
this sent Dr. Munk into a tantrum. Before he had entirely calmed down, he 
walked over toward the balance structure and put his hands on the long diagonal 
braces. These were fairly flexible and he found he could move them back and 
forth a bit. 
Visualizing the entire structure vibrating to the point of failure and the 
whole airplane and balance crashing to the ground, the perturbed Munk 
ordered Weick to tear down the balance entirely and design a new foundation 
and framework for it. The chief of aerodynamics then went back to his office 
a couple of blocks away. 
Naturally Weick, too, was perturbed. Munk, after all, had approved 
every detail of that balance. After giving the German aerodynamicist 
some time to cool down, Weick went to the chief's office and, as calmly 
as he could manage, mentioned that he thought the natural frequencies of 
the long diagonal members would be so low that vibrations would not be 
incited by the more rapid impulses from the engine and propeller. The 
engineer suggested that inasmuch as the balance was ready to be tried out, 
they should make a careful trial starting at low speed, gradually increasing 
it, before dismantling the apparatus. Munk agreed, but demanded to be 
present when the test was made. 
Weick did not like that idea one iota. To start the engine, the 
Messenger's propeller had to be cranked by a man standing on a ladder. 
This sweaty business often took some time. It was not the kind of operation 
he wanted the excitable Munk to watch. Weick executed an end run around 
Munk, his division chief, and discussed his problem with the engineer-in-
charge, now Henry Reid. Together, Weick and Reid decided to check out 
the tunnel balance system in Munk's absence. This was easily done, as 
Munk worked on theoretical problems in his room at a Hampton boarding 
house every afternoon. Weick set up the test run and ran through the speed 
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Interior views of the Propeller Research Tunnel building showing the balance struc-
ture which had upset Munk. The setup in the top photograph was for a drag inves-
tigation over a dummy fuselage in 1928. Among the men in the bottom photograph, 
also from 1928, are Munk's successor as chief of aerodynamics Elton Miller (far 
right}, and PRT section head Fred Weick (immediately in front of Miller). 
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range without any difficulty from the balance. He then made some minor 
adjustments and satisfied himself that all rough spots had been smoothed 
out. 
The problem of convincing Munk remained. Weick could not simply 
tell him about the successful test, so he and the engineer-in-charge agreed 
to arrange another "first test" for Munk to witness. Reid escorted Munk 
to the tunnel the next morning. Weick casually said, "Good morning," 
walked up the ladder, and pulled through the Messenger's prop. Luckily, 
the engine started on the first try. Weick moved the ladder away, ran the 
engine through its entire range, and then shut it down. There was no 
noticeable vibration in any part of the balance. Weick, who had wo1.1dered 
what Munk's reaction would be, later recounted: "He walked toward me 
with his hand outstretched and congratulated me on the success of the 
operation." 35 The balance system operated satisfactorily with engines of up 
to 400 horsepower into the late 1930s, when it was replaced by a new and 
better one. 
The matter of the PRT balance design resolved, Weick later had to 
deal with Munk over the technical issue of the best propeller blade-section 
coefficients-the numbers representing the lift, drag, and pitching moment 
characteristics. Munk thought that the coefficients should be put on the 
same logical foundation as that on which wing coefficients were based. While 
Munk's were more precise and elegant, Weick urged the use of coefficients 
that would be easier for designers to apply. ( As an employee of the Bureau 
of Aeronautics, Weick had authored NACA TN 212, "Simplified Propeller 
Design for Low-Powered Airplanes," to help people make their own props 
for home-built aircraft.) One day in Munk's office Weick argued for his 
viewpoint. Not flinching, Munk-thumbs in the arm holes of his vest-
ended the conversation with his version of compromise: 
Mr. Weick, we should agree. We should agree so that when we get up ... we 
say this is the way the coefficients should be. No one will dare stand against 
us. We should agree on my coefficients. 
At that moment Weick did agree, but, back at work, he continued to use 
his own coefficients. 36 
Munk's subordinates did what they could during 1926 to work with 
him and then around him, but they finally rebelled. In early 1927 all of 
the section heads of the Aerodynamics Division resigned in protest against 
Munk's supervision: Elton Miller, head of the PRT section; George Higgins, 
head of the VDT section; Montgomery Knight, head of the Atmospheric 
Wind Tunnel (AWT) section; and John Crowley, head of the flight test 
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section. Engineer-in-charge Reid, in office for barely a year and already 
stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, tried to resolve the crisis by 
reassigning Munk as his adviser. Lewis tried halfheartedly to pacify Munk 
by asking him to return to Washington, even though Lewis probably did not 
want that to happen.37 But Munk, his pride hurt, refused all options left 
open for him with the NACA, emphatically refusing to be holed up again 
in a small office away from research facilities, and resigned. Peace, and the 
section heads, returned to Langley, but only at the cost of losing one of the 
best theorists ever to work there. 
Complexities 
Because a profile of an outsider can help to outline the character of 
an inside group, just as a clear statement of antithesis clarifies a thesis, 
further exploration of the question "Why was it impossible for Munk to 
survive as chief of aerodynamics at Langley?" seems worthwhile. Such 
exploration might reveal important aspects of the historical personality of 
Langley laboratory, and might suggest much about the intercultural sharing 
of technology. 
Clearly Munk was unusual in the Langley setting. The first thing 
that any group of Americans would have noticed about him, once hearing 
him speak, was that he was a foreigner. No doubt his thick accent and 
unfamiliar inflections made him seem more eccentric than he really was. 
What was worse in the early 1920s-a time of rampant nativism-Munk 
was a German, a "hated Hun," only recently the enemy of the United 
States and its allies.* In 1921 Frederick Norton, Langley's chief physicist, 
informed the NACA in Washington that if Munk were to stay at the lab 
on a regular basis-as he believed (correctly) Munk desired to do-it would 
be "extremely difficult to fit him into the organization." Army officers at 
Langley Field, he reported, would not take kindly to the presence of the 
German.38 
Like the great majority of Langley researchers, Munk was an engineer-
but the professional norms he had learned to value were those of German 
engineering and Gottingen applied science. Though some Langley engineers 
understood the importance of theory and were mathematically competent 
according to the American (not the Gottingen) standard, they saw Munk's 
* I have found no evidence that Munk suffered from any anti-Semitism at Langley; in 
fact, Munk, during my most recent (20 August 1985) interview with him, refused to admit 
that this sort of ill will, to whatever extent it existed, had anything to do with his problems 
at the NACA laboratory. 
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theoretical orientation as a factor separating him from themselves. George 
Lewis remarked that Munk's works were "of such a highly scientific charac-
ter that they are not appreciated by the average aeronautical engineer, and 
can be appreciated only by those who have a very extensive training in math-
ematics and physics." 39 Besides believing this personally, Lewis had heard 
others complain about the highly mathematical character of Munk's works. 
For instance, in response to Munk's criticism of one prospective NACA re-
port, Langley engineer-in-charge Leigh Griffith had advised the Washington 
office that "criticism of research reports dealing with actual laboratory re-
sults should not be undertaken by theoreticians since the viewpoint of the 
theoretician is usually so radically different from that of the laboratory re-
search man." The engineer-in-charge tied his unwillingness to accept the 
judgment of this particular theoretician to Munk's use of foreign criteria. It 
"is rather unfortunate," he told Lewis, that Munk was "not more familiar 
with current standard American nomenclature" and was therefore "inclined 
to criticize terminology not in agreement with his own peculiar ideas." 40 
Not only American engineers but American scientists as well thought 
that Munk's report writing, both its style and substance, was excessively 
vague and obscure. After reading the draft of Munk's July 1925 report "On 
Measuring the Air Pressures Occurring in Flight," Joseph Ames, a physicist, 
wrote Lewis that Munk's discussion of general problems in the paper was 
"excellent" but his style "impossible." It was "neither fish, flesh nor 
fowl." Ames nevertheless recommended that the report be published after 
extensive editing.41 However, Walter S. Diehl of the Bureau of Aeronautics 
(a profoundly influential individual in NACA history; see especially chapter 
6) reviewed Munk's prospective report and asserted that "there can be no 
real argument about the style desirable for a scientific report." It had to be 
"clear, concise, and without grammatical errors or rhetorical flourishes." 
"I feel that Munk has carried the matter entirely too far and that he 
is substituting rhetoric for scientific facts," Diehl charged.* Though he 
* Typically a paper by Munk included very few references to relevant published literature 
or rigorous mathematical demonstrations which would show readers exactly how he came to 
his conclusions. His manner of thinking was so highly intuitive that he proceeded in research 
as if he were the only person working in the field. His collection of technical books (which 
Munk recently donated to the Langley Historical Archive) is remarkably meager--perhaps 
indicating the great extent to which he relied on no human being but himself for revelation of 
knowledge. In "My Early Aerodynamic Research: Thoughts and Memories" (in the Annual 
Review of Fluid Mechanics, 13 [1981], pp. 4 and 6), Munk declared: "Mathematics comes from 
within . . . . Undertaking research for the advance of mathematics is more difficult than 
using established mathematics. It requires more curiosity, diligence, and aimful thinking. 
The researcher's character in general, I believe, has also much to do with it. The pure in 
heart shall see." When asked (during an August 1985 interview) how he arrived at the thin 
92 
The Variable-Density Wind Tunnel 
considered the piece of interest and value, Diehl questioned the advisability 
of publishing it. He suggested holding out for a "conventional rep01:t," one 
in which the observed data-all of it-held center stage.42 
In addition, Munk showed personality quirks that went far beyond those 
tolerable even in NACA Nuts.t Having internalized the social relations 
of German academic life, Munk considered himself the absolute master 
of the division he directed. He intended · to set the research goals and, 
like a German university professor, himself receive whatever credit was 
forthcoming. A proud genius, Munk was frequently autocratic and arrogant 
in his dealings with people, treating his men at Langley as graduate students 
and obliging some of them to attend a seminar on theoretical aerodynamics 
he conducted in a way that at least two talented young men, Elliott Reid 
and Paul Hemke, a Ph.D. in physics from Johns Hopkins University, found 
rude and condescending. (In 1927 Reid and Hemke both resigned from 
the LMAL, "strongly influenced in their decisions to leave the Committee 
because of their unpleasant relations with Dr. Munk." )43 While still learning 
English by reading Macaulay and Oscar Wilde, Munk had the audacity to 
offer Langley employees and their wives a night class on English literature. 
The class met once; Munk's sweeping criticisms of some of the class 
members' favorite authors and books alienated his audience completely.44 
In sum, one may interpret the revolt of the Langley engineers against 
Munk as a clear instance of nonadaptation between different national 
cultures of science and engineering, or as a case in point showing how 
"culture shock" may affect technology transfer. American history is full 
of outstanding examples of skilled European technologists, such as Samuel 
Slater, Benjamin Latrobe, and John Roebling during the early nineteenth 
century, emigrating to the United States and successfully transplanting the 
airfoil theory of 1922, for example, Munk answered, "How do such things happen? They are 
miracles!" 
t Langley old-timers Harold R. Turner, Sr., James G. McHugh, and Hartley A. Soule 
love to tell a tall tale about Munk learning to drive a car; over the years, the story has 
become a sort of local legend, an extravagantly exaggerated one. When he arrived, the story 
goes, Munk had never driven an automobile. One of the wind tunnel technicians tried to 
teach him how to do it right, but Munk thought there was a better way. So, he drew a map 
of the road between Hampton and Langley Field, figured the exact distances between the 
curves of the road, calculated the curvatures of the mandatory turns, hung a string down 
from the top of the steering wheel, and applied numbered pieces of tape to indicate the 
manipulation of the wheel required for the car to follow each turn. Then, by driving at a 
predetermined speed, he could, with the help of his map and a stopwatch, make it safely 
from home to work. According to Soule, "It was that type of story that caused the local 
people to assume that everyone from the NACA was a screwball" (Soule interview with 
Walter Bonney, 28 March 1973, p. 2 of transcript in LHA). 
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In the eyes of most aeronautical experts, the overall record of Max Munk (front 
row, third from left) in aerodynarn.ic research falls at least one big step short of that 
achieved by fellow immigrant Theodore van Karrnan {the short man in a double-
breasted coat in the middle), shown here during a visit to Langley in December 1926. 
Both men were proteges of Gi5ttingen's Ludwig Prandtl. George Lewis, the NACA 's 
director of research, stands to the far right of the photo. Henry Reid, Langley's 
bespectacled engineer-in-charge, is on the same step as van Karman, to his right. 
Fred Weick, PRT head, is in the back row, over Reid's right shoulder. Paul Hemke 
is to Weick 's immediate left. Elliott Reid, the future Stanford University professor, 
is at the far right of the back row. 
new or "hot" technologies of the Old World in the fertile soil of their New 
World. But these transplantations were not automatic. There were certain 
forces in American society that resisted technology transfer. We know for 
example that American clients criticized Latrobe for his stubborn insistence 
on doing everything to English standards, such as building with expensive 
stone instead of wood.45 We know also that the canal builders of western 
Pennsylvania at first rejected ( also mainly for financial reasons) Roebling's 
advice to substitute wire for hemp in their winch-driven canal cables.46 
Transfers of technology, like transplantations of living organisms, are 
difficult, and do not always succeed. You cannot raise cotton in Michigan, 
after all, or sugar cane in Maine. Alligators will not live in the Bering 
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Sea. Taken away from native nutrients, confronted with the challenges of a 
radically different environment, species have to prove adaptable genetically 
or they die out. The story of Max Munk at Langley should encourage 
students of American science and technology to be more sensitive to the 
kinds of attitudes and arrangements on both sides of a transfer that in 
some circumstances facilitate and in others impede the flow of knowledge 
between different peoples. 
Max M. Munk in his office at Langley, 1926. 
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With a View to 
Practical Solutions 
Though Munk resigned from the NACA in early 1927, Langley's 
systematic experimental program to develop improved airfoils in the VDT 
continued unabated. In 1933 the Committee published "Characteristics of 
78 Related Airfoil Sections from Tests in the Variable-Density Tunnel." This 
report introduced what was to be the VDT's principal achievement as an 
aeronautical research tool: a second and more significant series of airfoils, 
the NACA 4-digit series. 
The Mind's Eye 
In the course of developing the second airfoil series in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, the VDT team devised a numerical code-patterned after 
that used to identify the composition of steel alloys-by which to describe 
the physical shapes. Like all other aerodynamical laboratories, Langley had 
until then designated airfoils simply by numbering them in the sequence 
in which they had been tested (M-1, M-2, M-3, and so on). In the new 
system, however, four numbers would indicate the airfoil section's critical 
geometrical properties. The first integer represented the maximum mean 
camber in percent of the chord; the second integer represented the position 
of the maximum mean camber in tenths of the chord from the leading edge; 
and the last two integers represented the maximum thickness in percent 
of the chord. Thus, airfoil "N.A.C.A. 2415" was a wing section having 
2 percent camber at 0.4 of the chord from the leading edge, with thickness 
15 percent of the chord. Zeroes were used for the first two integers when the 
section was symmetrical, as in the case of N.A.C.A. 0015. The laboratory 
expanded the code to five and then six digits for subsequent airfoil series, 
and indicated modifications like changes of the leading-edge radius or the 
position of maximum thickness by adding a suffix consisting of a dash and 
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By August 1929, tests in the Variable-Density Tunnel had derived the family of 
airfoils N.A.C.A. 0006 through N.A.C.A. 6721, shown here in cross section. 
two more digits, as with N.A.C.A. 23012-64, an outstanding section in the 
popular 230-series. 1 
This code did not signify much to the man on the street, but to 
aeronautical engineers it suggested everything important about an airfoil. 
The NACA's 1933 report on 78 related airfoils, which formally introduced 
the numbering system, became a classic, a designer's bible. From the 
mid-1930s on, one could say, for instance, "N.A.C.A. 2415," and an airfoil 
complete with a camber line, position of maximum thickness, and special 
nose features would appear in any aerodynamicist's mind's eye. Serving 
to remind as much as to instruct, the NACA's airfoil report complemented 
the coded information with graphic illustrations of two independent sets 
of curves. These curves communicated knowledge basic to an engineer's 
understanding of the relationships among an airfoil's variables. 2 Graphic 
representation of airfoil data-the outline of the physical shape reinforced 
by performance curves and the digital code-gave aeronautical engineers 
ready access to the wide range of parametric data necessary to their work. 
The NACA digest gave them a "whole range of wings from which to choose, 
the way one might select home furnishings or automobile accessories from a 
catalog." 3 From that catalog, the American aircraft industry picked NACA 
airfoils that became the wings for some of the best aircraft of their era, 
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including the DC-3 transport and the B-17 Flying Fortress, as well as a 
number of postwar general aviation aircraft. 
Tunnel Turbulence 
In 1929 C. G. Grey, British engineer and editor of The Aeroplane, 
attended ceremonies at Kitty Hawk celebrating the 25th anniversary of 
the Wright brothers' flight. During his stay in America, Grey visited the 
NACA laboratory in nearby Hampton. Upon his return home, he upset his 
British colleagues by expressing the opinion that "the only people so far 
who have been able to get something like accurate results from wind tunnel 
experiments are the workers at the experimental station at Langley Field." 4 
The NACA staff had made a reputation by building and making good 
use of the VDT and a few other unprecedented facilities. By that time, the 
Propeller Research Tunnel (PRT) had made its initial contribution to the 
development of a low-drag engine cowling (see next chapter), research work 
had begun in an 11-inch high-speed tunnel which used exhaust air from 
the VDT (see chapter 9), and a giant 30 x 60-foot full-scale tunnel was 
under construction. Above all, however, it was the VDT, representing the 
Committee's first bold step in the direction of novel research equipment, 
which won the NACA its international reputation as a technologically 
outstanding research organization. 
Ironically, though, as useful as it was, the VDT was far from the total 
aerodynamic triumph trumpeted in the NACA brochures: the compressed-
air machine suffered from intense airstream turbulence (small-scale eddies 
and cross-current swirls) resulting from its small-contraction-ratio, double-
return design and relatively inexpensive synchronous drive motor, which 
followed small but rapid frequency fluctuations. These motor fluctuations 
made airspeed control a serious concern for tunnel operators. 
Langley chief physicist Fred Norton, who had so many problems with 
Munk over the design and construction of the tunnel, had in fact identified 
the VDT's basic defect as early as April 1921. In a letter to NACA 
headquarters, Norton had asserted "the probability that the steadiness of 
flow in the compressed-air tunnel because of the small room required [to 
turn the airstream] would be inferior to that in the usual type tunnel, thus 
considerably decreasing the accuracy of the test." 5 
In spite of these shortcomings, VDT researchers were extremely proud 
of their facility because they knew that no one in the world had a similar 
instrument for penetrating the vagaries of scale effects, meaning that 
everyone else was getting data even less accurate than they were. By 
the late 1920s, however, the VDT was fast losing its edge over other wind 
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This diagram, based on an LMAL drawing from 1928, illustrates the lab's plan 
for correcting the turbulent airflow that had plagued the original VDT. Notice in 
particular the change from an open-throat to a closed-throat test section. 
tunnels. Enhancing the tunnel by rectifying its limitations became critically 
important to the NACA staff. 
In August 1927 a broken light bulb sparked a fire and explosion in 
the VDT and gave Langley the opportunity to tear the compressed-air 
machine apart and rebuild it with a closed-throat test section and a new 
direct-current, variable-speed drive system. But after some five years of 
sporadic reconstruction, the head of the VDT section, Eastman N. Jacobs, 
informed the engineer-in-charge that the tunnel's basic design precluded the 
"possibility of obtaining the steady, constant, and uniform airstream sought 
in modern wind tunnels." 6 
NACA Langley's growing recognition of the seriousness of turbulence in 
the VDT was only one good reason to seek funds in 1928 for the construction 
of a full-scale wind tunnel. Though the Committee continued to believe 
in the VDT as "a satisfactory means for testing the component parts 
of an airplane" and, in particular, "for conducting fundamental research 
on airfoil sections," it also wanted a state-of-the-art facility large enough 
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to permit the testing of actual pursuit aircraft complete with operating 
engines and slipstream effects. Fortunately for the NACA, Congress decided 
to appropriate the money for the construction of the Langley Full-Scale 
Tunnel (FST) in February 1929, just months before the Wall Street crash. 
Contracting for materials and labor at Depression prices, the laboratory 
was able by May 1931 to complete what was then the world's largest wind 
tunnel at a cost of just over one million dollars. 7 
FST vs. VDT Debate 
The need to investigate the degree of dynamic similarity between 
the performance of scale models in small tunnels and the performance of 
airplanes and components at full scale led the FST section into spirited 
competition with the VDT group. Preliminary tests in the 30 x 60-foot 
facility convinced the FST staff that turbulence in the new machine was so 
"unusually low" -certainly much lower than in the VDT-that its effects 
could "be neglected in applying the data to design." 8 Then the results of an 
FST study of the characteristics of several large airfoils of various designs, 
including some from the NACA 4-digit family, indicated an increase in drag 
caused by differences in section thickness, a key design parameter, at a 
rate much less than that predicted by VDT tests. This was a discrepancy 
that directly affected the choice of wing thickness for the inner sections of 
airplane wings. 9 As more and more tests in the FST showed good agreement 
with results obtained in flight, some of the prouder and less circumspect 
proponents of the FST even went so far as to contend that results from 
the VDT bore little relation to what really happened in flight and that 
correct airfoil data could only be obtained from tests on full-scale wings in 
the FST. VDT defenders, though fully aware by this time of their facility's 
inherent defects, answered the charges of their peers by asserting that their 
machine was still the NACA's best cheap means of obtaining a wide range of 
comparative data on a multitude of related airfoils. FST test specifications 
called for aircraft and aircraft models that were simply too cumbersome and 
expensive, they argued, to permit the kind of systematic research programs 
that had been accomplished in the VDT .10 
The FST vs. VDT debate continued into the mid-1930s, stimulating 
members of all LMAL wind tunnel teams to think about the factor of scale 
and the corrupting effects of turbulence on aerodynamic measurement. In 
particular, however, the debate seems to have sparked the ingenuity of 
the VDT team itself, whose work was most in question. Many of these 
researchers began to look more carefully at the flow phenomena, especially 
in the boundary layer, that might be the source of the consistent errors in 
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their results. (The boundary layer is the thin stratum of air very close to 
the surface of a moving airfoil in which the impact pressure-that is, the 
reaction of the atmosphere to the moving airfoil-is reduced because of the 
air's viscosity. In this layer, which is separated from the contour of the 
airfoil by only a few thousandths of an inch, the air particles change from a 
smooth laminar flow near the leading edge to a more or less turbulent flow 
toward the rear of the airfoil. See von Karman, Aerodynamics, pp. 86~91.) 
To visualize the nature of the airflow around airfoils and other objects, they 
constructed-next to the other equipment in the VDT building-a small 
low-turbulence smoke tunnel. Photographs of the smoke flowing around 
test models facilitated study of the conditions of the boundary layer as 
they changed from low-friction laminar flow to high-friction turbulent flow. 
LMAL engineers accelerated their pursuit of a means of removing air from 
the boundary layer through slots or holes in the wing surface--an effort 
which dated back to 1926, and which was intended to decrease drag and 
increase lift by postponing transition from laminar to turbulent flow. Work 
in the smoke tunnel eventually led NACA aerodynamicists to the conclusion 
that two of the critical factors causing transition, and thus high skin-friction 
drag, were surface roughness (the rivet heads, corrugations, and surface 
discontinuities then common in manufactured airplane wings) and pressure 
distribution on the wing surface. 11 
Eastman Jacobs, head of the VDT section, answered the FST challenge 
to the integrity of VDT results by introducing the concept of "effective 
Reynolds number." In essence, this was Jacobs's stopgap effort to reproduce 
the aerodynamic effect that would be obtained in the VDT if it had zero 
turbulence: 
In a wind tunnel having turbulence, the flow that is observed at a given Reynolds 
number ... corresponds to the flow that would be observed in a turbulence-free 
stream at a higher value of the Reynolds number. The observed coefficients and 
scale effects likewise correspond more nearly to a higher value of the Reynolds 
number in free air than to the actual test Reynolds number in the free stream. 
It is then advisable to refer to this higher value of the Reynolds number at 
which corresponding flows would be observed in free air as the effective Reynolds 
number of the test and to make comparisons and apply the tunnel data at that 
value of the Reynolds number. 
Jacobs figured the effective Reynolds number by multiplying the test 
Reynolds number by the tunnel's turbulence factor. For the VDT, the 
turbulence factor was 2.6, the highest of all LMAL tunnels. 12 The concept 
of the effective Reynolds number, though resting on a slender empirical 
correlation, was soon used by all the NACA wind tunnel sections, in 
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Above, a view of the Full-
Scale Tunnel's huge {434 
by 222 feet, and 90 feet 
high) exterior from the 
Little Back River, Octo-
ber 1930. Center, one 
of the first tests in the 
Full-Scale Tunnel was a 
performance evaluation of 
the Loening XSL-1 single-
engine navy seaplane, 
October 1931. Below, the 
FST's enormous twin fan 
blades. 
particular to show the effects of Reynolds number on maximum lift. 13 Some 
way to compensate for tunnel turbulence was better than no way at all. 
The permanent solution Jacobs really wanted to the problem plaguing 
his work, however, was a new and larger variable-density tunnel with an 
airstream quality approaching that of the smooth air of free flight. Though 
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The VDT research team, March 1929. Eastman Jacobs is sitting (far left) at the 
control panel. 
he had wanted it for some time, Jacobs began to campaign in earnest for 
the new machine after the NACA's introduction in 1934 of its successful 
5-digit airfoil series, which had evolved through systematic variation of the 
nose shape and camber parameters of the better airfoils of the 4-digit family. 
For the first time since the beginning of the Depression, the Committee was 
in a relatively good position to secure funds for new construction. In an 
April 1935 memorandum to the engineer-in-charge reporting the results of 
a staff conference on ways to increase the speed of airplanes, Jacobs made 
his idea official. A low-turbulence pressure tunnel, he urged, would greatly 
enhance the two related lines of research that the VDT team had been long 
pursuing: development of new airfoils and better understanding of the ba-
sic aerodynamic relationship between airstream turbulence, boundary-layer 
flow, and wing performance. Though asserting that the existing VDT could 
still provide useful design data and should "probably be maintained for this 
purpose" and as an air reservoir for the LMAL's 11-inch and 24-inch high-
speed tunnels, Jacobs quickly emphasized that the "air stream necessary 
for the continued investigation of the fundamental characteristics of large 
scale air flows cannot be obtained in the existing tunnel." Turbulence in 
the old tunnel did not completely invalidate its results for airfoils like those 
of the 4- and 5-digit classes, but accurate experiments with airfoils and other 
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bodies that might enjoy low-friction laminar flow could not be expected in 
the existing facility. 14 
Within two weeks after receiving a copy of Jacobs's proposal for 
comment, two of Langley's most influential division chiefs sent memos to 
Henry Reid elaborating their reasons why the NACA should reject Jacobs's 
idea. Smith J. DeFrance, head of the FST group, questioned whether 
the knowledge to be gained from the new equipment would warrant the 
expenditure of money. 15 But it was Theodore Theodorsen, head of the 
small Physical Research Division, who expressed the most vociferous and 
historically significant ( and ultimately incorrect) objections to the facility 
Jacobs had in mind: 
I think the variable-density wind tunnels have outlived themselves. I do not 
think that the variable-density tunnel has led to any fundamental discoveries. 
They contain a very large amount of turbulence in the airstream, a condition 
that cannot be avoided. 
"What is a new variable-density tunnel to be used for?" Theodorsen asked. 
"Several years will be required to investigate the tunnel, and then what?" 
There was "no more need for airfoil testing," the physicist declared, except 
possibly in connection with some questions about flow conditions in the 
boundary layer better answered by theoreticians.16 
The Jacobs-Theodorsen Rivalry 
While Eastman Jacobs and his VDT staff had been developing 
the 4- and 5-digit families using the systematic experimental approach, 
Theodorsen and his group of more mathematically inclined researchers in 
the Physical Research Division had been tackling various airfoil problems 
from the theoretical angle. Though perhaps the greatest contribution of 
Theodorsen's group during this period was a theory of oscillating airfoils 
with hinged flaps, related closely to the problem of flutter, the group also 
provided some very meaningful insight into the relationship between pres-
sure distribution and boundary-layer flow, and hence on wing-section char-
acteristics. In an NACA report published in 1931, Theodorsen had de-
scribed a "Theory of Wing Sections of Arbitrary Shape," which made it 
possible, as long as the flow did not separate from the airfoil, to predict 
the pressure distribution of an airfoil. Starting with an arbitrary airfoil, 
one changed the closed two-dimensional shape through a conformal trans-
formation almost into a circle; then, by using a rapidly converging series, 
one transformed the bumpy circle into a true circle about which the flow 
105 
Engineer in Charge 
Tl IE SYIX\Xl:~ .\LBElff HEED .\W.\IW 
FOH .\ :\'0'1'.\Bl,E CO:\'THI 111:'l'IOC\ TO Tm: 
.\EHOC\.\l:'l'IC.\L SCIEC\CES llESl'l,'l'IC\(j FIW;\I 
EXl'EHl:\lE:\"l'.\L OH Tl IEOlmTIC.\I, l'.\\'ESTI< i.\'l'I< ):\'S. 
Tim BE:\'EFICl.\L l'.\FLl:l•:xn: OF\\'IIICII ox 'l'IIE 
IJE\'ELOl''.\11•::\'T OF l'H.\CTH'.\L .\EHO:\'.\l "l'ICS 
IS .\l'l'.\HE:\'T. 
TIIE FELLO\\'S OFTIIE I\STl'ITTE OFTIIE .\EIIOX\D'IC.\L 
SCIE\CES IL \YE SELECTED 
E\S'DL\X XIXOX .L\COBS 
'm IIECEl\'E TIIE .\W.\IW F!lH TIIE YE.\H 
FOH IIIS COXTHIBI:TIO:\' TO TIIE .\EHODYX.\.\IIC 
Dll'H0\1<:;\IE:\'T OF ,\IHFOILS !'SEil IX 
:\!ODEH:\' :\IILl'l'.\HY ,\.'{)) cmI~IEHCL\l, ,\IHCIL\VI' 
l:'\STITI :TE OF Tl IE • \EHO:'\, \I ~l'IC. \L SCIEXCES.IXC. Eastman N. Jacobs, one of 
Langley's most adventurous 
researchers. In 1937 Jacobs 
received the Sylvanus Albert 
Reed Award for his contri-
bution to the aerodynamic 
improvement of air/ oils. 
was known. 17 Though no one at the time thought it reasonable to apply 
this theory for the purpose of a practical design, the knowledge of the pres-
sure distribution made possible by this clever double transformation later 
suggested the answer to the riddle of how to shape a laminar-flow airfoil. 
The proposed low-turbulence tunnel was not the first issue over which 
Jacobs, the lab's leading experimentalist, and Theodorsen, the lab's top 
theoretician, had squared off, and it would not be the last. Beneath the 
basic difference in their approaches to gaining aeronautical knowledge, there 
existed a strong personal rivalry and mutual dislike that moved most of their 
confrontations beyond mere objective disagreement. At Langley both men 
controlled fiefdoms, and because both men were so valuable to the NACA, 
George Lewis had permitted the feudal arrangement to flourish. Usually 
they worked on completely separate activities, but occasionally they had to 
work together~and then they inevitably clashed. 
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Theodore Theodorsen, the 
NACA 's Norwegian import, 
complained that many LMAL 
engineers were weak in math-
ematics. 
More significant than any hint of personal antagonism in Theodorsen's 
critique of Jacobs's tunnel proposal was the theoretician's suggestion that 
Langley's airfoil research had reached an experimental impasse. Though 
Theodorsen was practical enough to realize that the "imperfect status" 
of wing theory required designers to make their airfoils "independent of 
theoretical restrictions," he nonetheless saw the need for the NACA staff 
to fertilize its experimental routine with a stronger dose of theory. "A 
large number of investigations are carried out with little regard for the 
theory," Theodorsen charged, "and much testing of airfoils is done with 
insufficient knowledge of ultimate possibilities." In his opinion, to discover 
more advanced airfoils the NACA did not need a new wind tunnel but 
rather better mathematical and physical understanding of the effects of 
basic aerodynamic phenomena on wing performance. The implication of 
his argument was that the experimentalists at Langley had become too 
interested in and dependent upon equipment for their own good. 18 
Jacobs disagreed totally with the idea that theoreticians could answer 
the remaining questions about airfoils better than could experimentalists; 
he also rejected the argument that it was unnecessary and impossible for 
the NACA or anyone else to build a pressure tunnel having low airstream 
turbulence. He did not disagree, however, with Theodorsen's notion of 
theory's general role in successful research. An adventurous man with 
an expansive outlook on what was possible, Jacobs kept up with and 
understood the most current theory-though he did not devote much of 
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his own time to its study-and valued its role in creating the fundamental 
but directly useful technological information expected of the NACA. In 
fact, he had a broader outlook on what was possible than did many 
of the more theoretical types. During his long career with the NACA 
(1925-1944), Jacobs explored several revolutionary aeronautical concepts 
and sometimes grew impatient with co-workers and bureaucrats who saw 
too many obstacles in the way of their rapid development. In the late 
1920s, he tested the potential of thrust augmentors for jet propulsion (see 
chapter 8). Ten years later, after a newspaper article led him to read the 
theoretical papers of Hans Bethe, he and fellow NACA researcher Arthur 
Kantrowitz attempted to initiate the thermonuclear fusion experimentation 
described in chapter 2. Colleagues remember "Jake" as the type of man 
who was always looking for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. 19 
As for the development of airfoils by a combination of theory and ex-
periment, in the 1930s no one working in the United States, perhaps even in 
the world, surpassed J acobs's ability. Though it is now difficult to pinpoint 
just when he first considered controlling the boundary layer through body 
shape or through control of the usual pressures acting along the body sur-
face, the idea for doing so seems to have been germinating in Jacobs's mind 
since at least as early as 1930. In a memo on airfoil scale effects in November 
of that year, Jacobs discussed the importance of the relationship between 
transition and airfoil drag and mentioned the dependence of the transition 
point on airfoil shape.20 At the time, he expected that "the possible large 
drag reductions through prolonging of laminar boundary layers" (that is, 
through prolonging transition to turbulent flow) would become apparent 
"as the result of the systematic tests of various airfoil shapes." By 1935, 
however, he knew this empirical verification would not happen without new 
turbulence-free testing equipment.21 
In May 1935, after considering Jacobs's tunnel proposal together with 
the comments of DeFrance and Theodorsen, engineer-in-charge Reid de-
termined that the project did "not warrant serious consideration by the 
Committee at this time." George Lewis, in Washington, concurred.22 The 
research managers had good reasons to turn down Jacobs's idea for a new 
VDT. First, other important projects, including the construction of an ex-
pensive new tunnel visualized as a super PRT for high-speed propeller re-
search ( eventually built at the LMAL as the 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel but 
which was not really used much for propeller research) were awaiting fund-
ing. Second, because the NACA knew that "the desirability of low turbu-
lence in wind tunnels was not widely appreciated," funds for such a facility 
would be difficult to justify before Congress.23 
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Jacobs Campaigns 
for Low-Turbulence VDT 
In late 1935 Jacobs returned to Langley after representing the NACA in 
Rome at the Fifth Volta Congress on High-Speed Aeronautics. Now more 
than ever, he was convinced that Langley had to have a low-turbulence 
pressure tunnel. During his trip he had visited most of the larger aeronau-
tical research laboratories on the Continent, whenever possible examining 
new experimental facilities and discussing current work. He found the Euro-
pean nations to be in keen scientific and technological competition, spending 
"large sums of money building up their research establishments." Though 
concluding that America's "present leading position" in aeronautical re-
search and development was "not seriously menaced at this time," Jacobs 
warned that "we certainly cannot keep it long if we rest on our laurels" 
and fail to develop and modernize our test equipment. At the end of his 
trip report the Langley engineer reverted to the theme of his memorandum 
of 26 April 1935: "It is again urged that modern variable-density tunnel 
equipment be built in this country capable of testing at full dynamic scale 
for modern aircraft." 24 
Jacobs also brought back some new insight into the nature of the 
boundary layer. While in England he had spent a weekend at the home 
of Sir Geoffrey I. Taylor, professor of physics at Cambridge University, who 
had presented a paper on high-speed flow at the Volta Congress. In long 
private conversations, Taylor described for Jacobs the substance of his 
recent work in the statistical theory of turbulence. This theory seemed to 
indicate that "the transition from laminar to turbulent flow was due to local 
separation caused by the pressure field." 25 By implication, this result said 
that transition could possibly be delayed or perhaps avoided by preventing 
laminar separation-Le., by using a falling pressure gradient. This would 
be the mechanism used eventually by Jacobs in his design of laminar-flow 
airfoils. 
Jacobs also had the chance at Cambridge to talk at length with 
B. Melville Jones, professor of aeronautical engineering, who, like Jacobs, 
epitomized the researcher who combined theory and experiment for pra~tical 
purposes. (Jones's classic 1929 paper, "The Streamline Airplane," had 
provided designers with an idealized goal that served to indicate how much 
power was being wasted to overcome drag.) Jones reported to his American 
counterpart that recent British flight work showed considerable laminar 
flow over the forward regions of very smooth wings where much of the 
flow was in the falling-pressure region. This encouraged Jacobs greatly; 
It pointed to the possibility that drag levels achieved by well-designed 
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advanced aircraft could be down to the value of skin friction. Thus, the only 
remaining opportunity for reducing drag would lie in encouraging laminar 
flow-something that is still true. 26 
Armed with this new information, Jacobs returned to the LMAL ready 
to press harder for the construction of his new variable-density tunnel. 
During his presentation to the NACA's annual manufacturers' conference in 
May 1936, he advertised his belief that further reduction in drag would have 
to take place as a result of somehow delaying transition to turbulent flow in 
an airfoil's boundary layer.27 At a laboratory conference on boundary-layer 
control in July, Jacobs argued that "direct control through shape should be 
placed first on our program" and again urged his colleagues to support his 
idea for the construction of suitable turbulence-free testing equipment. 28 In 
the fall, he wrote a paper on "Laminar and Turbulent Boundary Layer as 
Affecting Practical Aerodynamics," which, in essence, was a plea for the 
new tunnel. 29 
On 28 May 1937, Jacobs's 13-month campaign for a low-turbulence 
VDT finally achieved its goal, if in a roundabout way: NACA headquarters 
authorized the construction of an "icing tunnel." The name was a necessary 
political subterfuge. George Lewis felt that the NACA could not at 
the time justify the expense of a new wind tunnel at Langley solely for 
development of low turbulence. Congressmen simply would not understand 
the urgency. But the Committee could sell it, he believed, on the basis of 
icing experiments. Many aircraft crashes traced to icing problems were 
attracting considerable public attention in 1937; the commercial airline 
operators were clamoring for useful information on the subject. 30 Here was 
a way for the NACA to kill two birds with one stone. 
In 1937 a team of Langley researchers headed by Lewis A. Rodert was 
in fact in the midst of conducting icing research in free flight. The idea was 
to pipe hot engine exhaust gases through interior passages in model wings-
mounted firmly on struts a foot or two above the wing of a test airplane-at 
the critical altitude where air temperature could cause ice to form. When 
the plane reached that height, water was sprayed on the leading edge of 
the model. As the edge quickly coated with ice, heat was piped into the 
model's interior passages, and a timed camera recorded how long a given 
amount of heat took to free the surface of its ice coating. This technique 
worked-that is, it worked in these flight tests in small models. But it raised 
serious problems of adaptation for full-size flying machines. In particular, 
since the heat-conducting pipes in an actual airplane had to pass through 
critical elements of the wing structure (e.g., spars and ribs), the technique 
threatened to weaken that structure seriously, mainly by adding too much 
weight. Thus tests using models in a small ice tunnel could not aid the flight 
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program significantly. (In 1938 Rodert's team reduced the weight of the 
NACA thermal ice-prevention system to a minimum. The army provided 
funds for Langley to remodel a Lockheed 12 with a wing-and-tail heating 
system and to send the aircraft up into the clouds seeking ice. )31 
So Langley never really intended to conduct many icing experiments 
in the icing tunnel of 1937. LMAL technicians had insulated the walls on 
the outside of the tunnel with only a wrapping of crude insulation (kapok 
removed from surplus navy life preservers by members of the Hampton High 
School football team) and added only the simplest refrigerating equipment 
(an open tank of ethylene glycol cooled by blocks of dry ice). On one hot 
summer day in 1938, when everything was ready, enough of the cold mixture 
was pumped into the tunnel test section to cause some ice to form on the 
leading edge of an airfoil. Then a method of using an engine's exhaust heat 
to prevent the ice formation was tested. A perfunctory series of experiments 
fulfilled the announced purpose of the ice tunnel, and Langley immediately 
converted it into a low-turbulence tunnel for low-drag airfoil studies. This 
facility served as a prototype for the pressurized Two-Dimensional Low-
Turbulence Tunnel constructed at the LMAL between 1939 and 1941. 
In Search of the Laminar-Flow Airfoil 
After returning from the Volta Congress in late 1935, Jacobs discussed 
with the men of his VDT section what he had discussed in England with 
Taylor and Jones: the idea that continuously decreasing pressure along an 
airfoil would tend to delay transition from laminar to turbulent flow in the 
boundary layer. But exactly how and when the implications of this concept 
were first spelled out for the rest of the lab is not entirely clear. Jacobs now 
recalls that sometime in 1937 he "rediscovered" the idea, noting that the 
effect of the pressure gradient on laminar separation had been established 
previously.32 In fact, the idea dated back to a paper by Prandtl published 
before World War I, and had been restated by Theodorsen in his 1931 paper, 
"Theory of Airfoils of Arbitrary Shape." Whatever its origins, this concept 
was the underlying criterion for the Jacobs group's imminent preliminary 
design of laminar-flow airfoils. 
Jacobs and his fellow researchers knew that laminar-flow airfoils would 
have to satisfy several conflicting requirements. They were confident that 
an application of existing airfoil theory could start the design process by 
producing shapes with prescribed pressure distributions. (Langley's airfoil 
experts already had some valuable experience in designing airfoils for a 
prescribed pressure distribution. In the mid-1930s they had designed the 
16-series to have a specific distribution in order to achieve the highest 
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In late September 1931 Langley performed stalling and icing studies with a DC-3 
Mainliner passenger transport {top) belonging to United Airlines. In order to warn 
the pilot of an approaching stall, the NACA engineers installed sharp leading edges 
on the section of the wing between the engine and fuselage {left). These sharp edges 
disturbed the a£rfiow enough to cause a tail buffeting which could be felt by the pilot 
in his control column. When the pilot felt this buffeting, he knew that his airplane 
was approaching a stall and needed pilot correction. In order to simulate the effects 
of ice formation on the DC-3 's performance, the engineers cemented pieces of sponge 
rubber to the forward part of the wings {right), where ice was thought to form most 
often, and then measured the resulting changes in the plane's climb, cruise, and 
stalling speeds. 
112 
With a View to Practical Solutions 
possible critical Mach number. )33 But they were also quite sure that such a 
theoretical application would only be the first step. Theory alone could not 
answer the key design questions, such as: What distribution was needed for 
laminar flow? What compromises with other kinds of design requirements 
would have to be made for construction of an effective and practical wing? 
Answers to these questions would have to be found, the researchers believed, 
in a comprehensive program of experiments in the low-turbulence tunnel. 
The Jacobs group could visualize a virtually infinite number of airfoils 
with falling pressure distributions-with varying pressure gradients, cam-
ber, thickness, and positions of peak suction pressure. A large number of 
related experimental airfoils would now have to be designed to incorporate 
the falling pressure feature, together with systematic variations in the other 
parameters.34 Obviously this would be a far more difficult task than had 
been the design of the previous NACA airfoil families, which involved mostly 
simple, arbitrary, geometrical relationships. 
With his commitment to the design of laminar-flow airfoils now over-
shadowing all of his other work, Jacobs disappeared from Langley Field for 
a few days to unravel the mysteries of Theodorsen's 1931 airfoil theory and 
to explore possible ways of reversing its procedure, which had been designed 
to predict the pressure distribution from a given shape. First, he called over 
to his house a close friend, Robert T. Jones, a highly intuitive NACA re-
searcher who had taken a few classes at Catholic University taught by Max 
Munk.35 Together, Jacobs and Jones decided that Theodorsen's method 
could not be used in the way desired without adding to the theory. Jones 
proposed an extension of the theory derived from Munk's thin-airfoil work 
that seemed to be a way of calculating a shape that would give a desired 
sequence of pressures, but this also proved too inaccurate. 36 
When Jacobs returned to the laboratory from his short working vaca-
tion, he challenged his staff to apply Theodorsen's theory in design. H. Ju-
lian "Harvey" Allen, one of the brightest members of the VDT staff, came up 
with one means of inverting the theory based on a linearization that started 
from a thin Joukowski airfoil. Applicable only to thin sections, Allen's way 
proved too inaccurate near the leading edge for prediction of local pressure 
gradients. 37 
No one in the VDT section had any special training in advanced math-
ematics of the sort required, which prompted a few of the men to approach 
Theodorsen's Physical Research Division for assistance. According to Ira 
Abbott, another key member of Jacobs's staff: "We were told that even the 
statement of the problem was mathematical nonsense with the implication 
that it was only our ignorance that encourages us." 38 Theodorsen himself 
went to the trouble of showing that the shapes likely to result from an 
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inversion of his theoretical method would be "unreal," things that looked 
like figure eights and surfaces that crossed over one another. 39 Encouraged 
now by hearing this negative peer response, Jacobs stubbornly persisted in 
directing an all-out effort to devise a satisfactory inversion of the Theodorsen 
method. (In fairness to Theodorsen, it must be noted that he eventually 
contributed to solving the problem. )40 
The breakthrough in this effort came in the spring of 1938, during the 
construction of the icing tunnel. The inversion, which Jacobs now says 
he modeled after Isaac Newton's clever method of approximating a square 
root, consisted essentially of changing a function in small increments in the 
conformal transformation of Theodorsen's theory. By taking an ordinary 
wing section, like the N.A.C.A. 0012, and "running it backwards," that is, 
designing its nose features according to the shape principles of the tail and 
its tail features according to the nose, Jacobs's team was able to arrive at 
an approximate shape that had falling pressures over most of the surface. 41 
It is impossible to document whether this single spectacular approximation 
ever took place; the inversion procedure may in fact have been a gradual 
refinement. Jacobs's role is not in dispute, however; he was the inspiration 
and driving force behind the entire laminar-flow program. 
After verifying its pressure distribution theoretically, Jacobs rushed the 
manufacture of a wind tunnel model through the LMAL shop. As soon 
as the new low-turbulence testing equipment was ready for operation, he 
supervised a test of the new model in comparison with a conventional airfoil. 
To his delight, "the new airfoil showed a drag on the order of one-half that of 
the conventional airfoil." 42 The result pleased him for two reasons especially: 
it provided empirical verification that inversion of the Theodorsen theory 
worked-something that his rival Theodorsen had called impossible-and 
it further justified the construction of the controversial new VDT, which he 
had personally championed through strong opposition. 
Inspired by this success, Jacobs and colleagues explored further into 
the range of shapes theoretically enjoying laminar flows. By combining ex-
perimental knowledge with better ways of approximating solutions, they 
delineated a family of airfoils designated the 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-series airfoils. 
Wind tunnel and free-flight work on some of these sections provided good 
qualitative information about the characteristics to be desired, but, because 
the mathematics was simply too approximate to show correctly the effects 
of changing such key parameters as the profile of the section near the leading 
edge, the work produced no practical airfoils. Much was learned, however, 
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and modified criteria evolved for development of the new 6-series. * In 
comparison with conventional sections, airfoils from this new series had 
the point of maximum thickness further aft along the chord. The point was 
prescribed in order to achieve the type of pressure distribution on the airfoil 
surface thought necessary for laminar flow. 
In June 1939, the NACA distributed an advance confidential report 
prepared by Jacobs covering his new laminar-flow airfoils and explaining 
the methods his wind tunnel team had adopted for airfoil and boundary-
layer investigations.43 Though the Committee did not circulate the exact 
results of this research publicly until after World War II, a copy of the 
confidential report was sent to the Paris office of the NACA; John Ide burned 
it along with all of his other files before the Germans overran the city in 
1940. German aeronautical engineers had reason to guess at the nature of 
the development anyway. On the first page of its Annual Report for 1939, 
published in 1940, the NACA hinted: 
Discovery during the past year of a new principle in airplane-wing design may 
prove of great importance. The transition from laminar to turbulent flow over 
a wing was so delayed as to reduce the profile drag, or basic air resistance, by 
approximately two-thirds. 
Though admitting that it was still too early to appraise adequately the 
significance of this achievement, the NACA nonetheless suggested that its 
continued wing research should in the near future "increase the range and 
greatly improve the economy" of both military and commercial aircraft. 
Beginning in 1940, Langley helped North American Aviation test 
fly its prototype of the P-51 Mustang, the first aircraft to employ the 
NACA laminar-flow airfoil.t Though the Mustang's war record confirmed 
* Airfoils belonging to the 6-series were designated by a six-digit code together with 
a numerical expression of the type of mean line used. For example, in the designation 
"N.A.C.A. 65,3-218. a= 0.5," 6 was the series designation; 5 denoted the chordwise position 
of minimum pressure in tenths of the chord behind the leading edge for the basic symmetrical 
section at zero lift; 3 was the range of lift coefficient in tenths above and below the design lift 
coefficient for which favorable pressure gradients existed on both surfaces; 2 was the design 
lift coefficient in tenths; 18 indicated the airfoil thickness in percent of the chord; and a = 0.5 
showed the type of mean line used. When the mean-line designation was not given after the 
~ixth digit. a uniform-load mean line (a= 1.0) had been used. Ira H. Abbott, Albert E. von 
Doenhoff, and Louis B. Stivers, Jr., "Summary of Airfoil Data," TR 824, 1945. 
t The P-51 had another interesting distinction: it was the first case of an aircraft's actual 
construction matching its aerodynamic design specifications without adding thickness in 
building the metal skin. The idea of the Mustang designer, a German perfectionist named 
Edgar Schmued, was to produce an airplane whose aerodynamic shape was the same as that 
decided upon by the aerodynarnicist-not that shape plus an overcoat of lapped aluminum 
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In the spring of 1.941 Langley installed an experimental low-drag test panet on me 
wing of a Douglas B-18 airplane. The panel, seen close up at right, was fitted with 
suction slots and pressure tubes for a free-flight investigation of the transition from 
laminar to turbulent flow in the boundary layer. The pressure at each tube was 
measured by liquid manometers installed in the fuselage. 
expectations of appreciable improvements in speed and range as a result of 
the low-drag design, practical experience with this and other aircraft using 
advanced NACA sections in the 1940s also showed that the airfoil did not 
perfonn quite as spectacularly in flight as in the laboratory. Manufacturing 
tolerances were off far enough, and maintenance of wing surfaces in the 
field careless enough, that some significant points of aerodynamic similarity 
between the operational airfoil and the accurate, highly polished, and 
smooth model that had been tested in the controlled environment of the 
wind tunnel were lost.44 Still, despite manufacturing irregularities and the 
detrimental effects of actual use, the Mustang's modified 4-series section, 
with its pressure distributions and other features, proved an excellent high-
speed airfoil. The delineation of it and other laminar-flow airfoils was thus 
a great contribution by Langley, even if not exactly to the degree advertised 
by NACA publicists like George Gray, who claimed in Frontiers of Flight 
that "the shape of this new wing permitted the flow to remain laminar 
until the air had traveled about half way along the chord." According to 
Langley engineers who knew what it took in practice to achieve success, 
Gray's claim was an exaggeration. Because the percentage drag effect of 
even minor wing surface roughness or dirt increased as airfoils became more 
efficient, laminar flow could be maintained in actual flight operation only in 
a very small region near the leading edge of the wing.45 
Though the NACA's high-speed airfoil work continued to be impressive 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this chapter's examination of its role in 
alloy that in places might add up to four sheets of thickness. The Mustang's faithfulness 
to profile was later exceeded by refined thicker-skinned aircraft like the Lockheed P-80 and 
F-104. See Richard P. Hallion, Designers and Test Pilots (Time-Life Books, 1983), pp. 78-79, 
148-151, and Richard Sanders Allen, Revolution in the Sky: Those Fabulous Lockheeds (The 
Stephen Greene Press, 1967). 
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The North Amer£can XP-51 
Mustang (shown above, in 
1943) was the first aircraft to 
incorporate an NACA laminar-
flow airfoil. In 1946, Langley 
equipped a P-51B (left) with 
wing gloves for an investiga-
tion of low-drag performance 
in flight. 
the history of the VDT actually ends in 1939 with the cautious public 
announcement of the laminar-flow airfoil, a dramatic research success. By 
that time, the Committee's airfoil research had moved a full 180 degrees 
away from its unsatisfactory course of 20 years earlier, when a very small 
research staff with very limited technical capability and no operational test 
facilities of its own had mainly occupied itself accumulating, analyzing, and 
disseminating European data. Thanks in large part to the VDT and to its 
enhanced successor, the Two-Dimensional Low-Turbulence Tunnel, a much 
larger research staff worked at the cutting edge of modern experimental 
technology by the time of American entry into World War II. One result: 
wing sections developed by the NACA at Langley became by far the most 
widely used sections worldwide. 
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Postscript to VDT History 
The history of Langley's variable-density wind tunnel would not be 
complete without some reference to the ultimate fate of the actual equip-
ment. After replacing it with the Two-Dimensional Low-Turbulence Tunnel 
in the early 1940s, Langley continued to use the VDT, minus internal test 
instruments and mechanisms, as a high-pressure air storage tank for small 
high-speed induction tunnels. In 1981 the Pressure Systems Committee of 
NASA Langley Research Center closed the VDT pending its inspection and 
recertification for use as a tank, but Langley lacked the $30,000 needed 
to ready the old, riveted structure for inspection. In 1984 the National 
Park Service recommended that steps be taken to safeguard the VDT as a 
national historical landmark. 
The fate of Max Munk, the father of the Langley VDT, should also be 
noted briefly. After leaving the lab in 1927, Munk seems to have "failed 
to repeat the brilliant record" 46 he achieved when the VDT and other 
NACA resources were available to him. He took a job with Westinghouse 
in Pittsburgh, where he tried to solve a cooling problem in electric motors. 
Then he worked a year for the American Brown Boveri Electric Corporation 
of Camden, New Jersey, and another year for the small Alexander Airplane 
Company in Colorado. In the late 1920s Munk asked the NACA to 
publish one of his articles, but the Committee rejected it for lacking clarity 
and rigor. By 1930 hard times had reduced him to writing "pathetic 
letters" 47 in which he styled himself "the foremost aerodynamic expert 
of the world" and declared that "all special scientific methods by which 
aircraft is [sic] computed nowadays, most experimental methods, and 
types of equipment have been originated by me." 48 During the Depression 
he became a consulting editor for the journal Aero Digest, and, in the 
opinions of George Lewis and others at NACA headquarters, contributed 
anonymously to its editorial campaign against the Committee.49 Munk 
also taught mechanical engineering at Catholic University part time and 
educated himself in patent law. 
It is not widely known that Munk proposed to design another new wind 
tunnel for the NACA. In July 1939, as Nazi Germany prepared to invade 
Poland, Munk wrote a letter to NACA chairman Joseph Ames, the man 
who had arranged for Munk to come to America in 1920 and work for the 
NACA, saying that he knew how to design "the ideal, the most efficient, 
most practical, most useful and most impressive piece of equipment" for the 
study of high-speed airplane problems. He suggested that the NACA might 
make use of his knowledge by rehiring him as an employee or by special 
contract.50 
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NACA member Jerome C. Hunsaker, the other principal actor in 
Munk's immigration to America, answered Munk for Ames, who was very 
sick, with a one-sentence letter: "I have read your letter to Dr. Ames about 
a proposed wind tunnel, but unless you can disclose something of the ideas 
behind it, I don't see how anything can be done about it." Two weeks later 
George Lewis wrote Munk, suggesting that he "submit for the Committee's 
consideration general or detailed plans" of the proposed device. 51 
Munk swallowed hard, for he had had a very serious falling-out with 
Lewis in 1927, and sent the director of research a contrite letter in which he 
proposed in vague terms the design of a "new type of wind tunnel," the same 
phrase Munk had used in 1921 to describe the VDT. This new tunnel was to 
be at least 32 feet in diameter at the throat and have a 20,000-horsepower 
motor capable of providing 400-mile-per-hour low-turbulence airflow. Munk 
estimated its cost at $1.5 million. 52 
Lewis, pressed by the heavy schedule of preparing the expanding NACA 
organization for wartime research and development activities, was slow to 
act on Munk's proposal. 53 Eventually he did ask Langley's foremost designer 
of large atmospheric wind tunnels, Smith DeFrance, for a quick appraisal of 
Munk's idea, to be based on the correspondence. DeFrance reported back 
that a device of the size and speed suggested could not attain 400 miles 
per hour with only 20,000 horsepower, and probably would not be of much 
value to the Committee even if it could. "It is apparent that Dr. Munk 
has in mind testing single-engine pursuit ships at full-scale and at what he 
may consider to be full speed," DeFrance asserted. "However," he went on, 
"from experience at Langley Field, it is safe to say that results obtained at 
250 MPH can be extrapolated to 400 MPH, provided compressibility effects 
are disregarded." As for determining compressibility effects, DeFrance 
argued that either of the two new 16-foot wind tunnels authorized for 
construction by the NACA in 1939 (one at Langley and the other at the new 
Ames laboratory in California) would supply the necessary information.54 
Munk later submitted a more formal and specific contract proposal for 
the design of his new tunnel, but in May 1940 the NACA rejected it. 55 
Munk then asked Vannevar Bush, who had replaced the ailing Ames as 
NACA chairman in October 1939, to reestablish his old technical assistant 
position at NACA headquarters and to appoint him to it. Bush, after 
looking into the NACA's past problems with the imported aerodynamicist, 
turned down that idea as well.56 
Munk had to remain content writing articles for Aero Digest and 
teaching part time at Catholic University. Beginning in 1945, he went to 
work as a research physicist at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, contributing 
reports on the mechanism of turbulent fluid motion. He returned to Catholic 
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Max Munk at his home in 
Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 
1981. 
full time in 1958, retiring in 1961. In the mid-1970s, the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) honored Munk with one of its 
awards. In 1977, Munk published a small book at his own expense in which 
he claims to have provided the proof of Pierre de Fermat's "Last Theorem," 
which has baffled the mathematical profession for over 300 years. 57 In 1985, 
95-year-old Max Munk was still living and still in good health, if with failing 
eyesight, in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. He enjoyed discussing with visitors 
the etymology of words, especially Greek derivatives, and quoted at length 
from the works of Arthur Schopenhauer. 
The consequences of the NACA's first and later rejection of Munk on 
the quality and vision of subsequent research at Langley laboratory are still 
a matter of debate. Basic work in theory seems to have declined for a while 
at Langley following Munk's departure; over the years there would be few 
researchers at the NACA who spoke the language of higher mathematics. 
On the other hand, the overall quality of NACA research in the 1930s seems 
not to have declined but, in fact, to have risen. 
There is far less contention about the consequences for Munk himself: 
the impact of the revolt on Munk's life and career after 1927 was tragic. His 
notorious departure from the NACA surely slowed the advance of his ideas 
within the American community of aeronautical engineers. The NACA, 
which so often in the early 1920s had touted Munk as its most brilliant 
and productive staff member, now treated him virtually as a nonperson. 
Many technical reports published by the NACA that by rights should have 
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credited Munk's earlier papers did not reference them at all. As a result, 
many members of the American aeronautics community supposed that 
Munk's work was irrelevant or out-of-date. They began to assume (perhaps 
correctly) that Munk had pretty well exhausted his supply of genius and 
vision by the time he left Langley. Moreover, they suspected from what 
they did hear from and about him that he was devoting far too much of his 
subsequent time and energies to flirting with exotic research topics (such as 
the Flettner rotor, a strange sailboat-like craft moved by vertical rotating 
sheet-metal cylinders~a concept which also interested Albert Einstein 
and Jacques Cousteau) and criticizing the research establishment for not 
investigating their potential benefits. 
Perhaps the bitterness with which Munk remembered the revolt against 
him at Langley made him think he had something new to prove. Perhaps the 
hurt and anger did affect Munk's work adversely, if by adversely one means 
that by choosing to explore research problems offering largely imaginary 
benefits instead of those having the most urgent technological relevance, 
Munk failed to match the practical brilliance of his NACA contributions. 
In spite of all the reasons he might have had for holding a grudge against the 
NACA, Munk might have risen above them further than he did. As Samuel 
Johnson once said, "A man of genius is seldom ruined but by himself." On 
the other hand, America with its egalitarian society~with its egalitarian 
engineering society~is not an easy place in which to be a genius. 
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One of the more urgent questions facing American aeronautical engi-
neers in the 1920s was how to reduce the drag of radial engines without 
degrading their cooling. Soon after the end of World War I, the navy had 
become convinced that the air-cooled engine offered a more practical solu-
tion to its aircraft power-plant problems than did the heavier liquid-cooled 
engine-with its water jacket, radiator, and gallons of coolant-favored by 
the army. The jarring confrontations of naval aircraft with arresting gear on 
aircraft carriers resulted in too many cooling system maintenance problems 
at sea (e.g., loose joints, leaks, and cracked radiators). However, subse-
quent experience also made it clear to the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics 
that existing air-cooled designs wasted considerable power: projected into 
the external airstream for cooling, the finned cylinders of the radial en-
gine caused high drag. Navy engineers attempted to reduce this drag by 
putting a propeller spinner ( a rounded cover) over the hub and covering the 
crankcase and inner portions of the cylinders with a metal jacket, but this 
left the outer ends of the cylinders still jutting into the airstream. 1 
In June 1926 the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics asked the NACA 
to determine how much a cowling could be extended outward over the 
cylinders of the radial engine in order to reduce drag without excessive 
interference with cooling. Less than a year later, during a technical session 
of an aircraft manufacturers' conference at Langley Memorial Aeronautical 
Laboratory, representatives from industry also asked the NACA for help 
in understanding the effects of cowling on the performance and cooling of 
radial engines.2 The NACA responded to these requests by authorizing its 
laboratory, first, to conduct a free-flight investigation of the effects of various 
* A version of this chapter appeared in the Fall 1985 issue of Aerospace Hi'Jtorian. 
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forms of cowling on the performance and engine operation of a Wright 
Apache (borrowed from the navy) and, second, to prepare a systematic 
program of cowling tests in its Propeller Research Tunnel (PRT), a brand 
new facility that made it possible for the first time anywhere to test full-size 
propellers and other aircraft components in a wind tunnel. 3 
The results of this research program are well known. In 1929 NACA 
Langley won its first Robert J. Collier Trophy, an annual award presented 
by the National Aeronautic Association for the year's greatest achievement 
in American aviation, for the design of a low-drag cowling.4 By the mid-
1930s the laboratory had designed a family of streamlined cowlings that 
not only reduced drag dramatically but actually improved engine cooling as 
well, an accomplishment that confounded the previous engineering intuition 
that had stuck those finned cylinders directly into the airstream. What is 
not very well known, however, is the history of the method of the NACA's 
successful cowling research and, more specifically, the fact that the engineers 
at Langley who used that method so well in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
eventually met and had to overcome what can only be described as an 
experimental impasse, a position from which there seemed no empirical 
way out. That history is the subject of this chapter. 
Parameter Variation 
The primary method employed by the NACA engineers in their cowling 
research was experimental parameter variation- "the procedure of repeat-
edly determining the performance of some material, process, or device while 
systematically varying the parameters that define the object or its conditions 
of operation." 5 When a complex research problem needs practical solution, 
and hypotheses are more scattershot than pinpoint because complex under-
standing is still a distant goal, this technique systematizes the pragmatic 
researcher's only real choice for a course of action: a combination of brain 
work, guesswork, and trial and error. By observing the effects of slight 
changes made one at a time in planned, orderly sequence, he can add pro-
gressively to his knowledge about the actual performance of whatever he is 
investigating. Seeking effects now and saving causes for later, he uses what 
he does know, circumvents what he does not know, and discovers what will 
work. 
The method is ancient. Greek military engineers varied the parame-
ters of full-scale machines to find the most effective dimensions for their 
catapults.6 During the Industrial Revolution, engineers used the method to 
explore the performance of new construction materials and steam engines. 7 
The success of the first powered airplane in 1903 followed application of 
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Originally the Wright Apache had a propeller spinner over the hub and a metal 
jacket covering the crankcase and inner portions of its engine cylinders. Configured 
as a seaplane, the Apache in the photograph at the top prepares to take off from 
the Little Back River. Lower left, an LMAL test pilot prepares to fly the Apache 
to high altitude. (In 1929 navy pilot Apollo Soucek set a world altitude record 
of 40,366 feet in the same type of plane.) Lower right, NACA mechanics install 
cowling for testing, 1928. 
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the method's fundamentals by the Wright brothers while testing airfoils in 
their wind tunnel.8 The success of Langley laboratory's own airfoil research 
in its Variable-Density Tunnel, discussed in the two previous chapters, also 
hinged on parameter variation. The method has been used for so long by 
so many different types of engineers precisely because it permits solution of 
a complex problem without a complete understanding of all aspects of the 
problem.9 
The growth of the method of Langley's cowling research from 1926 
to 1936 and beyond can be divided into four stages: (1) definition of the 
cowling's parameters, ending in 1929 with the public announcement of a 
successful low-drag design; (2) 1929 to 1931, encompassing an important 
series of engine placement and free-flight cowling tests that resulted in a 
strong identification throughout the NACA with the empirical method; 
(3) 1931 to 1934, when the laboratory began by outlining a new three-
pronged experimental attack on cowling and cooling problems, but ended 
in an impasse with that attack stalled; (4) 1934 to 1936 and beyond, when 
a more analytical approach to cowling research began to emerge out of this 
stalemate to answer some of the basic questions that the empirical approach 
of the preceding stages had left unanswered. Experimental parameter 
variation had led to results. Practical use had been made of observed 
performance effects; now it was time to search beneath them for those causes 
that had been postponed for later. It was time to go after that distant goal 
of complex understanding. 
LMAL engineer Fred Weick, the former employee of the navy's Bureau 
of Aeronautics who had become a principal designer and head of the Pro-
peller Research Tunnel, was already very familiar with parameter variation 
when he used it as the basis of the first-stage attack. As a senior engineering 
student at the University of Illinois, Weick had based a paper on variable-
pitch propellers on data from "the first aerodynamic study under NACA 
auspices" to employ the method of experimental parameter variation-data 
reported by professors William F. Durand and Everett P. Lesley from model 
air propeller tests in the Stanford University wind tunnel. 10 Later, one of 
the first things Weick had done after joining the Bureau of Aeronautics in 
1924 was "to work out a simple system of blade-element analysis using only 
a single element ... but obtaining the airfoil lift and drag characteristics by 
working the analysis backward" from the Durand-Lesley propeller data. In 
1926, Weick reported the details of the method in NACA Technical Notes 
(TNs) 235 and 236. 11 
Recognizing that he should extend the cowling investigation well be-
yond the range of immediate interest, Weick pinpointed the extremes. Ob-
viously, one extreme was a bare engine with no cowling at all; everyone who 
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Fred E. Weick, head of the 
Propeller Research Tunnel 
section, 1925-1929. 
knew anything about aerodynamics assumed that it would have maximum 
cooling, but maximum drag as well. The value of the other extreme--
enclosing the engine completely-no one had anticipated because that form 
seemed to exclude all possibility of air cooling. For smooth flow around 
the exterior of the cowl, Weick's team of engineers in the PRT modeled an 
engine nacelle on the best available airship form. Then the amount of cowl-
ing was systematically varied from extreme to extreme, and ten different 
cowlings for experimentation resulted. 12 
The test program proceeded easily enough-its goal being a cowled 
engine that would be cooled just as effectively as one with no cowling 
whatsoever. The PRT team mounted the Apache's J-5 Whirlwind engine in 
the tunnel, measured the cooling effectiveness of each of the ten cowlings, 
and investigated their effects on propulsive efficiency. Each experimental 
shape underwent numerous, systematically planned variations. With the 
help of Elliott G. Reid, the head of the Atmospheric Wind Tunnel section, 
who had been studying the effects of Handley-Page wing slots, the team 
designed a cowl that brought outside air in and around the engine via a slot 
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By the end of Septem-
ber 1928, tests of cowl-
ing no. 10 in the PRT 
showed a dramatic reduc-
tion in drag. 
at the center of the nose. The potential of a complete cowl then began to 
look more enticing. Researchers had to modify the cooling air inlet several 
times, and had to install guide vanes or baffles to control the air in its 
passage for a more efficient heat transfer. They also had to design an exit 
slot that released the air at a slightly higher velocity and lower pressure 
than it had entered the cowling with, but they finally obtained satisfactory 
cooling with a complete cowl ( called "no. 10") that entirely covered the 
engine and used slots and baffles to direct air over the hottest portions of 
the cylinders and crankcase.13 
To everyone's surprise, the no. 10 cowling reduced drag by a factor of 
almost three! The results of this first portion of cowling tests at Langley 
were so remarkable that the NACA made them known to industry at once. 
In November 1928 the Committee published Technical Note 301, "Drag 
and Cooling with Various Forms of Cowling for a 'Whirlwind' Engine in a 
Cabin Fuselage," by Fred Weick. In it, Weick argued that use of the form 
completely covering the engine was "entirely practical" under service con-
ditions, but warned that "it must be carefully designed to cool properly." 14 
The NACA then announced to the press that aircraft manufacturers could 
install the low-drag cowling as an airplane's standard equipment for about 
$25 and that the possible annual savings from industry's use of the invention 
was in excess of $5 million-more than the total of all NACA appropriations 
through 1928J5 
With the initial round of wind tunnel investigations completed, Langley 
borrowed a Curtiss Hawk AT-5A airplane from the Army Air Service, fitted 
it with the J-5 engine, and applied cowling no. 10 for flight research. The 
Hawk's speed increased from 118 to 137 miles per hour with the low-drag 
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The Curtiss Hawk with NACA cowling, November 1928. 
cowling, an increase of 16 percent. The results of the instrumented flight 
tests had enough scatter for Langley to have been justified in claiming 
a 20-mile-per-hour speed increase instead of 19, but the NACA kept its 
advertised figure conservative.16 
Effectiveness of the cowling was demonstrated to the public almost 
immediately. In February 1929 Frank Hawks, who was already famous for 
his barnstorming and stunt flying, established a new Los Angeles-to-New 
York nonstop record (18 hours, 13 minutes) flying a Lockheed Air Express 
equipped with an NACA cowl that increased the aircraft's maximum speed 
from 157 to 177 miles per hour. The day after the feat, the Committee 
received the following telegram: 
COOLING CAREFULLY CHECKED AND OK. RECORD IMPOSSIBLE 
WITHOUT NEW COWLING. ALL CREDIT DUE NACA FOR PAINSTAK-
ING AND ACCURATE RESEARCH. [signed] GERRY VULTEE, LOCK-
HEED AIRCRAFT co.17 
A few months later, the NACA won its first Collier Trophy, for the greatest 
achievement in American aviation in 1929. This pleasant recognition not 
only promoted the cowling's economic value and justified the NACA's 
decision to build the PRT; the award was also timely support for the 
NACA's request for money to build a full-scale tunnel. 18 
A second stage of systematic cowling research had begun in late 1928-
even before the public acclaim-and involved tests with several different 
forms of cowling, including individual fairings behind and individual hoods 
over protruding cylinders, and a smaller version of the new complete 
cowling, all mounted on an open-cockpit fuselage. The researchers at 
Langley also performed drag tests with a conventional engine nacelle and 
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The record-breaking Lockheed Air Express with NACA cowling, 1929. 
President Herbert Hoover presents the Collier Trophy to Joseph Ames, chairman of 
the NACA, in 1929. Three years later, as part of his plan to increase efficiency in 
government, Hoover would sign an executive order to abolish the NACA. (See next 
chapter.) 
with a nacelle having the new complete design. The individual fairings 
and hoods proved ineffective in reducing drag, and it was found that for 
a smaller body as opposed to a fuselage with larger cabin, the complete 
cowling reduced drag more than twice as well as the conventional cowling 
did. Data from the AT-5A flight tests confirmed this conclusion. 19 
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The LMAL flight crew installs an experimental low-drag cowling on the Fokker 
trimotor, 1929. 
In 1929 Langley mounted its low-drag cowling on the engines of a Fokker 
trimotor. When comparative speed trials proved extremely disappointing, 
the engineering staff started to wonder how the position of the nacelle with 
respect to the wing might affect drag. In the case of the Fokker ( as well 
as the Ford) trimotor, the original design location of the wing engines was 
slightly below the surface of the wing. As the air flowed back between 
the wing and nacelle, and the distance between them increased toward the 
rear of the nacelle, the expansion required was too great for the air to flow 
over the contour smoothly. The PRT team tried fairing-in this space, but 
achieved only a small improvement. 20 
Nevertheless, the lab's systematic, empirical approach soon yielded its 
dividend. With the help of his assistants, Fred Weick laid out a series of 
model tests in the PRT with NACA-cowled nacelles placed in 21 different 
positions with respect to the wing-above it, below it, and within its leading 
edge. The resulting data on the effect of the nacelle on the lift, drag, and 
propulsive efficiency of the airplane made it clear that the optimum location 
of the nacelle was directly in line with the wing, and with the propeller fairly 
well ahead. Although their primary emphasis was on drag and improved 
cooling, the tests at Langley also confirmed that a complete cowling of 
the radial engine, if situated in the optimum position, could in some cases 
actually increase the maximum-lift coefficient.21 The NACA transmitted 
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An engineer in the PRT tests the aerodynamic effects of nacelle position with respect 
to the wing, May 1930. 
these results confidentially to the army, navy, and industry. (This private 
transmission was very significant: it gave U.S. industry several months lead 
time over European aircraft builders.) After 1932 nearly all transport and 
bombing airplanes with radial, wing-mounted engines-including the DC-3, 
the B-17, and many other famous aircraft of the era that followed-used the 
NACA cowling and located the nacelles with reference to the NACA data. 
Momentum or Inertia? 
The cowling was winning so much respect in the late 1920s and early 
1930s that the NACA seemed to have gradually identified itself more and 
more with the systematic experimental approach that had been the basis 
of that successful research. In 1930 the head of the Aerodynamics Division, 
Elton W. Miller, reported to engineer-in-charge Henry Reid that "an effort 
is being made throughout the Laboratory to conduct every investigation 
in as thorough and systematic a manner" as the cowling program.22 The 
following year, George Lewis in Wasp.ington told Reid to frame and hang 
in his office or along the corridor of the LMAL administration building a 
copy of a quotation from a recent speech by President Hoover in praise of 
Thomas Edison: 
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EFFECT OF COWLING ON UFT 
AND DRAG OF NACELLE AND WING 
AT IOO M.P.H. 
UFT 
LBS, 
1500 -
woo -
500-
0 IOO 200 
DRAG LBS. 
The NACA used this 
chart at its manu-
facturers' conj erence 
in May 1930 to 
demonstrate the ad-
vantageous effects of 
various cowlings on 
the lift and drag 
of a nacelle-wing 
combination. 
Scientific discovery and its practical applications are the products of long and 
arduous research. Discovery and invention do not spring full-blown from the 
brains of men. The labor of a host of men, great laboratories, long, patient, 
scientific experiments build up the structure of knowledge, not stone by stone, 
but particle by particle. This adding of fact to fact some day· brings forth a 
revolutionary discovery, an illuminating hypothesis, a great generalization or 
practical invention.23 
Clearly the pattern of work behind the cowling-the NACA's greatest public 
success to date--was contributing to a clearer sense of institutional identity 
and mission. 
At least one contemporary observer saw this identification with sys-
tematic engineering as unflattering to Langley laboratory. Frank Tichenor, 
the outspoken editor of the journal Aero Digest who had hired Max Munk, 
labeled the NACA cowling "a development rather than an original work" 
and misjudged it as being far less effective than the Townend ring, a rival 
concept developed simultaneously by Hubert C. Townend at the British Na-
tional Physical Laboratory.24 Though the NACA can perhaps be criticized 
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for trying to take too much credit for industry's adoption of the cowling, 
one must underscore the truth that the NACA never really claimed to have 
invented the cowling. It professed neither conceptual originality nor revolu-
tionary development. What the NACA did claim-and what seems beyond 
dispute-is that the PRT permitted engineers to work with full-scale cowled 
engines. Better experimental equipment had led to more comprehensive 
and more useful data. It is not so clear in retrospect, however, whether the 
NACA's commitment to the pattern of experimental parameter variation 
for the next stage of cowling research signified technological momentum, or 
technological inertia. 
The third stage of cowling research, 1931-1934, began at Langley when 
many more aircraft manufacturers decided to adopt the NACA design as 
standard high-performance equipment. A few companies did rather well 
with their applications of the NACA no. 10 cowling, especially those that 
put a series of adjustable flaps around the circumference of the metal jacket 
in the hope of better regulating the release of used air. (Those that tried 
to encourage more cooling flow by employing larger exit openings failed, 
however, sometimes to the point of nullifying the external drag advantage.) 
With the development of twin-row engines such as the Pratt and Whitney 
R-1830 of 1933 and 1934-with one row of cylinders behind the other-
whole new problems arose.25 This situation challenged Langley to obtain 
more trustworthy data on the general aerodynamic properties of the proven 
NACA design. Practical results had been obtained from experimental 
parameter variation, and they had been used profitably. Now it was time for 
a clearer understanding of them, so that still more results could eventually 
be achieved. 
Three major branches of the laboratory became involved in the ambi-
tious program. The Power Plants Division worked to improve the efficiency 
of radial engine cooling by varying such engine parameters as pitch, width, 
thickness, and shape of the fins. The 7 x 10-Foot Wind Tunnel section, us-
ing small models, sought the best possible cowling arrangement for necessary 
cooling with minimum drag by streamlining the front and rear openings, 
changing the size of the nacelle, and altering the camber of the cowling's 
leading edge. The PRT team was then to verify the results of the tests made 
by the other two groups. Full-scale propeller-cowling-nacelle units were to 
be tested under conditions of taxiing, takeoff, and level flight. 26 
Though the first two parts of the program advanced without much 
difficulty, the PRT tests-the final and most important part-ran into major 
problems soon after starting in 1933: the 100-mile-per-hour tunnel could 
simulate only the climb speeds of the cowled engine being used ( a borrowed 
Pratt and Whitney Wasp); the obsolete shell-type baffles employed to 
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deflect cooling air toward the hottest parts of the engine were too loose for 
the NACA researchers to work with effectively;27 and, more importantly, 
certain anomalies that no one at the lab could explain plagued the cowling 
drag measurements. Together these problems contributed to a growing 
"maze of contradictory data" about cowlings. Despite five years of NACA 
experimentation and three years of general industrial flight test experience, 
American aeronautical engineers felt a "general suspicion" that there was 
"something mysterious or unpredictable determining the efficiency of engine 
cowling." 28 
Analytical Help 
To move beyond the paralyzing confusion of this experimental impasse, 
Langley's cowling research needed some analytical help. It was eventually 
provided by the head of the laboratory's small Physical Research Division, 
Theodore Theodorsen. A Norwegian-born engineer-physicist with a trigger 
mind and tremendous power of concentration, Theodorsen had already 
seen in Langley's pattern of airfoil testing in the VDT the need for 
experimental routine to be fertilized with a stronger dose of theory ( as the 
terms of his opposition to Eastman Jacobs's idea for a new low-turbulence 
VDT, outlined in the previous chapter, plainly showed). In the curious 
introduction to his seminal 1931 report on the "Theory of Wing Sections of 
Arbitrary Shape"-curious at least in an NACA report for stating a bold 
personal opinion and implicitly taking part of the parent organization to 
task-Theodorsen had asserted that 
a science can develop on a purely empirical basis for only a certain time. Theory 
is a process of systematic arrangement and simplification of known facts. As 
long as the facts are few and obvious no theory is necessary, but when they 
become many and less simple theory is needed. Although the experimenting 
itself may require little effort, it is, however, often exceedingly difficult to 
analyse the results of even simple experiments. There exists, therefore, always a 
tendency to produce more test results than can be digested by theory or applied 
by industry. 
What Theodorsen believed the NACA needed in order for it to move beyond 
the impasse temporarily blocking the progress of its experimental cowling 
program was more attention to the "pencil-and-paper" work that could lead 
to a complete mathematical and physical understanding of the basic internal 
and external aerodynamics of the different cowling shapes.29 And what this 
meant in terms of the history of Langley's method of cowling research was 
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Theodore Theodorsen, head of the small Physi"cal Research Di.vision, prepares to 
give a conference talk on the physics of a four-blade propeller in 1945. 
a turning away from experimental parameter variation, and toward that 
distant goal of complex understanding. 
Theodorsen first perceived new cream to be skimmed off the top of 
the old cowling and cooling investigation while serving on the editorial 
committee that reviewed the draft report on the tests of the full-scale 
propeller-cowling-nacelle units in the PRT. After pointing to the blunt 
afterbody of the nacelle as the probable source of the anomalies that had 
been observed in the drag data, he suggested to his colleagues that the 
stalled cowling program could be completed as planned ( and his resolution 
of the drag anomalies verified) by a new, more comprehensive and analytical 
full-scale investigation. Its aim, underscored Theodorsen, would be both 
to improve basic understanding of the obscure cooling mechanisms of the 
cowled engine and to put the understanding of the relationship between 
internal flow and drag on a more rational basis. The provocative suggestion 
was adopted; the engineer-in-charge transferred most of the cowling work 
and some of its key workers to Theodorsen's division.30 
Previously the PRT research team had focused almost entirely on the 
net or overall effect of the cowling on drag and engine temperatures. What 
Theodorsen now proposed was to investigate the fundamental flow involved. 
In part, the approach of Theodorsen's new cowling research team still 
followed that of experimental variation. The Wasp engine having proved 
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inadequate as part of the test bed, they built a full-scale wind tunnel model 
with a dummy engine, which had one cylinder heated electrically. Numerous 
combinations of more than a dozen nose shapes, about a dozen skirts, six 
propellers, two sizes of nacelles, and various spinners were tested. But 
hoping to produce a detailed handbook by which designers could better 
understand the actual functioning of the NACA cowl, they also included 
extensive measurements of pressure in both the external and internal flows. 
Langley's revised cowling program thus remained primarily experimen-
tal, but it now also allowed quantitative analysis and computation of these 
flow pressures. This quantitative analysis, which had been lacking in the 
previous work, eventually produced some new NACA cowling designs, but 
more importantly it provided solid answers to virtually all the remaining 
questions about the fundamental principles of the cowling and cooling of 
radial engines.31 It demonstrated conclusively that the early NACA designs 
had been "quite haphazard and often aerodynamically poor" and had cooled 
the engine successfully only by a crude excess of internal flow and internal 
drag ( a conclusion that Vought engineers had apparently arrived at on their 
own, earlier, on behalf of Pratt and Whitney and its R-1830 engine).32 De-
signers of future cowlings, like airfoil designers, would have to be much 
more sensitive to such subtleties as the ideal angle of the cowling's leading 
edge attack on the local airflow. The work even demonstrated as fact some-
thing that everyone had unconsciously assumed to be physically impossible 
when the cowling research began in 1926: a proper engine cowling could, 
by making the enclosed baffled engine act in essence as a ducted radiator 
for cooling, lower operating temperatures more than could full exposure of 
cylinders in the airstream. With an understanding at once basic and ad-
vanced, the national aeronautical establishment could now begin to focus 
on more specific, higher-speed applications of cowlings, work that would be 
essential to the design of military aircraft used by America and her allies 
during World War II. 
Evaluation of the Research Method 
The history of the NACA's cowling research from 1926 to 1936 cele-
brates a victory but also demonstrates an important general point about re-
search: No matter how practical or otherwise advantageous any one method 
may be, it always has some disadvantages. Systematic parameter variation 
had enabled the researchers at Langley to delineate a cowling that signif-
icantly reduced the drag of a radial engine without degrading its cooling, 
but because initial success came rather quickly and easily, they did not have 
to understand exactly why the cowling worked. When questions and doubts 
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In the summer of 1939 the NACA tested an experimental cowling and cooling system 
on Northrop's A-17A attack plane. 
A model of Vought 's F 4 U-1 Corsair with high-speed cowling was tested in the LMAL 
8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel in April 1943. 
arose, and data seemed contradictory and mysterious, the original empirical 
method was unable to proceed. Only then did Theodorsen design the re-
search program whose goal was an understanding that went far beyond the 
mere collection of overall performance data on a variety of promising but 
arbitrary shapes. The cowlings that resulted from the Theodorsen program 
did not beat the earlier shapes as regards external drag (which is only a weak 
function of cowl shape), but with the tight baffles, small exit areas, and low 
internal drag made possible by the NACA's new criteria of understanding, 
the total drag of Theodorsen's shapes was dramatically less. 
* * * 
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Historians have tended to treat the NACA cowling as a magical piece 
of tin wrapped around an engine and producing fantastic results. As a 
result, they have failed not only to appreciate the systematic character of 
the laboratory work which made the initial design breakthrough possible, 
but also to pick up on the later work by Vought and Theodorsen which 
made the important breakthrough in understanding possible. The success 
of the cowling was not due to magic. Nor was it the result of simple 
cut-and-try or advanced theory demonstrating its ultimate superiority over 
empiricism. Rather, the cowling was the product of fruitful engineering 
science: a solid combination of physical understanding, intuition, systematic 
experimentation, and applied mathematics. 
Ultimate success in research is never inevitable, however. Without 
the help of Theodorsen or someone else with comparable analytical and 
mathematical talents, cowling research at Langley might have remained 
indefinitely at the point of impasse. 
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Langley managers understood the American aeronautics community as 
a team of four members: the universities and technical schools, which pre-
pared future scientists and engineers for work in aeronautics; the NACA, 
which produced and distributed the new research results that made progress 
in aeronautical technology possible; the aircraft manufacturing and operat-
ing industries, which used research results in design, production, and routine 
flying of aircraft; and the military, whose requirements for advanced aircraft 
constituted the most acute challenge to the manufacturing industry and the 
NACA. 
As the government's civilian member of the team, however, the NACA 
had to operate within perhaps the most challenging environment in the 
American aeronautics community, where teamwork was all too often the 
euphemism for political hardball and the push and shove of powerful interest 
groups. In such an arena the NACA could easily strike out if its managers 
had not prepared their players to stay away from wild pitches. The purpose 
of this chapter is to summarize the most serious political threats facing the 
NACA and Langley before World War II and, more importantly, to analyze 
major aspects of Langley's working relationship with its two major clients, 
the aircraft manufacturing industry and the military. 
Surviving Political Threats 
Gossamer wings had kept the NACA aloft in a turbulent atmosphere 
from the start. In 1915 Congress had established the Committee not, after 
all, because of any groundswell of public_ opinion, but rather to satisfy a few 
persistent advocates of such a step. Many of its supporters had opposed the 
construction of Langley laboratory, believing that it would duplicate work 
at existing government facilities. Those few Americans who had learned 
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about the NACA during World War I had supported it as an instrument of 
national security and industrialized armed force; they perceived it after the 
Armistice as just another military branch in need of demobilization. 1 
Money matters plagued the NACA from its inception. After secretary 
John Victory's $1200 salary was subtracted from the first year's budget 
in June 1915, the Committee was left with only $3800. Fortunately, the 
comptroller decided that Congress had meant for $5000 to be immediately 
available~meaning until 30 June-and that a brand new $5000 was to be 
made available on 1 July. Six years later, this problem arose again. During 
the second session of the 67th Congress, the House Independent Offices 
Subcommittee asked whether the enabling act preempted the House's right 
to appropriate to the NACA any funds beyond that original $5000. With the 
1915 decision as a precedent, the subcommittee resolved the question in the 
NACA's favor. 2 The NACA wisely kept its budget requests modest; until 
1930, none exceeded a million dollars a year (see appendix C). Nonetheless, 
getting appropriations was always tricky business. Langley's construction 
was funded through legislative contrivance as part of a naval appropriations 
bill. This tactic, which had also been used to make the Committee's 
establishment possible in the first place, was followed for a few years. But 
after the Bureau of the Budget was created in 1922, the NACA had to 
fight the same battles for money and live by the same budget cycle as other 
branches of the federal government. Legislation regulated how the agency 
spent its money and transferred its funds from one account to another.3 
As soon as World War I ended, a series of political maneuvers threat-
ened the NACA's existence as an independent body. The Committee seems 
to have provoked the first threat by helping to draft and then support 
legislation in Congress that, if passed, would have "stopped just short of 
giving [the NACA] control over all aeronautical and aviation activities of 
the federal government." 4 House Bill 14061, introduced by Julius Kahn 
on 13 May 1920, provided for "the establishment of a Bureau of Aeronau-
tics in the Department of Commerce, in charge of a Commissioner of Air 
Navigation whose duties will comprise the licensing of aircraft, pilots, and 
airdromes, the designation of flying routes, cooperation with the States and 
municipalities in the laying out of landing fields, and, in general, the pro-
motion of all matters looking to the advancement of commercial aviation." 
All rules and regulations formulated by the new commissioner of air navi-
gation were to be submitted to the NACA for consideration, criticism, and 
recommendation to the secretary of commerce. House Bill 14137, intro-
duced by C. F. Hicks on 19 May 1920, offered an alternative to the Kahn 
proposal. Hicks would not only have created a Bureau of Aeronautics in 
the Department of Commerce, where the NACA would have had broad 
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advisory responsibilities, but his bill would also have given the NACA the 
authority to consider "questions of policy regarding the development of 
civil aviation, with particular reference to education, preliminary training, 
commercial production of aircraft, establishment, elimination, and consoli-
dation of flying fields and air stations" and "to recommend to the heads of 
the departments concerned the [transfer] of aircraft and aircraft equipment 
and accessories from one department to another for the civil uses of the 
Government." The Committee was also to "consider and report upon any 
question dealing with aviation referred to it by the President or by any of 
the departments, and . . . initiate, report, and recommend to departmental 
heads desirable undertakings or developments in the field of aviation." Each 
department would "furnish the said Advisory Committee such information 
as to its aviation activities as may be requested." 5 
The purpose of both bills was to coordinate the government's multifar-
ious aeronautical and aviation activities. Through its support of the legis-
lation, the NACA offered to assume the major coordinating functions. This 
was a bold and risky step by an inexperienced agency ostensibly devoted to 
advice, not executive control, and the Committee barely survived the swift 
storm that blew up. Waving the old red flag of overlapping and duplicated 
effort in government, Senator William E. Borah (Rep., Idaho) introduced a 
joint resolution to abolish the NACA and to transfer its equipment to the 
Bureau of Standards and its land and buildings to the War Department.6 
Preoccupied with other business, Congress failed to act on the proposal ( or 
on the Kahn and Hicks bills); however, in its pursuit of more control over 
civil aviation, the NACA had angered some old enemies and made some 
new ones.7 
One of the most vociferous opponents of the NACA during the debate 
in the mid-1920s over national aviation policy was Brig. Gen. William 
"Billy" Mitchell, USA. Even before the dedication of the LMAL in June 
1920 (a ceremony in which he had participated), Mitchell wanted to abolish 
the NACA. He wrote to the military attache at the American embassy in 
Paris: 
It is difficult to handle this National Advisory Committee in any way. It does 
no good here nor any place that I can see.8 
As a guest at a meeting of the NACA Executive Committee on 27 January 
1921, Mitchell proposed that the Air Service buy all of the NACA buildings 
at Langley Field and move the research operations to Col. Thurman Bane's 
"Arsenal of Aeronautics" at McCook Field.9 In 1925, before the House 
Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air 
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Service, the general argued that the NACA spent "large appropriations of 
money for matters that could be handled far better in a central engineering 
department." Seeing in the NACA a major obstacle to his idea for a separate 
air force, Mitchell again advocated its abolition. 10 After an inspection of 
Langley laboratory, however, the congressional committee found Mitchell's 
criticisms excessive. 11 
From 1926 to 1930 the NACA's public situation was as secure as at any 
time before World War II. Appropriations for the agency rose from $470,000 
in 1925 to $1.3 million in 1930 (see appendix C). Mitchell's court-martial 
in October 1925, the publication of a favorable report on NACA activities 
two months later by President Coolidge's Aircraft Board, and the Lindbergh 
boom contributed to an overall improvement. So did the NACA's decision 
to keep out of the spotlight. 
The critics of the NACA ended their sabbatical as soon as the Depres-
sion arrived, launching an attack on the Committee the equal of any that 
had come before 1926. Though it had a good reputation in government 
circles for fiscal responsibility-even for turning back unspent money to the 
Treasury-the NACA now had to convince skeptics that its efforts gave an 
adequate return for the precious dollar spent. In the December 1930 edito-
rial "Why the NACA?" Frank Tichenor, editor of Aero Digest, portrayed the 
Committee as just another self-righteous and unenterprising federal bureau. 
He derided Langley laboratory as a second-rate organization, trapped in red 
tape; its staff, though working in what Tichenor called the world's largest, 
most expensive, and most modern facilities, had been unable to contribute 
"one research project of scientific value, and only few of technical value." 
"If the results of the NACA could be computed in dollars and cents," the 
editor chided, "the Committee would long ago have been bankrupt." In a 
March 1932 editorial entitled "Take Politics Out of Research," he in fact 
calculated the cost of an NACA research paper: 
The main results of the NACA's experimental research for the year [1931] is 
[sic] laid down in 13 technical papers. Attributing the [year's] entire expenditure 
[of roughly $1.4 million] to them we find their cost to have been in excess of 
$100,000 each .... The world never has known more costly current literature 
than that. 
With this absurd upbraiding of the NACA for "doing only one thing well," 
spending money, Tichenor urged Congress to "merge the NACA laboratories 
with those of the Bureau of Standards, with those of the Army Research 
Department at Wilbur Wright Field, or with those of the Naval Aircraft 
Factory at Philadelphia." 12 
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On the heels of this editorial campaign came the most serious di-
rect threat to the NACA's existence in its first two decades. On 
9 December 1932, as part of his plan to reduce expenditures and increase 
efficiency in government by eliminating or consolidating unnecessary or over-
lapping federal offices, President Hoover signed an executive order to abolish 
the NACA-just as he had wanted to do a few years earlier as secretary 
of commerce. The original resolution that had become the Air Commerce 
Act of 1926 contained a provision insisted on by Secretary Hoover calling 
for the transfer of the NACA to the Department of Commerce. Though the 
provision was eventually removed from the bill, Hoover continued to believe 
in its wisdom. As a lame duck president, he finally acted on that belief. 13 
In its January 1933 editorial "Perhaps Farewell, Lewis and Victory," 
Aero Digest applauded Hoover's action. Editor Tichenor said that the 
NACA had ceased to be a research body and had become "an advertising 
club, a rest home, a comfortable refuge for the two who have controlled 
it." 14 This war of words against the Committee's director of research 
and executive secretary was so personal and bitter that the NACA staff 
thought that it saw Aero Digest employee Max Munk's hand providing the 
ammunition. 15 
The NACA responded to Hoover's order by soliciting the support of 
its most influential friends. Chairman Joseph Ames appointed a dozen 
men prominent in military and civil aviation (including Maj. Gen. Benjamin 
Foulois, chief of the Air Corps; Rear Adm. William A. Moffett, chief of the 
Bureau of Aeronautics; Edward P. Warner, editor of Aviation; Harry F. 
Guggenheim; and Orville Wright) to a Special Committee on the Proposed 
Consolidation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics with 
the Bureau of Standards. As might be expected, they expressed strong 
opposition. Though not a member, Charles Lindbergh wrote a letter 
supporting the committee's report. He argued that the present, with its 
"rapid development in technical improvements and applications of aircraft 
to American commerce," was not the time "to make any move which would 
impair the efficiency" of the NACA. 16 
In January 1933 House Democrats voted unanimously to kill Hoover's 
mergers and left readjustment of the federal establishment to the new 
Roosevelt administration. In the heady days of the New Deal, critics of 
the NACA found little opportunity to threaten it with abolition. Budgets 
once again became the Committee's most serious political concern, Congress 
having refused in 1931 and 1932 to appropriate to the Committee a single 
penny for new construction. In 1933 and 1934, however, the NACA managed 
to get from the Public Works Administration nearly three-quarters of a 
million dollars for new construction at Langley. Part of the money was used 
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to rehire some personnel. In 1936, the NACA's general purpose budget rose 
by more than 50 percent to over one million dollars for the first time since 
1932. An article in the previously censorious Aero Digest related that the 
NACA was a "non-political organization of aeronautical experts" and that 
its research findings were based "not upon guesses or political expediency, 
but upon fact." 17 NACA Langley had survived the Depression. 
The NACA's continuous existence from 1915 to 1958 as an independent 
organization of the federal government testifies not only to real merits in 
research but also to skill in the art of survival. Though the Washington 
office insulated the laboratory as much as possible from playing this political 
game, Langley had to be discreet in dealing with its clients. In particular, 
it had to respond effectively to calls for service from the aircraft industry 
and from the military. 
Satisfying Industry 
During World War I the NACA worked to stimulate the nation's 
aircraft industry. Between the wars, the Committee continued to give 
due consideration to the problems of business firms involved in designing, 
building, and operating aircraft. As matters of policy, the staff at Langley 
laboratory not only regularly investigated research questions peculiar to 
commercial aviation, but carried out its military-related programs in such 
a way as to make their results applicable to civil purposes. Industry could 
use idle research facilities for proprietary tests upon payment of the costs 
involved plus 100 percent. Excepting proprietary information, the NACA 
generally made its research findings known to all companies at the same 
time. When a test program suggested results of immediate interest to 
aircraft manufacturers prior to the publication of a formal report, the 
Committee issued the data to industry in advance. All technical reports 
were distributed to industry free of charge. 18 
The NACA's sustenance of the aircraft industry between the world 
wars was hardly carte blanche, however. To avoid any suspicion that it 
belonged to or sanctioned an aviation trust, the NACA in its first year of 
existence had decided that industry should have no direct representation on 
the Main Committee and only limited membership on the subcommittees. 
This decision reflected the NACA's acceptance of an earlier piece of advice 
from the assistant secretary of the navy, the young Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Endorsing the House resolution behind the establishment of the NACA, 
Roosevelt had argued in 1915: 
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Langley Field on 29 July 1940. 
The departments of the Government most interested in the development of aero-
nautics will be the ones that will be coordinated by the advice of this committee, 
individually carry out the work required, and be responsible for the expendi-
tures of money appropriated by Congress. Therefore, the representatives of 
the Government should always have the controlling interest in the activities of 
the proposed committee. The interests of private parties must be more or less 
commercial and influenced by such c;onsiderations. 19 
As a result of such Progressive ideas, the aircraft industry acquired only in-
cidental NACA membership-the consequence of the sporadic appointment 
of individuals who happened to be associated with industry. Such persons, 
the NACA asserted, were always selected on the basis of their unquestion-
able qualifications, and did not represent industry.20 
Industry spokesmen occasionally challenged the NACA policy-
especially in the early 1920s when manufacturers hoped for federal aid to the 
depressed aircraft market and bitterly opposed the NACA's unwillingness 
to advocate a separate air service. 21 The NACA responded by approving 
in principle industry's frequent representation on future ad hoc subcommit-
tees, organized under the standing subcommittees-which themselves had 
significant informal industry representation-to consider specific problems. 
In 1936, for example, the NACA created a Special Committee on Problems 
of Transport Construction and Operation and convened a conference of air-
plane pilots to discuss the handling characteristics and piloting techniques 
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of large transport planes. The membership of both included representatives 
of the principal American airlines, as well as representatives of the air 
services of the army and navy, the Bureau of Air Commerce, the Weather 
Bureau, and the NACA itself. Former Langley chief physicist Edward P. 
Warner, editor of Aviation and consultant to Douglas Aircraft Company, 
chaired the committee. 22 
Annual Aircraft Engineering Conferences 
On 24 May 1926, 15 months after the Kelly bill had authorized 
the contract air transport of the U.S. mail and four days after the Air 
Commerce Act had assured small but consistent appropriations for the 
development and procurement of military aircraft, the NACA convened the 
first of what collectively became its most significant response to industry's 
request for service: the annual aircraft engineering conferences. Convinced 
that the advent of commercial aviation would generate a new series of 
aerodynamic problems, the Committee collected various representatives of 
the aircraft manufacturing and operating companies for a one-day, by-
invitation-only tour of Langley laboratory. The meeting was intended 
to allow the LMAL technical staff to ascertain "the problems deemed 
of most vital importance" so that the NACA could incorporate them 
"as far as practicable" into its research programs. Held through 1939 
(with the exception of a postponement in 1938 due to the extensive 
prewar construction of new research facilities), the conference became a 
regular conduit through which industry could make requests of the NACA. 
Discontinued by World War II, the conferences resumed in 1946 under a 
slightly different format. 23 
The way Langley organized and conducted the annual conference 
illustrates much about the organization's situation within the American 
aeronautics community. A combined technical meeting and public relations 
extravaganza, the conference provided an opportunity for the NACA to 
highlight its recent accomplishments before captains of industry and high-
ranking military officers (groups whose members "seldom had time to 
read NACA technical reports"), to exchange information with the other 
leading minds in American aviation, and to bang its big drum before 
congressmen and other public officials (who "had neither the time nor 
the qualifications to read the technical reports and judge whether the 
agency's output justified its appropriations").24 The event grew from a 
modest and relaxed affair in 1926, when the Committee sent out only 
38 invitations, into a highly staged pageant that took weeks of preparation 
by the Langley and Washington office staffs. By 1936 the spectacle took two 
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days, the first day's session "for executives and engineers of the aircraft and 
operating industries, and Government officials," the second for "personnel 
of the governmental agencies using aircraft, representatives of engineering 
societies, and members of professional schools." 25 Over 300 people attended 
each session, including a number of aviation writers who reported fully on 
the laboratory's presentations in newspapers and journals. 
NACA Langley's handling of the annual conference reflected the shrewd 
political and administrative talents of its two executive officers, John 
Victory and George Lewis. Under their personal supervision, the event 
became the NACA's rite of spring. Victory was basically responsible for 
making sure that all the guests enjoyed themselves. All of the "important 
people" he gathered in Washington the day before the meeting, and in the 
late afternoon he escorted them aboard a steamer for a leisurely overnight 
trip down the Chesapeake Bay to Hampton. Mid-May was chosen to 
increase the chance for excellent weather. Cruise director Victory assigned 
cabins in a way that would facilitate easy exchanges of business and cordial 
conversation. He must have succeeded in creating a relaxing atmosphere 
despite "running around wearing his annual worried look." After the 1939 
junket, an executive of the Curtiss Wright Corporation was reported as 
having successfully defended "the championship for having the wildest 
pajamas on the boat." 26 After docking at Old Point Comfort early in 
the morning, conference participants breakfasted in grand style at the 
Chamberlin Hotel with its view of Hampton Roads, and then proceeded 
to Langley Field some five miles away via automobile caravan (55 cars as 
early as 1930) escorted by Hampton motorcycle police. Victory seemed 
to be everywhere during the tour, smoothing over any rough spot that 
might appear ( such as an uninvited guest), overseeing the place cards for 
lunch, and staging the group photograph. His most cherished moments, 
however, came after the conference adjourned, when participants were back 
at the Chamberlin for cocktails on its spacious verandas and for dinner, and 
later during the return steamer voyage to Washington.27 (One menu at the 
Chamberlin during the Depression included fruit cocktail, celery and olives, 
essence of tomatoes, crabcakes mornay, half a broiled chicken, baked stuffed 
potato, fresh green peas, lettuce and tomato salad with French dressing, 
walnut ice cream and cake, and demitasse; the cost to the NACA was 
85 cents a meal.) 
The part of the program influenced most directly by George Lewis 
began with the morning's first technical session at Langley Field. After 
welcoming speeches in the post theater by the air base commander and 
the NACA chairman, Lewis heard his engineer-in-charge and his chief of 
aerodynamics summarize the laboratory's major investigations of the past 
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On the north shore of Hampton Roads, Old Point Comfort (top) and the Chamberlin 
Hotel (bottom) in the 1950s. In the hotel photograph, notice the moat of Port Monroe 
to the right. (Courtesy of the Newport News Daily Press) 
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"Doc" Lewis, about 1935. 
year. At 10 A.M. sharp the tour began. The visitors, organized into 
color-coded groups for compatibility of membership, were taken on a strict 
schedule through the various wind tunnels, shops, the hangar, and along 
the flight line. Lewis himself escorted one of the groups. At each location, 
a thoroughly prepared engineer demonstrated some current work in terms 
that Lewis and Victory had judged during rehearsals to be suitable for both 
expert and layman. No pains were spared in helping the visitor to visualize 
tests and understand results. 
After lunch-originally in the base officers' club, but in later years in 
the Full-Scale Tunnel-key staff members, such as the heads of propeller 
and power plants research, offered more technical reports within special 
conferences, answered questions, and entertained comments. Here was 
industry's opportunity to recommend to the NACA new wind tunnel and 
free-flight tests. Though it was pretty hard to get the first individual to 
stand up in a large crowd of peers-and competitors-to suggest what 
the N ACA should do in the future, the meetings stimulated plenty of 
ideas. Records show that conference guests from 1926 through 1939 offered 
hundreds of suggestions for research. At the 1935 conference alone, the 
NACA staff heard 72 different ideas. 28 
As years went by, however, less and less time was made available 
for audience participation. For weeks prior to the meeting, management 
supervised the preparation of talks and demonstrations by the LMAL staff 
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The annual industry conj erence grew from a small, modest affair into a large, 
orchestrated pageant. At the first conference £n 1926 this photo was taken 
on the steps of the administration building. Those attending were, from left 
to right, (1) John F. Victory, NACA; (2) R. W. Brewer, Pitcairn Aviation, 
Philadelphia; (3) Andrew J. Fairbanks, LMAL; (4) William B. Stout, Stout Air-
plane Co., Dearborn, Mich.; (5) Thomas Carroll, LMAL; (6) A. E. Larsen, Pit-
cairn Aviation; (7) Harold F. Pitcairn, Pitcairn Aviation; (8) Lt. Ernest W. Dich-
man, Materiel Division, Air Corps, McCook Field, Dayton; (9) Jones (pos-
sibly either Charles S., Curtiss Flying School, Garden City, N. Y., or Ernest 
La Rue, Chief, Air Information, Aeronautical Branch, Department of Commerce); 
(10} Charles F. Pape, Hall-Aluminum Aircraft Corp., Buffalo; (11) J. S. Bray, 
Allison Engineering Co., Indianapohs; (12) Charles W. Lawrance, Wright Aero-
nautical Corp., Paterson, N.J.; (13) Hugh L. Dryden (with hat), Bureau of Stan-
dards; (14) Herbert V. Thaden, Thaden Metal Aircraft Corp., San Francisco; 
(15) William F. Joachim, LMAL; (16} Waldemar A. Klikoff, Aircraft Develop-
ment Corp., Detroit; (17) Karl Arnstein, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Akron; 
(18} Charles F. Marvin, Chief, U.S. Weather Bureau; (19) Joseph Ames, NACA 
chairman; (20) J. B. Johnson, Materiel Division, McCook Field; (21) George 
Lewis, NACA; (22} Henry Reid, LMAL; (23} Marsden Ware (behind), LMAL; 
(24) Elton W. Miller, LMAL; (25) Max M. Munk, LMAL; (26) A. E. Nesbitt, Avi-
ation Corp., New York City; (27) John W. Crowley, Jr., LMAL; (28) Arthur Gar-
diner, LMAL; (29} Smith J. DeFrance, LMAL; (30} Charles Ward Hall, Charles 
Ward Hall Inc., New York City; (31} W. G. Brombacher, Bureau of Stan-
dards; (32) Fred E. Weick, LMAL; (33} Theodore P. Wright, Curtiss Aeroplane 
and Motor Co., Long Island; (34) Lt. Walter S. Diehl, BuAer, Navy Depart-
ment; (35) Temple N. Joyce, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Long Island; 
(36) George J. Higgins, LMAL; (37) Edward P. Warner, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Aeronautics; (38} Walter Reiser, LMAL; (39} Capt. Holden C. Richard-
son, BuAer; (40) Edward R. Sharp, LMAL; (41) Lyman J. Briggs, Bureau of Stan-
dards; (42) Maj. Leslie MacDill, Materiel Division, McCook Field; (43) unknown; 
(44) Donald G. Coleman, LMAL; (45) Paul Hemke (behind), LMAL; (46) Mitchell 
(full identity unknown). 
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Attendees at the 1934 annual conference assembled for a group picture in the Full-
Scale Tunnel because it was the only place large enough to hold them all. The 
airplane mounted in the FST is the Boeing P-26A Peashooter. 
as if the boys were "putting on a parade for their parents." 29 Lab engineers 
worked long and hard on their presentations until nearly everyone was 
satisfied that they were near perfection. In 1937 the chief of aerodynamics 
wrote the engineer-in-charge: 
If it is desirable that all speeches and demonstrations be ready for rehearsal at 
an earlier date than heretofore, it is my suggestion that the date be set some 
time in advance so that everyone can work to it. I think the best way to bring 
our preparations to a completion at an earlier date is to stop tunnel operation 
at an earlier date and concentrate on our conference preparations rather than 
to try to keep the tunnels running and make preparations at the same time.30 
Even before 1939, when the NACA formally changed the name of the confer-
ence in response to military requirements brought on by the start of World 
War II, most Langley employees already considered it an "inspection." 
Such an approach worked at times against spontaneity. Eastman Jacobs 
remarked in a 1939 memo: 
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A pretense should at least be made to giving the guests an opportunity to make 
suggestions and to get ideas off their chests. Very few will respond, but they will 
leave with the impression that we would have been glad to hear from them.31 
The well-rehearsed NACA engineers made the most of their time in the 
national spotlight, sometimes reducing the time for visitor input. This 
domination of conference sessions reflected a management decision. In 
1931 George Lewis had informed Langley that too much time in past 
meetings had been consumed by the presentation of suggestions. "We [in 
the Washington office] are trying in so far as possible to obtain in writing all 
the suggestions of the manufacturers' representatives as to future research 
problems to be undertaken by the Committee," said Lewis, and the lab 
must "cut down the time allowed [for them] as much as possible." 32 
However limited the give-and-take within the program, the NACA 
conference initiated a year-long discourse within the American aeronautics 
community. Companies that were reluctant to offer their most profitable 
ideas for research and development in the presence of competitors frequently 
wrote to the NACA proposing tests, and many followed up on an idea 
expressed during the conference by later sending a representative or even a 
team of consultants. Nearly all of these visits were friendly, though some 
of them could be troublesome. A few weeks after the 1934 conference, 
Langley's chief of aerodynamics reported to the engineer-in-charge that a 
recent visit by a man from Chance Vought demonstrated the "need for 
more definite rules" regulating visitors. The manufacturer's representative 
arrived at Langley Field on a Saturday morning (when all employees worked 
until noon), spent about an hour with the chief getting information that 
would be needed in arranging a definite test program, and then bothered a 
member of the chief's staff at his home in the afternoon. The following 
Monday the Chance Vought man spent six and a half hours tying up 
two of Langley's best men (Fred Weick and John Stack) and "not by any 
means" did he confine himself to the "questions which he [had previously] 
mentioned." The purpose of his visit, in the chief's estimation, was "not 
so much to clear up hazy points regarding our reports or the information 
given out at the conference" as to obtain additional data that might help 
in connection with the design on which his company was then working. 33 
Since it was strict NACA policy to avoid giving commercial advantage 
to any one company or to obligate itself to any firm, Langley had to ti7 as 
best it could to fend off these occasional attempts to use it as a consulting 
service. Usually this meant tightening the visitation rules. By 1938, one rule 
in the NACA's "General Information for Laboratory Guides" provided that 
"the research problems of the Committee shall not be discussed with visitors 
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at the Laboratory except upon specific authorization from the Engineer-in-
Charge or a division chief," and another stated that "unless visitors have 
a letter from the Washington office authorizing their obtaining technical 
information and data, [they] shall not be given information on any of the 
researches of the Laboratory, except where such information is published." 34 
At least one industry representative complained years later that by the late 
1930s it was not even possible to watch tests being made on proprietary 
articles belonging to his own company.35 World War II, however, required 
that the NACA loosen its rules; during the national emergency, getting the 
job done "took priority over concern for fairness in dealing with competitive 
companies" (see next chapter).36 
In the weeks following an annual conference, the NACA staff gave 
serious consideration to the merits of every suggestion made by the visitors. 
Langley forwarded written comments on each idea to the Washington office, 
which in turn sent its recommendations to relevant NACA subcommittees. 
Even those questions that had already been answered during the meeting 
were considered as serious requests and given formal review. 
From the hundreds of suggestions at the conferences from 1926 to 1939, 
the NACA authorized only 15 new research projects (see table 1). That 
comes to just over one research authorization (RA) per conference. Why 
so few? There are at least two explanations to consider. First, because the 
NACA's initial research authorizations had broad titles, Langley could often 
carry out tests suggested during a conference under RAs already in effect. 
Second, most suggestions for research that surfaced at a conference reflected 
someone's desire for a solution to a specific, and often private, problem of 
current aircraft design or operation. These ideas for NACA research thus 
involved refinement of what Edward Constant II, historian of the turbojet 
revolution, has called "normal technology"; that is, technology that evolves 
slowly, incrementally, and in accordance with a community of practitioners' 
ruling paradigm.37 The NACA rejected some suggestions as technically 
unsound and turned down some others because they would require detailed 
work on someone's proprietary design, and therefore were not problems 
appropriately to be undertaken by the Committee. In evaluating most 
ideas, however, it concluded that there was "sufficient information already 
at hand," that "this question has been covered to a reasonable extent," or 
that "work on this project is in progress." (For examples of these typical 
conclusions, see table 2.) Since it was Committee policy to carry out all 
major tests requested by the military, even to authorize an investigation of 
a special or proprietary device if the army or navy or a large number of 
manufacturers were interested in it, Langley at any one time had in mind 
most of the problems that were important to the aircraft industry. 38 
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RA 
215 
252 
253 
283 
285 
325 
418 
472 
476 
509 
510 
542 
660 
699 
703 
Table 1 
NACA Research Authorizations Resulting from 
Suggestions at Annual Manufacturers' Conferences 
1926-1939 
Title ( Source of idea) 
Effect of Cowling and Fuselage Shape on the 
Resistance and Cooling Characteristics 
of Air-Cooled Engines (Several individuals) 
Mutual Interference of Airplane Parts and 
Effect of the Use of Fillets (Charles Ward 
Hall, Charles Ward Hall, Inc., New York City) 
Effect of Position of Propeller with Reference 
to Wings (Col. Virginius E. Clark and 
W. H. Miller, Curtiss Aeroplane and 
Motor Co., Long Island, New York) 
Investigation of Maneuverability and Control 
of Commercial Type Airplane (E. P. Warner, 
Asst. Sec. of the Navy for Aeronautics) 
Study of High-Speed Cowling as Ignition Shielding 
of Air-Cooled Engines to Aid Radio Reception 
(Airways Div., Dept. of Commerce) 
Investigation of the Causes of Airplane Crash 
Fires (Soc. of Automotive Engineers) 
Investigation of Landing Characteristics of an 
Autogiro (Aeronautics Br., Dept. of Commerce) 
Aerodynamic Characteristics of W-1 Airplane 
with Slot-Lip Aileron and New Type of Flap 
(Bur. of Air Commerce) 
Investigation to Determine the Handling 
Characteristics of an Airplane in Flight 
Following Failure of One Engine (Douglas 
Aircraft Co.) 
Preliminary Study of Control Requirements for Large 
Transport Planes {E. P. Warner) 
Investigation of Airplane Tail Surfaces 
{Consolidated Aircraft Co.) 
Detailed Investigation of Balanced Control 
Surfaces ( Consolidated Aircraft Co.) 
Investigation of Flying Qualities of Lockheed 14 
Airplane with Special Reference to Stability, 
Controllability, Stall, and Vibration (Air 
Safety Board, Civil Aero. Adm.) 
Flight Investigation of Control and Handling 
Characteristics of a Light Airplane (CAA) 
Study of Airline Operating Conditions of Wright 
1820-Series Engines in DC-3 Airplanes {Air 
Safety Board, CAA) 
Source: NACA research authorization files, Langley Historical Archive (LHA). 
Date approved 
22 June '27 
28 June '28 
28 June '28 
22 Mar '29 
22 Mar '29 
24 June '30 
8 June '33 
14 June '35 
14 June '35 
14 Jan '36 
3 Mar '36 
22 Oct '36 
13 Mar '39 
15 Sept '39 
19 Oct '39 
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Table 2 
NACA Responses to Selected Suggestions for Research Made 
by Representatives of the Douglas Aircraft Co. at the 
Annual Manufacturers' Conference in 1935 
Suggestion to study NACA response 
Problem of a transport airplane Problem already being studied 
taking off and clearing an as part of the NACA's research 
obstacle at the edge of a field program on propellers and 
high-lift devices; covered 
by existing RA 
Problem of landing over an obstacle Already being studied as part 
and stopping in the shortest of program on high-lift 
possible distance devices; covered by existing RA 
Lateral control at low speeds, Already being studied as part 
particularly in connection with of program on use of high-lift 
blind landings devices; covered by existing RA 
Handling characteristics of airplane Recommended for authorization 
in flight following failure of by Executive Committee; 
one engine RA476 
Investigation of proper design of vents A particularly suitable problem 
and scoops for various purposes on for laboratory study; work 
body and wings of airplanes covered by existing RA 
Ice formation in carburetors and on Work covered by existing RA 
airplane parts such as ailerons 
Effect of airport contours on Research outside the scope 
accelerations during taxiing of NACA functions 
Development of retractable landing gear Outside the scope of NACA 
that will operate very quickly functions 
Problem of landing with a side wind, Though already part of an NACA 
particularly in regard to proper research program, more 
proportions of the vertical attention should be paid to 
surfaces and the dihedral of the problem 
the main wing 
Investigation of propellers, preferably Covered by existing RA 
at full scale, with higher pitches 
and with three or more blades 
Sources: "Suggestions for Aerodynamic Research, 10th Annual Aircraft Engineering Research 
Conference, Langley Field, Va., May 22, 1935," A197-1, LaRC Central Files; Fred Weick to files, 
"Discussion with Dr. W. Bailey Oswald during His Visit to the Lab on May 27, 1935," 29 May 1935, 
A197-1. 
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No one at Langley in 1926 needed to be told that the cowling problem 
was important, for example. It had been obvious to most aeronautical 
engineers for years. The NACA had only deferred action until Langley's 
new Propeller Research Tunnel became available. So the conference request 
for cowling studies simply provided the official justification for the NACA's 
authorization of a new research project. 39 
The annual aircraft engineering conference at Langley Field allowed the 
NACA to solidify its place in the American aeronautics community. As a 
public institution, the Committee and its laboratory faced the challenge of 
promoting teamwork in national aeronautics while dealing with competitive 
economic interests, professional rivalries, and political tensions-forces that 
sometimes threatened the NACA's role as an autonomous federal agency. 
The conference informed ( and entertained) important people in the various 
fields of aviation, and advertised NACA research. The response of most 
visitors was positive. In his written evaluation of the 1939 conference, 
one LMAL engineer noted that "spontaneous comments on the work of 
the laboratory were invariably favorable-occasionally to the point of 
absurdity." 40 
Though the annual conference kept NACA Langley in touch with the 
needs of industry, and allowed manufacturers' representatives to obtain 
firsthand information on the Committee's research facilities and results and 
to advance suggestions for future research, the conferences did not make the 
NACA captive to commercial interests. Considering the polished, public-
relations finesse with which the NACA executed the conference proceedings, 
the limited time for questions and answers during the formal program, and 
the regulations for follow-up visits, it is hard to see how the meetings could 
have furthered any exploitation of the NACA by industry.41 
Relations with the Military 
The annual aircraft engineering conferences did not cause LMAL pro-
grams to slide toward commercial, as opposed to military, applications. 
After all, the U.S. government had first supported aeronautical research 
and development during World War I as an instrument of national defense 
and industrialized armed force. The NACA's organic legislation and the 
funds to build the LMAL had been approved by Congress as riders to naval 
appropriation bills. Until 1919, the NACA budget had been part of the 
navy's request. (Some critics had even called the NACA "The Naval Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics.") Committee headquarters was located in 
a wing of the old Navy Building, and its laboratory was on an army base. 
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The lab's location confused the public and caused LMAL officers "no lit-
tle ... inconvenience ... in our transaction of business by correspondence." 
In 1925, for instance, the lab's chief clerk and property officer complained 
to George Lewis about the practice of addressing all government communi-
cations intended for the LMAL to the "Officer in Charge, Langley Field," or 
"Commanding Officer, Langley Field." Apparently this was the invariable 
practice with the navy, and a common one with the army. "It is evident that 
the Committee is confused with the Army," the clerk reported, "probably 
as a result of no instructions having ever been issued covering the indepen-
dence of the two, and the distinction that should be made in addressing 
them." The lack of distinction, with uncertainty as to the real recipient of 
a letter or package, was an administrative nuisance: 
Not infrequently the Army holds property intended by the shipper for the 
Committee, merely because of it being addressed to the Commanding Officer, 
Langley Field, ... who will receive the property and demand a memorandum 
receipt before delivering it to us. In such cases we become accountable to both 
the Langley Field authorities and the shipper for the same item of property. 
NACA headquarters worked to remedy the problem by instructing other 
agencies to address mail intended for NACA Langley to "Engineer-In-
Charge, N.A.C.A., Langley Field," but Langley's correspondence files and 
property records after 1925 continue to furnish hundreds of instances of this 
nuisance. 42 
There were other minor problems associated with the everyday sharing 
of Langley Field by the NACA and the army. One aspect of the lab's 
operation that routinely irritated military personnel in the 1920s and 1930s 
was the noise caused by the "blowing down" (rapid release of pressurized air 
to achieve high speed) of the VDT, by the diesel submarine engines of the 
PRT, and by the two powerful 4000-horsepower drive motors of the FST. 
According to base adjutants who periodically complained, not only did the 
noise interrupt sleepers, but it also destroyed the ambience of the officers' 
club.43 
Of course a trifling problem like noise from wind tunnels did not in 
the long run really harm NACA-military relations, which especially in the 
period between the two world wars were generally close, constant, and 
cordial. NACA policy was to carry out expeditiously all major research 
investigations requested by the military: whereas proposals from civilian 
sources were sent to appropriate subcommittees for review, military requests 
went directly to the Executive Committee for action. And although the 
NACA tried not to ask for military funds to carry out the projects, in the 
early 1920s it did get some money to pay for them. For example, to cover 
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the cost of research authorization 46, "Investigation of Small Oscillations 
in Steady Flight" (approved in June 1921), the engineering division of the 
Army Air Service transferred $1500 to the Committee; and to cover the cost 
of RA 97, "Investigation of the Landing Speed of a TS Airplane" ( approved 
in October 1923), the navy provided $24,000. By the mid-1920s, however, 
the NACA included such funds in its own budget requests. 
Military expressions of support and praise for the NACA's indepen-
dent aeronautical research provided the Committee with its strongest po-
litical testimony. In a letter sent to the Bureau of the Budget in 1922, 
Gen. Mason M. Patrick, chief of the Air Service, asserted that the army 
depended upon the NACA to solve "the more difficult problems" in aero-
nautics. Because the basic job of its aircraft engineering divisions was to 
assist procurement offices in selecting the best possible aircraft and acces-
sories, the military concentrated on design and applications, while depend-
ing on the NACA for "fundamental research." 44 In response to a request 
in January 1933 from the chairman of the Senate Committee on Appro-
priations for his view on President Hoover's order to abolish the NACA, 
Charles F. Adams, the secretary of the navy, argued that if the NACA 
were abolished, "the Navy would be deprived of the benefit of organized 
counsel with leading scientists and would be forced to conduct indepen-
dently the researches in aeronautics deemed necessary for the development 
of naval aircraft." Both the Navy and War departments strongly opposed 
the NACA's abolition or transfer to another agency of government, includ-
ing to the military departments themselves.45 John Victory, the NACA's 
executive secretary, regularly tapped the fount of incoming correspondence 
for these endorsements. According to historian Alex Roland, he 
would mark the appropriate passage, often lifting it entirely out of context, and 
direct a secretary to "card" it. From these excerpts Victory compiled over the 
years a 3 x 5 card file that stacked up over two feet high. In it were compliments 
for every occasion, which could be selected and quoted for any purpose .... 46 
So important were these endorsements to the survival of the NACA that 
George Lewis once remarked that "if the NACA ever sets itself aside from 
the Army and Navy, it is a dead duck." 47 
In the first years of Langley's operation-when the NACA was just be-
ginning to learn what it was going to take to survive public controversy, and 
when its research for the most part lacked specific military or commercial 
purposes-the Executive Committee authorized most laboratory projects 
without any background justification. Between 1920 and 1925, a period 
when the adolescent military air services were still relying on World War I 
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Table 3 
Military Requests for Research Work by NACA Langley 
1920-1941 
Military 
New RAs requests 
assigned Work requested by: as% of 
Period to LMAL Army Navy Total new RAs 
1920-25 94 8 17 25 27% 
1926-30 92 15 25 40 44% 
1931-35 118 12 47 59 50% 
1936-39 172 38 70 108 63% 
1940-41 162 83 59 142 88% 
Total 638 156 218 374 59% 
Source: NACA research authorization files, I.;HA. Nearly all of the more fundamental 
aerodynamic investigations of the NACA were undertaken at Langley; however, some 
investigations were also assigned, especially in the period 1920-25, to the Bureau of 
Standards, the Forest Products Laboratory, the Weather Bureau, the engineering division 
of the Army Air Service, the navy, and to various universities. 
aircraft, the NACA cited military requests as justifications for only 25 of 
Langley's 94 new RAs (table 3). After fluctuating in the late 1920s, the 
number of military requests then rose steadily with the explosion in new 
aircraft types under development. With the approach of World War II, 
the number skyrocketed. As the army and navy relied increasingly on the 
NACA for help with specific aircraft, the NACA seems to have rightfully 
used "military necessity" more and more as the justification for its programs. 
Borrowed Airplanes 
The NACA never owned many aircraft. Modest budgets, congres-
sional suspicion of the Committee's need to own aircraft, and the in-
creasing availability of military aircraft for loan when American produc-
tion picked up around the time of the army and navy five-year plans in 
1926 restricted the number of aircraft owned by the NACA. In 1924 it or-
dered its first airplane-a Boeing PW-9 pursuit plane built with especially 
strong tail surfaces and fuselage for use in a systematic investigation of pres-
sure distribution.48 Subsequently, George Lewis testified before a congres-
sional subcommittee that the purchase was necessary because the services 
could not provide an aircraft of the special construction required for the 
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Among the few aircraft owned and operated by the NACA at Langley Field in the 
1930s were a Boeing PW-9 pursuit plane (top left), a Pitcairn autogiro (top right}, 
a Ryan ST sportplane (bottom left), and a Lockheed 12 (bottom right). In the photo 
of the Lockheed 12 (NACA aircraft no. 99}, test pilot Mel Gough is pointing out a 
third vertical fin which Langley installed on the airplane to test the prevention of 
rudder lock in sideslips. 
research.49 (The NACA had requested an appropriation for the purchase of 
the plane after the order for it had been placed.) In 1928 the NACA bought 
a Fairchild FC-2W2 five-passenger monoplane with an enclosed cabin and 
detachable wings for testing a family of airfoils, and in 1931 came the first 
autogiro, a Pitcairn PCA-2. Other airplanes eventually owned by the Com-
mittee included two Fairchild 22s, a Stinson Reliant, a Ryan ST sportplane, 
a Piper Cub, and two Lockheed 12s. Though all were ostensibly purchased 
for research, several also served as transportation. 
Nearly all the flying machines tested at Langley throughout its history 
came on loan from the army and navy. The first experimental . work at 
the laboratory in the spring of 1919 involved flying two of the army's 
Curtiss JN4H Jennies to determine the degree to which their actual flight 
behavior at various altitudes differed from that predicted in wind tunnel 
tests at MIT. The NACA borrowed the biplanes from the flight line at 
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In the early years the flight research team was usually made up of a test pilot {in 
this case, Thomas Carroll, front cockpit) and an engineer ( John W. "Gus" Crowley,, 
Jr.}. 
Langley Field, where they were being used to train pilots and observers in 
gunnery, aerial photography, bombing, and communications. As test pilots 
the Committee used military aviators. 50 The next year it hired its first test 
pilot, but even after the NACA no longer had to rely on military test pilots, 
it still needed the routine assistance of the Langley Field base operations and 
flight control departments. 51 By the end of 1923 the services had transferred 
17 airplanes to LMAL. Thirteen came on temporary assignment from the 
army, including five Jennies, a Thomas-Morse MB-3 pursuit plane, a British-
designed SE-5A, a captured German Fokker D-VII, a French SPAD VII, 
and two DeHavillands, a DH-4 and a DH-9. Four were transferred by the 
navy: two Vought VE-7 trainers, a Douglas DT-2 torpedo plane, and a 
Curtiss TS-1 seaplane. As with the hundreds of other aircraft that were to 
be at Langley in the next 35 years (see appendix E), the NACA conducted 
comprehensive aerodynamic investigations with some of these airplanes and 
used others as test beds for various innovations (like superchargers and high-
speed cowlings). And over the years laboratory personnel also made brief 
evaluations of a considerable number of aircraft that were at the military 
field temporarily. 
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LMAL's earliest civilian test pilots: Thomas Carroll (top), Paul King {left), and 
Wilham McAvoy {right). King was the son of a United States senator from Utah. 
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The decision to lend a military airplane to NACA Langley was often 
informal and personal. Most naval aircraft in the 1920s and 193Os came 
through the good offices of Lt. Comdr. Walter S. Diehl, the officer in charge 
of liaison with the Committee at the Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington. 
A construction corps engineer who in his insistence on remaining a technical 
man refused throughout his career to pursue promotions via sea duty, 
Diehl often approached his superiors at BuAer with the news that the 
NACA wanted to borrow a certain type of airplane for an investigation 
at Langley. Because he met regularly with George Lewis and his assistants 
in the Washington office (Diehl's office was also in the Navy Building) and 
frequently visited Langley, he always knew exactly what the NACA was 
doing and what it wanted to do in the future. If he could pass on the 
Committee's assurance that the laboratory would make immediate use of 
the aircraft in question and that the proposed research had a good chance 
of producing data valuable to the general or specific development of naval 
aircraft, Diehl usually received permission to process the necessary papers. 
Besides arranging the loan of aircraft, Diehl was also the NACA's best 
means of getting navy support for the authorization of a new research 
program or the permanent transfer of equipment and spare parts. In return 
for such support-and because his supervision was friendly and occasional 
and did not put the staff to the trouble of preparing replies and discussions-
the NACA seems to have permitted him on-the-spot authority to terminate 
any navy-requested test that in his opinion had run its productive course. 52 
Dozens of the aircraft borrowed by the NACA came to Langley directly 
from the manufacturer's production line. Often naval machines were 
experimental types that came via the Anacostia and Norfolk air stations. 
Though the army sent the NACA many aircraft from Bolling Field near 
Washington, D.C., and its aircraft engineering division at McCook (later 
Wright) Field in Dayton, most loans came from the local flight line at 
Langley Field, typically from operational squadrons. 
The LMAL could keep most borrowed airplanes for only a specified 
period, usually several weeks. Some it possessed for an undetermined 
course of research or on permanent transfer. On the majority it could 
make modifications and install special equipment as long as the aircraft 
was restored to the original configuration before being returned to the 
owner. On a few it could make no changes whatsoever or, conversely, could 
make whatever permanent alterations and additions it saw fit. This latter 
category consisted mostly of older aircraft for which the services had no 
more use. 
Since the airplanes came from various sources under varied arrange-
ments, lots of paperwork and other chronic bureaucratic headaches were 
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unavoidable. Officers in charge of keeping track of military belongings, 
usually junior assistants, spent much time revising schedules. Because the 
laboratory frequently underestimated the amount of time it would need to 
keep an airplane, the schedules were sometimes unrealistic. Flight research 
required the development, installation, and calibration of many sensitive in-
struments and other special equipment, and it was very difficult-especially 
in the early years of Langley's operation-to estimate the time necessary 
for the work. More often than not, once an aircraft was available, some 
bright researcher would think of an additional, interesting way to use it. In 
1929 LMAL test pilot William H. McAvoy felt personally responsible for 
the failure to return an aircraft according to the agreed-upon timetable. He 
complained to the engineer-in-charge that "it has been quite embarrassing 
for me to continually ask [BuAer] for more time ... , particularly in view of 
the fact that I did not know of the various requests that were to be made 
for further work in conjunction with its use." It seemed to the pilot that 
the NACA had been guilty of "false pretense." Practically all of Langley's 
flight research investigations, McA voy argued, required considerably more 
time than originally estimated.53 
The NACA's executive officers sometimes aggravated this situation by 
reducing the time estimated by the men in the field. In the same year that 
McAvoy complained, chief test pilot Tom Carroll questioned the Washington 
office for cutting his carefully thought out estimate for tests of a Fokker C-2A 
monoplane transport from one month to two weeks. He recommended that 
all future loans be accepted "for the duration of the research at the discretion 
of the Committee." 54 This might have made life easier at Langley, but it 
flew in the face of the NACA's idea of considerate service to clients. 
The Case of the Sperry Messenger 
One of the earliest test programs requested by a branch of the military 
to be undertaken by the LMAL involved the loan of a Sperry Messenger, 
a small biplane the army had procured to replace motorcycles for certain 
liaison uses. The engineering division of the U.S. Army Air Service at 
McCook Field near Dayton provided the aircraft. Approved for research 
by the NACA Executive Committee in July 1923, RA 83, "Full-Scale 
Investigation of Different Wings on the Sperry Messenger Airplane," set 
a precedent. It was the first of many RAs in NACA history to cite work 
on a specific type of aircraft in its title. Before the NACA closed the file 
in February 1929, RA 83 would cover the job orders for nearly six years of 
occasional free-flight and wind tunnel testing, only a small part of which 
was directly relevant to the original purpose of the research. With this 
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background in mind, a case study of RA 83 not only demonstrates the 
laboratory's handling of a borrowed military airplane, but also sheds light 
on important details of research administration and the working association 
with the military on a particular project. 
The Lawrance Sperry Aircraft Company, Farmingdale, Long Island, 
delivered a Sperry Messenger to the Air Service at McCook Field in early 
November 1922. Soon thereafter the army engineering staff initiated a set of 
tests to determine the biplane's lift and drag characteristics when equipped 
with each of six interchangeable sets of wings. The manufacturer had 
built the wings after the then-popular R.A.F. 15, Gottingen 387, U.S.A. 5, 
U.S.A. 27, U.S.A. 35, and U.S.A. 35B airfoil sections, which were shapes 
of varying camber and thickness. By early 1923, the engineers at McCook 
had acquired considerable information on the airplane's performance as it 
compared to design calculations (including the results of three-foot-model 
tests of the Messenger's propeller in the Stanford University wind tunnel), 
but they possessed very little reliable information correlating the free-flight 
and tunnel performance of the airplane when using the different wings. 
Wanting to determine more correctly which of the six sets gave the best 
aerodynamic performance, the Air Service formally requested the NACA in 
February 1923 to conduct tests on the Messenger.55 
After receiving the request, the first thing that NACA headquarters did 
was ask Langley several questions: What work does the military request 
entail exactly? Can it be done? Does it require special instruments or 
equipment? How soon can the laboratory start on this work? How long will 
it take? Does its scheduling seriously interfere with work in progress? How 
much will the entire program cost? In sum, Washington was asking Langley 
how and when it could do the work, not whether the proposed research was 
of fundamental value or whether the LMAL staff wanted to do it. George 
Lewis had already told the engineer-in-charge that the lab would carry out 
at least part of the research on the Messenger airplane before the end of the 
current fiscal year. 56 
Foremost in the minds of the men who considered Langley's responses to 
these questions was the additional workload on the small aerodynamics staff 
(less than 20 men in the wind tunnel and flight-test divisions combined). 
"The actual work of carrying out the tests will be considerable," the chief 
physicist warned, "as each set of wings will have to be flown at about six 
air speeds, and each speed will have to be checked at least once." He 
thought that the effects of wing interference and structural resistance on 
the calculation of lift and drag coefficients for each wing section called for 
some wind tunnel work, but added that this could be done at MIT. However, 
the development, installation, and calibration of a special inclinometer and 
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The army's Sperry Messenger airplane with variable-camber wings, 1926. 
airspeed head would require several weeks before tests could begin. If 
Langley was going to take on this project, the physicist argued, "either 
some of our personnel or else some part of our present program must be 
abandoned." 57 The engineer-in-charge reinforced that opinion. He wrote 
George Lewis that the flight operations section was busy supplying Joseph 
Ames with data on the performance of the Fokker D-VII-information that 
the chairman of the Executive Committee planned to use later that same 
year as part of his Wilbur Wright Memorial Lecture in London. Therefore, 
the NACA "should not promise to get out any Messenger results before the 
end of the summer." 58 
On 2 July 1923 Charles F. Marvin, chief of the U.S. Weather Bureau 
and acting chairman of the Executive Committee, signed research autho-
rization 83. For the brief description of the purpose and method of the 
investigation called for on every RA form, NACA officers in Washington 
lifted phrases directly from Langley's evaluation of the research request. To 
cover the cost, the engineering division at McCook transferred $3000 to the 
NACA. Two weeks later Langley received a duplicate copy of the signed 
RA. Its engineer-in-charge then had the authority to approve job orders 
and its chief clerk the means for paying costs. 
During the remainder of the summer, McCook conducted a preliminary 
investigation of the airplane's performance. Mechanics calibrated the small 
three-cylinder, 60-horsepower Lawrance engine and, in turn, attached the 
first three sets of wings to the fuselage. After each assembly, the flight test 
section investigated the plane's high- and low-speed characteristics. In early 
November, the maintenance section crated all six sets of wings and shipped 
them, along with the plane's freshly painted fuselage, overhauled engine, 
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and flight log, to Langley Field. A few weeks earlier, the Air Service had 
sent its final outline of proposed tests to the NACA. 
The Air Service plan called for NACA Langley to test fly the Sperry 
Messenger, equipped alternately with each of the six sets of wings, with 
power on and power off at five different speeds. To check the accuracy 
of the full-scale data, the Air Service asked the lab to test a one-tenth-
scale model in its atmospheric and variable-density wind tunnels. After 
reading the proposal, the head of the wind tunnels division reported to the 
Washington office that the costs of all the tests, as outlined by McCook, 
would exceed the army's original transfer of funds by at least $9500. He 
believed that Langley could curtail costs and still get meaningful results 
by encouraging McCook to continue the study of the biplane in free flight 
with different wings. The NACA could then ignore those of unsatisfactory 
performance. He also wondered, though, whether it might not be wise for 
the LMAL staff to conduct the research as requested, regardless of the cost; 
the program was especially important because it involved, for the first time, 
"both coordination between three different sections of our own organization 
and the maintenance of requisite contact with McCook Field." 59 
Up to that time, members of the Langley and McCook organizations 
had felt vaguely as if they were rivals. Air Service personnel remem-
bered their difficult and unproductive working association with George 
de Bothezat, a temperamental Russian aerodynamicist whom the NACA 
had recommended;60 NACA employees recalled with some irritation that 
the army had agreed to share experimental facilities with them at Langley 
Field and had then reneged in 1918, transferring its aircraft development 
programs to Ohio. McCook's engineers had worked successfully on the de-
velopment of the Sanford Moss turbosupercharger, a siphon gasoline pump, 
several different leakproof tanks, and fins and floats for emergency water 
landings, all before the dedication of the LMAL in June 1920. Later, they 
built the first high-speed tunnel in the United States and used the acquired 
data to design reversible and variable-pitch propellers.61 The Langley staff 
had a hard time matching these contributions until the VDT began opera-
tion in late 1922. 
A point of friction between NACA Langley and the Army Air Service 
surfaced almost immediately after the Sperry Messenger research was 
authorized. The chief of McCook's airplane section wanted to send the 
designer of the six sets of wings to Hampton for two or three weeks to assist 
in rigging the wings and to watch test procedures. The McCook official 
assumed that "both parties can benefit by having him stay on the job as 
long as we can spare him from here," especially as the designer was one of 
the engineering division's "most capable men, but quiet and unassuming." 62 
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But even with that assurance, Langley did not like the idea of a McCook 
engineer under foot during the tests. The LMAL engineer-in-charge could 
only hope that "some unforeseen circumstance" would prevent the visit. 
George Lewis realized that the attendance of the military representative 
meant that the NACA would "have to use more care and judgement in 
estimating when we can undertake the investigation and the time required 
to complete it," but also understood that the army had "a perfect right" to 
request such attendance since it was paying for the research.63 
Unpacking the various parts of the Sperry Messenger in November 1923 
uncovered another problem. Although the airplane was supposed to arrive 
complete and ready for easy assembly with each set of wings, the Langley 
crew discovered that the Air Service had shipped a heterogeneous assort-
ment of parts, some of which had never been checked. Half of the wings-
the U.S.A. 5, U.S.A. 35, and U.S.A. 35B-had never even been fixed to 
the fuselage! This situation necessitated more work at Langley than had 
been scheduled. Moreover, the propeller sent by McCook was old and "by 
no means comparable with the model." Langley asked for a new propeller 
with more exact and predetermined characteristics. Only when these details 
were worked out could flight research begin.64 
Agitated by the problem of assembling the Messenger, Langley re-
searchers soon were questioning the very methodology of aerodynamic re-
search at McCook. The head of Langley's wind tunnels division found the 
McCook Field report "Determination of Airplane Drag Characteristics in 
Free Flight" so full of errors that he doubted the overall value of the army's 
proposed outline of tests on the Messenger. He reported that 
the sample tests on a VE-7 and a DH-4 airplane are surprising to us because they 
show the latter to have a higher lift/drag ratio than the former. Our information 
on these two machines shows the condition to be quite the opposite and we can 
not believe the McCook Field flight tests show the true characteristics of these 
two airplanes. We do not see how a test of this nature can be of any value 
unless done with considerably greater care and accuracy than seems to have 
been used in this report. 
The division head brought this criticism to the attention of his engineer-in-
charge because the earlier work at McCook was the basis for many details of 
the proposed Messenger research that Langley was about to commence.65 In 
a letter to George Lewis covering the memo, the engineer-in-charge related 
that this was not the first case of problems referred to the laboratory by one 
of the military services being "partially covered by erroneous and misleading 
reports." The mistakes thus put on record constituted "an obstacle which 
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must be cleared away before the organization is in position to properly 
appreciate and value the research work we do for them." 66 
The director of NACA research understood even better than his tech-
nical staff at Langley that this matter had to be handled with discretion. 
If the NACA officially criticized McCook for faulty research methods and 
erroneous reports, the army "would be seriously antagonized," even though 
it might eventually admit that the criticisms were justified. If, on the other 
hand, the NACA did not report its suspicions about the value of the Air 
Service work, it would have nothing on record to show that its research 
team had noticed the errors; worse, there would be no way to justify devi-
ating from the research agenda planned by the Air Service. Lewis brought 
this delicate issue to the attention of certain members of the Committee. 
He also sought the advice of his good friend in the navy's Bureau of Aero-
nautics, Lieutenant Commander Diehl. After reading the McCook report 
in question and Langley's critique of it, Diehl concluded that "the errors 
passed over at McCook Field appear serious in this kind of work." As the 
army results were "certainly questionable," he recommended that the staff 
at Langley "be allowed to devise and use their own methods." 67 
After giving the problem this private airing, Lewis advised the engineers 
at Langley to ignore the faulty McCook report, which would mean not even 
mentioning it in the bibliography that would accompany the final NACA 
report. Though someone might one day take this omission as an indication 
of the NACA's unfamiliarity with the relevant literature, Lewis believed 
that this approach to the quandary best freed the hands of the laboratory 
staff to conduct the Messenger tests properly. It was also the best way to 
avoid mutual embarrassment and to keep the army cooperating with the 
NACA on friendly terms.68 
This matter resolved, another arose: McCook stalled the research 
by failing to understand the stringent requirements for models to be 
tested in the VDT. In 1923 Langley was learning something every day 
about the operation of its newest facility, but aerodynamicists outside the 
organization, though they could easily understand the principle behind 
the tunnel's revolutionary design, could also easily remain largely ignorant 
of its details. Models had to be made of metal, preferably duralumin, 
to withstand the tunnel's high dynamic pressures and the test section's 
powerful vibrations. Wooden models could break up, especially at high 
angles of attack, sending splinters and other debris flying through the tunnel. 
Moreover, early tests in the VDT had confirmed that models had better 
replicate the exact geometry of the full-scale body. Tests with simplified 
models, such as had sufficed in earlier tunnels, would not produce reliable 
data. 
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Elton W. Miller inspects dam-
age to a wing setup in the 
Variable-Density Tunnel, Au-
gust 1924. 
The engineering division at McCook did not adequately appreciate 
these things. After having been informed earlier of the special requirements 
of VDT models, McCook had agreed to provide a model of the Messenger 
with interchangeable duralumin wings. This it did do-but during a visit 
to Dayton in January 1924, the head of the VDT section learned that the 
Air Service's model was nonetheless "utterly inadequate," that it was being 
built with little or no regard for the other structural features that Langley 
had specified. "It seems improbable," he reported, "that the wings as they 
are now being put together will hold up in the Variable-Density Tunnel." He 
advised his engineer-in-charge that some of the model's major defects could 
be corrected in Hampton, but questioned whether the Committee should 
have to pay for army mistakes.69 Later that month the NACA extended the 
scope of RA 83 to meet McCook's request to include tests of the Clark Y 
and U.S.A. 45 wings. When these models arrived at Langley a year later, 
they had been made of wood! As late as September 1925, the head of the 
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VDT requested approval of a job order for the manufacture of duralumin 
wings to replace unsatisfactory ones sent by the Air Service. 70 
In any event, tunnel testing had to await the completion of preliminary 
tests of the Messenger airplane in free flight. In March 1924 a Langley 
test pilot succeeded without much difficulty in taking the biplane, equipped 
with the U.S.A. 5 wings, to 2000 feet, but a few weeks later, with the 
R.A.F. 15 wings, he could barely get it off the ground. The engineer-in-
charge reported to Washington in late April that if the other wings showed 
no better performance, the lab would be unable to execute more than 
one-half of the contemplated program. He even suggested transferring the 
research to the Fokker D-VII because that airplane was in much better flying 
condition than the Messenger and because the lab already had an accurate 
duralumin model of it, which was being tested successfully in the VDT. 
Lewis answered that "it would be rather bad form for the Committee to 
make any definite recommendations" relative to the Messenger until Langley 
had made a more serious effort to conduct investigations with it, especially 
as McCook had reported "no difficulty of any nature" in flying the airplane 
with the R.A.F. 15 wings. 71 
Reporting Test Results 
The NACA expected research authorization 83, like all other RAs, to 
lead to the publication of technical papers. The first was Technical Note 
(TN) 223, "Determination of the Lift and Drag Characteristics of an Air-
plane in Flight," a report by Maurice W. Green in August 1925 that an-
nounced the preliminary results of Langley's glide tests with the Messenger. 
Then, in 1926, the NACA published Technical Report (TR) 225, "The Air 
Forces on a Model of the Sperry Messenger Airplane without Propeller," 
by Max M. Munk and Walter S. Diehl. The TR series was the top of the 
Committee's report hierarchy, "the rock to which the NACA anchored its 
reputation." 72 The NACA intended for TR 225 not only to satisfy McCook's 
request for specific information about the performance of the Messenger, but 
also to make a lasting contribution to the body of aeronautical research lit-
erature. An advance copy was sent to the engineering division of the Army 
Air Service for comments and recommended changes. Only then was the re-
port sent to the Government Printing Office for printing and binding in the 
Committee's Annual Report to Congress. Finally, the NACA distributed 
separate copies of the TR to a long list of academic, industrial, and military 
subscribers. 
Even more than addressing the original purpose of the Messenger 
research-to ascertain experimentally which wings gave the biplane its best 
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The Sperry Messenger mounted for testing in the PRT, 1927. Standing in the exit 
cone is Elton W. Miller, Max M. Munk's successor as chief of aerodynamics. 
performance--the real purpose of TR 225 was to advertise the Variable-
Density Tunnel as a research tool of enormous potential. After testing a one-
tenth-scale model of the Messenger ( equipped with U.S.A. 5 wings) without 
propeller, Munk and Diehl declared that the NACA's VDT was "admirably 
suited for studying the scale effect and obtaining information which is 
necessary in an interpretation of the results obtained in atmospheric wind 
tunnels at low values of the Reynolds number." Though the research on 
the Messenger had not progressed far enough to allow complete comparison 
between model and full-scale machine, the authors concluded on the basis 
of the data at hand that airfoil characteristics were "affected greatly and in 
a somewhat erratic manner" by variations of the Reynolds number and 
that "the more exact a model is made, the more exactly will the test 
data obtained in the variable-density wind tunnel agree with the full-scale." 
Knowing all about Langley's nagging problem of getting McCook to provide 
suitable models for testing in the VDT, Munk and Diehl could not put too 
much emphasis on the "unsoundness" of testing with simplified models.73 
Just as the multiple purposes of the TR went beyond the Messenger's 
aerodynamic problems, much of the testing done by N ACA Langley from 
1926 to 1929 under the cover of research authorization 83 had little to 
do with the purpose of the research as originally expressed. (In this 
regard, RA 83 was not unique.) In June 1927, for example, engineers 
assigned to the Propeller Research Tunnel asked for permission to mount 
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PAPERS PREPARED UNDER RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION NO. -e& 
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The document that concluded the business of every research authorization file was 
a list of technical papern written under that RA. 
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the Sperry Messenger, minus wings and propeller, at zero pitch in their 
new facility's mammoth 20-foot test section to determine the drag of the 
airplane's detailed parts. Theretofore, drag measurements had been limited 
by the sizes of the available tunnels to tests on relatively small models 
that replicated few of an airplane's complicated shapes, such as landing 
gear, engine cylinders, and tail surfaces. After taking up the matter with 
the Executive Committee, George Lewis extended the scope of RA 83 to 
cover the new work. Under this administrative umbrella Langley produced 
several research papers, including: TN 255, "Precision of Wing Sections and 
Consequent Aerodynamic Effects," January 1927, by Frank Rizzo; TN 271, 
"Full-Scale Drag Tests on Various Parts of the Sperry Messenger Airplane," 
January 1928, by Fred Weick; TN 274, "The Effect of the Sperry Messenger 
Fuselage on the Air Flow at the Propeller Plane," January 1928, by Fred 
Weick; and TN 280, "Drag of Exposed Fittings and Surface Irregularities on 
Airplane Fuselages," March 1928, by Donald H. Wood. The last paper grew 
out of observed differences between the drag of the Messenger fuselage in the 
PRT and that of its model in the VDT. Believing that the difference could 
be explained by investigating the drag of various small parts, the chief of 
aerodynamics requested job order 862 under RA 83 to measure the effects 
of turnbuckles, wire fittings, certain unfaired struts, rudder and elevator 
horns, pulleys, bolt heads, and nuts in Langley's 6-Inch Wind Tunnel at 
an airspeed of 100 inches per second. The engineer-in-charge approved the 
request on 3 November 1927. 
These follow-on research efforts demonstrate Langley's good use of a 
research authorization and of a wind tunnel to go beyond stated purposes. 
Such latitude in research management and innovation in the use of research 
equipment were basic ingredients in NACA Langley's long-term success. 
(Note that the NACA cowling, the most important contribution of the 
Propeller Research Tunnel, was only indirectly related to the study of 
propellers.) 
The NACA usually published a final technical report tying together 
the loose ends of a research authorization and announcing its conclu-
sions. TR 304, "An Investigation of the Aerodynamic Characteristics of 
an Airplane Equipped with Several Different Sets of Wings," July 1928, 
by John W. Crowley, Jr., and Maurice W. Green, completed the work of 
RA 83.74 Unlike the earlier reports prepared under the RA, TR 304 specif-
ically addressed the purpose of the research as requested by the Army Air 
Service in 1923-comparison of the lift and drag characteristics of the full-
scale Sperry Messenger with different sets of wings of commonly used airfoil 
sections. In contrast to all but the earliest report prepared under RA 83 
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(TN 223), the authors of TR 304 were flight researchers-not wind tunnel 
engineers-flight testing, after all, having been the principal mode of 
aerodynamic investigation called for originally by the engineering .division 
at McCook Field. 
Langley had tested only four of the six sets of wings before condemning 
the Sperry Messenger as "structurally unsafe" and discontinuing flight 
investigations with it. Nevertheless, the authors of TR 304 claimed that the 
results were clear. The thin R.A.F. 15 wings gave the airplane its lowest 
maximum lift and lowest minimum drag and the thicker Gottingen 387 
wings gave the greatest maximum lift and highest minimum drag. (They 
found the U.S.A. 5 and U.S.A. 27 wings to be quite similar to each other in 
all respects.) 75 
There was no criticism of the army in TR 304, and NACA editors 
would have deleted it even if the Langley authors had cared to include 
it. However, the authors did manage to question discreetly the operating 
presupposition of the entire study as requested by the Air Service: the 
results of the Sperry Messenger tests "emphasize one fact which it is believed 
is not sufficiently appreciated," declared the LMAL flight researchers, "and 
that is, that with the exception of the change in maximum lift, the use of 
different reasonably good airfoil sections in themselves can not be expected 
to greatly change the performance of an airplane." Airplane drag consisted 
of induced, parasite, and profile drag of the body, tail surfaces, and wings, 
they reported, and the refinement of the section shape improved only the 
wing profile drag. 76 Without mentioning the method by name, the authors 
implied that parametric variation of model airfoil shapes in wind tunnels 
was a better way to find the best wing for any particular application. 
Significance of RA 83 
The history of RA 83 is the story of a precedent. It demonstrates how 
N ACA Langley handled the first of many military requests for developmen-
tal testing of a particular airplane. It also exemplifies the routine of opening 
up, conducting, administering, and finally closing out a research program for 
a client. Together, the precedent and the example suggest some important 
points about NACA Langley's cooperation with the military in aeronautical 
research and development. 
First, it was essential for clients to understand all of the NACA's 
detailed requirements. This was especially true in the case of the Sperry 
Messenger program because the army's engineering division at McCook, 
which had to provide the critical test apparatus-the model wings-was 
unfamiliar with the special aerodynamic conditions inside Langley's VDT. 
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As a result, more than two years passed before McCook provided LMAL 
with suitable duralumin models. 
Better liaison between the NACA and the military might have pre-
vented this and similar problems. Whereas Lieutenant Commander Diehl 
visited Langley often to discuss naval problems, the army had not estab-
lished a channel by which to stimulate regular, fruitful exchange of ideas 
and know-how between its aircraft engineering staff and the NACA research 
team. Only when the pace of developmental testing accelerated with the 
approach of World War II did the army try to follow the navy's exam-
ple. In March 1939 Maj. Carl Greene, chief of the engineering division of 
the Air Service Technical Command, and his civilian aeronautical engineer 
Jean Roche moved from Wright (formerly McCook) Field to Langley. Their 
new job was to provide more regular liaison between the applied research 
and development activities of the Air Corps and the more basic research of 
the NACA. Besides funneling information to appropriate Air Corps offices, 
the occupants of "Greene House" across from the LMAL Administration 
Building enabled the army to keep up better with the detailed requirements 
of the laboratory's research methods, facilities, and programs. To complete 
the conduit, the NACA later created its own liaison office at Wright Field.77 
The history of RA 83 also demonstrates how cooperation between 
institutions with complementary functions and regular mutual business 
can be hampered. The NACA's policy of honoring all military requests 
for research placed Langley in a dilemma. Doubting the correctness of 
the army's procedures-the basis of the proposed tests of the Sperry 
Messenger-the LMAL staff either had to execute the flawed proposal 
or find some means to do useful testing in spite of the dubious military 
objective. Either way, the military engineers needed to be led-gently-to 
appreciate the value of the Committee's independent research process. The 
latter option demanded the more circumspection, especially in the language 
of its research reports, if relations between the NACA and the services were 
to remain cordial. In its internal memos Langley criticized many things 
about McCook Field, but these opinions were never aired officially. 78 
Many Langley old-timers have suggested that NACA-army relations 
between the two world wars tended to be less productive than NACA-navy 
relations. They believe that into the 1930s heirs of Billy Mitchell continued 
to want the removal of "those civilians" from Langley Field and the trans-
fer of NACA research equipment to McCook. In this view the navy, having 
no similar designs, supported the NACA and achieved happier results. 79 
Diehl believed in retrospect that the navy's approach to the airplane had to 
be less "emotional" and more akin to and dependent on the more "scientific" 
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approach of the NACA than the army's did, because of the special technical 
requirements of carrier aircraft. In the 1920s the navy 
didn't know what kind of an airplane it would take to use on [a carrier]. It 
took ten years of ... hard work before we had [real] carriers and [real] carrier 
airplanes. And all the time we were calling on the NACA for help [in] measuring 
something, getting more stability and control, getting [better] data on the lift 
you could get out of wings, trying to improve the lift, trying to improve the 
structure, getting a lighter structure, reducing the drag.80 
Table 3 may support Diehl's appraisal: between 1920 and 1935 the navy 
requested NACA research more than twice as often as the army did. 
With the arrival of Greene and Roche to establish the Materiel Com-
mand Liaison Office at Langley in 1939, the army's understanding of the 
requirements of the N ACA operation generally improved and the number 
of army requests for research increased dramatically. This closer tie to 
the army may have exacted a cost from Langley's research independence, 
however. At least in the beginning, the Langley staff strongly preferred the 
navy's occasional and informal style of liaison, reflected in the visits of Diehl, 
to the omnipresent army officers who regularly requested up-to-the-minute 
data sheets and curves and unpublished reports. World War II demanded 
such close liaison, however, as well as a change in the focus of NACA publica-
tions from polished TRs to quick, confidential bulletins. When the Japanese 
bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941, most everyone at NACA Langley 
was grateful that the army liaison office had already been operating at the 
lab for over two years. 
Finally, the life of RA 83 demonstrates that investigations resulting 
from those many research authorizations based on military requests aided 
more than the development of military aircraft. Under the cover of RA 83, 
Langley made a number of investigations that had little to do with the 
army's original intent. The lab went beyond the development of the Sperry 
Messenger to pursue those aspects of the research problem that could 
make innovative use of new research equipment, the VDT and PRT. The 
NACA's research on the little biplane furthered the broader interests of the 
American aeronautics community, both military and civilian, by revealing 
two fundamental points: that airfoil characteristics were affected greatly 
by variations in Reynolds number, and that in order for VDT test data 
to reliably predict actual performance at full scale, tunnel models had to 
be made very exactly. In a limited sense, since its research involved a 
comprehensive program of coordinated tunnel and flight tests of a series of 
"research wings," Langley's experience with the Messenger even helped to 
prepare the NACA for its vital role in the famous transonic research airplane 
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programs of the late 1940s and 1950s. Thus by the time the Bell XS-1 
was conceived during World War II, the NACA laboratory already had 
acquired some valuable experience on a specially constructed flight research 
configuration. 
One explanation for the breadth of Langley's research contribution 
before World War II is that until military and commercial aircraft began to 
diverge in the mid-1930s-the military pursuing higher speed and altitude, 
the commercial emphasizing efficient operation and safety-there was no 
particular competition between military and commercial requests for NACA 
research. Earlier military and commercial airplanes did not differ greatly 
with respect to performance, wing loading, airspeed, and so on. At the 
NACA's first aircraft engineering conference at Langley in 1926, research 
on the effects of cowling on the drag, cooling, and propulsive efficiency of 
the new radial air-cooled engines had been requested by nearly everyone 
attending, including representatives of the army and navy, the Department 
of Commerce, and manufacturers. The low-drag NACA cowling that 
resulted (and which won the Collier Trophy in 1929) was used in all 
branches of aviation. Langley also performed some tests with no special civil 
applications and some with no obvious military applications, but most of the 
systematic programs-on airfoils, propellers, high-lift devices, alleviation of 
the flight hazards of airframe icing, and determination of the nature and 
magnitude of gust loadings that occur in storm systems, for example--
applied fairly equally to all fields. The momentum for most of these broad 
programs was generated internally by the LMAL staff. 
This assertion of in-house momentum is supported by the contents of 
dozens of Langley RA files besides RA 83. RA 204, for example, which 
called in 1927 for work on the "Control of Airplanes at Large Angles of At-
tack," contains a report on a November 1936 conference on stability research 
that exemplifies how a broad research program of the NACA was driven in-
ternally by laboratory researchers. 81 Fred Weick, the assistant chief of the 
Aerodynamics Division, was the meeting's main speaker; after dividing the 
stability problem into its most important components for his colleagues, he 
recommended that "all available data be used to obtain statistical infor-
mation for preparation of empirical rules and for development of possible 
theoretical relationships." Weick suggested further that "the present pro-
gram be extended to include a study of the effects of gusts," and then he 
opened the floor for discussion. During the course of the animated conversa-
tion that followed, Hartley Soule, one of two representatives at the meeting 
from the Flight Research Division, pointed out the advisability of develop-
ing a series of charts with which the longitudinal stability characteristics of 
any airplane might be readily estimated. Robert T. Jones of the 7 x 10-Foot 
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Atmospheric Wind Tunnel section then suggested that "full-scale tests could 
be made to measure various individual stability derivatives." Soule, who 
had previous experience in making such measurements, reacted to Jones's 
suggestion by warning that "such tests should be made only as check tests 
because of the difficulty and the time required." John Crowley, also of the 
Flight Research Division, added that the lateral stability of several airplanes 
should be measured "as a basis for comparing actual and estimated lateral 
stability characteristics." It is especially important to note that at the end 
of this 45-minute conference Weick stated in very strong and clear terms 
that it was advisable for the NACA "to obtain Army and Navy approval 
of our [author's emphasis) stability research program so that it will not be 
crowded out by urgent Army and Navy tests." Thus, military support was 
quite often merely the device used by NACA researchers to ensure that the 
generalized research program which they had developed would be conducted 
on an equal priority with development tests requested by the military. 
Just before World War II, NACA Langley rightfully placed more and 
more emphasis on the testing of particular military aircraft and, as a result, 
found itself increasingly limited as to what it could do to meet broad 
commercial needs. In May 1939, for example, the Committee replaced 
its 13-year-old practice of the annual manufacturers' conference with an 
"inspection," a classified technical meeting intended exclusively for military 
representatives and a few delegates of their chosen contractors. 
One civil aviation program which became increasingly directed toward 
military aircraft as World War II approached involved determination of 
satisfactory flying qualities. In 1935 Edward P. Warner, the original chief 
physicist at LMAL who was then working as a consultant for the Douglas 
Aircraft Company, asked the NACA to help him specify the stability and 
control characteristics to be built into the DC-4 transport. Up to this time, 
pilot impressions had been the only measure of what constituted good flying 
qualities in relation to the mission performance and operational suitability of 
an aircraft. In December 1935 the NACA Aerodynamics Committee, which 
was chaired by Warner, approved what became RA 509, "Preliminary Study 
of Control Requirements for Large Transport Airplanes." The purpose of 
this investigation was to determine "what specific qualities pilots desired, so 
that they could be numerically specified in future design competitions." A 
team of LMAL flight researchers under Hartley A. Soule started this work 
in 1936 with a Stinson cabin monoplane. Langley instrumented the airplane 
so that its response characteristics, following known control inputs from the 
test pilot, could be measured, related to design parameters, and correlated 
with the pilot's qualitative evaluation of the ease and precision with which 
he maneuvered the plane. Soule's team continued this effort using "all 
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In 1936 LMAL used this Stinson Reliant SR-7, which was owned by the NACA, for 
a prelz'minary study of control requirements for large transport airplanes. 
airplanes that could be obtained for the purpose" until 1941, when it was 
ready to specify numerical requirements for the longitudinal and lateral 
stability and control characteristics and the stalling characteristics of 12 
different airplanes, large and small. 82 
In 1942, the U.S. Anny and Navy revised the NACA's preliminary 
specifications to meet their immediate requirements and asked Langley 
to continue validating and upgrading handling requirements specifically 
for military aircraft. According to Soule, "this was fortunate, as many 
more airplanes were made available and a broader view taken than would 
otherwise have been possible." By the end of World War II, the NACA 
had measured the stability and flying qualities of 60 aircraft, and military 
and civil aircraft handling requirements had been standardized. This effort 
foreshadowed the extensive work that would be undertaken in the field over 
the next three decades leading to the uniformly utilized rating system of 
the present day. 83 
In the history of American aviation, the development of advanced 
civil aircraft has always depended to a large extent-at least until quite 
recently-on the availability of technology generated by military research 
and development. Many parts of the Douglas DC-3 commercial trans-
port, including air-cooled radial engines, retractable landing gear, and 
controllable-pitch propellers, derived from military-sponsored R&D. A 1972 
study by the air force on R&D contributions to aviation progress began by 
pointing out that more than eight out of ten of all the commercial jet airlin-
ers then operating in the free world were designed and built in the United 
States, and that one of every four of those American-built craft traced its 
lineage to a single military bomber program.84 
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The design formula for propeller-driven aircraft recommended by the NACA in 1939 
looked very much like the later configuration of the Douglas DC-4E. Ironically, plans 
for the DC-4E went nowhere. 
Ironically, however, working successfully with industry and the military 
before World War II on ever more refined propeller-driven aircraft may 
have cost the NACA some of its chances to explore more fully some 
of the more revolutionary ideas in aeronautical science and technology. 
Successful teamwork depended upon a consensus, and the NACA's clients 
were interested in optimizing shapes and structures that could fly at speeds 
up to 200 miles per hour without falling to the ground in pieces. One 
NACA engineer has written that "it would have been quite impossible in 
the prewar period to have any major support from the military, industry, or 
from Congress for research and development aimed at such radical concepts 
as the turbojet, the rocket engine, or transonic or supersonic aircraft," and 
another has commented that "it is certain that if the NACA had had the 
foresight to do research on the turbine engine in the decade before World 
War II, the agency would have met with such technical ridicule and criticism 
about wasting the taxpayers' money that it would either have had to drop 
it or have been eliminated." 85 
A review of suggestions for NACA research made at the annual aircraft 
engineering conferences and of military requests for NACA tests seems to 
confirm that these insider testimonies are not mere rationalizations. With 
management concentrating on ways to satisfy the immediate demands of 
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the American aeronautical establishment, Langley researchers could do less 
than they might have wanted to further understanding of exotic aeronautical 
ideas. On the other hand, the NACA was not beyond putting things over 
on Congress-like the "icing" tunnel. If members of the laboratory staff 
had really wanted to make exploratory studies of jet propulsion or another 
radical concept, they might have found some way to do it. 
Luckily, the failure of NACA researchers and other American engineers 
to understand the potential of the turbine engine as quickly as a few men 
in Germany and Great Britain did made little difference in the practical 
outcome of World War II. The timing of the turbojet revolution was such 
that the NACA's systematic, evolutionary approach to aviation progress was 
vindicated. Research done at Langley in the fields of subsonic aerodynamics, 
stability and control, loads, propulsion, and structures-that is, research on 
the practical aeronautical problems of the day-contributed significantly to 
the design of the military aircraft essential to the Allied victory. 
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The Priorities 
of World War II 
Of all the events that have affected the course of Langley history in the 
past seventy years, only two have caused major trauma. The second was 
the Sputnik crisis, induced in October 1957 by the Soviet Union's launching 
of the world's first artificial satellite. This crisis was indeed traumatic: 
Sputnik not only triggered the demise of the NACA and the birth of NASA, 
but it also triggered what future historians might very well call the "space 
technology revolution" -something that at present has all the appearances 
of becoming perpetual. The first was World War II, and in certain ways 
this trauma changed Langley more significantly, and more totally, than did 
even Sputnik. 
Before World War II, Langley and its parent organization, the NACA, 
were in some ways obscure operations. There were congressmen who did not 
even know that the NACA existed. The war altered this status dramatically. 
First, the laboratory grew much larger. In 1938, the total LMAL staff 
numbered only 426; by 1945 the size of the staff, in order to meet the 
increased workload, had swelled to over 3000. With wartime expansion came 
added organizational complexity and greater fragmentation of personnel. 
In 1935, employees belonged to one of only six different research divisions, 
and they worked in one of a dozen buildings on a few acres surrounded by 
army property; ten years later, employees worked in 18 divisions located 
either in the old "East Area" or in a large new "West Area" separate not 
only from the active parts of the military installation but also, by a few 
miles, from the other base of NACA operations. Beyond that, dozens 
of LMAL employees moved away to the NACA's new installations, the 
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory (AAL) at Moffett Field, California, and the 
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory (AERL) in Cleveland, Ohio. The staff 
that remained was less uniform: a large number of women worked there for 
the first time, many of them doing a "man's job." Also, Langley's fiscal 
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posture changed dramatically. Between 1940 and 1945 lab expenditures 
amounted to more than twice ( approximately $33 million) what they had 
been in the first twenty years of LMAL history combined ( approximately 
$14 million). 
Finally, the priorities of American involvement in the war dictated a 
change in emphasis at Langley from general to specific testing. This change 
did not compel every engineer and scientist on the staff to forsake basic 
research, but it did mean that researchers assigned to the major wind 
tunnels and to the Flight Research Division had to spend the majority 
of their time preparing for, conducting, and reporting on tests of specific 
aircraft configurations. In the minds of NACA clients, managers, and 
most employees, the main responsibility of Langley laboratory during the 
crisis was to refine the high-performance combat aircraft being readied for 
production and to communicate accurate component data and other useful 
test information to military contractors as quickly as possible. 
The NACA Perceives European Threat 
In 1936, NACA reports of European aeronautical activities grew urgent. 
The Committee's intelligence officer in Paris, John Jay Ide, reported that 
the French had just completed a full-scale wind tunnel at Chalais-Meudon; 
the Italians had built an entire city, Guidonia, which they planned to devote 
almost exclusively to high-speed aeronautical research; and the Germans, 
traditionally strong in applying the science of aerodynamics, were in the 
midst of what appeared to be a major revitalization of their country's 
aeronautical resources. As a result of Nazi support, there would soon be 
five major regional stations for aeronautical research and development in 
Germany: three in the west at Aachen, Braunschweig, and Gottingen; 
one in the south at Stuttgart; and a central establishment, the Deutsche 
Versuchsanstalt fiir Luftfahrt (DVL) at Aldershof near Berlin.1 George 
Lewis visited the DVL in the late summer of 1936 while touring various 
aeronautical installations in Russia and Germany; the place looked to 
him "like a construction camp" being readied for experiments "with every 
conceivable device." He estimated that between 1600 and 2000 well-trained 
employees were working there, compared with only 350 at Langley.2 
Despite this comparison, Lewis still considered Langley "the single best 
and biggest aeronautical research complex in the world." 3 The lab possessed 
an unparalleled array of experimental facilities, led by the VDT, PRT, and 
FST. Lewis knew what advances in the design of state-of-the-art aircraft 
had been and could still be achieved from test programs conducted in 
these tunnels, and he also knew that a full-speed (500-MPH) companion to 
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the low-speed Full-Scale Tunnel had just become operational at Langley in 
March. The director of research and other NACA officials believed that this 
facility, conceived by VDT section head Eastman Jacobs in November 1933 
and later named the 8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel, would "make possible the 
use of great speeds with safety, and thus give the United States a decided 
advantage over other nations." 4 
Lewis also knew that the NACA had just received over one million 
dollars, thanks to a June 1936 deficiency appropriation, for construction of 
a new pressure tunnel at Langley for high-speed propeller research. The 
basic idea behind the aerodynamic design of this super PRT, which came 
from Smith DeFrance in February 1936, was to overcome scale effects. 
DeFrance's experience in the FST had told him that "the most satisfactory 
size" of a wind tunnel for general use was one with a throat dimension of 
20 to 25 feet. In a tunnel of this size, wherein compressed air traveled at 
speeds up to 200 miles per hour (as compared to the 118-MPH atmospheric 
current of the FST), not only could models be large enough to incorporate 
minor construction details, but tests could be conducted at a Reynolds 
number high enough to reduce the scale effect "to a negligible quantity." 
Though this Reynolds number (9 million) was approximately the same as 
that obtained in the FST, the cost of operating the smaller tunnel would 
be considerably less, DeFrance argued, because of its need for less electric 
power and the greater ease it allowed in making and changing setups. The 
NACA's primary political justification for immediate construction of this 
tunnel was to handle on "a production basis" the increasing demands for 
complete-model testing which Langley had been receiving in the mid-1930s 
from industry.5 
Notwithstanding the excellent record of existing LMAL facilities and 
the promise of its new ones, NACA leaders understood the danger of com-
placency. In March 1936 they formed a Special Committee on Aeronautical 
Research Facilities, chaired by Rear Adm. Ernest J. King, the influential 
chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. It was congressional respect for a rec-
ommendation of King's panel for additional experimental facilities that led 
to the NACA's deficiency appropriation in June.6 This appropriation did 
not prevent Lewis, upon returning from Europe in September, from warn-
ing people that the technological edge enjoyed for the last several years by 
the NACA would come to an abrupt end if Congress did not allocate funds 
to increase manpower and build new test equipment beyond that already 
approved. Specifically, he wanted Langley's permanent complement raised 
immediately to 500 employees and a low-turbulence VDT for the develop-
ment of higher-speed, lower-drag wings. In 1937 the NACA managed to get 
the Congress to authorize funds for this facility, but only by packaging it 
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QUALITY 
The test section and the control console (bottom) of the 8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel 
were housed in the thick concrete igloo in the middle of the photograph at the top. 
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as an icing tunnel (see chapter 4). The Langley complement did reach 500, 
but not until 1939-when Germany invaded Poland and plunged Europe 
into war. 
Expansion 
The NACA had tried to prepare itself for this turn of events. In Octo-
ber 1936 it created a Special Committee on Relation of NACA to National 
Defense in Time of War, chaired by Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, chief of the 
Army Air Corps. This committee took nearly two years to issue a report, 
but when it did, in August 1938, the idea to build a second NACA laboratory 
was put forward in strong terms. A second lab was necessary somewhere 
in the interior of the country or on the west coast, the committee report 
argued, both to disperse the government's aeronautical research facilities so 
that they would not be vulnerable to a single attack, and to relieve "the 
congested bottleneck at Langley Field." 7 Research teams at the LMAL were 
admittedly "working under high pressure" and managing to satisfy the in-
creasing number of requests for specific configuration testing only "at the 
expense of interfering with or neglecting the more fundamental scientific 
long-range investigations that in the end mean much to the advancement 
of American aeronautics." 8 The argument for a second laboratory was soon 
strengthened by highly publicized reports from resolute Charles Lindbergh, 
who was touring Europe in October 1938, that Germany was "far ahead" 
of the United States "in military aviation." 9 
In December 1938, a Special Committee on Future Research Facilities 
under the chairmanship of Rear Adm. Arthur Cook, chief of BuAer, Navy 
Department, recommended the construction at Langley Field of several new 
facilities in which investigations of the special characteristics and problems 
of military airplanes could be made. One of these facilities was for structures 
research, a field made vital by the increases in size and speed of aircraft and 
by the increasing complexity of their metal construction. Another was a 
new tunnel to study spinning, which, as evidenced by the loss of several 
new aircraft such as the Grumman XF3F, was still a much-misunderstood 
phenomenon. The committee also advocated immediate construction at 
Langley of two high-speed tunnels, one (with a 16-foot-diameter test section) 
to investigate the cowling and cooling of full-size engines and propellers, 
and the other (with a 7 x 10-foot test section, the same size as that of the 
atmospheric wind tunnel operating at Langley since 1930) to study stability 
and control problems. All three of these facilities were eventually located 
a few miles away in the new West Area granted to the NACA by the War 
Department in 1939. 10 
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The special committee also named Moffett Field in Sunnyvale, Califor-
nia (38 miles south of San Francisco), as the best site for a second NACA 
laboratory. Moffett Field, a naval airship station used since 1938 by the 
Army Air Corps as a training base, met all the general requirements set 
down by the site selection committee, including adequate electric power 
supply, which had been a chronic problem at Langley.11 Location near the 
growing west coast aircraft industry was the deciding factor in preferring it, 
however.12 
The NACA quickly endorsed its panel's choice of Moffett Field and rec-
ommendation for new facilities at Langley, and appealed to the Congress 
for construction funds. George Lewis testified before a House subcommit-
tee that Langley was being forced, by lack of personnel and facilities, to 
neglect 49 authorized projects. He quoted engineer-in-charge Reid as say-
ing, "Right now, we have enough work to keep our present staff busy for 
2½ years."13 Though the Langley items experienced no difficulty in clearing 
either the Congress or the Bureau of the Budget, the Sunnyvale installa-
tion ran into some trouble in the House Appropriations Committee, headed 
by Congressman Clifton A. Woodrum of Roanoke, Virginia. Woodrum was 
"not opposed to seeing funds for the expansion of the NACA pour into Lang-
ley Field, within his own state, but he was a little more circumspect about 
the advisability of sending such funds all the way across the country." 14 
Eventually the NACA pacified Woodrum, and its entire expansion package 
was authorized-on 9 August 1939, just days before the Nazis rolled into 
Poland. The following spring, the NACA named the Moffett facility "Ames 
Aeronautical Laboratory," in honor of Joseph Ames, charter member of the 
Committee and its recently retired chairman; who was then near death. 
A Special Survey Committee on Aeronautical Research chaired by 
Lindbergh followed up on the authorization for a second NACA laboratory 
with a declaration, in October 1939, that time was running out for America 
to catch up with European nations in engine development. Britain, France, 
and Germany possessed faster and more versatile fighter aircraft, Lindbergh 
said. They did largely because their engine manufacturers had been able 
to afford to develop superior liquid-cooled power plants capable of high-
altitude flight. Because the geography of America was different, requiring 
flights of greater distances, U.S. manufacturers had concentrated instead 
on refining fuel-efficient air-cooled engines. Beyond industry, American 
facilities for research on aircraft power plants were totally inadequate, 
Lindbergh lamented. This inadequacy was partly a consequence of the 
NACA's agreement in 1916 to leave engine development to the engine 
manufacturers. It was now essential for the NACA to reverse this hands-off 
policy, he said. His committee called for the creation of a third NACA 
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laboratory geared solely to solving the problems of high-speed aircraft 
propulsion. 15 
On 26 June 1940 Congress authorized construction of the NACA's "Air-
craft Engine Research Laboratory" ( renamed the "Lewis Flight Propulsion 
Laboratory" in 1948, in memory of George Lewis who died in July of that 
year) at a site near the Cleveland municipal airport. As with the Ames lab, 
the key personnel of this facility were to be drawn from Langley. 
Langley now had two junior siblings. The NACA foresaw the three 
laboratories working together as a family, one member devoted to engines 
and two to aerodynamics. Ames and Langley might duplicate each other's 
programs only to the extent that duplication, competition, and cross-
fertilization were productive. People at Langley saw themselves as part 
of the "mother laboratory," sharing talent and experience with daughter 
facilities. For a short time some employees at Ames and Lewis felt 
subordinate to Langley because its practices, policies, and opinions were 
so well established. By the end of the war, however, most people at the 
new labs felt distinct and confident enough in the capabilities of their own 
organizations to view "Mother Langley" as a peer and, on occasion, as a 
rival. 16 
Drag Cleanup 
While the various ad hoc committees formed by the NACA from 1936 
through 1939 helped to organize the political support necessary for the 
addition of new research staffs and facilities, they barely addressed the 
question of what the NACA was supposed to do with them once it had them. 
That responsibility the special committees left to the main, executive, and 
technical committees and to the research staff at Langley. 
In April 1938 these bodies all heard a loud cry for help: the navy 
was unhappy with the 250-mile-per-hour flight test performance of its 
new experimental fighter, the Brewster XF2A Buffalo. The Bureau of 
Aeronautics wanted the staff at Langley to look for "kinks" or "bugs" in the 
plane's general design and to determine, in only one week's time, "what drag 
reduction may be expected from changes that can readily be incorporated 
in the event that this type is put into production." The NACA readily 
agreed, and even before a formal research authorization was transmitted to 
the lab, the navy flew an XF2A-1 to Langley Field for tests in the Full-Scale 
Tunnel. 17 
The FST team acted quickly to satisfy the navy's urgent request. Its 
engineers mounted the XF2A-1 on the balance of the 30 x 60-foot wind 
tunnel and put the airplane through a meticulous drag cleanup investigation. 
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In 1938 Langley mounted the navy's Brewster XF2A-1 Buffalo in the Full-Scale 
Tunnel for drag reduction studies. 
At the end of five busy days of tunnel tests, the FST team concluded that 
Brewster had in fact overlooked the aerodynamic importance of several 
small but highly significant details of the Buffalo's design. The landing 
gear, exhaust stacks, machine-gun installation, and gunsight all projected 
outside the smooth basic contour of the aircraft in such a way as to produce 
unacceptably high drag. By modifying the XF2A-1 in these and several 
other minor particulars, it reported, the top speed of the prototype could be 
increased by 31 miles per hour to 281, more than a 10 percent improvement 
in performance. 18 
The XF2A set two precedents. It was the first airplane to use the 
NACA's new 230-series airfoils. All high-performance American military 
planes built through the end of World War II, with the exception of the 
P-51 Mustang, employed an airfoil from this efficient series. 19 Second, Lang-
ley did such an outstanding job reducing the drag of the Buffalo that the 
army and navy were soon sending all of their new prototypes to the lab 
for drag cleanup. Between April 1938 and November 1940 the LMAL gave 
18 different military prototypes thorough goings-over in the FST to see 
if the airplanes could be bettered in any particular ( see the table below). 
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RA no. 
603 
606 
607 
633 
635 
636 
637 
646 
647 
672 
674 
695 
698 
709 
739 
746 
796 
797 
811 
Langley Drag Reduction Program 
April 1938~November 1940 
Date Airplane 
June 1938 Brewster XF2A-l Buffalo 
June 1938 Grumman F3F-2 
June 1938 Grumman XF4F-2 Wildcat 
August 1938 Vought-Sikorsky SB2U-l Vindicator 
August 1938 Curtiss XP-37 
August 1938 Curtiss P-36A Mohawk 
August 1938 Curtiss XP-40 Kittyhawk 
December 1938 Douglas XBT-2 
December 1938 Curtiss YP-37 
June 1939 Seversky XP-41 
June 1939 Bell XP-39 Airacobra 
September 1939 Curtiss XP-42 
September 1939 Grumman XF4F-3 Wildcat 
November 1939 Curtiss XP-46 
May 1940 Republic XP-47 Thunderbolt 
September 1940 Chance Vought XF4U-l Corsair 
October 1940 Brewster XF2A-2 Buffalo 
October 1940 Curtiss XSO3C-l 
November 1940 Consolidated XB-32 Dominator 
Source: Langley research authorization files, Langley Historical Archive (LHA), 
Hampton, Va. 
This program of specific configuration tests was of unprecedented 
proportions for the NACA laboratory, and Langley fulfilled its responsibility 
systematically. Following the classic style of the successful cowling and 
airfoil series research programs, the FST team perfected a method of 
experimental parameter variation. First, engineers examined the airplane 
in detail, identifying those of its external features most suspected of causing 
unnecessary drag. They then made the airplane as aerodynamically clean 
as possible, by carefully removing protuberances like the radio antenna and 
using putty or tape to cover holes and leaks and to reshape irregular surfaces 
such as the cockpit canopy. Following this, they mounted the plane in the 
test chamber, and measured its drag at various wind speeds. 
In this faired and sealed condition, the airplane naturally proved to 
have less drag than the original body, but it was impossible for this pristine 
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LMAL chart of the test arrangements for the Brewster XF2A-1 Buffalo. The two 
columns of numbers show quantitatively the effects of the configuration variations. 
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Airplane conditiun 
CD 
r-------T-
•cn7 Condltton Descriptwn >Cn 
number (cL" 0.15) percent a 
~ ~ 
---------+----
Completely faired condition, 0.0166 
long nose fairing 
~ Completely faired condition, .0169 ~ blunt nose fairing Original cowling added, no .0186 0.0020 12.0 ~ airflow through cowling Landing-gear 5eals and .0188 .0002 1.2 
~ ~ 
fairing removed 
Oil cooler installed .0205 .0017 10.2 
-'/ Canopy fairing removed .0203 -.0002 -1.2 ~~ ~ Carburetor air scoop added .0209 .0006 3.6 -.y .... Sanded walkway added .0216 .0007 4.2 
~ (ws~ Ejector chute added .0219 .0003 1.8 10 Exhaust stacks added .0225 .0006 3.6 
~~ <tt~111 11 lntercooler added .0236 .0011 6.6 12 Cowling exit opened .0247 .0011 6.6 
IL'11~ ~ 13 Accessory exit opened .0252 .0005 3.0 14 Cowling !airing and seals .0261 .0009 5.4 removed 
~~ d:Ii_~ 15 Cockpit ventilator opened .0262 .0001 .6 16 Cowling venturi installed .0264 .0002 1.2 
17 BJa5t tubes added .0267 .0003 1.8 
18 Antenna installed .0275 .0008 4.8 
L 
---- --
____=1 Total 0.0109 
a Percentage5 \:used on completely faired condition with long nose falrillj{. 
Experimental parameter variation of drag sources on the Seversky XP-41 airplane, 
summer 1939. (From Paul L. Coe, Jr., "Review of Drag Cleanup Tests in Langley 
Full-Scale Tunnel," NASA TN D-8206, 1976.) 
shape, with essential parts covered up or removed, actually to fly. The 
wind tunnel workers returned the plane to its service condition item by 
item and evaluated the change in drag caused by each action. In the case of 
the cleanup tests of the Seversky XP-41 in late 1939, for example, Langley 
studied the drag of the airplane in 18 different configurations. The data 
indicated that the changes in drag values corresponding to the steps of the 
cleanup process were generally small, amounting to only a few percent of the 
total drag coefficient and thus involving only small speed changes. Taken 
together, however, increments like these often resulted in impressive gains 
in total performance. 20 
The NACA did its best to help industry realize these dramatic increases 
of speed in production aircraft. This effort can be seen clearly in Langley's 
cleanup of the Bell XP-39 Airacobra, eleventh in the series of military 
planes subjected to the NACA operation. Bell's chief engineer Robert J. 
Woods (a former LMAL employee in Eastman Jacobs's VDT section) 
had designed the unconventional plane-its power plant amidships, at the 
center of gravity, and its cannon in the nose--as a 400-MPH fighter. At 
Wright Field in the spring of 1939, the unarmed XP-39 prototype (with 
a turbosupercharged Allison engine, rating 1150 horsepower) flew to a 
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maximum speed of 390 MPH at 20,000 feet. The aircraft reached this speed, 
however, with a gross weight of only 5550 pounds, thought to be about a 
ton less than a heavily armored production P-39. That meant that the 
existing aircraft, when normally loaded, would have a hard time exceeding 
340 MPH. Still, the test performance impressed the Air Corps enough for 
it to issue a contract, three weeks later, for 13 production model YP-39s. 
Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, desperate for a new fighter, hoped that the 
speed of the airplane could be increased to over 400 MPH by cleaning up the 
drag. On 9 June 1939 he formally requested NACA approval for immediate 
testing of the XP-39 in the Full-Scale Tunnel. 21 
Actually Langley had received the XP-39 from Wright Field three days 
before Arnold's request, which had been put in writing on 6 June to satisfy 
NACA headquarters. On 8 June, Robert Woods and other representatives 
from Bell arrived at Langley to see the NACA's experimental setup and 
witness the initial round of tests. For the next two months the FST 
team systematically investigated the airplane's various sources of drag. 
On 10 August, Lawrence D. Bell, president of the Bell Aircraft Company, 
visited Langley to discuss the test results obtained to date. Bell was shown 
preliminary data from the FST indicating that the prototype in a completely 
faired condition had a drag value of only 0.0150 compared to 0.0316 in 
the original form. This meant a maximum increase in speed, if all the 
NACA's suggestions for drag improvement were met, of 26 percent. The 
NACA realized, of course, that not all of the changes to the configuration 
studied in the FST were feasible for the production aircraft. Fifteen days 
later, the head of the FST team reported that by cuffing the propeller at 
the point where it met the hub, streamlining the internal cooling ducts 
of the wings, lowering the cabin six inches, decreasing the size of the 
wheels so that they could be completely housed within the wing, and 
removing the turbosupercharger and certain air intakes, the speed of the 
XP-39 airplane for a given altitude and engine power could be increased 
significantly. Extrapolating from the same weight airframe to a more 
powerful (1350-horsepower) engine with a geared supercharger, he estimated 
that the top speed attainable with the aircraft might be as high as 429 MPH 
at 20,000 feet. The FST head did not know precisely how much additional 
air would be required to cool the bigger engine, but he did believe that 
even if this increase was very large, it would not prohibit the plane from 
obtaining at least 410 MPH.22 
Bell incorporated enough changes recommended by the NACA to 
improve the speed of the airplane by about 16 percent. These changes 
included installation of an engine that could be equipped with a gear-driven 
supercharger but had only 1090 horsepower-60 horsepower less than the 
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The army's Bell P-39 Airacobra in flight over Langley Field, 1943. The pilot of 
this airplane sat on the front end of the gearbox with the engine behind him and the 
propeller shaft passing underneath his legs. The P-39 was one of the first military 
airplanes fitted with a tricycle landing gear. 
engine which had driven the unarmed XP-39 to 390 MPH at Wright Field 
in the spring of 1939 ( and 260 horsepower less than that used hypothetically 
by the FST head in his paper study). The Air Corps then resumed flight 
trials. The less powerful aircraft, redesignated XP-39B, weighed some 
300 pounds more than the original, and without the turbosupercharger flew 
to a maximum speed of 375 MPH at 15,000 feet in the first trials. Both 
the Air Corps and Bell expressed satisfaction with the NACA results. In 
January 1940 the Air Corps told Bell to finish the production of the first 
series of YP-39s without turbosuperchargers. (The Bureau of Aeronautics 
called the NACA report on the XP-39B the "worst condemnation of turbo 
supercharging to date.") 23 Soon thereafter Lawrence Bell informed George 
Lewis that 
200 
as a result of the wind tunnel tests at Langley Field, we are getting extraordinar-
ily satisfactory results. From all indications the XP-39 will do over 400 m.p.h., 
[even] with 1150 H.P. All of the changes were improvements and we have elimi-
nated a million and one problems by the removal of the turbosupercharger .... 
The cooling system is the most efficient thing we have seen. The inlet ducts 
on the radiator are closed up to 3% and the engine is still over cooling. . .. I 
want to convey to you personally and your entire organization . . . our very deep 
appreciation of your assistance in obtaining these very satisfactory results. 24 
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The top speed of the Airacobra never came anywhere near 400 MPH during 
this second round of flight trials-for that matter, no version of the P-39 ever 
would. However, the plane showed reasonable stability and roll rates and 
maneuverability at low altitudes-attributes that were not due to NACA 
drag testing-which meant it would be useful in ground support as a strafer 
and fighter-bomber. 25 
The Army Air Corps seems to have left the problem of increasing the 
speed of the XP-39 to over 400 MPH to Langley. On 6 February 1940, 
General Arnold's office advised the NACA to make any modifications its 
staff thought necessary "which do not involve structural change to the 
airplane." NACA headquarters responded with word that "the entire 
investigation should be carried out in flight" at Langley Field. At first, 
this appeared possible: during a telephone conversation with George Lewis 
on the morning of 28 February, General Arnold said that if the NACA felt 
the best way to increase the speed of the Airacobra to over 400 MPH was 
to make flight tests with the airplane at Langley, Langley "should do that 
and, if necessary, get a pilot from Wright Field." 26 
However, the Air Corps, Bell, and the NACA soon agreed that "these 
tests could be better conducted first in the Full-Scale Tunnel." 27 In early 
March the XP-39B was flown to Langley from Bolling Field, where it had 
undergone performance tests, and was again mounted immediately in the 
FST. Within a few weeks the FST team finished another systematic drag 
investigation, this time concentrating on internal flow problems. Little more 
could be recommended to improve the airframe, however, because within 
the poorly designed ducts were structural members for the wings which 
could not be altered without some basic reconstruction of the aircraft.28 A 
flight test program followed (at Wright, not Langley, Field). 
"In order to provide for the possibility of additional tests being re-
quested by the Air Corps," George Lewis notified Langley to keep the re-
search authorization (no. 674) covering drag cleanup of the XP-39 open. 29 
For the next several months, Langley sent representatives to both Wright 
Field and the Bell plant in Buffalo to make sure that the major modifica-
tions called for by the FST analysis ( such as the installation of propeller 
cuffs and wheel well covers, the latter being "the most likely possibility for 
large drag reduction") were being carried out properly.30 In September 1940 
the first YP-39, having incorporated most of the suggestions called for by 
the NACA, flew, top speed 368 MPH at 13,300 feet. Deliveries of the first 
production model P-39s, which were very similar to the service-test YP-39, 
began four months later. In 1941 the United States sent nearly 700 Aira-
cobras to Great Britain and the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease. After 
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the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the Air Corps rushed P-39 units into 
action in the South Pacific. 
Because these P-39s flew well below 400 MPH, with a slow rate of climb 
and a low ceiling, Bell asked the NACA for another round of tests in the 
FST. Langley answered that it seemed "unlikely that further tests in the 
Full-Scale Tunnel would result in any other suggestions than those already 
made as a result of the tests of the experimental model." 31 LMAL engineers 
did suggest two ways to boost the aircraft's speed by modifying the exhaust 
stacks for auxiliary thrust, but neither earned much support. 32 
The first unarmed P-39 prototype had flown 390 MPH, faster than 
any subsequent P-39, but 10 miles per hour slower than Bell advertised. 
The maximum speed of the production P-39D was only 368 MPH. Thus to 
assert that NACA drag testing helped the airplane to pick up speed may 
not appear to make sense: how could it make sense when, in spite of the 
NACA improvements, the production model flew slower? The answer to 
this riddle is weight. The army added a new and bigger power plant and 
heavier armor plate to the production model. (The XP-39E would weigh 
nearly 9000 pounds!) Based on drag coefficients from the FST, it seems 
that the NACA drag cleanup recommendations improved the speed of the 
airplane by a dramatic 16 percent. 33 In other words, if the P-39 had not 
gone through drag testing, it would have been slower than it ultimately was. 
The drag reduction program required precisely the kind of systematic 
wind tunnel work that Langley did best. The lab had derived its original 
families of airfoils in the VDT, and its first low-drag cowlings in the PRT, 
according to the method of experimental parameter variation; similarly, it 
cleaned up the drag problems of the American military aircraft that fought 
World War II. Here again, as in the other two cases, the NACA engineers 
were demonstrating how the correct design of small details improved the 
performance of an aircraft. The significance of this work should not be 
underestimated: by pointing out ways for these aircraft to gain a few extra 
miles per hour, the NACA effort might often have made the difference in 
performance between Allied victory and defeat in the air. Moreover, the 
program also had an impact on the shape of postwar technology. Specialists 
in the analysis of engine cooling and duct design-like physicist Kennedy F. 
Rubert, who had worked as an integral part of the FST drag reduction 
team during the war-formed the nucleus of a new Induction Aerodynamics 
Laboratory at Langley in 1946. In this facility, researchers investigated the 
aerodynamics of subsonic and supersonic internal flows, concentrating on 
solving such basic problems as the optimum method of inducing air and 
supplying it to high-speed conventional and jet engines. 
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Meeting Manpower 
Needs after Pearl Harbor 
From 1939 to 1941, as the drag reduction program picked up speed 
in preparation for direct American involvement in World War II, Langley 
increased its total manpower from 524 to 940 employees. Though 416 
more employees in two years' time constituted unprecedented growth for 
the NACA staff-especially considering that the LMAL was simultaneously 
losing personnel to help organize and operate new laboratories at Moffett 
Field and Cleveland-this expansion was minor in comparison with what 
happened after Pearl Harbor. On 6 December 1941 Langley still had fewer 
than 1000 employees, and of those, fewer than 300 were professionals. On 
V-J day in August 1945, the lab had more than 3200 employees, including 
more than 800 professionals. In a span of less than four years of war, 
personnel more than tripled. 
Accomplishing an expansion of this magnitude during national mobi-
lization for war was a prodigious, uphill task which constantly threatened 
to become a Sisyphean labor. By the end of 1941 the NACA had already 
tapped deeply into the already short supply of American aerodynamicists, 
engineers, technicians, and mechanics in order to get ready for its ex-
panded role during a war. Once the nation began fighting, everything about 
that involvement operated to reduce the supply of desirable personnel even 
further. 
The NACA's biggest personnel problem was the drain of qualified men 
to selective service. In 1938 the Special Committee on Relation of NACA 
to National Defense in Time of War had counseled the government to keep 
all NACA employees working in civilian status as employees of an "essential 
industry" in the event of war. The idea was to preserve NACA effectiveness 
by keeping personnel from jumping to jobs in manufacturing to avoid the 
conscription that would probably take place.34 The committee had advised 
against blanket deferment. It said that deferment arrangements satisfactory 
to both the NACA and the armed services could be made promptly with 
the proper authorities if and when war came. 
President Roosevelt incorporated this advice into his mobilization plan 
of 1939. Unfortunately, when the United States entered the war two years 
later, deferments for NACA personnel were not as easy to come by as 
had been anticipated in 1938. LMAL personnel officers had to travel to 
Richmond at least once a month to negotiate for the deferment of "essential" 
employees with the director of the state board on a case-by-case basis. 
Their efforts were not always successful: Langley lost more employees to 
military induction in certain months of 1942 and 1943 than it was able 
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to recruit.35 John Victory appealed to selective service director Lewis B. 
Hershey for special consideration of the NACA's unique role in the war 
effort, but nothing agreeable to both parties was worked out until early 1944. 
According to Victory, one idea offered by Hershey in 1943 was militarization 
of all the NACA's physically able males; however, everyone working for the 
committee from the director of research in Washington down to the junior 
engineering aide at Langley opposed being blanketed into military service. 
In a military organization, they feared, rank insignia would ultimately count 
more than what an individual knew about solving research problems.36 
Ironically, it was military service in the end that enabled the NACA to 
circumvent the unsympathetic selective service policy. On 1 February 1944, 
the army and navy agreed to a plan which, when approved ten days later by 
President Roosevelt, called for the induction into one of the armed services 
of all draft-age NACA employees. According to the scheme (which was 
modeled after one devised by the army in 1943 to take care of employees 
of the civilian flight training schools under contract to the Air Corps), all 
eligible employees at Langley would join the Air Corps Enlisted Reserves 
(ACER) and then be placed immediately on inactive status under the 
exclusive administrative management of the NACA. (Those holding reserve 
commissions resigned them to become members of the ACER.) When a 
Langley man was called for induction, he was given a letter prepared 
by the NACA personnel office, which he took with him to the induction 
station in Richmond. This letter indicated the procedure for inducting and 
placing essential NACA employees in the ACER. The man spent 24 hours in 
the state capital undergoing a physical examination and completing forms 
and other induction measures. Then he recited an oath of induction that 
included a reference to his assignment to the ACER on an inactive status, 
and went home. He received no military training, never wore a uniform, 
and spent absolutely no time on active duty. Through rigorous compliance 
with this system, Langley was able to retain most of its professional staff 
for the remainder of the war. Following the surrender of the Japanese in 
August 1945, all NACA members of the ACER were granted honorable 
discharges.37 
So the army-navy-NACA plan of February 1944 resolved the problem 
of keeping essential employees at Langley. On the negative side, though, the 
contrivance at the heart of the plan naturally upset some Hampton citizens 
who saw sons and brothers being drafted, sent to war, and killed. 38 Also, 
the plan came much too late to resolve Langley's other wartime personnel 
problem, the lack of engineering, technical service, and administrative 
laborers in sufficient numbers to meet the dramatically increased post~Pearl 
Harbor workload. 
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ANNOUNCE ARMY-NAVY PLAN REGARDING 
ESSENTIAL DRAFT ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES 
In a special February 1944 edition of the LMAL Bulletin, the engineer-in-charge 
announced a joint army-navy-NACA plan that placed essential lab employees who 
were eligible for the draft into the Army Air Corps Enlisted Reserve. 
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The lab had launched a vigorous recruitment campaign reaching far 
beyond traditional sources of new employees as soon as the war started. It 
sent scouts up and down the Atlantic coast to recruit anyone who looked 
even marginally qualified for the dozens of vacant positions in research, 
technical service, and administration. Automobile mechanics along the 
Maryland Eastern Shore were persuaded to leave their garages and come 
to Langley to work on aircraft engines; blacksmiths from the mountains of 
western Virginia agreed to try their hands at aircraft sheet metal work; and 
loom fixers who had been working in North Carolina textile mills proved 
to be effective wind tunnel mechanics. Recruits from other locales whose 
raw skills translated less directly into useful NACA work were placed into 
a new LMAL apprentice program, taught by the lab's own journeymen. 
By the end of the war this program had graduated nearly 400 men for the 
difficult work expected at Langley from draftsmen, machinists, metalsmiths, 
toolmakers, model makers, and the like.39 
LMAL personnel officers utilized the talents of the hometown popula-
tion more fully also. They hired hundreds of boys for part-time work as 
shop assistants, messengers, and model makers, and encouraged mathemat-
ics and English teachers from the local school systems to capitalize on their 
summer vacations by taking positions as computers and technical report 
editors. Many of the teachers chose to stay on at Langley permanently 
because their new jobs with the government were more interesting, paid 
better, had more fringe benefits, and related more concretely to the war 
effort than teaching school. 40 
Women in numbers came to work at Langley for the first time, many 
of them to do jobs formerly done only by men. Before the war the lab 
had never employed more than 100 women at one time, mostly for tradi-
tional office functions as secretaries, stenographers, typists, mail sorters, 
payroll and file clerks, telephone operators, and receptionists. The excep-
tion to the rule was Pearl I. Young (1895-1968), the NACA's first female 
professional. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate in physics from the Univer-
sity of North Dakota, Young reported to work at Langley in April 1922. 
Her first assignment was in the Instrument Research Division, where she 
worked side-by-side with Henry Reid, the future engineer-in-charge. In 
the late 1920s, when she suggested the need for a technical editor at 
Langley, she was promptly given the job. In this position she published 
a Style Manual for Engineering Authors (1943) which was consulted fre-
quently by employees both at Langley and at the other NACA centers. 
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In some respects, Pearl Young led the way for working women at 
Langley.* By war's end, nearly 1000 women worked at Langley-practically 
one-half of the nonprofessional staff and one-third of the entire staff. 
The majority of the women continued to do the quiet, unspectacular 
jobs involved in keeping the wheels of the government laboratory running 
smoothly through the welter of paperwork, but many of them rolled up their 
sleeves, donned shop aprons, and pitched in to do whatever work had been 
made necessary for them by the war. Women set rivets, operated spray guns 
and welding irons, polished wind tunnel models, and drove buses and trucks 
around the field. Others served as technical illustrators and draftsmen. One 
woman drove the towing carriage in the hydrodynamics research tank. The 
Structures Division, which operated its own training school, assigned women 
to take strain-gauge measurements. Female computing units ( one of them 
made up entirely of black women) were added to several of the individual 
wind tunnel staffs. These distaff units took over most of the slide rule work 
and curve plotting formerly done by the engineers.41 Only a few women 
held engineering posts, and they were not assigned to the wind tunnels. A 
number of females with the rating of "minor laboratory apprentice" were 
used, however, as mechanics' helpers to relieve hard-pressed junior engineers 
of many duties associated with tunnel operation and laboratory procedure. 
On the whole, the women who worked at Langley during and after World 
War II could not advance as far or as fast up the civil service ladder as could 
even some men with inferior talents; nonetheless, most of them still believe 
today that the NACA's treatment of women was better than the treatment 
of women by many other contemporary employers.42 
With the army's cooperation, Langley also recruited a number of re-
turning servicemen, mostly for technical service occupations. At regional 
* In 1943 Pearl Young moved from Langley to the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory 
in Cleveland. She stayed there until 1947, when she accepted a position teaching engineering 
physics at Pennsylvania State University at Pottsville as an assistant professor. In 1958 she 
returned to the Cleveland laboratory (now NASA Lewis Research Center) to do special 
bibliographical work on the spectroscopy of plasmas. After retiring from NASA in 1961, she 
taught physics for two years at Fresno State College in California. 
Young loved flight. Her most memorable experience was the trip she made to Europe 
in 1936 aboard the Hindenburg; she was one of only 50 passengers making the first west-
to-east flight of the great German airship. Her favorite hobby was aeronautical history. 
Starting in 1947, she gathered a wealth of material for a biography of the French engineer 
and aeronautical pioneer Octave Chanute. She also collected and indexed information on 
Francis Wenham, the builder of the first wind tunnel, Ferdinand von Zeppelin, and Alphonse 
de Penaud. These materials are preserved as part of the aeronautical collection at the Denver 
(Colorado) Public Library. 
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redistribution centers (in Atlantic City, Miami, and Santa Monica, Califor-
nia), army orientation programs gave these men an idea of the reassignments 
available to them, including jobs with the NACA at Langley, Ames, and the 
Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland. If a man thought he was quali-
fied for one of these jobs, he was interviewed by an army classification officer 
who had lists of the available occupations at the three NACA laboratories 
and of the necessary qualifications for them. If the classification officer 
felt that the applicant was qualified for a particular position, he referred 
him to the NACA representative at the orientation center, who, if satisfied, 
requested that the serviceman be sent to one of the laboratories for an in-
terview. If the lab's personnel officer then decided to offer an appointment, 
the NACA sent a letter to the army stating that fact and requesting that 
the applicant be transferred from active duty to reserve status at the lab.43 
Irreversible Changes 
According to one man who worked at Langley before, during, and after 
the war, the influx of thousands of new and different employees caused 
certain "irreversible changes" in the Langley personality: 
The selective standards which had provided the exceptional talent of the [1920s 
and 1930s] had to be abandoned. Both the quality and the per capita yearly 
output of reports declined. Not a few of the newcomers hinted openly that 
immunity from the draft was the reason they had come. The increased wind-
tunnel testing of specific military designs provided convenient undemanding 
assignments for the less-talented new engineers. The term "wind-tunnel jockey" 
was coined during the war and is still used today to describe inveterate tunnel 
operators. 
In the 1920s and 1930s the entire professional staff was so small that 
everyone had known each other on a first-name basis, gathered together in 
one room for meetings and lunch, and partied as a group. Now there were 
"hordes of weak performers ... who were OK for the double-shift testing [of 
specific aircraft] needed during the war" cluttering up the buildings, shops, 
and cafeteria.44 
Lab veterans seem to have snubbed or ostracized only those new 
employees who proved themselves technically incompetent. "We gave every 
newcomer the benefit of the doubt," the same man recalls, "at least until 
their limitations had become unmistakable. A minority proved to be good 
researchers, and quite a few with marginal technical qualifications and 
abilities were retained because of their likable personalities, loyalty, and 
reliability as team members." Competent newcomers and those well-liked 
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The contributions of women to NACA research began well before World War II, 
but did not truly expand until after 1941, Pearl I. Young (top left) works in the 
instrument research laboratory, about 1929; an unidentified female handles rolls 
and rolls of computer tape; another woman helps to finish the wing of a flying boat 
model in the dynamic model shop, 1944. 
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ls:s.ue 1, Vol. 4 
NOON IN THE 
EAST AREA 
CAFETERIA 
,\ir Scoop, .lanuary 5, 1944 
The LMAL cartoonist captured the hectic wartime lunchroom for the Air Scoop in 
January 1944- Notice that there is one reserved table. The drawing reflects much 
about the times. 
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persons who then worked at the lab long enough to become one of the old 
crowd relate today that during the war Langley veterans indeed went out 
of their way to make new men and women feel welcome and to assimilate 
them into the lab's business and social life.45 
The assignment of laboratory personnel to buildings in east and west 
areas and their parceling into a great number of sections and branches did 
tend to undermine the unity of prewar staff, however. Some of the old bases 
of influence were broken up. In February 1944, for instance, management 
dissolved Eastman Jacobs's Air-Flow Research Division and divided its 
personnel between various sections of the Full-Scale Research Division and 
of the new Compressibility Research Division.46 Compensating for this 
fragmentation in the life of Langley was a new organ of communication 
between employees, the LMAL Bulletin (renamed the Air Scoop in 1944). 
A survey of the articles, photographs, and illustrations in this in-house 
newspaper shows that what pulled together heterogeneous staff members 
more than anything else was awareness of their organization's special 
responsibility in winning the war. 
This wartime responsibility required certain changes in traditional 
NACA policies and practices. A major change occurred in the NACA's 
relationship with industry. Before 1939, the laboratory had endeavored 
to protect itself from becoming a consulting service. NACA policy had 
not allowed representatives from industry to serve as such on the Main 
Committee. Also, as shown in chapter 6, prewar Langley tried hard to 
remain impartial in its dealing with different companies, instituting strict 
visitation rules and refusing to release advance information-and even some 
information that companies considered proprietary-to individual interests. 
Also, the lab purchased outright virtually all equipment necessary for the 
conduct of test programs, or borrowed the equipment from one of the 
military services; it would not accept free of charge the ownership of any 
company's equipment or products. 
With the outbreak of war, however, the task of perfecting America's 
combat airplanes required the NACA to loosen its policies and practices in 
relation to industry. In 1939 George J. Mead, recently retired vice-president 
for engineering of the United Aircraft Corporation, became vice-chairman 
of the NACA and chairman of its Power Plants Committee. This was "as 
close as the NACA had yet come to placing an industry representative on the 
Main Committee or in the chair of one of the main technical committees." 47 
Though there was no causal link to Mead's appointment, Langley and the 
other NACA centers soon "became overrun by large numbers of industrial 
scientists, engineers, and technicians who witnessed tests relating to the 
designs of their companies, actively assisted in the conduct and planning 
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of such tests, talked with a new freedom with NACA employees about 
research-in-progress, received much advance information of a very tentative 
character, and sometimes used every possible opportunity to spy out what 
was being done for their competitors." 48 According to NACA statistics, 
there was an average of 45 industry representatives present at Langley each 
day in 1943; this compared to a daily average of less than three there during 
a twelve-month period in 1935 and 1936.49 Keeping happy these clients, 
who were under pressure to meet the needs of the military, while avoiding 
conflicts of interest, was a tall order for the LMAL staff, the newest members 
of which were unfamiliar with the old ways of successfully conducting such 
subtle business. Thanks largely to careful NACA management, which was 
handled almost entirely by men trained in the old ways, a degree of decorum 
satisfactory to the NACA was preserved. 
This change in the way the NACA served industry affected its publi-
cations practices. Before the war, nearly all NACA reports could be given 
wide circulation because they were not restricted by military security clas-
sification. Though its clients even then wanted the NACA to share its test 
results and other new information as rapidly as possible-so that they could 
put it to good use in aircraft design-the NACA could, in relative terms, 
take its time writing, editing, and distributing publications because there 
was no great national urgency. During the war, of course, requirements 
changed; in response to them, the Committee developed several new publi-
cations series, including the Advance Confidential Report (ACR), Advance 
Restricted Report (ARR), Confidential Bulletin (CB), Confidential Mem-
orandum Report (CMR), Restricted Bulletin (RB), and Restricted Mem-
orandum Report (RMR). Some reports were stamped "Secret," meaning 
that the content and very existence of the paper was to be made known 
to the absolute minimum number of people who in connection with offi-
cial duties had of necessity to be informed. Also, secret reports were to be 
transmitted from one authorized person to another by hand or by registered 
mail, locked in the most secure space available at all times when not in use, 
and disposed of only by being burned in the presence of an authorized wit-
ness. These precautions included all preliminary drafts, stenographic notes, 
stencils, work sheets, and carbon copies. Though the distinction between 
confidential and restricted papers was fuzzy, each type was meant to relay 
quickly, effectively, and privately-to selected parties in industry and the 
services-information considered vital to carrying on the war effort in the 
air. 50 
Thus another change brought on by the war was stepped-up laboratory 
security and increased recognition of the need for protecting national 
scientific and technological information. Until the mid-1930s, Langley 
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JAPAN BOMBED BY B-29'5 TESTED AT NACA 
Model of Boeing 8-29 superfortrpss mcunted for te~t ing in 8-Fcot HiJI"'> Speed TunnEl. 
The giant B-29, the Boeing 
Superfortress, which filled 
the headlines of l&st week's 
newspapers with the story' of 
its raid on the Japanese home-
land is another of the army's 
top-flight warplanes whicl1 
underwent early tests here at 
LMAL. 
Early in 1942, a model of 
the XB-29 was set up in the 
eight foot high-speed tunnel 
for testing. The tests were 
completed in a relatively 
short time, and the technical 
report was written b~, John V. 
Becker and Donald D. Baals. 
The late Eddie Allen, one 
of' the world's foremost aero-
nautical engineers and test 
pilots wrote April 10, 1942 to 
thank Uie Laboratory for its 
part in the tests. His letter 
read, "The cooperation given •• 
in making possible the rapid 
develt;)pment of the tests and 
the earl~ availability of' pre-
liminary data has greatly en-
hanced the value of' the tests 
and reduced the time required 
for their conduct and analysis, 
thus appreciably assisting in 
a material speed-up of oper-
a t iOns." He added that he was 
"greatly impressed witl1 tl1e 
value of the eight foot high-
speed wind tunnel as a design 
tool. The cons tanc.)- of' data 
obtained indicates t11e balance 
of this tunnel to be equ.i.valent 
to a11y 111 tl1is contractor's 
experience •• ,The tunnel is 
operated by an experienced 
staff' and this is in no small 
part greatl) responsible for 
its satisfactor)' o-peration," 
At the time that Allen 
wrote the letter, he was serv-
ing as Director of Flight and 
Aerodynamics, a position which 
he iteld with the Boeing Air-
craft company until l1is un-
timely death in a crash on 
February 18, 1943. 
The Sul]erfortress is de-
scribed briefl~ as the bomber 
wJlich "flies farther, faster, 
a.nd higher witt1 a heavier bomb 
load," Its overall lengtt1 is 
98 f'eet, its wing span 141,2 
feet, and t11e height of its 
vertical tail sur.f'ace 27 feet. 
The fuselage is c,yl1ndrical in 
shape and the wiug is mounted 
midwaJ, in comparison with the 
high wing of the B-24 and the 
low wing of th~ B-17, The 
Superfortress has a tricycle 
landing gear With double 
wli eels • 
It is powered by f'our 
Wright Cyclone 18 cylinder 
radial engines, eaelJ with 2200 
horsepower. Ttie engines swing 
four bladed propellors w1Jich 
span 1r.-1/2 feet and are tiie 
largest in use. 
The Superfortress is recog-
nized as the most s treamli11ed 
heavy bomber in existence, The 
drag is doubled when tile land-
in~ gear is lowered, 
From the LMAL Bulletin, 24-30 June 1944-
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~-,, I 't 'o\....K.,,,l-4\ I ~t'!' 
\~~Mb...-.,.., :,,:.p'-~0"1'"""'-'1:~J..-----, 
~o:::~~~~~~,: ~~=;b':1'~  
e,-c:: E"l)::: 900MP~. 'VvOQ."'-1,.._,' ON,.._ HO"T 
-e1c. Roc...-c"'-~t Vo~ K,~"~ NO'N 
BL._w~\ -'NH'< IH,,.._TLL Top AN"l-
\H' 005-'5 ~ ... to-- --r"H1N(:a IN -Ct,t' AIR-
From the Langley Air Scoop, 
13 April 1945. 
employees showed little eoncern for such things. Involvement in very few 
research programs required security clearances, meaning that very few 
people were prevented by the lack of identification badges from entering 
wind tunnel buildings or other facilities. Beginning in June 1937, the 
Committee began to tighten security regulations, announcing that foreign 
visitors to Langley would be allowed only to see the lab's exterior-though 
this did not stop five members of the Japanese Imperial Army from making 
an inspection tour in July.51 However, visitors were often given sanitized 
tours in which they saw nothing of real technological significance. 
Major steps to increase security and protect secrets came only after 
the attack at Pearl Harbor. In January 1942 the LMAL engineer-in-charge 
told his division chiefs to maintain constant surveillance for "probable fifth 
column activities such as agitation, propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and 
actual physical attack." 52 Placards were posted around the lab warning 
employees of the dangers of loose talk. After the FBI informed the Office 
of Naval Intelligence that "an outside confidential source" had overheard 
"young boys employed at the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
Hampton, Virginia" discussing, at the Langley Sweet Shop, "laboratory 
tests on new types of planes," the engineer-in-charge instructed the head 
of the apprentice program to deliver a talk to the boys on the dangers 
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of discussing any of their work, including that of their model airplane 
clubs, in public places.53 In 1943 the Committee published an information 
pamphlet entitled "Don't Talk." This pamphlet listed ten rules, including: 
"The research on and the results of each project at the Laboratory are 
to be discussed only with those members of the staff who are connected 
with the subject," (rule no. 1); "Do not leave material of a Confidential 
or Restricted nature unattended in an exposed place while you are on 
duty," (rule no. 5); "Data and photographs obtained in connection with 
the Committee's research activity shall not be taken from the Laboratory 
nor shown outside the Laboratory without the specific permission of the 
Engineer-In-Charge," (rule no. 6); and "Technical information and data 
shall not be released in the form of a paper to be presented to an engineering 
or technical society if the information has not been released in an unclassified 
Committee publication that is issued before or at the same time as the 
paper is presented to the society," (rule no. 8). An NACA pamphlet 
warned workers that pursuant to federal laws regulating the disclosure of 
information affecting national defense, personnel found in violation of these 
rules were subject to a $10,000 fine and liable to 30-year imprisonment 
or the death penalty. 54 There is no evidence of any arrests for spying at 
Langley during the war, but LMAL security officers did complain frequently 
to NACA management about careless lapses by employees in abiding by 
minor security practices. 55 
In Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and 
Activities to 1940, historian A. Hunter Dupree observed that "many of 
the characteristics of the wartime research effort were in fact permanent 
changes in the government's relation to science." 56 Langley history seems 
to support Dupree's observation. Life at the NACA laboratory was changed 
significantly by the war: research was performed now not only at Langley 
but also at sister laboratories in California and Ohio; the size of the LMAL 
staff itself exploded from fewer than 500 to over 3000 members; women 
became vital members of the research and technical divisions; expenditures 
on the order of millions of dollars a year became established; in many of 
the wind tunnels, testing of production prototypes and production models 
themselves predominated, as opposed to the testing of purely experimental 
designs; and security regulations became more strict. By inheriting these 
changes, postwar Langley would be in several basic respects more like the 
wartime laboratory than like the laboratory of the 1920s and 1930s. 
This was especially true for Langley's formal organization. In the 1920s 
and 1930s organization charts were drawn up only occasionally and with 
only a few simple divisions. By 1945, though, rapid expansion of the LMAL 
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RESEARCH 
DR. LEWIS' CAREER 
VARIED, COLORFUL 
Effective September 1, Hl47, 
Dr. George vr. Lewis resigneJ as 
Director of Aer,nautical Research 
and was anoointed Resear~h C:.m-
sultant t~ • the Committee. He 
was succeeded as Dir'::ctor of 
Aeronautical Res ear c b oy Dr. 
Hugh L. Dryden. 
Dr. Lewis assumed the direc-
tion of the Committee's research 
activities in 19HJ with the title 
Executive Officer, and in H-1?,4 he 
was appointed Director of Aero-
nautical Research. He was a-
warded the Daniel Guggenheim 
Medal in 1926 for "outstanding 
success in the direction of aero-
nautical research and for the de-
velopment of original equipment 
and methods," ln Hl~~7 he was 
appointed by President Roosevelt 
as plenipotentiary delegate of the 
United States to the Inter-Ameri-
can Tuchnical Aviation C')nference 
in Lima, Peru. He delivered the 
Wilbur Vtright Memorial Lecture 
before the Royal Aeronautical 
Society in London in Hcl311 on the 
subject, "Some Modern Methods 
of Research in the Problems of 
·Flight." He was awarded the 
Spirit of St. Louis Medal of the 
American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers in 194 5. Be has oeen 
active in scientific and e~ineer-
ing societies, and has s,--,rved on 
a number of boards of award for 
aeronautical medals, contests, 
and trophies. He has oeen hon-
ored oy election to the National 
Academy of Sci enc es , by the 
award of two degrees of D::ictor 
1 of Engineering, and by a Life 
PIONEER 
DR. GEORGE W. LEWIB 
182;,-,,-lti48 
Memoership in the National Aero-
nautic Association. He served 
as an official e::nissary of the 
United States Government in in-
specting aeronautical res ear c h 
activities in various European 
countries, notably Germany and 
rtussia, before the war. 
At a meeting of the NACA 
Executive Committee held on 
August 11, 1847, at which tt1e re-
signation of Dr. Lewis as Direc-
tor of Aeronautical Research was 
announced, the members unani-
mously acopted a testimonial to 
Dr. Lewis ir.:with our heart-felt 
thanks for all he has done for the 
Committee" and congratulating 
him for his long period of "ex-
ceptionally meritorious service 
to his Gountr . " 
Air Scoop, July 16, l\::l48 
Issue 28, Vol. 7 
SUCCUMBS 
LAB PAYS TRIBUTE 
TO NACA OFFICIAL 
Dr. George Vt. Lewis, 66, 
Research Consultant to the NACA 
and director of the Committee's 
research activities from 1919 to 
J 8-P, Jied Monday, July 12, at his 
summer home at Lake \Vinota, 
Pennsylvania, 
Funeral s e r vices for the 
world-reknowned figure in aero-
nautical research were conducted 
Wednesday in Pennsylvania. Tl"1e 
Laboratory paused a moment in 
silent tribute ·wednesday to Dr. 
Lewis, who made frequent visits 
to Langley in the course of his 
o ffi ci al juti,2s. 
Dr. Lewis is survived by his 
widow, six child re n , and six 
grandchildren. A son, Leigh K. 
Lewis, is employed at the Lab-
oratory in the West Mechanical 
Engineering Section. 
Born at Ithaca, N. Y., in 1882, 
Dr. Lewis was educated at Cor-
nell University. He received the 
honorary degree of D:::ictor of 
Science from Norwich University 
in 1934 and the honorary degree 
of Doctor of Engineering from 
the Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology in 1944. 
During his service with the 
NACA, Dr. Lewis recruited and 
trained the research staff from a 
handful of workers into the pre-
sent force of approximately 
6,000 employees. He planned 
and carried through the unique 
research facilities at Langley, 
Moffett Field, and Cleveland, and 
has led an outstanding technical 
staff, from whom have come a 
succession of advances in aero-
nautical science. 
Langley pays tribute to George Lewis, 16 July 1948. 
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Hugh L. Dryden (left), George Lewis's successor as the NACA 's director of research, 
arrives with John F. Victory (center), the NACA 's executive secretary, for a tour 
of the LMAL. Welcoming Dryden and Victory is engineer-in-charge Henry Reid. 
staff and physical plant regularized and complicated the charts. By the 
end of 1956, less than a year before the Russians put Sputnik 1 into orbit, 
Langley's 3300 employees were organized into 19 divisions, 50 branches, 
and 100 sections. Between March 1958 and November 1963, there were at 
least 28 different NASA organization charts (9 proposed and 19 authorized), 
more than NACA Langley produced in its first 28 years of operation. 
Langley lost a major link with its past in July 1948: George Lewis died. 
Lewis had been sick for most of the war but pushed himself stubbornly 
from NACA laboratory to laboratory, overseeing the details of research. He 
resigned as director of research in September 1947. Before he left office, 
however, he said to Ira Abbott, his assistant: "I have given my life to 
the NACA. I want you to promise me that it will never become simply 
another Government agency interested chiefly in its own preservation and 
bureaucratic growth." 57 Succeeding Lewis was Hugh L. Dryden, former 
director of the National Bureau of Standards. Dryden did not have Lewis's 
zest for sitting down daily with politicians and military leaders to deal 
with the nitty-gritty of research appropriations and procurements, but he 
was scientifically sharper than the former director. Under Dryden's more 
formal and less paternal management, Langley researchers would extend 
their vision beyond the subsonic aeronautics of Lewis's era to the supersonic, 
hypersonic, and space frontiers. 
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Exploring Unknown 
Technology: The Case 
of Jet Propulsion 
Langley's wartime mission was essentially not much different from its 
earlier peacetime mission: to find practical ways for American aircraft 
to achieve improved performance, i.e., higher speeds and altitudes, longer 
range, more maneuverability, and better handling characteristics. The pace 
of its quest had to be much more frenetic, of course. Though all aircraft used 
by the United States in combat were designed to the same basic formula 
(internally braced, all metal monoplane, equipped with retractable landing 
gear, wing flaps, controllable pitch propeller, and enclosed compartment 
for the crew), they differed widely and significantly in terms of their 
aerodynamic details. It was thus essential to refine aircraft on a case-by-case 
basis as problems arose. 
Rarely did the army, the navy, or a manufacturer already know the 
design problem that needed fixing when it sent an aircraft to the NACA 
laboratory; in most cases, a prototype would be sent to the lab with 
instructions for the NACA to determine the aircraft's characteristics and to 
fix problems if the staff found any. In this way Langley researchers solved 
various problems in specific configurations. For instance, they recommended 
a modified tail arrangement and antispin device on the Vought F4U-l and 
a new elevator for the Curtiss SOC-1.1 Tests in the Full-Scale and 8-Foot 
High-Speed tunnels and in different tunnels at Ames lab in California led to 
the development of a simple but effective wing flap which, when deflected, 
increased lift just enough to make recovery from a high-speed dive possible 
( see next chapter). 2 Tests in the LMAL towing tanks and impact basin 
led to the development of a "hydroflap" to aid in ditching. 3 These are just 
a few examples of specific refinements to aircraft recommended by NACA 
Langley. In all, Langley tested 137 different airplane types between 1941 
and 1945, representing more than half of all the types contracted for by 
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Data from tests of over 300 different models in Langley's free-spinning tunnels 
enabled the NACA by the end of the war to establish tail design requirements for 
satisfactory recovery from high-speed dives. 
the army and navy during the war and including virtually all types that 
actually saw combat service.4 
But the design of advanced-performance bombers and fighters involved 
more than mere aerodynamic refinement based on existing knowledge-
among other things, it also required new understanding of high-speed phe-
nomena. By 1939 flying speeds had increased to the point where the fastest 
aircraft were encountering a unique set of potentially dangerous aerody-
namic phenomena known as compressibility effects. Previously, designers 
had created aircraft on the assumption that the air flowing over the wings 
and other surfaces was essentially incompressible, like water; though com-
pressibility was always present in air, it was negligible until speeds ap-
proached sonic. Thus as aircraft evolved and their speeds increased, en-
gine cowlings, canopies, fuselages, and especially wings and propellers were 
subject at high speed to a sharp rise in drag and loss of lift, with result-
ing changes in pitching moments. These compressibility effects limited the 
speed of aircraft and caused buffeting, control surface flutter, shifts in trim, 
and other dangerous changes in stability and control characteristics. In 
some cases, aircraft flying into the compressible regime became completely 
uncontrollable, could not recover, and crashed.5 
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Eight-stage axial-flow compressor designed by Eugene Wasielewski and Eastman 
Jacobs, 1938. 
To achieve safe high-speed flight, the NACA began to consider some 
new technologies such as lighter-weight materials, stronger structures, 
and radically different types of engines for application in airplane design. 
Not all of these considerations led to immediate-or even to successful-
application. (Langley's successful overall response to the "compressibility 
crisis" is analyzed in the next chapter.) In 1938, for example, Langley engi-
neers Eastman Jacobs and Eugene Wasielewski (a power plants expert for-
merly employed by Allis-Chalmers) explored the potential of a technology-
unproven in aeronautics-that they thought might help to solve some of the 
high-speed problems: they designed an axial-flow compressor, an unconven-
tional piece of machinery that compressed an engine's intake air by sending 
it through a series of rotating and stationary (stator) blades which were 
concentric with the axis of rotation. The practical purpose of the axial-flow 
compressor was to be part of a piston-engine supercharger application (that 
is, part of a device for sending pressurized air into the engine cylinders to 
increase thrusting power). That the design posed some ultimate, mind-
boggling problems for an airfoil researcher was Jacobs's personal reason for 
undertaking such a project. To work effectively, each one of the compres-
sor's dozens of rotary and stationary blades had to be designed perfectly, 
according to airfoil theory, and put into a cascaded series that fed the flow 
output of one stage of blades into the input of the next stage.6 
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Though the initial round of tests demonstrated the high performance 
potential of the new compressor, Jacobs was left with "serious doubts about 
the axial design when the blades of the test machine were destroyed during 
a run in which the compressor stalled." Believing incorrectly that this 
accident was caused by some inherent structural weakness which would 
prevent success, Jacobs abandoned the project. Wasielewski and other 
members of the LMAL engine research staff continued to refine the design, 
however. Though the application to a piston-engine supercharger proved a 
failure, showing no real advantage over the contemporary General Electric~ 
Moss supercharger, Langley's preliminary reports on the overall efficiency 
of its compressor seem later to have persuaded American manufacturers 
selecting compressors for jet engines to favor axial designs (wherein the 
direction of the airflow into and out of the compressor is parallel to 
the longitudinal axis of the engine) over centrifugal designs (wherein the 
direction of the airflow out of the compressor is perpendicular to the 
longitudinal axis). 7 
A much more notable failure to develop a radically new technology for 
high-speed aviation at Langley during the war was an attempt between 1941 
and 1943 to create a hybrid system of jet propulsion. (Jet propulsion is a 
means of moving an aircraft forward by sending rearward at high velocity a 
stream of flowing gases, like sending a balloon across the room by letting go 
of its neck.) This system, like that developed by Italian engineer Secondo 
Campini in the 1930s and applied in the early 1940s to a Caproni airplane, 
was based on the principle of the ducted fan. 8 
Langley's version of the Campini ducted-fan propulsion system was 
supposed to complement conventional propulsion in the following way: Air 
was admitted through a frontal inlet into a duct, where the air slowed 
to practically stagnation pressure. A fan inside the duct, driven by the 
aircraft's conventional radial piston engine, then boosted the pressure and 
passed the air into a combustion chamber (located at the region of highest 
boosted pressure) where the exhaust gases (i.e., heat) from the piston 
engine vaporized gasoline for a primary fire. In turn this primary fire 
vaporized gasoline that was flowing over the main boiler section, igniting 
a secondary fire. Heated gases from this fire then escaped, accelerating 
through the constriction of a high-speed nozzle, where the thermodynamic 
energy accumulated during the various phases of compression and heating 
added to the driving thrust. This thrust, Langley engineers thought, could 
be harnessed for assisted takeoffs and emergency high-speed dashes by 
combat aircraft. (Today, such a system is called an afterburner.) If the 
jet was shut down, the aircraft could then revert to the conventional power 
plant, making it capable of long cruising flight.9 Langley's ultimate goal 
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was to apply the Campini system to either a military aircraft or to a small 
experimental aircraft designed specifically for the purpose of high-speed 
research. Although this goal was not achieved, the lab did prove the system 
feasible. 
Until March 1943, when the work was officially canceled, Langley's 
testing of the Campini engine had the full support of a special NACA com-
mittee on jet propulsion and the polite tolerance of the military services. 
But during all of the time it worked on the Campini engine, the laboratory 
was unaware that another type of jet engine, the gas-turbine or turbojet,* 
was rapidly becoming a reality-and one that had greater feasibility and 
more potential than the ducted fan. The world's first jet aircraft, Ger-
many's Heinkel 178, had flown for the first time on 27 August 1939; the 
experimental airplane was powered by a turbojet engine, designated the 
S-3, designed for Heinkel by Hans Von Ohain. The S-3 engine produced 
about 1100 pounds of thrust-which was just enough power to make the 
flight of the small airplane successful. But the NACA lab knew nothing 
about this top secret German development until 1944. Nor did the lab hear 
anything concrete about concurrent turbojet developments in Britain un-
til the summer of 1943-even though American military leaders knew a lot 
about them much earlier. In April 1941 Air Corps chief Hap Arnold found to 
his astonishment during a tour of England that the British were not simply 
planning to develop gas turbines, but were actually preparing to flight-test a 
turbojet-powered aircraft, the Gloster E 28/39, which flew successfully the 
following month with an engine designed by Frank Whittle. Arnold made 
arrangements with the British to bring engine blueprints, and eventually 
a prototype of the Whittle WIX engine itself, to the United States. The 
* Turbine is derived from the Latin word turbo, meaning whirlwind. The earliest turbojets 
achieved their thrusting power by sucking air into the front of the engine, compressing it, 
and feeding it into a chamber (or chambers) where the compressed air was mixed with fuel 
and was ignited by spark plugs. The hot gases which resulted from this combustion were 
piped to a vane of airfoils, whose rotation ensured an aerodynamically smooth flow of gas at 
all engine speeds, and thence expelled into the buckets of the turbine wheel, whose whirlwind 
action increased the velocity of the already rushing exhaust. The gases were then forced 
out of the power plant at high velocity (full throttle, at over 2000 feet per second) through 
a nozzle or tailpipe. The turbojet was long considered impractical; engine experts felt that 
the necessary compressor and turbine equipment would be too heavy for an airplane and 
would generally burn too much fuel to be cost-effective. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, 
the jet proved to have several major advantages over the conventional reciprocating engine, 
including the elimination of the propeller with all its inherent limitations, the capability of 
burning almost any type of available fuel (but usually kerosene), and the power to drive 
aircraft to supersonic speeds. For an introduction to the technical details of the turbojet 
and other reaction engines, see C. N. Van Deventer, An Introduction to General Aeronautics, 3d 
ed. (American Technical Society, 1974), pp. 200--215. 
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British, who had just experienced the shocking forced evacuation of their 
troops from Dunkirk and felt that invasion of England by the Germans was 
imminent, shared their discovery with Arnold on the condition that he treat 
it as a top military secret. Upon his return, Arnold assigned the General 
Electric laboratory at West Lynn, Massachusetts, the task of imitating the 
prototype engine. Soon thereafter, in the early summer of 1941, the Army 
Air Corps placed a top secret order with Bell Aircraft Corporation for con-
struction of an experimental jet aircraft. In September 1941, Maj. Donald 
Keirn carried, manacled to his wrist, a set of design drawings for the Whit-
tle engine from London to G.E. at West Lynn. Thirteen months later the 
Bell XP-59A, powered by two Whittle I-A "Superchargers" (called that in 
disguise) developed by G.E., flew successfully at Muroc Dry Lake in Cali-
fornia with full armament. Because of the tight lid of secrecy put by Arnold 
on all jet propulsion developments, Langley had not even an inkling of these 
important events until after an NACA representative to Bell's plant on the 
west coast heard rumors about them in May 1942.10 
This lack of information put Langley engineers searching for a practical 
means of jet propulsion for aircraft at a serious disadvantage. What 
was clear to Arnold in the spring of 1941-that the potential of turbojet 
technology clearly outstripped that of the ducted fan-was not clear to them 
until the summer of 1943, when the military began to bring the NACA 
more into its confidence about secret jet propulsion programs, and when 
Eastman Jacobs, leader of the Campini project, returned from England 
with knowledge of British developments. 
This chapter illustrates an episode in Langley history in which the 
engineers had every reason to think they were in charge of the technological 
situation, when in fact they were not. Though their combustion tests were 
successful in the sense of showing the general feasibility of the Campini 
system, their overall program was a failure. The failure was lack of 
knowledge-not about ducted fans, but about turbojets. 
Conventional Wisdom 
To trace the sources of Langley's interest in a ducted-fan jet propulsion 
system, it is first necessary to summarize the NACA's earlier analyses 
of the potential of jet propulsion for aircraft. In 1923 the Committee 
published a paper by Edgar Buckingham of the Bureau of Standards which 
declared that jet propulsion for aircraft was practically impossible. From 
his analysis of the thrust produced by an exhaust of burning compressed 
air in a combustion chamber, Buckingham determined that there was "no 
prospect whatsoever that jet propulsion ... will ever be of practical value, 
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even for military purposes." Even at the highest flying speed anyone then 
had in view-250 miles per hour-a jet-propelled aircraft could not come 
close to matching the efficiency of an airplane equipped with a piston engine 
and propeller. The jet's fuel consumption would be far too excessive, he 
argued, largely because the weight of the compressor machinery would have 
to be so great. Buckingham calculated that the fuel consumption of a jet 
would be four times that of a conventional engine producing equivalent 
thrust. He assumed that aircraft turbines would have to be huge and 
heavy, similar to industrial turbines then being used in blast furnaces and 
boilers, to withstand the high temperatures and attendant high pressures. 
Buckingham's error was in this and other assumptions, not in his subsequent 
analysis. 11 
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Langley researchers accepted 
Buckingham's conclusions as their own; as a result, they did little to 
investigate the possibilities of a jet power plant for aircraft. The LMAL 
had one comparatively small research division devoted to engine research, 
but the outlook of its members was "slaved so strongly to the piston engine 
because of its low fuel consumption that serious attention to jet propulsion 
was ruled out." 12 What little research the lab did do on the subject was done 
by aerodynamicists, an interesting historical fact, given that the turbojet 
revolution happened elsewhere largely as a result of investigations made by 
aerodynamicists, not propulsion experts. 13 
In 1926 and 1927 Eastman Jacobs and James Shoemaker experimented 
with "thrust augmentors" for jet propulsion at Langley. The idea behind the 
program was to increase the mass of the airflow involved in the propulsion 
process by equipping a conventional gasoline engine with a special device 
that admitted additional external air and caused it to mix with a primary 
jet. Jacobs and Shoemaker thought that the momentum and energy 
relationships involved in this process would permit some augmentation 
of aircraft thrust. Although preliminary data from a specially built test 
apparatus indicated that it was possible to increase the thrust of a jet 
by using suitably designed high-speed nozzles, results warned that the 
maximum increase of thrust was too small, considering the dimensional 
and weight limitations of conventional aircraft, to achieve a worthwhile net 
benefit. 14 
During this same period, the NACA received a proposal from one 
Lt. Sidney P. Vaughn, an obscure supply corps officer stationed at the 
naval air station at Pearl Harbor, for research on a gas-turbine jet engine 
for aircraft. The Committee sent a copy of Vaughn's proposal to Langley; 
Carlton Kemper and William Joachim, two power plants engineers, reviewed 
it. Both of their evaluations were negative. Kemper concluded that the 
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proposed jet was "impracticable" because "the use of a turbine installation 
with the present low efficiency, excessive weight and high speed would 
give an installation having a lower overall efficiency than the present 
internal combustion engine and propeller." Joachim's remarks were equally 
conservative. He listed as the chief factors preventing favorable comment: 
( 1) Thermodynamically impossible to compress sufficient air by a fuel jet ... 
to provide proper combustion. 
(2) Practical impossibility of combustion air-fuel ratio control under all con-
ditions of flight. 
(3) Practical impossibility of maintaining the weight of the power plant and 
discharge jet ducts to as low a weight as present engine with propeller. 
Eastman Jacobs also read Vaughn's proposal, and though his evaluation was 
not entirely positive, neither was it closed-minded. He said that "the ques-
tion of whether or not this system is of practical value cannot be answered 
without a consideration of the efficiency of the system." Because there were 
no experimental data available which were strictly applicable to the pro-
posed system under consideration, Jacobs recommended, in March 1928, 
that "some simple tests" be made to furnish "definite information about 
the efficiency of such a device." 15 
Henry Reid agreed not with Jacobs but with the engine experts. Be-
cause no form of jet engine at the time seemed to offer any theoretical 
advantages over the conventional gasoline engine, "with the possible excep-
tion of [in an application for] very high-speed military airplanes," the LMAL 
engineer-in-charge advised NACA headquarters that the laboratory "should 
not undertake further investigations of jet propulsion at this time." 16 Head-
quarters concurred. In the early 1930s America's young airlines were trying 
to achieve reliable flight at 100 to 200 miles per hour. The NACA had more 
pressing problems than the development of aircraft for 500-MPH flight at 
30,000 feet (where these aircraft would be required to fly to obtain this high 
speed). Headquarters authorized only three jet propulsion investigations in 
the early 1930s, all at the instigation of the Bureau of Standards, which 
carried out the work. Results sustained Buckingham's pessimism. 17 
Reevaluating Buckingham's Conclusion 
In January 1939, two years after Frank Whittle first bench-tested a 
jet engine, Eastman Jacobs wrote up a job order covering an analytical 
reevaluation of Buckingham's authoritative 1923 report on jet propulsion 
for aircraft. Albert E. Sherman, a member of Jacobs's airflow research 
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In the spring of 1939 Langley's Power Plants Divisfon tested a Pratt and Whz"tney 
1340 engine to determine the amount of thrust that could be obtained by pro}ecting 
the waste gas rearwards through short exhaust stacks. 
staff, was to rework the old problem in terms of the 500-MPH speed range 
then being approached by high-performance airplanes. The engineer-in-
charge signed the job order immediately. Besides knowing that the navy 
had asked the NACA in July 1938 to determine how the exhaust system of 
a radial engine should be designed to obtain the maximum jet reaction from 
its waste gases, the engineer-in-charge had just heard from George Lewis 
that "the Army Air Corps [was) particularly interested in the development 
of some form of jet propulsion apparatus to be used for assisted take-off." 18 
On 11 April 1940, a conference was held in Henry Reid's office to dis-
cuss calculations reported by Sherman in his paper "Jet Propulsion for 
Aircraft at Subsonic Speeds"; present at the meeting were Reid, Elton 
Miller, Carlton Kemper, chief of the engine research staff, and Benjamin 
Pinkel, his assistant chief, plus Jacobs and Sherman. The six men agreed 
that jet propulsion now seemed to offer "the possibility of high enough 
power outputs with little machinery" to make a new experimental investi-
gation desirable. They also agreed that, at the high air velocities through 
the combustion chamber, to burn gasoline satisfactorily constituted one of 
the most definite problems. The trailing flame, in particular, might be 
dangerous. 19 Since these men were not yet aware of the rapid progress of 
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Eastman Jacobs 1s drawing of experimental jet propulsion airplane, 1942. 
the turbojet in England and Germany, they were considering jet propulsion 
in the absence of the turbine component.20 
Jacobs and Sherman proposed studying a ducted-fan system that used 
only dynamic pressure (that is, the pressure was not boosted by a fan) 
for compression and the Meredith cycle for thrust. (In 1936 Frank W. 
Meredith had pointed out in England that not all of the waste heat of 
a piston engine had to be lost when transferred to the cooling airflow of a 
radiator. If the pressure at the exhaust of the radiator tubes was higher than 
the free static pressure of flight, some of the dissipated heat could produce a 
small thrust.)21 Because this propulsion concept was a hybrid whose success 
depended only upon a creative modification, rather than a replacement, of 
the traditional aircraft power plant, it seemed a logical choice for the NACA 
to study. The results of Sherman's preliminary investigation indicated that 
an airplane having a ducted-fan system installed in conjunction with a good 
reciprocating engine would be capable of "truly high" power-power that 
could be used for short bursts of speed in combat, and for assisted takeoffs. 
When not using jet power, the airplane could revert to its piston-engine 
power plant, making it capable of great cruising range.22 
Construction of a jet propulsion test bed called the "Jeep" got under 
way as soon as George Lewis gave authority. Lewis had been no great 
believer in the future of jet or rocket propulsion (like JATO, or jet-assisted 
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takeoff, a system developed later that used auxiliary jet-producing units, 
usually rockets, for additional thrust); however, he had a tremendous faith 
in the talents and intelligence of his Langley staff. In 1940, for example, 
Lewis expressed his opinion to the laboratory that jet propulsion for assisted 
takeoff was inherently "inferior" to the catapult method. Even Benjamin 
Pinkel, head of the LMAL engine analysis section, tried to convince the 
director of research that jet propulsion offered "many advantages" over 
the catapult method. Jet-propelled aircraft could take off "simultaneously 
and in rapid succession" in contrast to the "inherent limited capacity 
and slowness" of the catapult, Pinkel advised Lewis; moreover, catapults 
required special apparatus easily put out of commission. 23 
Lewis chose not to press his point. He might not always agree with every 
person at the lab on technical matters, but he was certainly tolerant and 
imaginative enough to know that bright members of his field staff should not 
be discouraged from pursuing ideas in which they believed strongly, as long 
as those pursuits did not take too much attention away from work on the 
higher-priority items of the NACA, and as long as they did not cost much 
money. On 22 April 1940 Lewis sent a letter giving Langley his personal 
approval to start building the combustion test rig.24 
There was no formal assignment of construction funds for the Jeep, so 
the Langley engineers had to build it mostly out of cheap sheet iron-which 
made it almost impossible to make the ducting system very efficient. To 
drive the rig's simple one-stage compressor, they scrounged a spare Pratt 
and Whitney aircraft engine ( rating 450 horsepower) from the naval air 
station in Norfolk. The responsibility for designing the combustor fell to 
Carlton Kemper, who had been in charge of Langley's Power Plants Division 
since 1931. Kemper turned key aspects of this design over to Ben Pinkel. 
With very few people inside the NACA or even at Langley knowing 
anything about this project, and with nothing yet known about the revo-
lutionary progress of European turbojet development, none of these NACA 
engineers felt any real sense of urgency to expedite their jet propulsion re-
search. While the necessary large-scale equipment was slowly being built 
in late 1940 and early 1941, Sherman conducted some small-scale experi-
ments consisting of a series of qualitative observations of fuel burning under 
various windstream conditions. These preliminary experiments gave useful 
information only about the best methods to be tried later with the large-
scale apparatus, if that apparatus was ever completed.25 
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Vannevar Bush (center) visited Langley on 21 October 1938-fust months before 
becoming the NACA chairman. Henry Reid stands to Bush's right; George Lewis is 
to his left. 
The Durand Special Committee 
In early 1941 something dramatic happened to quicken the tempo and 
expand the purpose of Langley's work on the jet propulsion burner rig. 
On 25 February Vannevar Bush, chairman of the NACA, received a letter 
from General Arnold reporting that the Germans were making "considerable 
progress" in jet propulsion, "both as a means of assisting take-off and as a 
primary power plant." (This was two months before Arnold discovered that 
surprising British progress on the Whittle engine.) "In particular," Arnold's 
letter stated, "the Heinkel 280 is reputed to have been built and tested with 
experimental rocket motor installations for assisting take-off. Its predicted 
climb and ceiling will, if obtained, [make] obsolete existing fighter aircraft." 
Arnold's letter to Bush continued: 
For the last three years, the Air Corps has subsidized, through a contract with 
the National Academy of Sciences, a continuous, though limited, program of 
jet propulsion research which has been carried out at the California Institute 
of Technology. Due to limited facilities and personnel, no practical results are 
indicated for at least one or possibly two years. 
In view of the new urgency for an early solution of the "rocket problem," 
Arnold advised Bush that "further investigation by a large group of able 
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scientists is immediately needed." The most significant point about this 
letter according to historian Virginia Dawson (who discovered the letter in 
the National Archives in 1984) is that Arnold addressed it not to NACA 
Chairman Bush, but to National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) 
Chairman Bush ( as Bush also then was). In paragraph three Arnold 
made it clear that the army wanted the NDRC, not the NACA, to take 
over the research on "the general questions dealing with jet propulsion 
and rocket motors." While the army "realized that any application of 
rockets as a means of assisted take-off for aircraft . . . is properly a function 
for investigation by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics," 
Arnold felt that "the general questions dealing with jet propulsion and 
rocket motors, i.e., fuels, efficiencies, weights, basic materials, etc., could 
properly be investigated by the National Defense Research Committee." 
His argument was that "the basic problem of rocket propulsion ... has to 
do essentially with National Defense"; it was not "exclusively restricted to 
aircraft in its application." 26 
Dawson has also found Bush's response to this urgent request by the Air 
Corps chief, who on 10 March did not yet know about the Langley project. 
This document shows that Bush agreed with Arnold "entirely in regard to 
the importance of this subject and the need for immediate steps to evaluate." 
It shows that he recommended, however, that, since the problem of aircraft 
propulsion fell "outside the scope of the NDRC," the "best way to do this 
[was] by setting up a special committee in the NACA organization." 27 
A week later, after taking up the issue with Rear Adm. John H. Towers, 
chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and a prominent member of the NACA, 
Bush expanded the scope of a recently constituted NACA subcommittee 
on auxiliary jet propulsion. Then on 24 March he established a Special 
Committee on Jet Propulsion. To head this committee, Bush called from 
retirement Prof. William F. Durand, a member of the NACA since its 
beginning and the independent dean of American engineers. 28 
For Durand, to be 82 years old at the time of his appointment 
as chairman of the Special Committee on Jet Propulsion was only a 
matter of counting birthdays. After retiring from teaching at Stanford 
University in 1924 at the statutory retirement age of 65, Durand had stayed 
extraordinarily active. Besides continuing as a vigorous member of the 
NACA, he assumed editorial charge of the Daniel Guggenheim Fund's series 
of monographs by recognized authorities on aerodynamic theory. He wrote 
parts of three volumes himself, and translated all of the articles written in 
French, German, and Italian. This work, which would have done credit to 
a man less than half his age, kept him fully abreast of current foreign and 
NA CA research. 29 
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Prof. William F. Durand, 
ca. 1955. Durand died in 
August 1958, at the age of 
99. 
Until Bush informed him about it by a letter dated 18 March 1941 (six 
days before the announcement of the formation of the special committee), 
Durand knew absolutely nothing, however, about new jet propulsion re-
search at Langley. Sherman's March 1940 report on "Jet Propulsion for 
Aircraft at Subsonic Speeds" -the only paper yet written dealing with the 
lab's critical reevaluation of Buckingham's conventional wisdom-had not 
been published in any form because Eastman Jacobs had believed the re-
port's findings too preliminary.30 And all Durand learned about the Langley 
Jeep and the project in general before assuming the chairmanship of the new 
special committee on jet propulsion was that it had "attracted the favorable 
attention of Dr. Bush." In his 18 March letter to Durand (also found by 
Dawson), Bush reported that "the group at Langley Field and Jacobs, in 
particular, have been very active in developing one jet propulsion scheme in 
which I have acquired a large amount of interest and perhaps even enthu-
siasm, for it seems to have great possibilities and I cannot find any flaw in 
their arguments." 31 
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In order to judge firsthand what role this Langley project might play in 
America's belated effort to develop a jet-propelled aircraft, Durand visited 
Langley. He made the visit in late March 1941, even before the inaugural 
meeting of his special committee. Escorted by engineer-in-charge Reid and 
director of research Lewis, the professor inspected the unfinished burner 
rig and talked at length with Jacobs and Sherman. Impressed with the 
potential of what he saw and heard, Durand asked Reid to have his staff 
prepare for him a memo with drawings illustrating how the test stand could 
become more nearly a mock-up of a proposed airplane. 
At the first meeting of the special committee in April, Durand used 
this material to describe the Langley project. He told the panel that he 
felt a ducted-fan system could be incorporated into a military aircraft in a 
relatively short time and could give it a performance in some ways superior 
to that of any existing propeller aircraft. The committee reacted to its 
chairman's message by recommending, in its first resolution, that the NACA 
laboratory turn the rig into a nonflying model of a jet propulsion system. 32 
Thereafter, Langley would conduct its project in strict accordance with 
instructions given by Durand. 
At this time, because of the changed and expanded scope of the 
research, Langley began to reexamine the character of the whole project. 
Jacobs, in particular, argued that various parts of the test rig had to be 
rebuilt and new machinery added into the system if results were to be 
applied to the design of an airplane that really could be flown. After all, 
the original purpose of the equipment had been only to demonstrate, first, 
how well the burning of fuel could be controlled in a high-speed propulsive 
duct and, second, whether the addition of heat to the burning fuel mixture 
actually produced the large increases in thrust predicted by Sherman. Now, 
without even having finished the equipment to make these preliminary 
investigations, his staff was being asked to transform a raw test apparatus 
into a geometrically accurate mock-up of an actual aircraft system.33 
In the summer of 1941 the Durand committee reacted to military in-
telligence reports of British and German turbojet developments by recom-
mending that the U.S. military services let contracts to Allis-Chalmers and 
Westinghouse for the development of contrasting turbojets and to General 
Electric of Schenectady, New York, for a turbo-propeller. The army appar-
ently did not inform the NACA, however, that a Whittle engine had been 
sent to the G.E. lab in West Lynn, Massachusetts, for development of a pro-
totype; nor did the army tell the NACA when it placed an order with Bell 
for the XP-59A. The NACA first heard about this aircraft in May 1942-
six months after the army let the contract-when one of its representatives 
reported hearing rumors of a "Buck Rogers" project at Bell.34 
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Ignorant of the jet propulsion projects which the Air Corps was just 
starting up, the Langley staff worked through 1941 to complete the Jeep. 
In this effort the staff had the support of the Durand committee. By 
February 1942 the Jeep was operational, if not always successful. The 
machine was awesome. It consumed three gallons of gasoline per second 
and exhausted a gigantic blowtorch that "impressed, and often terrified" 
spectators and NACA employees alike.35 In fact, many of the machine's 
early test runs failed simply because the man ( usually Jacobs himself) 
handling the introduction of the main flow of gasoline into the combustion 
chamber, who was understandably nervous about his responsibility, either 
jerked the fuel valves open or backed them off too suddenly.36 
By the end of the spring, however, most of the Langley test crew 
had overcome their fears about working with such volatile equipment. By 
vaporizing the fuel before mixing it with the combustion air, Jacobs had 
tried to restrict the main fire to an "intense, small, and short annular 
blue flame burning steadily in the intended combustion space." His idea 
had been that the blue flame indicated, and was thus necessary for, high 
combustion efficiency. It is uncertain whether this technique ever succeeded 
totally. By ensuring proper conditions, however, Jacobs did demonstrate 
that "a blanket of cool air" could be maintained between the hot gases and 
the walls of the test stand. Besides reassuring the men involved that their 
lives were not in danger, this knowledge meant that an airplane having the 
propulsion system would probably not burn to pieces or explode from its 
own energy. 37 
Eventually the Jeep did demonstrate efficient combustion as the result 
of a liquid injection system designed by K. K. "Nick" N ahigyan of the LMAL 
engine analysis section. By late July 1942, the basic features of the system 
appeared promising enough in the ground mock-up to merit instructions 
from the Durand committee for a design study of an actual flight article, a 
research airplane incorporating the Campini system.38 
By the time it received those instructions from Washington, the Jacobs 
staff had in fact already been investigating the aerodynamic and thermo-
dynamic characteristics necessary for such an airplane for at least three 
months. In the course of this study, Jacobs and Sherman had parted com-
pany in strong personal disagreement over how the ducted fan should be 
applied. In March 1940, Sherman had argued that "the application of jet 
propulsion to the cooling ducts of fast military or racing airplanes for auxil-
iary emergency purposes appears interesting enough to warrant immediate 
experimental investigation." This argument for what later became known 
as an afterburner had appeared in the draft of the report which Sherman 
now said Jacobs had "suppressed." 39 
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According to Sherman's plan for the Martin B-26, Langley was to fair out and 
extend the nacelle afterbody, seal all the air intakes, and arrange for the exhaust 
to be discharged from the modified nacelle at the tail opening. Then the lab was 
to fit exhaust boilers to the engine and install jet burners in the forward part of 
the nacelle afterbody, whz"ch would be provided with a light inner heat-resistant duct 
extending from the burners to the tail opening. 
In early 1942 Sherman had still believed that "the actual flight appli-
cation of jet propulsion to the cooling ducts of some of our existing fighter 
ships" was desirable, "if only for morale and research purposes." The appli-
cation "could be done in only a few months," he emphasized, "as is indicated 
by the information that I have already acquired experimentally." Specifi-
cally, Sherman had recommended that a twin-engine, high-speed medium 
bomber-a Martin B-26 Marauder in Langley's test flight fleet-be modi-
fied to include the auxiliary jet propulsion system, which the Langley Jeep 
had proved to be "attractive in all respects." With the afterburner, he had 
predicted that the top speed of the B-26 could be raised in an emergency 
from 350 to 400 miles per hour, "with the fuel consumption increased by 
the order of only 300 percent." The jet's average temperature would be 
approximately 1700 degrees Fahrenheit, but since the unburned portions of 
the air would be directed along the walls for cooling, there was no reason 
to fear overheating.40 
Because he knew that Jacobs had a much different application in mind, 
Sherman had executed an end run around his boss and sent copies of his 
proposal directly to engineer-in-charge Reid and chairman Durand. At the 
same time he had requested a transfer from airflow research to another 
division where he could spend more time on his own developing a 12-inch 
portable combustion tunnel for testing his afterburner idea.41 
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Jacobs's Concept for a Research Airplane 
The jet propulsion application Jacobs had in mind showed more bold-
ness and less concern for precedent than even Sherman's idea: an out-and-
out NACA research airplane that not only could test the Jeep concept for 
propulsive capacity but that also could explore the frontier of high-speed, 
perhaps even transonic, flight. Though it was NACA policy to stay clear 
of designing aircraft, the idea of a special high-speed experimental plane 
had been gaining steam at Langley since 1941. At one of the first meetings 
of the Durand committee on 22 April 1941, Jacobs had said that with the 
NACA's new family of laminar-flow airfoils it would be possible to attain 
approximately the speed of sound in flight. 42 And only in flight tests could 
knowledge of high speeds be gained, for wind tunnel tests in those days 
provided little if any reliable data at Mach numbers between O. 7 and 1.3 
( that is, between speeds 30 percent below and 30 percent above the speed 
of sound). Later in the same year John Stack, who had worked for Jacobs 
in the VDT section for most of the 1930s and was soon to become head 
of Langley's new Compressibility Research Division, suggested to George 
Lewis a concept for a transonic research airplane (see next chapter). 
With Sherman going his separate way toward a specific military con-
figuration, Jacobs put together an experimental jet airplane design team 
consisting of young engineers Macon C. Ellis, Jr., and Clinton E. Brown. 
This team quickly decided that it was advisable, for experimental purposes, 
to keep the airplane small. On the other hand, to obtain conclusive re-
sults, the team realized that the plane had to be large enough to carry a 
pilot and instruments, and of sufficient dimensions and power so that these 
items would not exert a marked adverse effect on its flight test performance. 
Most importantly, the designers concluded that in view of the problems con-
nected with the development of radically new airplane types, it was unwise 
"to complicate and retard the fundamental development by numerous con-
siderations of adaptability to military requirements" or to hamper a project 
intended primarily to develop the possibilities of an experimental system 
by "unnecessarily making components, such as a gas turbine-prime mover, 
which themselves must be treated as experimental," part of the NACA 
program.43 
By July 1942, the team of Jacobs, Ellis, and Brown had finished pre-
liminary plans for a specific configuration of the experimental jet-propelled 
airplane. The design featured a modified Pratt and Whitney R-1535 radial 
engine, an advanced type of nose inlet and high-speed cowling, a cylindri-
cal fuselage, a high-shoulder wing ( derived from an NACA low-drag airfoil 
section), a v-tail, and a cockpit for one pilot, as well as a version of the 
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V-tail model of Langley's proposed jet propulsion airplane, December 1942. In the 
bottom photograph, the model is mounted in the 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel. 
Jeep. Because of uncertain values of drag caused by compressibility ef-
fects at speeds over 550 miles per hour, the designers could not pinpoint a 
prediction of the maximum speed of their creation. They did believe, how-
ever, that because the same engine in ground tests produced three times 
the thrust thought necessary to reach Mach 0. 75, their small airplane could 
reach 600 miles per hour. This meant that it "could have really barreled 
into the transonic region." 44 
For a late July 1942 meeting of the Durand committee at NACA 
headquarters in Washington, Jacobs brought with him a short reel of film 
237 
Engineer in Charge 
made during a recent test of the Jeep. This film demonstrated achievement 
of efficient combustion in the Jeep through liquid injection of the fuel. After 
showing the film, he recommended that arrangements be made with the 
military services, either jointly or separately, for the immediate construction 
of his research airplane. Jacobs called such a step "the quickest and most 
direct approach" to the application of jet propulsion to military aircraft 
and asked for permission to test the stability and control characteristics of 
a scale model in the LMAL 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel. 
It was the decision of the Durand committee, however, that Langley 
extend its jet propulsion work along both Jacobs's and Sherman's lines of 
research in definite accordance with military objectives made necessary by 
the war: 
First, design studies should be made of applications representing actual mili-
tary airplanes meeting certain stated minimum requirements [Sherman's way]. 
Second, the detailed design of the experimental airplane should be continued 
[Jacobs's way] in order to investigate more thoroughly any possibility of using 
the experimental airplane itself for military operation. 
Durand asked that Langley send him a short progress report about this 
parallel work each week. Proceeding further with definite plans for pro-
curement would wait until the results of both design application studies 
were compared.45 
In late September 1942 Durand notified George Lewis that "there is 
nothing in particular that we, as a committee, can do with regard to the 
[jet propulsion] projects in the hands of the industrial companies," but that 
the committee could help the project at Langley. In this letter Durand 
admitted feeling "a little anxious about Jacobs's work, due to the fact 
that the Committee is directly interested in that particular project in the 
sense that its success or failure will react directly on the reputation of the 
Committee~at least in conjunction with this particular work." Durand 
told Lewis that he would be "very grateful . . . if you will feel entirely free 
to represent me in connection with this work and guide Jacobs and his 
collaborators as may seem best to you." 46 
The Campini Project Dies 
A few weeks later the Durand committee visited Langley for the express 
purpose of witnessing a demonstration of the Jeep. Stationed safely some 
200 yards behind the monstrous burner, the visiting dignitaries watched 
Jacobs's experienced crew ignite the engine. Stable combustion was still 
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not automatic inside the apparatus, however, and the test run fizzled. The 
failed test was a great disappointment to everyone, especially to those aware 
that just two weeks earlier at Muroc, Bell test pilot Robert Stanley had 
flown the XP-59A with Whittle engine successfully. The Durand committee 
returned to Washington gravely concerned over the delays caused by the 
fickle apparatus and over the loss of innumerable gallons of precious gasoline. 
(According to Jacobs's staff, much gas had been stolen from the Jeep for 
use in private automobiles as a result of wartime rationing.) 47 
Though some members of the research team were growing increasingly 
dubious about the Campini system, Jacobs continued to have his staff work 
hard on the Jeep into the first months of 1943.48 Full-scale burning tests 
resumed. Albert Sherman analyzed the potential of an afterburner in a 
Bell P-39 airplane.49 Systematic tests of the stability and control charac-
teristics of Jacobs's aerodynamic configuration were made in the 7 x 10-Foot 
Tunnel, followed by a round of drag tests on the fuselage, tail surfaces, and 
central wing portions of the scale model at higher Reynolds numbers in 
the Two-Dimensional Low-Turbulence Pressure Tunnel.50 Though formal 
work on Jacobs's engine by the engine analysis section ended in Decem-
ber 1942-when the entire LMAL Power Plants Division moved to the new 
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory (AERL)-NACA correspondence in-
dicates that Nick N ahigyan in Cleveland continued making tests related to 
the liquid injection system for Jacobs's jet airplane into early 1943.51 
Virginia Dawson thinks that Nahigyan's continuation of work on the 
Jacobs engine might have been kept a secret from everyone at the AERL 
except Edward R. "Ray" Sharp, the field manager. Not even Ben Finkel, 
Nahigyan's boss, seems to have known about it. Finkel recalled in a 1984 
letter to Dawson that his engine analysis section completed all work on the 
Jacobs combustor before the division's move to Ohio in December 1942. 
According to him, all of the section heads of the LMAL Power Plants 
Division had been called into Reid's office just before their transfer. There 
George Lewis informed them that the "top military echelon" had instructed 
the NACA "that the war would be fought with five reciprocating engines, 
namely, the Wright 1820 and 3350, the Pratt and Whitney 1830 and 4460, 
and the Allison V 1710, and that all work on jet propulsion [could] be 
stopped in order that all effort [could] be directed toward those reciprocating 
engines." In Pinkel's mind, then, there was "no useful purpose for further 
work on Jacobs' engine following our successful demonstration of principle" 
to the Durand committee in July 1942.52 
The proscription of further jet propulsion work may have applied 
to the AERL but not to Jacobs and his staff at Langley, whose overall 
airplane design was unknown to those power plant engineers brought in 
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periodically to assist on specific engine components. Records show how 
strongly committed to the Campini system Jacobs and the NACA as a 
whole remained even after the transfer of the Power Plants Division to 
AERL. During a visit to Wright Field in January 1943, Jacobs advised Air 
Corps officials that the Durand committee still supported the experimental 
airplane idea, as did NACA chairman Hunsaker and director of research 
Lewis. Jacobs argued that the best way of obtaining the flight article, the 
research airplane, would be "to have an airplane company appointed to 
work on the design of the airplane with [the NACA] and then take over the 
construction." Upon returning to Langley, Jacobs reported that "Wright 
Field was convinced that flight tests should be made, but was apparently not 
certain as to how the work should be prosecuted." He believed that "Wright 
Field would be inclined to build a complete military version rather than 
building with the least expenditure of effort and time a purely experimental 
flight article." 53 
The Langley jet propulsion project died in March 1943 when the 
military services turned down the NACA's request to construct Jacobs's 
research airplane: 
The Army Air Forces and the Bureau of Aeronautics have had the occasion to 
study the characteristics of several [jet propulsion) schemes and combinations 
now under consideration. As one result of these studies, it appears inadvisable 
at this time to build an airplane of the type recommended [by the NACA). This 
conclusion is based primarily on weight and fuel economy when compared with 
more highly developed types. 
Certain features of the NACA Jeep interested the services enough for their 
representatives to recommend jointly that "further investigations be made 
in order to explore the possibilities of increasing the ratio of thrust to 
weight." If the NACA could show this ratio to be comparable to those of 
other types of jet engines, or if the ducted-fan scheme could be modified to 
show "compensatory advantages," there would then be "ample justification 
for reconsidering the proposed design application." And since wind tunnel 
data in the transonic range were not available, and conventionally powered 
test aircraft were too slow to perform the needed research in actual flight, 
the services advised the Durand committee, finally, that "a jet-propelled 
airplane now under construction" should eventually be made available to 
the NACA. The airplane being referred to was most likely the XP-80, the 
first U.S. airplane conceived from the beginning for turbojet propulsion, the 
design of which had just gotten under way for the Air Corps at Lockheed's 
plant in Burbank, California. 54 
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Langley received word from NACA headquarters on 23 March 1943 to 
hold the jet propulsion project in check pending further action. A few weeks 
later, the lab also learned that neither service was interested in Sherman's 
speed booster application. In May Sherman resigned "to go into another 
business." Jacobs's immediate reaction was to write a memo in which he 
charged bluntly that the army and navy were making a big mistake. In 
concluding that the NACA's proposed experimental airplane was deficient 
in thrust relative to its weight, the services were comparing "uncertain de-
velopment projects with a conservative straightforward engineering design 
which has been partly tested and could be readily constructed by straight-
forward means and for which we have every reason to expect large gains in 
performance." The services should do the developmental work only "after 
the experimental airplane has served its purpose and while the system is 
being developed for application to a military airplane." In response to a 
suggestion by Durand that a lighter burner unit might satisfy the military 
requirement, Jacobs stated that "any gain here would be relatively small." 
The power-to-weight ratio could not be increased markedly by decreasing 
the weight of the structure. That feat could only be accomplished by "go-
ing over the entire airplane and ruthlessly sacrificing other things." Jacobs 
doubted whether such alterations in the end would even appear desirable. 
At any rate, his experimental airplane already showed "ample thrust for its 
weight." There was no good reason to make the design "less practical or 
conservative" in order to gain a better ratio of thrust to weight.55 
Jacobs's reaction, especially the phrase "uncertain development 
projects," implies that he and his colleagues at Langley were still unaware 
of how far along G.E. and others had come in achieving a successful gas-
turbine form of jet propulsion for aircraft. They apparently did not know 
that the U.S. military was well on the way to having its first jet fighters, with 
the Bell XP-59 having flown in 1942 with a full armament system and the 
Lockheed XP-80 under development. The only explanation for Langley's 
lack of knowledge about these things in the spring of 1943 is that General 
Arnold and others had been keeping the NACA in the dark. Historian Alex 
Roland believes that this was in fact the case: 
Part of the story was simply that the services put an unprecedented lid of secrecy 
on all jet-propulsion development. Not only did this policy shut out the NACA 
more completely than ever before from developments in military aviation, but 
it also prevented manufacturers from freely exchanging information on their 
projects. In fact the two sections of the General Electric Company working on 
... the separate jet projects did not know that the other team existed.56 
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Drag cleanup of the Bell P-59, America's first jet airplane, in the Full-Scale Tunnel, 
May 1944. 
In June 1943 NACA chairman Jerome Hunsaker complained privately: 
The idea that they [the British] are supplying "us" everything they have [about 
turbojet development] does not apply to NACA but may apply to the services.57 
Roland explains these facts by suggesting that Arnold had lost faith in the 
NACA. A less controversial explanation is that Arnold and other military 
leaders felt that it was more dangerous to confide top secret information 
to the civilian research agency, and thus increase the number of potential 
leaks, than it was to keep the NACA research staffs ignorant of military 
programs to develop jet aircraft. This policy helps to explain the army's 
polite tolerance of the LMAL Campini project in 1941 and 1942. 
Other documents dug out by Dawson suggest that Durand knew about 
the secret military developments just about as they happened, but could not 
share his timely information with the NACA staff. On 27 February 1942 the 
chairman of the Special Committee on Jet Propulsion had asked Maj. Gen. 
Oliver P. Echols, USAAC, for permission to circulate test results among 
G.E., Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers, the three companies secretly and 
independently involved in jet engine development. "Of course," Durand 
had added, "this request has no relation whatever to the particular project 
sponsored by the Army, now being carried on by the General Electric or-
ganization, and of English origin [emphasis added]. It relates solely to 
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the projects which have been developed as a result of meetings of the Jet 
Propulsion Committee." 58 
When the Bell XP-59A, powered by two G.E. I-A Whittle turbojet 
engines, made its first successful flight test at Muroc Dry Lake, California, 
on 1 October 1942, Durand had been there to see it. He wrote four weeks 
later to Colonel Keirn, the army officer at Wright Field who had brought 
the plans of the Whittle engine from England a year earlier: 
I was very sorry that you could not be with us in California. The performance 
was indeed very interesting, and I am very much indebted to you for your 
kindness in facilitating my visit to Muroc .... It really begins to look as though 
a definite start has been made along the lines we have been thinking about so 
long.59 
Jacobs and a few other privileged members of the Langley staff heard about 
what Durand saw only in the summer of 1943 when the military changed 
the Whittle project from secret to confidential. 
Since the policy of secrecy regarding jet propulsion research and devel-
opment in America contrasts sharply with the policy of a relatively free flow 
of information within the British aeronautics community,* the wisdom of 
Arnold's keeping the NACA ignorant of U.S. military programs can be de-
bated. What seems beyond debate, however, is that researchers at Langley 
laboratory, fully supported and regularly monitored by the Durand commit-
tee but with far too little knowledge of the overall turbojet revolution and 
its security problems, worked through 1941, 1942, and the first three months 
of 1943 on a questionable system of propulsion that seemed to cancel out 
the advantages of both the pure propeller and the pure jet. 
This fact raises a provocative but unanswerable set of "what if" ques-
tions: What if the research staff at Langley had known more about the 
most recent developments in turbojet technology? Would they still have 
worked so hard on a jet propulsion system based on the principle of the 
ducted fan? Would they have made major changes in the system? Would 
they have abandoned the concept behind the system altogether? Would 
they still have proposed the construction of a small experimental airplane, 
or would they have embraced the idea of a complete military version? If 
the army had shared its intelligence with the NACA through proper and 
* In Britain, the Gas Turbine Collaboration Committee made sure that British agencies 
pooled their resources and avoided unnecessary or duplicated efforts. See H. Roxbee Cox, 
"British Aircraft Gas Turbines," Ninth Wright Bros. Lecture, Journal of the Aeronautical 
Sciences 13 (Feb. 1946): 53-83. 
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secure channels, would the NACA have leaked the information or simply 
have improved it? 
There are good reasons to think that Jacobs and most other NACA 
engineers would have turned away from work on the ducted fan much earlier 
if they had known more about the progress of turbojets. Jacobs today recalls 
thinking about the potential of gas turbines in the late 1930s, during the 
period when he was working with Wasielewski on the axial-flow compressor. 
He and his colleagues had even thought about using a gas turbine to drive 
the compressor of the Campini system.* But they decided against this on 
the technical judgments ( erroneous as they turned out, but not farfetched 
at the time) that the material and fluid-mechanical problems of the turbine 
were too intractable and that the extra machinery would simply weigh too 
much for practical application to an aircraft. 
In the summer of 1943 Jacobs journeyed to Great Britain, where he 
spent two weeks in London, one week at the Royal Aircraft Establishment 
in Farnborough, and a day at Cambridge. At one of these places, he saw 
aerial photographs of German aeronautical centers which showed scorch 
marks on the ground thought to be the tracks of jet exhaust. Jacobs also 
found out a good deal more than what he already knew about the Whittle 
engine and its applications.60 
With this new insight into the state of foreign turbojet technology 
came a new argument from Jacobs in protest of the military's decision 
to kill his experimental airplane idea: in subsequent written and oral 
reports to the NACA about his visits, Jacobs observed that the British 
were making the same mistake as that already made by the U.S. military in 
turning down the NACA research airplane proposal; that is, "the mistake of 
applying the new power plants to more or less conventional airplanes rather 
than giving careful consideration to essentially new extreme-performance 
types" made possible through the use of new power plants. He concluded 
that both in England and the United States "the development of the jet 
power units themselves had progressed beyond the development of suitable 
airplanes to employ them." If a system as new as the turbine engine 
were incorporated without accompanying changes in the principles of the 
airplane's aerodynamic design, there would be such an imbalance between 
power plant and airframe, Jacobs feared, as to make both propulsion 
and aerodynamics ineffective. What was needed, Jacobs emphasized, 
was a unified cooperative program among the military services, aircraft 
* In principle, the only difference between the ducted fan and the turbojet-aside from 
the dividing-up of the fluid stream in the former (which is not really essential and would 
be introduced into later turbojets anyway )-was that one drove the compressor with an 
internal-combustion engine and the other drove it with a turbine. 
244 
Exploring Unknown Technology: The Case of Jet Propulsion 
manufacturers, and the NACA, "with a view toward producing quickly 
extreme-performance airplanes of several types to be developed around 
existing units and suitable to exploit to the full the capabilities of those 
existing jet-propulsion power plants." 61 
In using this last phrase, Jacobs was almost certainly thinking of 
turbojets of the kind he had seen in England. As a result of his growing 
awareness of the advanced state of the new engine technology, Jacobs 
now shifted his attention away from the power plant problem, which had 
preoccupied him on the Campini project, to the problem of fully utilizing 
the overall potential of jet aircraft. This was the natural thing for an 
aerodynamicist to do. But not once in 1943 did Jacobs confide in his 
airflow research staff anything about his knowledge of British turbojets; 
for an NACA researcher accustomed to the free exchange of information at 
least among his own staff, this was most unnatural. 
He never did acknowledge that his ducted-fan research airplane concept 
was unworthy of additional consideration. In a personal letter to George 
Lewis written in England, Jacobs related that the people at the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment 
profess to agree with me that the Army and Navy are short-sighted in not 
backing our project to have constructed the N.A.C.A. jet propulsion airplane. 
I really think that they believe that we should go ahead with the experimental 
airplane as the best and perhaps the only means of obtaining reliable data and 
experience in the high Mach number range. 
Lewis agreed with Jacobs, telling his engineer in July 1943, "I have always 
felt that if a jet-propulsion device was to be considered at this time for a 
single-engine airplane, and if range was an important factor (which it was 
not], your particular scheme offered the best opportunity of answering the 
requirements." 62 
Turbojet Revolution Upheld 
This chapter is meant to enrich historical understanding of the NACA's 
failure to discover jet propulsion, not to explain it away. Nothing can do 
that. One of the main points of Edward Constant's book The Origins 
of the Turbojet Revolution is that the turbojet revolution began with the 
vague feeling of a few farsighted European aerodynamicists that something 
anomalous was about to block the further progress of aviation to higher and 
higher speeds and that only a radically new type of power plant such as the 
turbojet could resolve the anomaly and ensure progress. Since aerodynamics 
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America's first generation Jet planes at Langley. Clockwise, from top left: 
Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, November 1946, the first fully operational U.S. Jet 
fighter; Vought F7U Cutlass, December 1948, the navy's tailless twin-Jet fighter; 
North American B-45 bomber, November 1949, powered by four Jet engines; and 
Republic F-84 Thundery.et, October 1949. 
was the NACA's forte, failure here to presume the anomaly before it became 
an actual problem appears all the more glaring. 
The NACA soon made up for the failure, however, by having its three 
labs shift focus from the old to the new technology and come with skills and 
alacrity to the aid of American turbojet development. Subsequent history 
proves that it was this type of flexibility, not the more radical type that first 
led certain Europeans to explore turbojets seriously, in which the NACA 
research staffs excelled. 
NACA senior staffers in Ohio, California, Virginia, and Washington, 
D.C., received their first briefings on the General Electric and Bell turbojet 
projects in late 1943. At Cleveland, Colonel Keirn swore AERL team 
leaders to secrecy and then showed them a special test cell designed at 
West Lynn. The army delivered a G.E. I-A turbojet to the AERL in early 
1944 under heavily armed guard. Tests were then made confidentially in the 
Altitude Wind Tunnel, which was built for the study of liquid-cooled engines 
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under altitude conditions, to check G.E.'s refinements of the Whittle I-14, 
I-16, and I-40 engines. Members of the AERL staff also collaborated with 
manufacturers in the design of combustion chambers for proposed new 
engines. 
The postwar turbojet revolution affected the Cleveland laboratory more 
completely and directly than it affected either of the other two NACA 
labs.63 When the war ended in August 1945, the AERL underwent a 
sweeping reorganization known by insiders as "The Big Switch." As John 
Sloop, who headed the group at this lab working on ignition problems 
during the war, described it: "Overnight, research emphasis shifted from 
piston engines to jet engines (turbojet and ramjet) with some work on 
rockets." In the process, the name of the institution was changed to the 
Flight Propulsion Laboratory ( and in 1948 to the Lewis Flight Propulsion 
Laboratory), the entire work force was reassigned into four new divisions, 
and top administrators lost or gave up their posts. The Big Switch caught 
everyone by surprise, especially the lower-level supervisors. Sloop recalled 
going home one night "deeply engaged in writing a report on spark plug 
fouling to find in the morning that [his] desk was in another building and 
[he] was now officially engaged in rocket engine cooling research." 64 
Though the AERL was most directly affected, Ames and Langley 
had also become actively involved in developing the technology of jet 
aircraft starting in 1944. As one would expect, the contributions of these 
two laboratories mainly involved aerodynamic analysis of turbine engines, 
compressors, and complete jet aircraft configurations. In May 1944, for 
example, Langley put the Bell P-59 through drag cleanup in the FST.65 
Swept wings, with new flap systems and other high-lift devices, and narrow 
streamlined compressor units that could be buried cleanly into the wing or 
fuselage were some of the NACA aerodynamic developments of the mid-
and late 1940s that proved crucial to the ultimate success of the turbojet 
revolution. With conventional configuration the speed of aircraft would have 
jumped from the 350- to 450-MPH to the 450- to 550-MPH range because 
of jet propulsion, but beyond this plateau jet aircraft could not have gone 
without the breakthroughs in transonic aerodynamics. 
It was to this purpose-solving the transonic problem-that NACA 
Langley had been directing considerable research energy since the late 1930s. 
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Throughout World War II, Langley and the other NACA laboratories 
faced a perplexing research policy problem: the need to balance refinement 
of conventional aircraft technology with a strong enough dose of basic 
research into the high-speed frontier of future flight. In 1941, American 
combat planes encountered the dangers of compressibility for the first time. 
When diving vertically to terminal velocity, they penetrated far into the 
transonic region, where the effects of such aerodynamic phenomena as shock 
waves on moving bodies were largely unknown.* Lockheed test pilot Ralph 
Virden's fatal loss of control in November of that year during a dive test of 
the P-38 Lightning, an extremely high-powered and aerodynamically clean 
fighter plane, dramatized the need for a more complete understanding of 
the essential characteristics of transonic flight. 1 The military necessity of 
solving the many difficult problems associated with the development of 
jet engines and guided missiles and rockets underscored this need. This 
combination of factors-the waging of world war and the emergence of 
compressibility and other problems of high-speed aerodynamics-challenged 
* The transonic range begins for a particular aircraft when the flow over any part of 
the aircraft's wing exceeds the speed of sound, or Mach 1. At the point when this speed 
is reached, at what is known as the critical Mach number, there are no adverse aerodynamic 
forces. But as the critical Mach number is exceeded, a shock wave, or major pressure 
disturban<:e, forms on the top of the wing (at 90 degrees to the airstream) and propagates 
through the surrounding air at sonic speed. Because it forces the wing to encounter a mixture 
of subsonic and supersonic conditions, this shock presents serious problems for the aircraft 
( see further in text). 
Another term that will appear in this chapter is supercritical. This refers simply, as it 
did in the 1940s, to any speed beyond the critical Mach number. In the 1960s, Richard T. 
Whitcomb of NASA Langley introduced a more restrictive meaning of the term with his 
invention of a "supercritical" airfoil to delay the drag rise that accompanies transonic 
airflows. Thus supercritical has also come to mean airfoil operations in the speed region 
between the critical Mach number and drag-rise Mach number. For an introduction to 
the principles of high-speed flight, see Van Deventer, An Introduction to General Aeronautics, 
pp. 108-128. 
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Test of Lockheed P-38 Lightning in Full-Scale Tunnel, December 1944-
Langley not only to create a whole new wind tunnel and flight research 
capability but also to move away as quickly as possible from the first duty 
of its wartime assignment, which was essentially to help industry catch up 
with and consolidate the many diverse gains of pre-1939 NACA research. 
In spite of their parent organization's heavy commitment to cleaning 
up specific military configurations, many of Langley's more experienced and 
restless aeronautical researchers somehow managed to find the time and 
resources during the war to respond to this challenge. In the summer of 
1942, for example, at the same time that Eastman Jacobs was attempting 
to develop the ducted-fan jet propulsion system (see the previous chapter), 
he and Arthur Kantrowitz were also busy designing and constructing the 
NACA's first supersonic wind tunnel. This tunnel, which had a small 
9 x 9-inch test section, was built with the approval of NACA headquarters 
to serve as a partial model for a larger supersonic tunnel authorized for 
construction at the new Ames laboratory in California. Though it had 
a water condensation problem, the Jacobs-Kantrowitz model supersonic 
tunnel provided Langley aerodynamicists timely education and experience 
in the fundamental phenomena of supersonic flow. In 1944 and 1945 Langley 
engineers changed this pilot facility to closed-circuit, dry-air operation. 
This conversion immediately preceded the NACA's major drive for large 
supersonic tunnels, which began in 1945.2 
But the deepest probe into high-speed aerodynamics at Langley during 
the early part of the war was made by John Stack's wind tunnel groups. 
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In December 1941, a few weeks after test pilot Virden lost his life test-
diving the P-38, Stack's 8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel (HST) group began 
an investigation of the stability and control problems of Lockheed's new 
airplane using one-sixth-scale models. 3 At about 450 miles per hour, shock 
waves formed on the upper surface of the P-38's wings. This formation of 
disturbed airflow-which was not unique to the P-38-made it very qifficult, 
and sometimes impossible, for a pilot to recover the plane from a steep dive. 
Either controls stiffened up so much from the resulting loss of both lift and 
downwash on the tail that he could not pull out, or, as had happened in 
Virden's fatal case, violent buffeting and strong downward pitching motion 
tore the plane's tail off.4 
In March 1942, after less than four months of tests in Langley's 8-Foot 
HST, Stack's engineers reported that they had an answer to the P-38's 
dive-recovery problem: a wedge-shaped flap installed on the lower surface 
of the aircraft's wings. They said that their tunnel tests showed that 
wings having this flap would retain enough lift at high speeds to enable 
a pilot to pull the plane out of steep dives. 5 Langley then turned the dive-
recovery program over to its sister facility in California-Ames Aeronautical 
Laboratory at Moffett Field-where the flap idea could be proved sound to 
nearby Lockheed more expeditiously than at faraway Langley. Further tests 
in Ames's new 16-Foot HST did prove the idea sound: NACA-style dive-
recovery flaps eventually saw service not only on the P-38 but also on the 
P-47 Thunderbolt, the A-26 Invader, the P-59 Airacomet (America's first 
jet), and the P-80, the first U.S. airplane designed (by Lockheed) from the 
beginning for turbojet propulsion.6 
Stack's 8-Foot HST group carried out the dive-recovery program to 
prevent failures of precious combat aircraft in dangerous high-speed ma-
neuvers. But there was another purpose as well: the Stack group did this 
work as part of a more basic program to develop a new family of high-speed 
airfoils. At the time that the P-38 was experiencing its most severe troubles, 
Stack and his closest associates were discussing the validity of calculations 
showing conventional airfoils to have improved lift and moment performance 
when operated inverted with negative camber-meaning with a curved-in 
or caved-in camber. (This was contrary to the conventional design, which 
added different degrees of outward curvature from the chord line.) However, 
all the Langley engineers involved in these conversations dismissed this as 
an unthinkable approach to solving the P-38's problems. Their educations 
and working experiences as aerodynamicists told them that positive cam-
ber was inherently beneficial to the lifting power of airfoils because such 
curvature caused the comparatively low pressures on the top side of the 
airfoil necessary for great lifting force. This lesson of conventional subsonic 
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Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, 1946. The dive recovery flaps are barely visible under-
neath the wings. 
aerodynamics was so deeply ingrained in the engineers that they dismissed 
the new high-speed airfoil data as an impractical aerodynamic curiosity. 
One engineer remarked that pilots would reject the inverted wing because 
it would make them think that they had to fly their airplanes upside down. 7 
The imaginative critic was being facetious, of course, because he realized 
that pilots would be willing to fly the new "upside-down" wing rightside 
up-especially if the wing helped them to pull out of supercritical dives. 
Beyond the sniping at pilot mentality, though, Langley's work on the 
P-38 embodied an early attempt to obtain an airfoil with truly supercritical 
performance. The broader goal of the research program was to discover 
the new airfoil shapes that would make propellers and wings capable of 
flight at speeds of 500 miles per hour and beyond. At such velocities, which 
seemed so fantastic at the time, a plane would be flying into the mysterious 
transonic region. Tests in the lab's 12-inch and 24-inch induction-jet 
high-speed tunnels had already shown that even on approaching such 
speeds, air "bunched up" unpredictably on the upper surface of an airfoil. 
This bunching-up or burble caused an airfoil to lose its lifting power and 
controllability. 8 
In July 1943, the NACA directed Langley to investigate routinely this 
and other major impediments to safe and efficient flight at high speeds 
by creating a new Compressibility Research Division at the lab. This 
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division incorporated all the ground-based high-speed research sections then 
at Langley, including the 8-Foot HST section, the 16-Foot HST section, 
the model supersonic tunnel section, and a small section under Arthur 
Kantrowitz involved with the study of fundamental gas dynamics. Five 
months later, George Lewis formed a special four-man panel (consisting 
of Stack, H. Julian Allen of Ames, Abe Silverstein of the Aircraft Engine 
Research Laboratory in Cleveland, and, as chairman, Russell G. Robinson 
of NACA headquarters) to coordinate NACA high-speed research. 
The "Sound Barrier" 
In 1935, a newsman asked British aerodynamicist W. F. Hilton what 
problem he was working on in the National Physical Laboratory's newest 
high-speed wind tunnel. Pointing to an airfoil drag plot, Hilton replied, "See 
how the resistance of a wing shoots up like a barrier against higher speed as 
we approach the speed of sound." The next morning, all the leading English 
dailies misrepresented Hilton's response by coining the phrase, "the sound 
barrier." 9 
The men who specialized in high-speed aerodynamics at Langley and 
elsewhere during this era knew that no actual physical barrier existed. But 
they did realize that flying at sonic velocity required not only finding a set 
of yet unimagined practical solutions to a number of tremendously adverse 
and perhaps ineradicable aerodynamic and power plant problems, but also 
overcoming some major inhibitions against assaulting what was commonly 
held to be an impenetrable barrier. Realization of these problems did 
not stop aeronautical engineers from trying to add a hundred miles per 
hour or more to the maximum practical speed of contemporary aircraft by 
refining design techniques, carefully streamlining aerodynamic shapes, and 
improving the power and efficiency of aircraft engines. It did prevent all 
but a few farsighted individuals, however, from considering flight at speeds 
approaching and going beyond that of sound. 
Indeed Stack and Jacobs, his section head, had worked on high-speed 
aerodynamic problems from very early in their NACA careers. In 1927 
they constructed an 11-inch induction-drive high-speed wind tunnel whose 
airstream was provided by a rapid blowdown from the VDT. Though 
certainly not meant to explore transonic flight, tests in the 11-inch tunnel 
provided the Langley engineers with important formative experience in high-
speed aerodynamics. Compressibility phenomena and their ill effects on the 
performance of airfoils became a major new concern. 
In 1933 Jacobs, who as an amateur astronomer was familiar with 
various optical systems, suggested that Stack try to make compressibility 
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During her tour of Langley in November 1928, Amelia Earhart had part of her 
raccoon fur coat sucked into the 11-lnch High-Speed Tunnel. To her left are Henry 
Reid and Col. Jacob Wuest, Langley base commander. 
phenomena visible by using schlieren photography, a method first used by 
the Austrian scientist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) for visual observation of 
supersonic flow. Using a schematic drawing of the method from Robert W. 
Wood's Physical Optics, found in the Langley library, Stack constructed a 
crude schlieren device. Though the quality of the first photographs was 
poor, the results were nonetheless sensational: 
Shock waves and attendant flow separations were seen for the first time .... 
Visitors from all over the Laboratory, from Engineer-in-Charge Reid on down, 
came to view the phenomena.* 
In 1934 Langley equipped its new 24-Inch High-Speed Tunnel (built with 
$10,000 provided by the Public Works Administration) with an improved 
version of the schlieren photographic system. 
* John V. Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, p. 16. According to Becker, Theodore 
Theodorsen, Langley's ranking theoretician, viewed the schlieren photos skeptically, pro-
claiming that what appeared to be shock waves was really an optical illusion. At a banquet 
of the LMAL staff in 1936, Stack played the role of Theodorsen in a skit making his procla-
mation of the illusio!l. 
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Wind tunnel researchers used schlieren photographic systems to visualize high-speed 
aerodynamic phenomena affecting air! oil performance. In the photograph, a general 
view of Langley's 9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel, showing the control desk, the test 
section, and, just to the right of center, the schlieren apparatus. (Schlieren systems 
continue to be used today.) 
Jacobs used the data from the first tests in this new tunnel as the 
basis of a paper he was preparing for the Volta Congress on High-Speed 
Aeronautics (in Italy). In this important paper, Jacobs tried to describe 
what was actually happening in the compressibility burble (i.e., the region 
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Schlieren photographs showing shock waves, wakes, and other aerodynamic phe-
nomena affecting a low-speed and a high-speed airfoil at subsonic, transonic, and 
supersonic speeds. 
of disturbed flow generated behind a shock wave). He also attempted to 
determine whether the critical Mach number could be increased by changing 
the shape of the airfoil in minor ways. What Jacobs actually did in this 
paper was derive the relationship between the local Mach number on an 
airfoil at high speed apd the suction pressure on the airfoil at low speed. This 
derivation enabled aerodynamicists to estimate the critical Mach number 
from the low-speed pressure distribution on the airfoil. They could then 
improve the high-speed performance by making shape changes determined 
on the basis of simple incompressible theory or low-speed tests. 10 
In 1933 and 1934 Stack conceptualized on his own initiative an ex-
perimental aircraft for compressibility research and published a drawing 
of it in the Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences. He concluded from 
his paper study that a small propeller-driven monoplane, powered by a 
2300-horsepower Rolls-Royce engine and equipped with wings designed in 
accordance with the NACA's new high-speed airfoil sections, might fly to a 
maximum 566 miles per hour. Though the NACA apparently never consid-
ered helping Stack to find a developer for the airplane, the optimistic results 
of his paper study convinced many people at Langley that the potential for 
flying at speeds far in excess of 500 miles per hour was there. To realize that 
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John Stack as an MIT stu-
dent in 1927, and (larger pho-
tograph) as head of Langley's 
Compressibility Research Divi-
sion in 1944-
potential, however, the first thing Stack felt that aircraft designers needed 
to have from the NACA was a much more complete understanding of the 
basic aerodynamic phenomena in the transonic region. 11 
Leaders of the aerodynamics staff at Langley like John Stack and 
Eastman Jacobs understood the physics of fluid flow well enough to know 
that though "barrier" was the wrong word, there did exist a definite set 
of transonic flight problems. There were flight and propulsion ingredients 
to this problem-set, and there was a major wind tunnel ingredient. (In 
demonstrating how the resistance of a wing shot up "like a barrier" as it 
approached sonic speeds, had not Hilton pointed the English newspaper 
reporter to an airfoil drag plot drawn from a series of tests from a wind 
tunnel?) A limbo in the state of tunnel technology existed just below and 
just above the speed of sound, preventing fruitful research until there were 
practical solutions to difficult questions: Why did strange things happen 
in Langley's own tunnels as airflows approached Mach 1, the velocity of 
sound? Why could one get Mach 1 in an empty high-speed tunnel but not 
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in one with a model installed in the test section? Why did the airflow in 
the 8-Foot HST always tend to choke up in the tunnel's throat at some 
Mach number, generally above 0.7, that was lower the larger the model 
size and its blockage effect? Why did this still happen no matter how fast 
NACA mechanics made the driving fans turn? Why did shock waves form 
off the test model, reflect off the tunnel wall, and thereby inhibit accurate 
measurement of flow characteristics and behavior around the model? Since 
the model supersonic tunnel was capable of producing airstream speeds 
in excess of Mach 2, why did it also choke when slowed down to produce 
transonic airspeeds? 
Though these questions plagued aerodynamicists in the late 1930s, 
physicists had actually known the fundamentals of the choking problem 
and the identity of what was now called the "sound barrier" long before 
that time; in fact they had known them even before history's first wind 
tunnel had been built in the 1870s. In the 1830s, French scientists Wantzel 
and Saint-Venant had derived mathematically that a gas flowing through 
the narrowest part of a constricted duct could not exceed sonic velocity 
no matter how much additional driving pressure was exerted. To later 
scientists, this finding did not mean that supersonic flow was unattainable 
in channels; it meant only that the channel area had to be expanded 
or diverged to accommodate the increased volume required by the flow 
as it accelerated above Mach 1 downstream of the throat. In the late 
1880s, Swedish physicist-mathematician De Laval applied this principle to 
achieve supersoni'c velocities in the convergent-divergent nozzles of his steam 
turbines. 12 
In the 1920s, Americans L. J. Briggs and Hugh L. Dryden obtained 
supersonic flow during experiments at the Edgewood (New Jersey) Arse-
nal with a small free-jet apparatus having a convergent-divergent nozzle. 
Results indicated that radical changes in the behavior of air happened as 
the spetd of its stream approached that of sound. 13 Later in the decade, 
Eastman Jacobs and John Stack found during test runs of Langley's origi-
nal high-speed induction tunnel that higher Mach numbers could be reached 
with an open throat than with a closed throat. Throughout the 1930s Stack 
and colleagues explored the nature of the tunnel choking problem. Among 
other things, they made a detailed study of the blockage effect caused by 
the presence of a model in the test section. Until aircraft reached much 
higher flying speeds, the choking problem did not demand a practical solu-
tion, however; at low airspeeds, the choking effect was small and accurately 
correctable. 
In the spring of 1940 William J. Orlin, an independent-minded engineer 
in Stack's 8-Foot HST section, developed a small water channel to visualize 
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the process of the tunnel choking problem by hydraulic analogy. Though this 
little facility provided some valuable insight into the dynamics of a choking 
fluid, its operation suggested no solution to the problem of choking. 14 By 
December 1941 it was clear to Stack and his wind tunnel engineers that no 
one was likely to solve this problem for some time-if ever. No one was 
making any significant progress in the theory of transonic flows. Thus they 
envisioned only one alternative to boarding up the now vitally important 
transonic region and closing it off from study: a specially instrumented 
full-scale transonic research airplane. 
Stack Gets Go-Ahead 
Stack sold Langley management on the technical merits of the transonic 
research airplane idea in the spring of 1942. Then, though he and everyone 
else at the lab knew very well that the NACA charter did not allow 
construction of a complete airplane-and that the NACA budget could not 
finance such an enterprise even if it did-he brought the idea before George 
Lewis, director of NACA research. Lewis did not care for the research 
airplane idea on principle, but characteristically, he tried not to react too 
negatively. He liked Stack: not only was Stack a rugged individualist, a 
"man's man," with self-assured ways and ambitious ideas, but he had also 
proved over the last 15 years to be one of the NACA's best researchers. One 
question Lewis asked Stack playfully, before talking with him more seriously 
about the present strain of military research and the inevitable problem of 
getting such a project off the ground, was whether people might interpret 
the NACA's unprecedented desire for a research airplane as an admission 
of some basic failure on the part of all those expensive wind tunnels and 
their champions at Langley. He left Stack with the idea, however, that some 
low-priority, back-of-the-envelope estimates to identify the most desirable 
design features of a transonic airplane could not hurt anyone, providing they 
did not distract from more pressing business. 
Though he knew that this go-ahead by no means implied Lewis's general 
approval to develop and procure an airplane, Stack immediately assembled 
a special team of NACA researchers to work out the design requirements of 
a transonic research aircraft. Stack selected engineer Milton Davidson and 
junior engineering aide Harold Turner, Jr., to make preliminary layouts and 
performance estimates. By the early summer of 1943 Davidson and Turner 
finished a preliminary design of a small turbojet-powered plane capable of 
flying safely to high subsonic speeds, from Mach 0.8 to L0.15 (Turner had 
also helped Eastman Jacobs design his proposed research airplane, the one 
described in the previous chapter, but this new design was far different.) 
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Stack wasted no time in sending news of his pet project to friends and 
selected acquaintances inside the aeronautical branches of the army and 
navy. 
Military personnel who learned about Stack's transonic research air-
plane idea had solid reasons to be cautiously interested in it. Ezra Kotcher, 
the chief of aeronautical research of the Air Service Materiel Command 
at Wright Field, felt, too, that the speed of sound was only a wind tun-
nel and mental barrier. In 1939, Kotcher ( a 1928 graduate in mechanical 
engineering from the University of California) had himself suggested the 
construction of a transonic research airplane to be powered by either a gas 
turbine or rocket propulsion system.16 Because it came before news of the 
British and German successes with turbojets, General Arnold had rejected 
Kotcher's suggestion. Several things had happened since 1939, however, 
to change Arnold's attitude: the army had found out about the Whittle 
engine; at Arnold's instigation, secret development of an American turbo-
jet had begun; the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California 
Institute of Technology (GALCIT) had completed a series of experiments 
with JATO (jet-assisted takeoff) rockets for army ordnance;17 and, perhaps 
most importantly, two of the army's newest high-speed combat aircraft-the 
Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and the Bell P-39 Airacobra-had experienced 
fatal tail failures during high-speed dives. This frightening epidemic was 
hitting navy airplanes just as hard: for example, the horizontal tail of its 
Curtiss SB2C Helldiver was fluttering so badly in high-speed maneuvers 
that the tail was breaking off.18 Together, these developments were making 
answers to compressibility problems an urgent necessity. 
Although the loss of life and aircraft heightened both army and navy 
interest in a possible NACA high-speed research airplane, few officers in 
either service responded to Stack's proposal immediately. Kotcher, for one, 
was too busy coping with buzz bomb problems (the army had just assigned 
him the formidable job of copying the German pulsejet-powered V-1 robot 
missile). One military man who did actively advocate support for Langley's 
concept was Capt. Walter Diehl, USN. A longtime friend and close working 
associate of the NACA, Diehl argued in late 1943 during meetings with the 
chief of BuAer's structures branch that a transonic research airplane was 
the only way to convince people that the "sound barrier" was "just a steep 
hill." 19 
The first time that the military actually recognized and formally 
discussed Stack's idea, however, was at a conference between service and 
NACA personnel held at Langley laboratory on 15 March 1944. On 
that day, two meetings-one chaired by Captain Diehl and the other by 
Col. Carl Greene, the permanent liaison officer at Langley from the Materiel 
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Command-dealt with the development of a possible transonic research 
aircraft. During these meetings the NACA put its weight behind Stack's 
proposal of a joint NACA-military program to develop and construct a 
transonic research airplane. According to NACA spokesmen, the purpose of 
this airplane would be to collect the aerodynamic data needed for transonic 
flight that could not be obtained in any wind tunneI.20 
Langley's visitors could not reach agreement with NACA representa-
tives that day, however, over the goals of a transonic research airplane, let 
alone over its basic design features. Army spokesmen conceived of the air-
plane more "as a major developmental step toward higher operating speeds 
extending upward through Mach l," and navy representatives were inclined 
to view it "as a means of dispelling the myth of an impenetrable barrier and 
providing needed high-speed data." 21 Some of the differences of opinion were 
quite outspoken. For example, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Echols, assistant chief 
of staff at Air Corps headquarters, questioned the wisdom of procuring in 
wartime a nonmilitary research airplane, especially if the army was going to 
pay for most of it. By the end of the meeting, two things were frustratingly 
clear to Stack and his colleagues at the NACA: the competitiveness of the 
services was going to make it very difficult to win joint army-navy cooper-
ation in the development of a single experimental vehicle; and the NACA 
had better find some other reliable method to collect transonic data. 
Stopgap Methods 
Although the Langley staff slowly came to believe that Stack's transonic 
airplane should perform the ultimate experiments, it supposed at first that 
an area as mysterious as the transonic speed region had to be attacked from 
every possible theoretical and experimental approach. After attempting 
some theoretical studies, however, the staff chose to treat the problem 
of transonic flows as essentially an experimental problem. In its opinion, 
transonic flows involved too many unknown physical principles and complex 
mathematical relations to recommend the theoretical approach. 
In 1942 John W. "Gus" Crowley and Floyd L. Thompson of the lab's 
flight research section suggested that the NACA improve understanding of 
the aerodynamic phenomena occurring at high speed by mounting a wing 
model on a bomb-shaped missile and dropping this body from an airplane 
flying at great altitude. (The Germans had already tried this technique in 
1941, but it is unclear whether Crowley and Thompson knew about this 
previous experience.) After some preliminary tests, Langley temporarily 
abandoned this drop-body technique. Not only did the lab lack adequate 
radar and radio telemetering equipment to measure the high-speed flow 
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around the test model accurately, but it was also just too much of a chore 
to build the big test model (made from a piece of pipe 12 feet long and 
10 inches in diameter, filled partly with concrete), carry it up to 40,000 feet, 
and then find and salvage the model after it had sunk several feet into the 
muddy bombing range at Plum Tree Island near Langley Field. 22 
In December 1943 the NACA revived the falling-body idea in response 
to a proposal for a joint American-British effort on the transonic research 
problem made by William S. Farren, director of the British Royal Aircraft 
Establishment. During his visit to Washington that month to give the an-
nual Wright Brothers Lecture, Farren described how the RAE, too, had 
experimented with dropping weighted bodies from high altitudes. He in-
dicated that such investigations could now be carried out very effectively 
thanks to tremendous advances in the development of radar and other elec-
tronic telemetering devices. 23 Farren's message convinced the NACA Exec-
utive Committee that this type of research should be tried again at Lang-
ley. On 25 March 1944-ten days after the conference dealing with Stack's 
transonic airplane concept-the committee approved research authorization 
1224, a confidential "Investigation of Aerodynamic Characteristics of Free 
Bodies at High Mach Numbers." 
Langley began new falling-body tests with a Boeing B-29 Superfortress 
borrowed from the army, which it equipped with the navy's most advanced 
SCR-584 radar tracking unit. The large airplane carried the test missile to 
30,000 feet and then released it. Ground observers received radio signals 
relayed from instruments inside the body. These instruments, which were 
developed just for this test program by Edmund C. Buckley of Langley's In-
strument Research Division, measured the forces on the body as it dropped 
at velocities sometimes equaling or exceeding that of sound. 24 Though the 
speed range and therefore the data were limited by the maximum opera-
tional altitude of the B-29, and though Theodore von Karman of Caltech 
raised the possibility of errors due to "acceleration effects," NACA engi-
neers considered these data reliable enough to estimate the drag and power 
requirements of a transonic airplane.25 (By dropping identical models of 
varying weight, the NACA later proved that the acceleration, or virtual 
mass, effects were negligible.) 
In 1944, an NACA engineer devised a second alternative method of 
transonic research whose value was perhaps even greater. Robert R. Gilruth, 
the young engineer from the University of Minnesota in charge of Langley's 
flight research section, had noted as early as 1940, during dive tests of 
the Brewster XF2A-2 airplane, that the transonic flow fields developing on 
wings in actual flight were 10 to 20 times larger than those predicted by 
wind tunnel tests on models. More recently, he had heard pilots who had put 
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The high speeds of diving aircraft and missiles during World War II took the NACA 
by surprise, for there were no wind tunnels in its laboratories capable of exploring 
transonic aerodynamics. One of the stopgap methods developed by Langley after 
1944 to acquire meaningful data near l'vfach 1 involved dropping instrumented bodies 
{top) for free falls from high altitude. The first aircraft used by the NACA to drop its 
instrumented bodie8 was a Boeing B-29 Superfortress (bottom), the type of aircraft 
that dropped the first atomic bomb. In the early 1950s, the NACA used a North 
American F-82 Double Mustang (j,ust below) for its drop-body tests. A test body is 
shown mounted beneath the Double Mustang's center wing section. 
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11 
...... I know, but Boy, you should see the swell data 
we getl 11 
From the Langley Air 
Scoop, 25 October 1946. 
the new North American P-51 Mustang into dives report that they could 
actually see, if the sunlight was just right, the shadowy edges of shock waves 
cutting across the streamlines of their airplane's wings. Though this sleek 
little fighter plane was diving at speeds only to about Mach 0. 75, naked-eye 
observation of this phenomenon by pilots suggested to Gilruth that the flow 
of air over a portion of the P-5l's wing was moving quite smoothly through 
the speed of sound to low supersonic speeds! Although admitting that a 
number of Langley's wind tunnel researchers were far more expert than he 
was in the physics of airflow, the head of the flight research section believed 
that the supersonic flow region that existed on wings at supercritical (but 
still subsonic) flight speeds could be used as a test environment. This "flying 
wind tunnel" would have one great advantage over tunnels on the ground: 
it would not have walls to constrict and distort the airstream. 26 
In his first application of the wing-flow technique, Gilruth mounted a 
small airfoil model perpendicular to the upper surface of a P-51D's wing. 
He placed the model vertically just above the Mustang's wing, making 
sure, in order to generate uniform flow for valid testing, that it rested 
in that part of the supersonic flow region where the induced velocity was 
most constant. An NACA test pilot then flew the Mustang to the desired 
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After extensive flight exper£ence as an engineering observer in the late 1930s, 
Robert R. Gilruth {left) had a keen appreciation for the pilot's side of the man-
machine relationship. In particular, he had learned a great deal from Melvin N. 
Gough {right, 1936), Langley's chief test pilot, who took great pains to educate 
Gilruth about airplane handling characteristics. 
altitude and dived the plane as rapidly as he safely could, which was to 
about Mach 0.81. As the speed of the plane in its dive increased, airflow 
around the small wing-mounted model passed from subsonic through the 
transonic region to supersonic velocities on the order of Mach 1.4. A 
small balance mechanism fitted within the P-51's gun compartment and 
tiny instruments built into the mount of the model recorded the resulting 
forces and airflow angles. (Because diving the airplane to high speeds was 
a dangerous maneuver, Langley developed an advanced system of rapid-
response instrument surveillance to indicate whether the pilot was headed 
for trouble in handling the airplane's controls. Specialists in stability and 
control cleared each test flight that was to go to a previously unexplored high 
speed, and specialists in reading and interpreting the instruments indicating 
control handling qualities constantly advised the pilot whether he should 
proceed with the test once it had started. )27 
The first reaction of the majority of Langley's wind tunnel groups to 
Gilruth's wing-flow technique was negative: "There was great consternation 
amongst the wind-tunnel people in why a young upstart could come along 
[with a solution] when all their wind tunnels had" failed. 28 Some of Gilruth 's 
best friends were completely against using the method. Engineers in the 
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Gilruth based his small-model wing-flow technique on the physical fact that air above 
the wing of a high-speed airplane, like the P-51 Mustang, went quite smoothly and 
uniformly through the speed of sound. 
16-Foot HST group, for example, pointed skeptically to its "many obvious 
problems" and "impurities" ~the nonuniformities of the flow field, the 
unknown effects of the wing boundary layer, the problem of wing shock 
passage over the test model, and the very low test Reynolds numbers. 29 
Gilruth agreed with but discounted the technical content of most of 
these criticisms by confronting the method's critics with two rhetorical 
questions: Was not the collection of any usable transonic data preferable to 
the collection of none? Had technical problems and impurities comparable 
to those handicapping the wing-flow method ever stopped wind tunnel 
researchers from experimenting with new ways of doing things? Of course 
not, Gilruth knew. The young engineer tried to reassure the wind tunnel 
specialists by telling them that in applying the wing-flow method his flight 
researchers were not using just any airplane wing. They were modifying 
the wing surface experimentally to meet all the aerodynamic conditions 
essential for valid testing.* 
* There were four surface conditions necessary for the wing-flow method to be valid: 
(1) the chord-wise velocity gradient had to be sufficiently small; (2) the velocity gradient 
normal to the airplane wing had to be sufficiently small for a distance somewhat exceeding 
the span of the test model; (3) the boundary layer on the airplane wing had to be sufficiently 
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Gilruth's first wing-flow test results-which the NACA kept secret-
impressed Langley's wind tunnel groups.30 Besides demonstrating airflow 
trends that conformed to expectations, they gave the most systematic and 
continuous plots of transonic data assembled by the NACA up to that time. 
This success not only prompted Langley to put an entire series of wings of 
various thicknesses through the wing-flow examination, but also eventually 
helped to confirm its opinion that supersonic flight required a thin wing. 
About one year after starting to use the drop-body and wing-flow tech-
niques extensively, NACA Langley began to develop a third stopgap method 
of acquiring transonic data: rocket-model testing. Conducting research on 
"pilotless aircraft" (the military's name for all types of guided missiles) was 
not at that time new to the laboratory, however. :From the Executive Com-
mittee's authorization of a test of the General Motors "flying bomb" in the 
Full-Scale Tunnel in June 1941 to the time it approved rocket-model testing 
in early 1945, Langley had worked, in one way or another, on practically 
every guided missile project started by either service, including the testing 
and development of glide, shrouded, and buzz bombs, gliding torpedoes, and 
various types of interceptor missiles. 31 In December 1944, acting engineer-
in-charge John Crowley organized a "Special Flying Weapons Team" to 
oversee all missile research at Langley. 32 (Henry Reid was at the time in 
France with the Alsos Mission, a secret group sent by the secretary of war 
to the European theater to identify and collect valuable scientific research 
information abandoned by the retreating German army.) 
Along with its support of the military's top secret guided missile 
projects, Langley began an ingenious program of more basic aerodynamic 
tests. From the remote Atlantic coast beaches at Wallops Island, some 
distance from Hampton off the Eastern Shore of Virginia, a small team 
of researchers launched rocket models weighing about 40 pounds, of which 
about 50 percent was the weight of the rocket motor and about 20 percent 
the rocket fuel. These rocket models shot up into the air to a maximum 
velocity (at an altitude of only 2000 feet) of about Mach 1.4, continued 
upward, and then splashed into the Atlantic Ocean. The useful portion 
of the rocket's flight terminated at about 15,000 feet, meaning that the 
data were obtained in relatively dense air where the Reynolds number 
was high. Originally the researchers tracked the models and determined 
thin so as not to affect the flow at the juncture of the model and the main wing; and ( 4) the 
normal shock that occurs on the main wing had to be sufficiently far back so that the 
pressure rise through the shock acting back through the boundary layer could not affect the 
flow at this same juncture. See Robert R. Gilruth, "Resume and Analysis of NACA Wing-
Flow Tests," unpublished paper presented at the Anglo-American Aeronautical Conference, 
Sept. 1947, copy in Langley Central Files (LCF), A184-9, "High-Speed Research." 
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The NACA 's first year of operations at remote Wallops Island, Virginia, resembled 
the activities of advanced military bases in the Pacific during World War II. 
their speed, drag, and control effectiveness by using the immediately 
available telemetering instrumentation previously developed for the falling-
body tests; later, they adapted a Doppler radar system which, for certain 
research purposes, made it unnecessary to place complex instruments inside 
the test body. In the spring of 1945, Congress approved the NACA's request 
for a supplemental authorization for a permanent rocket launch facility at 
Wallops. The purpose the NACA had in mind for this facility was not only 
to support the military's ballistics projects but also to help define the basic 
airplane wing and fuselage configuration best able to fly in and through the 
transonic range. 33 
The rocket-model test was a challenging technique for NACA flight 
researchers to perfect. It required them to acquire and apply new knowl-
edge about how to measure, transmit, and record accurate test data dur-
ing the few fleeting seconds of a flight which changed speed, altitude, and 
model attitude rapidly. By comparison, the aerodynamic goals of the ini-
tial test flights were relatively simple, such as to trace the minimum drag 
curve throughout the transonic region for a variety of representative test ob-
jects. Beyond the exploratory flight testing for which the rocket models were 
suited originally, however, the new technique made it possible in some later 
cases to employ systematic parameter variation. Beginning in the summer 
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of 1945, a succession of rocket models were 
launched at Wallops, each model identical 
to the next except for one geometrical fea-
ture. 
Though wind tunnel groups at Lang-
ley knew that the rocket-model technique 
was not well suited for advanced aerody-
namical research involving extensive pres-
sure distributions, flow surveys, boundary-
layer measurements, and flow visualiza-
tion, they did not criticize the rocket-
model technique---as they had the wing-
flow technique---on scientific and technical 
grounds. The wind tunnel groups realized 
that the new flight technique was largely 
free of the impurities of the other stopgap 
transonic techniques and thus constituted 
exactly what was needed by the NACA at 
the time. They credited Robert Gilruth 
and his principal assistants for coping en-
ergetically and ingeniously with the inher-
ent problems of the technique, and credited 
Edmund C. Buckley and his group for de-
vising the indispensable tiny flight instru-
ments. 
But wind tunnel groups did eventu-
ally criticize rocket-model testing for in-
terfering with tunnel programs. Each fir-
ing required the sacrifice of a precious test 
model, many of them having expensive in-
struments inside. Though Langley em-
ployed its own shop staffs to build these 
models and incorporate the instruments, 
wind tunnel proponents complained, espe-
cially after the June 1946 conversion of 
the "Auxiliary Flight Research Station" at 
Wallops from a subordinate unit of Lang-
The Transonic Problem 
A rocket model is fired from 
Wallops in 1949. 
ley's flight research department into a separate "Pilotless Aircraft Research 
Division" (PARD), that the "voracious appetite" of the rocket-model spe-
cialists was resulting in "a major slowdown" in the production of their own 
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necessary test models and instruments. In the years 1947, 1948, and 1949, 
PARD expended no fewer than 386 models. Wind tunnel personnel told 
themselves that this expenditure was "roughly equivalent to the require-
ments of perhaps 10 major wind tunnels." Privately, they also said that the 
practitioners of the rocket-model testing technique tended, partly out of ne-
cessity, to be "as much interested in making the rocket models to do more 
things accurately as they were in the research problems." This tendency 
was apparent to them in that a majority of PARD reports discussed and 
analyzed the performance of specific model configurations without shedding 
much new light on the underlying flow processes-which were, after all, the 
main object of rocket-model studies in the first place.34 
Though they could not totally dispute the charges, P ARD employees 
objected strongly to implied criticism of the value of rocket-model testing 
in comparison with the value of wind tunnel testing. Though rocket-model 
testing appeared expensive because of the loss of complex and costly models 
to the depths of the Atlantic Ocean, a single test provided enough important 
data, they said, to establish the key flight parameters. Thus, the dollar-for-
dollar return on the NACA's investment in rocket-model research at Wallops 
at least matched that provided by the wind tunnels.35 
However stridently the individual research groups may have debated the 
scientific, technical, and budgetary validity of the new drop-body, wing-flow, 
and rocket-model techniques, the internal debate never overshadowed the 
commitment of Langley's research staff as a whole to exploring every avenue 
of transonic research. As NACA engineers and scientists, they knew that 
there existed, between the study of fundamental fluid mechanics and the 
large-scale testing of specific ideas, a range of problems for which either wind 
tunnel or free-air methods of research were most suitable. They knew also 
that every particular method had advantages and disadvantages. Thus they 
concluded that the peculiarities of the individual problem should dictate 
the choice of method. History bears out the truth of this conclusion: the 
early years of the rocket-model program at Wallops (1945~1951) showed 
that Langley was able to tackle an enormously difficult new field of research 
with innovation and imagination. 
Back in March 1944, before these alternative, free-flight methods of 
transonic research had been established, no one understood the need for 
flexibility in research method better than John Stack. If the frustrating 
interservice rivalries and differences of opinion that surfaced at the Langley 
conference that month made it seem impossible for the army and navy to 
cooperate in a high-speed research airplane program, then the NACA should 
try a new approach: it should try to persuade one of the services, or each 
of them individually, to procure its own transonic research airplane. 
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John Stack had first conceived a high-speed research airplane in 1933, 
but his paper design had been merely an object for theoretical performance 
evaluation. He had wanted to explore how fast an imaginary airplane with 
all known favorable features could go when due allowance was made for the 
adverse effects of compressibility on drag and propeller performance. 
With the coming of the compressibility crisis by 1940 and the growing 
recognition that there was some barrier preventing the acquisition of useful 
transonic data in existing wind tunnels, Stack began to campaign privately 
for NACA and military support for an actual airplane for high-speed 
research. By 1944, however, there were engineers, like Ezra Kotcher at 
Wright Field, and even some of Stack's colleagues at Langley, who had 
competing ideas for the requirements of a high-speed research aircraft. 
Though many of the particulars of Stack's research airplane concept would 
provide a solid foundation for the design of what became the Bell XS-1, 
the first plane to fly supersonically, some of its particulars would not be 
accepted and others would undergo major compromise. 
Working for Procurement 
Stack worked first on his contacts in the army. Citing the primary role 
the army had played in procuring the P-59 Airacomet, the first American 
turbojet plane, he pressed Col. Carl Greene and his assistant Jean Roche 
of the Air Materiel Command liaison office at Langley Field to persuade 
their superiors to develop a transonic research aircraft; within a few weeks 
a delegation from the Materiel Command, which included Ezra Kotcher, 
traveled from Wright Field to Langley to renew discussions with the NACA 
about the requirements of such an aircraft. At the first of two meetings in 
mid-May 1944, Kotcher reported the results of Wright Field's "Mach 0.999 
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study," the principal objective of which was to compare the theoretical 
performance of turbojet and rocket airplanes at high Mach numbers. 1 He 
told Stack and his colleagues that the experience of the P-59 proved that 
turbojets could not propel aircraft to transonic speed, while the results of 
the Mach 0.999 study indicated that rockets could. Kotcher then showed 
the Langley engineers a rough drawing of a rocket plane Wright Field had 
in mind. 
Stack responded to Kotcher's message by repeating a long-held NACA 
opinion: the application of rockets to airplanes was too unsafe. Stack knew 
that Melvin Gough, Langley's chief test pilot, had privately issued the edict, 
"No NACA pilot will ever be permitted to fly an airplane powered by a 
danmed firecracker!" He let Kotcher know that the majority of Langley 
test pilots had opposed the idea of the transonic research airplane in the 
first place; they had felt that they were being asked to risk their lives because 
wind tunnel personnel were unable to do the necessary work on the ground. 
Now pilots were going to be asked not only to sit in the cockpit of a radically 
new airplane, atop a heavy load of explosive fuels, but also to rely on only 
a rocket to keep them aloft! No pilot in his right mind would want to 
fly this plane, Stack said. (It is not clear whether Stack or his associates 
knew anything yet about the experience of the Germans with the ME 163 
rocket plane.) Furthermore, a rocket plane simply could not meet research 
needs as well as a turbojet. Because it could not stay in the air as long, 
it could not gather the kind and volume of systematic data that everyone 
required. Lastly, Stack argued that the performance of an experimental 
rocket aircraft surely would not be as applicable to the future development 
of aviation as that of the turbojet. At the end of this conference, however, 
it was agreed that the NACA would continue its separate study for the 
design of a transonic airplane and, upon completion, transmit a report 
about it to the army for comment.2 Stack held back submitting his design 
to Wright Field until 10 July, and then it still incorporated a turbojet rather 
than a rocket engine. The purpose of his airplane as he conceived it was 
to collect transonic data ( space was provided for 400 pounds of research 
instrumentation), rather than to fly supersonically. 
At another round of meetings at Langley on 13 and 14 December 1944, 
army representatives-many of whom Kotcher had persuaded personally 
to support his idea of a rocket-propelled transonic airplane-rejected the 
NACA's proposal for a turbojet as too conservative.3 The Stack team had 
designed an airplane to fly in the speed range from Mach 0.8 to 1.0, with a 
typical high-speed dash velocity of Mach 0.85 (650 MPH); the army wanted 
a plane that could fly supersonically to about Mach 1.2 (800 MPH). This 
apparently irreconcilable difference of intent was resolved easily: the army 
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Melvin N. Gough started his 
NACA career in the Propeller 
Research Tunnel. After taking 
flight training and becoming a re-
serve navy pilot in the late 1920s, 
he transferred from the PRT to 
the flight test section. He soon 
became one of the country's most 
accomplished experimental test 
pilots. 
Defining the Research Airplane 
"was putting up the money and they decided to do it their way." 4 One 
week after the meetings at Langley, the army started negotiations with the 
Bell Aircraft Company to procure a rocket plane. Bell immediately called 
together a design team headed by Robert Stanley, a California Institute 
of Technology aeronautical engineering graduate who had been the pilot of 
the first American turbojet, the XP-59. Under project designation MX-524, 
Stanley's team began development of the "Experimental Sonic-1" aircraft, 
or "XS-1" for short.5 
Stack did not give up the idea of procuring the kind of transonic research 
airplane he wanted. In fact, as soon as Kotcher made it clear to him in the 
summer of 1944 that the army was going to insist on a rocket plane, he 
had contacted the navy. He wrote letters and telephoned various friends 
and acquaintances in the Bureau of Aeronautics, telling them that the 
rocket plane the army was procuring would probably not survive many 
flights. With the help of George Lewis and Capt. Walter Diehl (Lewis's 
good friend), Stack arranged to detail his engineer Milton Davidson to 
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Washington to work with personnel in BuAer's aviation design research 
braneh on specifications for a transonic research aircraft.6 
Since the navy had done very little in the way of research airplane 
studies up to this time, it was more ready than the army had been to accept 
the NACA's advice and general guidelines. In September 1944, a BuAer 
engineer (Abraham Hyatt, a Marine Corps officer and an aeronautical 
engineering graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology) formally 
proposed that the navy procure a high-speed research airplane capable of 
meeting both military and NACA research requirements. Though the navy 
blueprint proposal called for some details different from those already set 
out by the Stack team (for example, side inlets instead of a nose intake, 
so as to free the nose for an armament installation), it basically matched 
the NACA's conservative design: the plane would take its power from a 
turbojet, not rocket, engine; the plane would take off from the ground and 
land under its own power; the plane would have good enough low-speed 
handling characteristics that data gathered from its flight test program 
could be applied directly to the design of future navy aircraft; and, finally, 
the plane would have a maximum velocity not exceeding the speed of sound. 
Together, these details would make an airplane far different from the XS-1 
being planned by the army. 
In late December 1944 Davidson informed Langley that the navy had 
taken the first step toward procurement of this airplane: BuAer had shown 
a representative of the Douglas Aircraft Corporation, one of the prime 
contractors for naval aircraft, a preliminary specification of the proposed 
experimental plane and asked him whether Douglas would be interested in 
working on it. Apparently the representative had immediately taken the 
offer back to his company's main office in California, Davidson reported. 
The report was accurate. By the first weeks of 1945, Douglas engineers 
were busy considering the design criteria for what would become "Douglas 
Model 558, High-Speed Test Airplane," the "D-558" for short. BuAer made 
it clear to its contractor from the start that the navy "was only interested 
in obtaining an airplane which met with the full approval of the NACA." 7 
Thus by early 1945 the development of two different transonic research 
airplanes was under way in the United States: the rocket-powered XS-1, 
being built by Bell under Army Air Forces sponsorship, and the turbojet-
powered D-558 being built by Douglas under navy sponsorship. Though 
researchers at Langley would actively assist in the development and flight 
testing of both airplanes, they would have reason to prefer helping with the 
D-558. It was most like the research airplane they wanted. 
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NACA RESEARCH INSTRUMENTATION IN XS-1 ROCKET AIRPLANE 
By December 1944 the NACA had determined that the XS-1 rocket plane should 
carry roughly 500 pounds of research instrumentation and auxiliary equipment 
within a space no larger than nine cubic feet. 
The Bell XS-1 
As soon as the Army Air Forces decided to procure an experimental 
rocket-powered aircraft, Langley researchers helped Bell engineers to deter-
mine the vehicle's basic design criteria. In December 1944, they estimated 
the instrument requirements for the XS-1: 370 pounds of instruments and 
130 pounds of auxiliary equipment (wiring and tubing), all to fit within a 
space of nine cubic feet.8 This estimate would form the basis for the pack-
age of instruments eventually installed in both the XS-1 and D-558-1. In 
January 1945, they finished calculation of the load requirements of the air-
plane: a load factor of 18g, or 50 percent higher than the usual load factor 
of fighter aircraft. (With a load factor of 18g, the aircraft could accept the 
stresses and strains of aerodynamic forces equivalent to 18 times its own 
weight.) Stack suggested this figure because he wanted a wide margin of 
safety for the plane's first flights.9 
One of Langley's most important recommendations for Bell's design of 
the XS-1 was its call for a thin wing section to minimize the buffeting, 
275 
Engineer in Charge 
loss of lift, and control problems that the experimental aircraft would 
probably experience at supercritical speeds. Langley thought long and 
hard before making this recommendation, but not because its research staff 
lacked knowledge about the effects of wing thickness ratio on transonic 
performance. By early 1945 the staff knew from Hugh Dryden's earlier work 
at the Bureau of Standards, from preliminary data from Gilruth's wing-flow 
tests ( described in the previous chapter), and from a recent report of their 
own high-speed airfoil group that "airfoils of large thickness ratio should not 
be used at high Mach numbers because of radical adverse changes in their 
characteristics at supercritical speeds." The shock-stall effects were just too 
severe. 10 Langley engineers disagreed sharply, however, over whether Bell 
should deliberately design wings to throw the XS-1 most quickly into the 
troubling region of deep shock stall, from Mach 0.75 to 0.90. There were 
two schools of thought on this question at the lab, one led by John Stack 
and composed mostly of wind tunnel people, and the other led by Robert 
Gilruth and made up primarily of his fellow flight researchers. 
Stack and his followers advocated a wing section of average (12 percent) 
thickness. They did so for reasons that Stack made clear in late 1944 in 
a handwritten note to himself in preparation for a conference with army 
personnel about its transonic airplane designs: 
l. 12% wing questioned 
(a) A good thinner wing for higher speed 
(b) Note flight further into supercritical region with 12% than with thin-
ner wing~primary purpose of aircraft is to get far into supercritical 
region 
(c) Unconventional landing arrangements demand good [maximum-
lift coefficient]~less than 12% [thickness-chord ratio] gives poor 
[maximum-lift coefficient] 
(d) Unknown or uncertain loading at supercritical M demands wing 
having great strength for first flights~Basic load data obtained would 
then permit precise design of structurally more difficult thin wings 11 
In sum, Stack wanted Bell to choose a thick wing because it would force the 
research airplane to encounter exactly those drastic flow changes occurring 
at critical Mach numbers that aerodynamicists were most interested in 
studying and correlating with wind tunnel results. The research benefits 
would be greater. 
Gilruth and his followers strongly opposed Stack's point of view. They 
opposed it, not because as proprietors of the NACA's wing-flow method 
they possessed some knowledge that Stack and his wind tunnel engineers 
did not have about thin wings retaining their lift at transonic speeds, but 
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because they had a different concept of the airplane's safety requirements. 
Gilruth believed that Bell should design the XS-1, the first aircraft to 
penetrate deeply into the supercritical zone, with every feature it knew 
could contribute to the airplane's safe operation. "If you put a thick wing 
on it," Gilruth warned, "it's bound to have problems." On the other hand, 
if you put a thin wing on the XS-1 (he suggested using wings as thin as five 
percent thickness-chord ratio), not only would you have a safer airplane, but 
you might be able to fly through the speed of sound with it.12 Ironically, 
Gilruth's conservative concept of the safety requirement was leading him 
to consider the possibility of the XS-1 flying supersonically, while Stack's 
adventurous attitude toward that requirement was keeping the airplane he 
had in mind to speeds well below Mach 1. 
Before the NACA could recommend to Bell a thickness ratio for 
the wings of their airplane, Langley management had to resolve this 
disagreement between the Stack and Gilruth groups. Resolutions of this 
sort were essential to the success of the lab, for it was an organization 
of people from many diverse disciplines. The assistant chief of research, 
Floyd Thompson, with nearly 20 years of broad experience in NACA flight 
testing and understanding of many different fields, had the responsibility of 
assessing the contradictory recommendations given to him by his specialists. 
Thompson talked at length with both groups of engineers, studied all the 
relevant data collected by them, and made his decision: Gilruth was right; 
the XS-1 needed to have a thin wing. 
Stack pushed for a compromise: perhaps the research airplane could 
have two sets of wings, one not quite as thin as Gilruth wanted and the 
other not quite as thick as Stack wanted. Thompson and the rest of Langley 
management concluded that splitting the difference was a good idea. It 
was doubtful that Bell could fabricate a wing as thin as five percent with 
the desired overstrength load factor of 18g anyway. Between March and 
July 1945, the NACA decided to advise Bell to build two sets of wings, 
one eight percent thick and the other ten percent thick. 13 Bell followed this 
advice. The company built the XS-1 to fly first with the thin wing, but 
later, in order to provide the data the wind tunnel people wanted, to fly 
with the somewhat thicker wing.* 
* "As it turned out, the most important region for comparison of flight and tunnels was 
from Mach 0.9 to 1.1, and thinner wings served as well as a thicker one would have. The 
region of deep shock stall, Mach 0.75 to 0.9, [the study ofj which Stack advocated, proved 
relatively unimportant from the correlation standpoint." Becker, The High-Speed Frontier, 
pp. 97-98. 
In 1965, at a history meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
(AIAA), Stack acknowledged the correctness of Langley's thin-wing decision as if he had 
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At first meeting many people 
underrated Floyd L. Thompson 
(1898-1976). But Thompson 
knew how to get his people to do 
their best work. In the opinion of 
most Langley veterans, the better 
one got to know Thompson, the 
more one appreciated him. 
Wing thickness seems to have been the only design criterion for the XS-1 
about which any members of the Langley research staff seriously disagreed. 
Both Stack and Gilruth wanted Bell to design the airplane's horizontal tail 
using a thinner airfoil section than it used for the wings, for they knew 
that if the wing and the tail had the same section thickness, both surfaces 
would reach the critical Mach number at the same time. The simultaneous 
experience of high drag rise of the wing and other compressibility effects 
from the tail could easily cause the pilot to lose control of the plane and 
crash. Stack and Gilruth also insisted that Bell make the horizontal tail 
agreed with it at the time. "We knew it should have a thin wing," Stack told his audience. 
(Draft of Stack's statement at AIAA History Committee session, San Francisco, Calif., 
28 July 1965, p. 6, in "John Stack, Special Collection," Langley Historical Archive.) 
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surface all-moving-that is, make the entire horizontal stabilizer adjustable 
by the pilot in flight. They realized that at subsonic speeds a pilot could 
ordinarily retain control of his aircraft, if a problem arose, by moving the 
elevator on a fixed horizontal stabilizer. At transonic speeds, however, they 
feared that this type of control probably would not be possible. At Langley's 
suggestion, the NACA also advised Bell to put the adjustable stabilizer high 
on the vertical fin of its airplane. This position, the laboratory staff had 
said, would keep the control surface safely above the wing wake. 14 
In early 1945, there was a virtual consensus at Langley-and at the 
Army Air Materiel Command-on one other basic design feature of the 
XS-1: no one wanted the NACA to advise Bell to design the transonic 
research airplane with anything but a conventional straight wing. This was 
true even though one of the lab's best aerodynamicists had explored a "new" 
theory suggesting that an aircraft could penetrate the sound barrier more 
easily if its wings were swept backwards. 
Jones's Swept-Wing Concept 
Robert T. Jones was an extraordinary aerodynamicist who made im-
portant contributions to NACA research without having completed a college 
education. As a boy in his hometown of Macon, Missouri, Jones read all the 
aviation magazines available on the local stand. His favorite was the journal 
Aviation, which carried technical articles by eminent aeronautical engineers 
and notices of forthcoming NACA technical reports. Jones ordered copies 
of many of the NACA reports from the Government Printing Office for ten 
cents each, and even received some free simply by writing NACA headquar-
ters in Washington. He perplexed many of his high school English teachers 
by writing essays for them on aeronautical subjects. 
Jones attended the University of Missouri for only two semesters before 
taking a job rigging wings on airplanes for a flying circus that gave aerial 
shows at county fairs across the Midwest. In 1929 he took a manufacturing 
job with the Nicholas-Beazley Airplane Company in Marshall, Missouri, 
helping to build its new Barling NB-3, a low-wing cantilever monoplane of 
metal construction ( except for fabric covering). Then came the Depression, 
the collapse of the Nicholas-Beazley company, and a succession of different 
jobs, in various towns, broken up by periods of unemployment. In 1933 he 
got a job operating an elevator in a government building in Washington, 
D.C. At night he took classes in aeronautics at Catholic University taught 
by former Langley chief of aerodynamics Max M. Munk. 
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Robert T. Jones used the Lorentz transformation (i.e., a mathematical relation 
connecting the space and time coordinates of an event) to solve the critical problem 
of wing sweep in supersonic aerodynamics. 
In 1934 the Public Works Administration opened up a number of tem-
porary scientific positions in the federal government. On the recommenda-
tion of his hometown congressman, Jones secured a nine-month appointment 
at Langley laboratory. The NACA made him an "assistant scientific aide" 
and assigned him to the 7 x 10-Foot Wind Tunnel section, where he soon 
proved to have exceptional talents, particularly for addressing theoretical 
problems pertaining to airfoils and to aircraft stability and control. For the 
next two years Langley managed to keep Jones by arranging for a series 
of temporary and emergency reappointments. It could not promote him 
to even the lowest professional or engineering grade, however, because to 
rate that grade, civil service regulations said that an individual had to have 
a college degree. In 1936 the lab finally found a way to keep him perma-
nently, and to pay him what he was worth: it gave him the next grade above 
the lowest professional grade--for which the academic requirement, though 
presumed, was not specifically mentioned. A few years later Jones became 
head of the stability analysis section.15 
While John Stack worked to win the military services over to his idea 
of the transonic research airplane, Robert T. Jones was busily engaged in 
studying the aerodynamic configuration of guided missiles. By the end of 
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1944, Jones had finished designing an experimental air-to-air missile for 
the Army Air Forces (the JB-3 or NACA "Tiamat") and was in the midst 
of studying the potential of a proposed glide bomb having a low-aspect-
ratio delta (triangular) planform. 16 This unconventional planform had been 
brought to Jones's attention in August 1944 during a meeting at Langley 
with Roger W. Griswold, president of Ludington-Griswold of Saybrook, 
Connecticut, a manufacturer of flying weapons. In 1942 Griswold's company 
had built a wind tunnel model of a dart-shaped missile conceived by Michael 
Gluhareff, a Russian emigre who was chief of design for the Vought-Sikorsky 
Aircraft Division of the United Aircraft Corporation; now, in 1944, Griswold 
was using the results of Vought-Sikorsky tunnel tests with the model to 
convince the AAF and the NACA that the new missile should be developed. 
At their Langley meeting, Griswold showed Jones data plots predicted for 
the Gluhareff model on the basis of Ludwig Prandtl's lifting-line theory, a 
mathematical theory involving a series of physical assumptions that made 
the problems of lift and drag accessible to analysis. 17 
Jones knew that Prandtl's 25-year-old theory of lift was applicable to 
bodies with high aspect ratio but that it did not work for bodies-like 
Gluhareff's dart-shaped missile---with low aspect ratio. Jones was intrigued 
by the prospect of the new missile, however, and, as soon as Griswold 
left Langley, he began to study its unconventional shape on the basis of 
a new theory of his own making. This theory, developed by Jones especially 
for the lifting characteristics of slender delta wings, resulted in formulas 
and analytical solutions that were very simple, and in some key respects 
similar to those derived for flow around airships in 1924 by Max Munk, 
his mentor at Catholic University, and to those derived for supersonic flow 
around projectiles and other slender bodies in 1938 by Hsue-Shen Tsien of 
Caltech's Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory. For the moment, though, 
Jones chose not to pursue publication of his theory. He thought the theory 
"so crude" that "nobody would be interested in it," especially since it was 
based on incompressible flow at very low subsonic speeds. He placed it in a 
drawer of his desk and temporarily forgot about it. 18 
One day early in 1945, while playing with the highly sophisticated 
mathematics of potential flows at supersonic speed,* it dawned on Jones 
that he was obtaining the same simple formulas with compressible flow 
equations as he had derived from his crude lifting theory for incompressible 
flow. He now recalled that Professor Tsien had reported finding that certain 
* In the theory of fluid mechanics, a potential flow is a type of fluid motion in which the 
rotation of the fluid element is zero (or irrotational). This type of flow is also called vortex-free 
flow. The term potential derives from the mathematical concept of the velocity potential. See 
Theodore von Karman, Aerodynamics, pp. 36-39. 
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slender projectiles exhibited no influence of compressibility when revolving 
at high speed. Jones immediately got his old paper out of his desk drawer 
and incorporated the compressible flow equations into it. To his growing 
wonderment, he discovered that for very slender wings there seemed to be 
no compressibility effect, no effect of Mach number. 
Jones sought a physical explanation for the total lack of compressibility 
effects on the theoretical performance of slender wings. After performing a 
series of complicated calculations, he recognized that the physical explana-
tion was related to the effect of sweepback on the lift of large-span wings. 
This effect, Jones remembered, had been noted by Munk in 1924 in a paper 
published by the NACA dealing with the stability of wings. In this paper, 
Munk had stated that in level flight, only the component of velocity normal 
(that is, perpendicular) to the planform's leading edge was "effective for the 
creation of lift." 19 This statement by Munk-namely, that the air force on 
a wing depends on the normal component of velocity-was the first state-
ment of the basic effect of sweepback made by anyone, and it was surely 
more than a coincidence that it was Jones, Munk's prize student, who now 
recalled it. Though Munk had made this statement for the purpose of com-
paring the relative effect of dihedral and sweepback on airplane stability in 
incompressible (low subsonic) flow-and thus not in connection with high 
Mach number effects-Jones now had good reason to suspect that Munk's 
principle could be incorporated meaningfully into his slender-wing theory. 
The result was a new theory that covered the entire sweep range from zero 
to 90 degrees, and was not limited just to very slender wings. 
Jones guessed that his sweep theory would show that the effective Mach 
number would be much less than that of the flight Mach number even for 
moderately swept and thick wings. He did not realize how much less the 
effective Mach number could be until he tried sweeping the leading edge of 
a slender wing back behind the Mach cone, the idealized cone-shaped zone 
of disturbance that theoretically emanates from a body moving through the 
air ( or any other fluid medium) at supersonic speed. The effective Mach 
number of the highly swept wing then appeared to be in the astonishing 
range of three to five times less than that of straight-wing planforms. The 
sweep smoothed out the sharply bending streamlines of supersonic flow that 
otherwise would have affected the wing adversely. This enabled a purely 
subsonic type of flow to exist on the wing's surface, a phenomenon which 
worked to eliminate the wave drag and compressibility shock of high-speed 
flight almost entirely. Jones now had a physical explanation for the missing 
compressibility effect shown by the mathematics of his theory. 
At the time Jones did not know that Adolf Busemann, a German 
aerodynamicist who would come to work at Langley after World War II, 
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Adolf Busemann, the German 
aerodynamicist who first ex-
pressed the advantages of wing 
sweep in a 1935 theoretical pa-
per, came to work at Langley 
in May 1941 as a result of Op-
eration Paperclip. 
had introduced the idea of sweeping wings to diminish the wave drag at 
supersonic speeds ten years earlier, in a paper he presented at the Volta 
Congress on High-Speed Aeronautics in 1935.20 (Busemann had kept the 
wing ahead of the Mach cone, however, so that the cross-flow was still 
supersonic.) Jones's colleague and close friend, Eastman Jacobs, had 
attended the meeting in Italy but did not remember the "arrow-wing" 
concept-one of many highly theoretical ideas in Busemann's paper-as 
anything important. Neither did Theodore von Karman or Hugh Dryden, 
the only other American representatives at the Volta meeting. 21 
Jones discussed his sweep concept first with Langley's other theoreti-
cians, and with supersonics expert Arthur Kantrowitz in particular; then 
he brought it to the attention of his division chief, Hartley Soule. In 
mid-February 1945 he outlined his concept for Jean Roche, civilian liai-
son officer at Langley for the Air Materiel Command, and described it for 
Ezra Kotcher. (At the time Jones was working with Kotcher to help the 
army copy the German V-1 missile.) In his conversations with both Roche 
and Kotcher, Jones tried to make clear his belief that sweep benefits were 
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progressive-that is, that the adverse effects of compressibility were reduced 
as the sweep angle of the wing increased-and that these benefits were not 
limited to the very slender wings of his original theory. He advised the 
army engineers that wings designed for flight at supersonic speeds should 
be swept back to an angle that would assure that the component of velocity 
normal to the wing's leading edge was less than the critical speed of the air-
foil sections. On 5 March 1945, he sent a memo to Gus Crowley, Langley's 
chief of research, announcing that he had 
recently made a theoretical analysis which indicates that a V-shaped wing 
traveling point foremost would be less affected by compressibility than other 
planforms. In fact, if the angle of the V is kept small relative to the Mach 
angle, the lift and center of pressure remain the same at speeds both above and 
below the speed of sound. 
Jones asked Crowley to approve tests of experimental wing shapes "designed 
to minimize compressibility effects." 22 
Jones's articulation of his theory was still in raw form, however; he 
would not finish a formal report on his theory until late April. 23 Then the 
report ran into trouble in Langley's in-house editorial committee. Theodore 
Theodorsen, head of the Physical Research Division, chaired this committee. 
Theodorsen had serious reservations about the publication of Jones's paper; 
he felt that parts of the presentation were too intuitive and asked that Jones 
clarify the "hocus-pocus" with some "real mathematics." More importantly, 
Theodorsen was sure that supersonic flow was so completely different in 
nature than subsonic flow that it was most unlikely to be accompanied by 
the subsonic flow that Jones predicted on a wing traveling at supersonic 
speeds. He called Jones's insight into the potential of swept wings "a snare 
and a delusion." 24 At the end of his committee's deliberations, Theodorsen 
insisted that Jones take the part about sweep theory out of his paper.25 
NACA management supported the judgment of Theodorsen and his 
editorial committee and withheld publication of Jones's report until the 
sweep theory was confirmed experimentally. 26 This confirmation did not 
take very long. Even before Jones had finished the first draft of his 
controversial report, Robert Gilruth's flight research section had started 
a series of wing-flow and drop-body tests to verify the favorable effects of 
sweep back on wing drag predicted by Jones. By the end of May 1945, results 
from these free-flight tests validated the swept-wing concept in convincing 
fashion: they showed a reduction of wing drag by a factor of almost four. 27 
Shortly thereafter, Macon C. Ellis and Clinton Brown verified this dramatic 
reduction of drag by testing a section of wire at a large angle of sweep in 
Langley's model supersonic tunnel.28 
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Engineer James N. Mueller 
tests models of various 
swept and delta wings in the 
9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel, 
October 1946. 
In early June, Langley transmitted Jones's report to NACA headquar-
ters for publication. In the transmittal letter, engineer-in-charge Reid stated 
that "Dr. Theodore Theodorsen [still] does not agree with the arguments 
presented and the conclusions reached and accordingly declined to partici-
pate in editing the paper." 29 On 21 June, the NACA issued Jones's report, 
"Wing Plan Forms For High-Speed Flight," as a Confidential Memorandum 
Report (CMR L5F21), part of a series the Committee's executive officers 
prepared chiefly for the information of the army or navy. Before the pa-
per was published, Jones's colleague at Langley, Robert Hess, found an 
overlooked copy of Busemann's earlier paper (a British translation dated 
April 1942) in the LMAL library, and Jones included a reference to it.30 
Three weeks later, the NACA reissued Jones's paper as an Advance Con-
fidential Report (ACR L5G07), a type of publication the NACA sent not 
only to both services and to its own subcommittee members but also by 
registered mail to those members of the aircraft industry who had signed 
secrecy agreements with the services and who had a "need to know." 31 
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Verification of sweep theory and publication of Jones's report came too 
late for the XS-1. On 10 March 1945, the Army Air Forces had notified 
the NACA that it was awarding Bell a contract to develop the rocket-
powered research airplane with straight wings. By this time, all. three 
parties involved had known something about Jones's theory that sweeping a 
wing would probably alleviate compressibility shock and generally improve 
performance, but they would not have changed their minds about the 
design in any case. There was no proven reason for them to recommend 
changing from conventional straight-wing planforms to swept wings, an 
almost completely unknown quantity. Flight test research with full-scale 
aircraft had to proceed cautiously and conservatively. They were doing 
enough bold things with the XS-1 as it was. Five days later, the Materiel 
Command at Wright Field had held the first design review of the XS-1. No 
one seems to have made any mention of sweep theory. 32 
Frustrations 
Because John Stack was in Europe at the time, Langley had sent Stack's 
top assistant John V. Becker, who was head of the 16-Foot High-Speed 
Tunnel section, to the XS-1 design review as its representative. At Wright 
Field Becker found that Bell had accepted all of the NACA's ideas for the 
design of the airplane except for Stack's longstanding recommendation for a 
more conservative power plant (turbojet) and speed range (Mach 0.8 to 1.0). 
Because Bell seemed to be planning for the XS-1 to take off from the ground 
rather than to be launched from the air, Becker reported that the proposed 
design was acceptable to the NACA. In climbing by itself up to the Mach 1.2 
supersonic cruising speed that the army specified, through the Mach 0.8 to 
1.0 speed region the NACA most wanted to know about, such an aircraft 
would provide realistic data on a full range of flight considerations.33 
Two months after the design review at Wright Field, however, Bell 
opted to change the research airplane to air launch: a specially configured 
B-29 would carry the XS-1 to an altitude of 30,000 feet and then release 
it for flight. Though there was disagreement among Bell engineers over 
the wisdom of this decision, the company made the change because, after 
technical deliberations, it saw no way for the airplane to achieve the 
supersonic speed required by the army if it had to take off and climb from the 
ground.34 The rocket engine would simply consume too much of the precious 
fuel allotment. This was true even though two-thirds of the gross weight 
of the airplane was to be in fuel, which would have been an extraordinarily 
high proportion for any nonrocket military aircraft.35 
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This change from ground takeoff to air launch further dampened 
Langley)s enthusiasm for the XS-1. According to the lab's experts, air 
launching was a cumbersome method and the second major violation 
of the NACA's basic notion that a research airplane should operate as 
conventionally as possible ( the first violation having been the use of rocket 
propulsion). Moreover, air launching also meant that in all probability the 
little rocket plane would never be operated out of Langley, a busy flying 
field close to highly populated areas-if the XS-1 came loose accidentally, 
without a pilot, from the B-29 in flight, the resulting crash could kill many 
people. At another field, the NACA would not be able to manage the 
program of flight tests for the XS-1 as directly as it wanted. 36 
Langley objected to the evolution of Bell's XS-1 from another stand-
point besides the launch mode. Because Bell believed that the unavailability 
of the complex new rocket fuel pumps (then being developed by Reaction 
Motors of Pompton Lakes, New Jersey) called for by the original design 
would probably hold up flight tests of the transonic airplane, it decided in 
April 1945 to redesign the first XS-1 with pressurized fuel tanks of some 
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simpler type already existing. Though the company's design team real-
ized that use of pressurized tanks instead of the new pumping units would 
reduce the duration of the airplane's maximum thrust by approximately 
3 minutes, from 5.4 to approximately 2.6 minutes, and thus force a reduc-
tion in the plane's cruising altitude, it judged that "it would be better to 
have an airplane which would enable preliminary flights to be made at a 
reduced altitude, rather than to have an airplane on the ground awaiting a 
pumping unit." 37 
John Stack reacted strongly when he heard about Bell's revised plans. 
In a memorandum to Langley's chief of research, he warned that the 
transonic airplane under development "may prove quite unsuitable." Stack 
noted that everyone had agreed at the initiation of the project that five 
items were the basic requirements of the research airplane: 
a. speed greatly in excess of the critical 
b. duration at full power for complete observations in level flight at steady 
conditions 
c. take-off, flight, and landing with self-contained power units 
d. flexibility to permit changing of all principal components such as wings, 
tail surfaces, canopies, etc. 
e. space for adequate instrumentation 
These requirements had since been sacrificed to the point where the project 
was now 
falling short of basic requirements b, c, and probably e. As a consequence of 
the failure of this project to fulfill basic requirement b, it will also fall short on 
basic requirement a. This is so because the fuel supply is adequate only to get 
the airplane to 35,000 feet, leaving no fuel for the test run. While it is true 
that the airplane can be flown at lower altitudes, it is only at the high altitudes 
approaching 35,000 feet that the airplane meets basic requirement a. 
Although he agreed completely with Bell's view that it was best to get an 
airplane flying as quickly as possible, Stack wanted the NACA to remind 
everyone that the "basic purpose of all of this work," as he had originally 
conceived it, was to obtain in actual flight compressibility data that could 
not be acquired in wind tunnels in certain speed regions. Bell could not 
let a little thing like the present unavailability of the correct rocket fuel 
pump destroy the basic purpose of the entire project. Stack recommended 
that "a much larger effort be devoted to the development of this pump, an 
effort that is as large as the project demands." He urged that the army be 
asked to call in engineering organizations other than Reaction Motors to 
help develop the pump, if necessary.38 
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For the rest of 1945 Langley did whatever the army or its contractor 
asked it to do to help complete the design of the XS-1 and ready it for test 
flights. It did these jobs well, as was expected of the NACA, even though 
the XS-1 was far from the research airplane that it wanted. The laboratory 
oversaw the design and preparations for installing the XS-l's instrument 
panel. By the end of the year, wind tunnel tests provided data reliable 
enough for the lab to predict the rocket plane's flying characteristics up 
to about Mach 0.90 for the low-angle-of-attack conditions which were of 
most significance for the XS-1 and D-558 flights. Wing-flow data took these 
NACA predictions up to about Mach 0.93.39 
Army criticism of the NACA for not releasing Jones's sweepback 
theory earlier made giving this assistance a somewhat unpleasant task. In 
May 1945 a special intelligence unit of the U.S. Navy had discovered among 
the countless abandoned documents of the aerodynamical laboratory at 
Gottingen solid evidence that the Germans had been aggressively studying 
for some time the advantages of sweepback in designs of their jet-propelled 
aircraft.40 The army heard news of this startling finding at least as soon as 
did the NACA.41 Some of its leaders thought that here was another example, 
like the turbojet revolution, of the NACA failing to keep the United States 
on a par with Europe in aeronautical development. 
In October 1945 Brig. Gen. Alden R. Crawford, chief of the Production 
Division of the AAF, asked Jerome Hunsaker, the NACA chairman, why 
there had been no mention of Jones's theory during the first XS-1 design 
review at Wright Field the preceding March or during follow-up visits of Air 
Materiel Command personnel to Langley later that spring. Applying 20/20 
hindsight, Crawford indicated that the NACA might have announced its 
vital new information in time to change the design of the XS-1 from straight 
to swept wings. Because such a change at this time "must delay the project 
and increase the cost to the Government," Crawford lamented, now the only 
thing the Air Forces could do was contract with Bell for the development 
of new XS airplanes with swept wings (which it did in December 1945). 
The NACA knew that its organization could not justly be held re-
sponsible for the XS-l's conventional wing planform; after all, the Materiel 
Command had made the decision for straight wings, not the NACA. More-
over, R. T. Jones had described his theory for both Jean Roche and Ezra 
Kotcher by the time of the first design review in March. Floyd Thompson 
(the LMAL assistant research chief who had arbitrated the original Stack-
Gilruth difference over XS-1 wing thickness) prepared for Hunsaker a polite 
but taciturn answer to General Crawford's letter. To have recommended 
changing the XS-1 in March 1945 from straight to swept wings could have 
been a "blunder of the greatest magnitude," Thompson wrote. "Not only 
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was experimental evidence lacking [especially about the low-speed charac-
teristics of the swept wing] but our best theoretical minds were divided as 
to the validity of the theory." 42 
The Douglas D-558 
Douglas proposed to build for the navy six D-558 transonic research 
airplanes initially. Each aircraft would be powered by a General Electric 
TG-180 turbojet engine and equipped with alternative wing and nose duct 
configurations; maximum speed would be about Mach 0.90. In phase two of 
the program, Douglas would change two of the planes to Westinghouse 24C 
turbojets plus supplementary rocket propulsion units. These modified 
aircraft would gather aerodynamic data from Mach 0.89 to about Mach 1. 
In phase three, Douglas would use results acquired during phases one and 
two to construct a combat version of the D-558. Douglas estimated the total 
cost of the three-phase program to be just less than $7 million.43 
This proposal was not what Douglas originally had in mind. In 
February 1945 company representatives had submitted a proposal to the 
navy for just one airplane. This airplane was to be designed around an 
available turbojet unit capable of delivering, with the help of supplementary 
rocket propulsion units, a maximum thrust of 3000 pounds for 40 seconds. 
It would reach Mach 0.9 in level flight and Mach 1.0 after a 25-degree dive 
from 35,000 feet. 44 With only a few minor modifications, this airplane was 
to be adaptable as a navy fighter. Its development could thus lead to volume 
production and considerable profits to the contractor. In most essentials, it 
was the same plane Douglas later proposed for development during phase 
one. 
The NACA had objected to Douglas's original proposal for this research 
airplane in very strong terms. Its spokesmen argued that a true research 
airplane should not be compromised for military or volume production 
requirements. In meetings with navy officials, they called Douglas's idea 
for a research airplane "wholly inadequate," "a half-way measure" that 
would result in an airplane which would "be obsolete by the time it was 
built." Milton Davidson, John Stack's colleague on special assignment to 
BuAer's airplane design research branch, reported to his superiors that 
he had fully outlined the NACA transonic research airplane specifications 
during meetings with Douglas representatives in early February. What the 
NACA desired, Davidson said he had explained, was an airplane that would 
"take off, climb to operational altitude [20,000-foot minimum, 35,000-foot 
maximum], operate for 10 minutes at a velocity near the critical speed 
at altitude, have a 2-minute burst at maximum thrust, and return to 
290 
Defining the Research Airplane 
the airport with power." The airplane Douglas suggested building would 
be deficient in duration and amount of power and fuel to meet these 
requirements. Davidson also indicated that he had made clear to the 
representatives that the plane had to have adequate space for a sizable 
package of NACA recording instruments; the airplane Douglas proposed 
did not have enough such space. On many occasions since the first round of 
meetings at BuAer, he had gone over their preliminary engineering sketches 
of high-speed research airplanes, enumerating the changes necessary to make 
the D-558 satisfactory. Apparently Douglas had chosen to ignore NACA 
advice, Davidson concluded.45 
The navy had supported the NACA's objections to the original Douglas 
proposal. Captain Diehl told Douglas representatives at a meeting at BuAer 
on 23 February that he thought "the NACA had spent a good deal of time 
studying the problem, and since the NACA was in the best position to know 
what was wanted in a research airplane," Douglas's airplane proposal should 
"measure up to NACA specifications." Four days later, Comdr. Emerson W. 
Conlon, head of BuAer's structures department, opened another meeting 
with Douglas representatives by stating that the NACA would have to 
"heartily approve of any airplane" before its procurement by the navy.46 
This double-barreled NACA-navy criticism quickly led Douglas to the 
decision to commit itself to a new design proposal, the three-phase plan 
that the company ultimately submitted in April. 
BuAer quickly approved Douglas's preliminary designs for the phase 
one and phase two aircraft and outlined a development program that 
guaranteed, among other things, the NACA's role in the management of the 
flight tests and immediate access to at least one of the airplanes: Douglas 
test pilots would fly the D-558-1 to acquire data applicable to the design of 
combat aircraft, and NACA test pilots would fly it to gather fundamental 
aerodynamic information about air loads, stability and control, flutter, and 
engine performance at high Mach numbers.47 Although John Stack, in 
particular, had some serious reservations about the adequacy of Douglas's 
phase one aircraft, especially in comparison with the proposed Bell XS-1 and 
the German ME 163, he soon became satisfied that the phase two program 
would result in the transonic research airplane he wanted.48 
Douglas held the first mock-up inspection of the D-558 at its main office 
in El Segundo, California, from 2 to 4 July 1945. As its representatives, the 
NACA sent Stack, Thompson, and Gough from Langley, as well as Milton 
Ames, a technical assistant assigned to NACA headquarters, and H. Julian 
"Harvey" Allen from Ames laboratory. The five NACA representatives 
made all of the various sources of their dissatisfaction with the Douglas 
design known during the first day of the inspection. Among other things, 
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they suggested that Douglas needed to increase the size of the space allotted 
for NACA recording instruments, generally enlarge the fuselage, change the 
design of the cockpit canopy and the side inlets, and improve the ducting of 
the nose inlet. Douglas concurred immediately. Following the ideas agreed 
upon by everyone during the technical meetings of the first day, the company 
prepared new drawings of the mock-up as modified. During the last day of 
the inspection, the NACA delegation got Douglas and navy spokesmen to 
agree to support the NACA's development of an afterburner unit at its 
engine research lab in Cleveland. The application of this afterburner, they 
argued, could probably provide the phase one research airplane with enough 
additional thrust to permit flight "at extremely great supercritical speeds." 
Langley and NACA headquarters representatives flew home to the east coast 
satisfied that they had finally gotten Douglas to commit itself to making the 
extensive changes that were necessary to make the D-558 into an adequate 
transonic research airplane.49 At a second D-558 mock-up inspection held 14 
to 17 August 1945, NACA representatives found that Douglas had indeed 
made the canopy and inlet changes in accordance with the requirements 
they had outlined at the meeting five weeks earlier.50 
Even before the first mock-up inspection in early July, John Stack 
had talked to Captain Diehl about Langley's experimental confirmation of 
R. T. Jones's sweep theory. The head of Langley's Compressibility Research 
Division thought it might be wise, considering recent developments, for the 
navy to ask Douglas to incorporate a 35-degree swept wing on one of its 
D-558s. Both Stack and Diehl realized that swept wings for the phase one 
airplane made no sense; it could not be powered by the proposed power 
plant to a high enough Mach number for the performance of swept wings 
to be fully evaluated. They also knew that the navy would want Douglas 
to proceed cautiously, with straight-wing configurations, until there was 
absolutely no doubt in the minds of the experts that sweep was the best 
way to go when designing an airplane wing for high-speed flight. They 
agreed, however, that wind tunnel evaluation of swept wings should be 
included immediately in the D-558 program for possible incorporation into 
the design of the phase two aircraft. Soon after the first inspection at El 
Segundo, the Langley High-Speed Panel, which Stack chaired, asked NACA 
headquarters to arrange for permission to incorporate swept wings on the 
model of the D-558 that was to be tested in the lab's 8-Foot High-Speed 
Tunnel. This request was supported at a joint army-navy-NACA research 
meeting at the NACA's Washington office on 13 July 1945.51 
In early August couriers arrived at the Bureau of Aeronautics in 
Washington and at the Douglas company in El Segundo with microfilm 
of the captured German swept-wing reports. BuAer shared and analyzed 
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Models of the D-558 were tested in the 8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel (top} in June 194 7 
and in the 20-Foot Spin Tunnel (bottom) five months later. 
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the new information with the NACA almost immediately. Their common 
evaluation of this microfilm led to a joint request at the second mock-up 
inspection for Douglas to initiate a study for the design of a D-558 with 
swept wings. The two men responsible for capturing and microfilming the 
papers at Gottingen for the navy (L. Eugene Root and A. M. 0. Smith) were 
Douglas employees. The company embraced the navy-NACA request for a 
design study of a swept-wing D-558 with both turbojet and rocket power 
for development during phase two and gave the NACA the job of specifying 
many of the design requirements, including complete responsibility for high-
speed wind tunnel testing.52 
While Langley tried to use its influence to get the navy and its contrac-
tor to accelerate the development of the swept-wing phase two aircraft, the 
laboratory staff continued to aid development of the straight-wing D-558-1 
in every way it could. Stack encouraged the dozens of engineers, scientists, 
technicians, and mechanics involved in carrying out Langley's comprehen-
sive high-speed research program to extend themselves in every way to meet 
the needs of the D-558 project quickly and successfully. 53 This group in-
cluded the staff of his own 8-Foot HST section, who were kept busy testing 
the aerodynamic characteristics of scale models of the D-558 configuration. 
It also included many personnel of the Flight Research Division, who were 
using the wing-flow method to test D-558 models mounted on the wings of 
a P-51 Mustang, and most of the personnel of the Spin Tunnel section, who 
had modified a scale model of the Bell XS-1 to simulate the spin behavior 
of the D-558. 
Feasibility of a Supersonic Ramjet 
Throughout the early development of the Bell XS-1 and the Douglas 
D-558, Langley engineers displayed their long-term preference for air-
breathing propulsion units over rockets. This preference can also be seen in a 
project designed by a team of engineers in the lab's 9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel 
section to study the feasibility of powering a small airplane to Mach 1.4 with 
a ramjet engine. 
By the spring of 1944 the Campini jet propulsion system had disap-
peared from Langley's list of research interests, even though the system's 
champion, Eastman Jacobs, seems never to have formally acknowledged 
that it was unworthy of additional consideration. During the summer, Ja-
cobs moved to the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory in Cleveland after 
the NACA dissolved the Air-Flow Research Division and made him, its for-
mer chief, a "consulting engineer." 54 (He would remain at AERL for only a 
short time before retiring from government service to do independent con-
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The supersonic ramjet conceived by Ellis and Brown died in a Langley committee 
in late 19,f_S. 
sulting work in California.) Before leaving Langley, however, Jacobs had 
encouraged the two-man staff of the 9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel section-
Clinton Brown and Macon C. Ellis, Jr.-to investigate the potential of a 
new ramjet propulsion unit. Another simple type of jet engine, this unit 
consisted of a specially shaped tube or duct open at both ends. It required 
no mechanical compressor. The forward motion of the engine shoved all 
the air necessary for combustion into the duct and compressed it. In the 
engine, the compressed air passed through a specially designed chamber, 
or diffuser, and mixed with fuel; together the fuel and air burned rapidly. 
Exhaust gases then issued as a propulsive jet from a rear opening. 55 
In December 1945 Ellis and Brown finished a report which showed to 
the NACA's satisfaction that a small ramjet research aircraft was feasible. 
Accelerating through the transonic region would require rocket boosters, 
but once the airplane flew to the speed of sound the ramjet could take over 
and power it for a short distance ( about 60 miles) at a supersonic speed of 
Mach 1.4. Ellis and Brown envisioned either airplane tow to altitude or air 
launch as the ramjet's takeoff mode----a plan not without a certain irony, 
given Langley's opposition earlier in the same year to the plan to air launch 
the XS-1, and given Langley's overall commitment to developing research 
airplanes that could operate as conventionally as possible.56 
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Langley managers, at John Stack's instigation, briefly considered advis-
ing one or both of the military services to add the ramjet aircraft to the fleet 
of transonic research airplanes under development, but there was no ram-
jet engine under development at the time: the engine Ellis and Brown had 
assessed was hypothetical. This meant that the ramjet proposal "had vir-
tually no chance of support" outside the NACA, especially with the designs 
of the XS-1 and D-558 now well under way. Stack, still strongly committed 
to the idea of operating a research airplane as conventionally as possible 
and apparently satisfied with the direction of the D-558 program, let the 
supersonic ramjet aircraft proposal die at home in conference.57 
Flight Tests of the XS-1 
Bell completed construction of the first XS-1, without the rocket motor, 
in December 1945~the month of the Ellis-Brown ramjet proposal. Under 
terms of its contract with the Army Air Forces, the company now had to test 
the XS-1 to the speed of Mach 0.8 before official acceptance. The AAF and 
the NACA had determined even before the delay in completing the rocket 
motor that Bell pilots should first fly the new airplane through a series of 
glide tests. These glide tests would identify quirks in the air launch method 
and address the feasibility of operating the rocket plane from conventional 
flying fields (like Langley) near population centers. In November 1945 the 
army had selected isolated Pinecastle Field in central Florida as the site of 
the glide tests. It was the NACA's understanding that these preliminary 
flight tests scheduled for Pinecastle with the unpowered airplane were to 
determine the feasibility and safety of operation from Langley Field.58 
The NACA sent two Langley engineers, Walter C. Williams and Ger-
ald M. Truszynski, to Pinecastle to join Bell test pilot Jack Woolams and the 
B-29 launch crew for glide tests of the XS-1. Williams, a 1939 graduate in 
aeronautical engineering from Louisiana State University, had worked with 
Stack as early as 1942 on research aircraft studies. Recently, as a member 
of the flight research section, he had been responsible for advising NACA 
pilots about how far to push the P-51 in dive tests for transonic wing-flow 
data. At Pinecastle Williams monitored flight test preparations and super-
vised on-the-spot analysis of the resulting glide path data. Truszynski, a 
1944 graduate in electrical engineering from Rutgers, had been designing 
radar and telemetry equipment in Langley's Instrument Research Division. 
At Pinecastle he took charge of the radar tracking equipment. 59 
The XS-1 glide test program at Pinecastle lasted about three months, 
from January through March 1946, while Bell readied the second XS-1 
for powered-flight trials. The aircraft showed itself to be aerodynamically 
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sound, with good low-speed handling qualities, and the air launch method 
proved practicable, but problems landing the XS-1 safely at Pinecastle 
demonstrated the inadequacies of a conventional airfield for operating the 
plane.60 These last two test results erased the NACA's vestige of hope that 
some method of ground launching would be found for the XS-1, making it 
possible for the aircraft to fly from Langley Field. 
During the final days of glide testing at Pinecastle, the AAF chose its 
flight base at Muroc Dry Lake in southern California as the site where the 
powered tests of the XS-1 would be made. In the opinion of the army, 
Muroc Dry Lake was the best possible location for several reasons: a flight 
test base was already there, complete with facilities and a contingent of 
military personnel; America's first turbojet aircraft, the Bell XP-59A, had 
flown for the first time at Muroc; the weather was usually excellent; an 
enormous stretch of desert and dry lake provided more than adequate space 
for emergency landings; and the remoteness of the site removed the worry 
and danger of overflying and crashing into populated areas. 61 
The NACA endorsed the AAF choice for the XS-1 test site and, in late 
September 1946, detailed a group of 13 engineers, instrument specialists, 
and technical observers from Langley laboratory to Muroc on temporary 
assignment.62 Hartley Soule, chief of the Stability Research Division and 
project manager for the research aircraft program at Langley, designated 
this group the "NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit" with Walter Williams, 
veteran project engineer for the XS-1 glide tests at Pinecastle, unit leader. 
Williams, who reported to Soule, was authorized by Langley's engineer-
in-charge "to make all necessary contacts and decisions for the NACA ... 
at Muroc." 63 The assignment given to this special unit was to supervise 
the complete instrumentation of the second XS-1, gather and analyze 
all possible data during the period of its powered test flights, and more 
generally to try to make sure that NACA research interests were considered 
in planning and carrying out the in-flight program. 
From the beginning, different people had different purposes in mind for 
the XS-1. Stack wanted the aircraft to collect as systematically as possible 
the detailed transonic data unobtainable in the wind tunnel, whereas Gilruth 
and Thompson, more in line with the thinking of the AAF, wanted to design 
a good high-speed aircraft and to get that aircraft to fly supersonically as 
quickly as possible so that it could serve as a prototype of an operational 
supersonic aircraft. Both the AAF and the NACA had recognized early 
in the XS-1 development period that these purposes, and the methods for 
achieving them, were contrasting and in certain ways even contradictory, 
but they had agreed to coordinate their plans so that the research aircraft 
could be built and flown for their mutual purposes. 
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Veteran flight researcher 
Hartley Soule managed the 
NACA Muroc Flight Test 
Unit from his office at 
Langley. (The model in this 
photograph was used in tuft 
survey research. By observ-
ing the reaction of the little 
pieces of cloth, or tufts, at-
tached in various places on 
the wing, a researcher could 
tell whether the flow over 
the surf ace was smooth or 
disturbed.) 
When Langley detailed the special flight test unit to Muroc in Septem-
ber 1946, it was seriously concerned about Bell's intention to make the 
acceptance tests of the XS-1 airplane in as short a time as possible. Though 
the lab recognized that Bell's test program lived up to the legal require-
ments of the army-Bell contract for the XS-1, it worried that the flight tests 
required of the company would cover only demonstration of the "limiting 
conditions." "The mere flying of the airplane to a Mach number of 0.8 
and making an 8g pull-out is not considered suitable preparation for the 
research flying," Langley emphasized. The program its staff had outlined 
for the acceptance tests of the XS-1 included "systematic exploration of the 
stability and control characteristics and structural loading at successively 
higher speeds up to a Mach number of 0.8." The lab had based its program 
on the understanding that "before asking anyone to proceed with the ex-
tremely hazardous flying above a Mach number of 0.8 everything would be 
done to make certain that the airplane was satisfactory in all aspects in the 
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speed range up to Mach 0.8." The acceptance-test program was thus the 
NACA's means of assuring itself that the airplane's subcritical characteris-
tics were satisfactory. 
Since the likely level of such assurance seemed too low, Langley in-
formed NACA headquarters that it did not want its pilots to undertake 
research flying in the XS-1 following the limited acceptance tests at Muroc 
proposed by Bell. It recommended that the army shift part of the flight 
test program originally included in the acceptance phase of the contractor 
program to the NACA research program phase. That way Bell could receive 
its payment for the airplane as quickly as it wanted without lowering the 
safety and overall value of the research airplane program.64 
Bell began flying the XS-1 number two at Muroc on 11 October 1946. 
Two months later, on 9 December, Bell test pilot Chalmers H. "Slick" 
Goodlin flew the airplane with its rocket power successfully engaged for 
the first time. (The company had selected Goodlin to fly the plane in 
September after Jack Woolams was killed in the crash of a P-39 Airacobra 
that had been modified to compete in air races.) On 8 January 1947, during 
a buffet-boundary investigation, Goodlin reached Mach 0.8 at 35,000 feet, 
the speed and corresponding altitude required by the contract before the 
AAF would accept delivery of the aircraft. Three months later Bell began 
flying the XS-1 number one, which had been out of action since its last glide 
flight at Pinecastle in March 1946 in order to have a rocket engine installed. 
In mid-May Bell successfully put number two through a required 8g pullout 
and final airspeed calibration flight. After a total of 21 powered flights (14 
by number two and 7 by number one), the contractor program was complete; 
both the AAF and the NACA were satisfied that the experimental airplanes 
were airworthy. Now the XS-ls belonged to the military. It was up to AAF 
flight engineers and test pilots to "break the sound barrier" and to do it in 
as few flights as possible.65 
Concurrently with the beginning of the AAF's accelerated transonic 
flight program, the NACA got ready to conduct its own series of flight tests 
with the XS-1. The AAF had agreed informally early in the development 
program to lend the NACA a finished XS-1 for a separate series of flight 
tests. According to the terms of the agreement-which was completed at an 
NACA-AAF conference at Wright Field on 30 June 1947-the NACA would 
use XS-1 number two. It would furnish fuel, maintenance, and a flight crew 
for the experimental airplane, while the army would furnish the same for 
the launch B-29.66 In March 1947 the NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit had 
prepared a more complex instrument package for installation in number 
two, as was necessary for making a thorough examination of the airplane's 
flying characteristics and loads. In late May, after the last flight in Bell's 
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The Bell XS-1 in flight over 
Muroc, California, 1947. 
contractor program, Walter Williams wrote Melvin Gough at Langley that 
"we want to fly it [what Gough two years earlier had called 'that damned 
firecracker that no NACA pilot will ever be permitted to fly'] at the earliest 
possible date because everyone is quite anxious to get going." 67 
Williams's special unit could not fly the XS-1, however, until the NACA 
received the number two plane and got it ready-and for a time in the long 
hot desert summer of 1947 it seemed that neither thing would happen very 
soon. In early June, the airplane the NACA was going to get was damaged 
seriously in a freak on-the-ground accident and had to be ferried back via 
B-29 to Bell's hangar in Buffalo, New York, for repairs. When number two 
returned to Muroc in July, progress on it was slow because of the intense 
level of activity on number one. The preparation of the army plane required 
so many of the mechanical crew that there were usually none left for the 
NACA plane. 
Gough's prediction of 1945 was coming back to haunt NACA person-
nel. In August 1947, while World War II combat ace Capt. Charles E. 
"Chuck" Yeager took up number one for more glide and the first acceler-
ated power flights, the two NACA pilots on the scene-Herbert Hoover from 
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Langley and Howard Lilly from the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory in 
Cleveland-had to be satisfied with taking number two through a series of 
ground runs. Through the first three weeks of September Walter Williams 
tried "stalling the Army off as much as possible until [the NACA could] get 
the NACA tests underway." 68 When the NACA airplane was finally ready 
for its acceptance test on 25 September, the NACA pilots were not. Since 
NACA management had thought it imprudent for its pilots to take up num-
ber one on pilot familiarization flights-and thus risk doing any damage to 
it-neither Hoover nor Lilly had gotten checked out in the XS-1. Thus the 
task of flying number two through its NACA acceptance test fell to Captain 
Yeager. 
Supersonic Flight 
In a preflight planning session on the morning of 14 October 1947, 
the NACA advised Yeager to take the rocket plane on its ninth powered 
flight to a maximum speed of Mach 0.97. Walter Williams and De Elroy 
Beeler emphasized for Yeager's sake that it would be unwise to go any faster 
until a complete examination of the data obtained from the previous flights 
was completed. They warned him to exceed Mach 0.97 only if absolutely 
certain that it was safe to do so.69 Yeager ordinarily did not like NACA 
"eggheads" trying to "dictate" the planned speed of his flight-he recalls 
attending "highly technical NACA preflight planning sessions and postflight 
briefings" and not knowing "what in the hell" Walter Williams was talking 
about. After NACA briefings Yeager usually sat down with fellow army 
pilot Jack Ridley to "decide whether or not we wanted to stick with [the 
NACA] recommendation." Invariably they determined to fly faster than 
the NACA engineers wanted them to. (Yeager has written that the NACA 
was "so conservative that it would've taken [him] six months to get to the 
barrier" if he had followed the NACA's instructions exactly.) The way 
he felt that morning, though, hurting from a broken rib suffered two days 
earlier in a fall from horseback, a speed of Mach 0.97 was at that moment 
all he thought he would care to handle. 70 
At about 10:00 A.M. Yeager got into the launch B-29, the rocket plane 
shackled in its bomb bay, for the approximately 20-minute climb to altitude. 
At 5000 feet Yeager climbed down the transfer ladder into the tiny cockpit of 
the XS-1. At approximately 20,000 feet, NACA radar cleared the B-29 to let 
loose the XS-1. Sixty seconds later, at 10:26 A.M., Yeager's plane dropped 
free. What followed was the first manned supersonic flight in history. 
Though Langley laboratory got word of Yeager's achievement immedi-
ately, it did not find out the details of the sensational flight until it received 
301 
Engineer in Charge 
a letter from Walter Williams more than a week later. William.s described 
the flight in measured, technical language as part of his regular bimonthly 
report to Gus Crowley, Langley's chief of research: 
In flight 9, the pilot started a four-cylinder climb at 20,000 feet; as he 
approached 35,000 feet, he shut down two cylinders. The climb continued to 
42,000 feet. As the altitude and Mach number increased, the pilot moved the 
stabilizer at Mach numbers of 0.83, 0.84, 0.88, and 0.92. At the top of the 
climb, the pilot turned on a third cylinder and pushed the nose down a little; a 
rate of descent of about 500 feet was noted. The airplane then accelerated to a 
Mach number of 0.98. 
At this Mach number, the needle of the Mach meter took an abrupt jump 
past M = 1.0 and went against the peg, which is a distance equal to about 0.05 
in Mach number past 1.0. The pilot reported that the elevator seemed more 
effective at this speed than at M = 0.94 to 0.95. Aileron control appeared good 
throughout the speed range. The pilot reported no buffeting beyond an indi-
cated Mach number of 0.92. He did report that the right wing dropped between 
an indicated Mach number of 0.88 and 0.90, as in previous flights. 
When the Mach number went off the scale, the pilot shut down all cylinders 
and jettisoned fuel in a climb. At 45,000 feet, an unaccelerated stall was made 
which appeared normal to the pilot. The descent from 45,000 to 35,000 feet 
was made at a Mach number of 0.7 so that a pressure altitude survey could be 
made. 
Preliminary NACA data work-up indicates that a Mach number of 1.06 was 
reached, taking in account the calibrated error in static pressure and assuming 
no error in total-head. Evaluation of all data from these flights is in progress 
and preliminary data will be issued. 71 
There was nothing in the tone of Williams's letter to suggest the fears and 
inhibitions that had been blocking the work of aeronautical researchers and 
aircraft designers since 1935 when Hilton inadvertently coined the term, and 
the concept, of the "sound barrier." Williams made not even an oblique 
reference to the concept of the "sound barrier" in his letter. In the public 
mind, however, news of Yeager's flight-once it was finally announced some 
weeks later-meant only that the awesome sonic barrier had finally and 
miraculously been pierced.* 
* It is illuminating to compare Williams's dry technical report with General Yeager's 
colorful and exciting account of the epic flight published years later in his autobiography~ 
for it sheds light on why Williams and Yeager had such a hard time communicating. But 
Yeager's outspoken reminiscences shed even more light on the differences and personal 
frictions between test pilots who are engineers (like most of those employed by the NACA), 
who try always to fly precisely, systematically, and after meaningful data, and pilots like 
Yeager who are accustomed to "living dangerously and flying the same way." At Muroc in 
the late 1940s a real grudge apparently grew up between these two types of pilots. According 
to Yeager's autobiography, the NACA "wasn't thrilled" with the army's selection of him as 
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" •••• And with this wo hope to break the Sonic Barrier." 
From the Langley Air Scoop, June 194 7. 
The day before Langley received this report from Williams, one of its 
own test pilots, Herbert Hoover, had initiated the NACA program on the 
XS-1 with a familiarization glide flight in the number two airplane. On 
landing, however, Hoover misjudged the height of the airplane and made 
several contacts with the ground, the last of which caused the nose wheel 
to collapse, before skidding to a stop on the desert runway with damage 
to the landing strut. 72 Repairs and bad weather kept the NACA airplane 
grounded for the next seven weeks. 
the XS-l's test pilot: "The NACA team [at Muroc] thought I was a wild man," a macho 
fighter jockey with no education and no real experience in flight research, whose cockiness 
might very well lead to tragic mistakes. Yeager, who remembers being treated with some 
condescension, calls the NACA pilots "the most arrogant bunch" at Muroc; "there was 
nothing worthwhile that a military pilot could tell them .... I rated them about as high as 
my shoelaces." See Yeager and Leo Janos, Yeager: An Autobiography (Toronto and New York: 
Bantam Books, 1985), pp. 129-131, 180-183. 
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During this interim from October to December 1947, test pilot Howard 
Lilly made the first two NACA test flights of a D-558-1, the navy airplane 
built by Douglas and so much favored by John Stack over the Bell XS-1. 
D-558-1 number one had arrived at Muroc with a company test team for the 
contractor program in April; at the end of summer, D-558-1 number two, 
the aircraft planned for extensive NACA service, arrived at the California 
site. It was number two that Lilly flew in November 1947. The NACA's 
systematic flight tests of the XS-1 number two began on 16 December 1947 
when Herbert Hoover became the first NACA pilot to fly a rocket plane. 
He reached Mach 0.71. By the end of January 1948, Hoover had made six 
more powered flights in the XS-1, working the speed up to Mach 0.925, and 
Howard Lilly had checked out in the plane. On 10 March, Hoover achieved 
the NACA's first supersonic flight. Three weeks later, Lilly repeated 
Hoover's supersonic performance. 
Between the time of these first civilian supersonic flights in early 
March 1947 and the time of the NACA's replacement by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration in the summer of 1958, the NACA 
made in the neighborhood of 100 research flights either in the XS-1 number 
two or in one of its sister ships in the X-series. In the same period, the NACA 
made nearly 300 flights in the D-558-1 or D-558-2, the latter being the first 
research airplane with swept wings. 73 But this chapter's examination of 
Langley's role in this genesis and development of the transonic research 
airplane program ends with December 1948. At that time, the National 
Aeronautic Association selected John Stack of Langley laboratory to share 
in its 1947 award of the Robert J. Collier Trophy, the association's annual 
prize for the greatest achievement in American aviation. In a ceremony at 
the White House, President Harry Truman presented the Langley engineer 
the award citation, which read: 
To John Stack, Research Scientist, NACA, for pioneering research to determine 
the physical laws affecting supersonic flight, and for his conception of transonic 
research airplanes; to Lawrence D. Bell, President Bell Aircraft Corporation, for 
the design and construction of the special research airplane X-1; and to Captain 
Charles E. Yeager, U.S. Air Force, who, with that airplane, on October 14, 1947, 
first achieved human flight faster than sound.74 
In accepting his citation, Stack insisted that he should not have been singled 
out for a share of the Collier award. The NACA's contribution to the 
supersonic flight of the XS-1, he said, had been a team effort.75 
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Langley test pilot Robert 
Champine {in X-series pres-
stire suit) lands the D-558-2 
Skyrocket number two at the 
NACA High-Speed Flight Sta-
tion in California after com-
pleting a stability and control 
investigation at Mach 0. 855, 
7 December 1949. 
It was ironic that Stack won a share of the Collier Trophy, commonly 
rated the highest honor in American aviation, for his part in the success of 
the Bell XS-1. Supersonic flight had not even been Stack's original interest; 
305 
Engineer in Charge 
his idea for the research airplane program had been only to get information 
in the transonic speed range. He had opposed the army's decision to build 
a bold new air-launched rocket plane designed especially for the purpose of 
pushing through the speed of sound. He had favored a rather conservative, 
turbojet-powered airplane designed to take off from the ground, as airplanes 
had always done, and explore the high-speed frontier from Mach 0.8 to 1.0. 
It was the Douglas D-558 that had actually followed Stack's concept. It was 
the development of the D-558, not the XS-1, that Stack had most encouraged 
NACA researchers to advance.76 
After the successful supersonic flight of the XS-1 in October 1947 
the NACA said nothing to indicate what Stack's real position on the 
development of the rocket plane had been. Rather, it emphasized the 
cooperative nature of the entire research airplane program. During a public 
presentation in June 1949 Stack said: "The research airplane program has 
been a cooperative venture from the start among the Air Force, Navy, the 
airplane manufacturers, and the NACA. The extent of this cooperation is 
best illustrated by the facts that the X-1, sponsored by the Air Force, is 
powered with a Navy-sponsored rocket engine, and the D-558-1, sponsored 
by the Navy, is powered with an Air Force-sponsored turbojet engine." 77 
Stack repeated these two sentences in speech after speech in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.78 As NACA spokesmen reiterated Stack's message, people 
believed that the research staff at Langley laboratory had in fact planned 
from the beginning for the XS-1 and D-558-1 to be complementary research 
vehicles, with the idea that the army plane would push through Mach 1 to 
supersonic flight while the navy plane simultaneously studied the transonic 
region from Mach 0.8 to Mach 1.79 
In reality, of course, Stack had argued strongly from 1944 to 1946 
that the rocket plane the army was procuring from Bell was unsafe and 
in important ways unsuitable for studying the intractable transonic speed 
region. This attitude eventually produced two further ironies. First, it was 
the conservative, slower-speed D-558-1 turbojet preferred by Stack, partly 
for safety reasons, that killed NACA pilot Howard Lilly in May 1948 due to 
engine failure during a ground takeoff. The faster air-launched XS-ls had 
a good safety record at Muroc. Second, it was the D-558-1, not the XS-1, 
that ended up the greater anachronism. Shortly after the NACA began 
testing its D-558, service airplanes like North American's F-86 Sabre flew 
in the Mach 0.8 to 1.0 speed range that the NACA most wanted to explore. 
The NACA could have instrumented one or more of these service planes as 
it did the D-558-2 at Muroc and could have conducted extensive transonic 
flight research using them. As Stack's associate John V. Becker wrote in 
The High-Speed Frontier, "If the D-558-1 could have been promoted in the 
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A technician prepares dynamic models of the Bell X-1E and the Vought XF-8 U 
Crusader for wind tunnel testing in 1951. The Crusader was then the navy's fastest 
aircraft ~maximum speed Mach 1. 15 at 35,000 feet. 
early forties, it would have been timely. But coming into the flight picture 
as it did in 1947, it was unnecessary." 80 
There was another reason why the D-558-1 was unnecessary by 1947. 
Not only were certain service airplanes fi'ying fast enough to be instrumented 
for transonic flight research, but NACA engineers had discovered a variety of 
ways (see next chapter) to circumvent the problem of wind tunnels choking 
just below and just above the speed of sound-the problem, then thought 
to be insoluble in the short term, that had led Stack and his associates to 
the idea of the research airplane program in the first place. 
Although it was ironic that John Stack shared the 1948 Collier Trophy 
for the supersonic flight of the rocket-powered XS-1, Stack and the NACA 
certainly deserved recognition. Supersonic flight depended unquestionably 
upon their prior successes. Almost singlehandedly, the Langley engineer had 
initiated the research airplane program and had sold it to military services 
heavily preoccupied with fighting a world war. As has been shown, this was 
not an easy accomplishment: the army did little with Stack's initial proposal 
other than to put it in a desk drawer at Wright Field. After the Bell XS-1 
was in procurement, NACA ideas (including some from Stack) and new 
research information (provided by LMAL research teams led by Stack) 
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Who, me? John Stack {left) looks surprised to hear that he had won a share of the 
Collier Trophy for his work on the Bell XS-1 with Lawrence D. Bell (center) and 
Capt. Charles E. Yeager (right}, since it was the development of the Douglas D-558, 
not the XS-1, that Stack had most wanted to encourage. The page is from Collier's, 
25 December 1948. 
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contributed greatly to the airplane's rapid development. NACA personnel, 
overcoming vested interests and the "not-invented-here" syndrome (their 
own and others'), became enthusiastic about cooperating with the military 
and its contractor to improve the chances of the experimental rocket plane. 
The cooperation that resulted supplied the American aircraft industry with 
the data base it needed for the safe and efficient design of the transonic and 
supersonic aircraft the U.S. military now wanted. 
In the end, the research airplane program seems to have furthered the 
cause of the NACA almost as much as the NACA furthered the cause 
of the research airplane program. The transonic problem stimulated the 
development of important new free-flight and ground-based test techniques: 
the wing-flow, drop-body, and rocket-model methods. Working on the XS-1 
and D-558-1 provided Langley researchers with a focus and a goal that were 
needed after the end of World War IL Winning the Collier Trophy in 1948 
for the supersonic flight of the XS-1 (by then designated the X-1) and again 
in 1952 for the invention of the slotted-wall transonic wind tunnel bolstered 
the reputation of the NACA and boosted the morale and self-confidence of 
all NACA e·mployees, at Langley and elsewhere. This was timely therapy 
after the criticism they had suffered at the end of the war by news of the 
American "failure" to seize the practical usefulness of the turbojet as quickly 
as the rival British and German aeronautics communities had. 81 
For good or bad, involvement in the ambitious research airplane pro-
gram required the NACA to become more complex organizationally, to do 
more intra-agency planning, and to formalize some of its methods of man-
agement. Planning and monitoring the flight-testing of the XS-1 and D-558 
at Muroc was not a small or simple task, especially when it entailed supervi-
sion from a mother laboratory some 2500 miles away from the engineers and 
equipment doing the work. Concern for proper management led the NACA 
in 1948 to create a special research airplane projects panel and in 1949 to 
establish a larger NACA High-Speed Flight Research Station (HSFRS) at 
the California air force base. Langley continued to manage this station un-
til 1954, when NACA headquarters decided to make it an autonomous field 
installation, the NACA High-Speed Flight Station (HSFS). In 1958, this 
installation became NASA's Flight (later Dryden) Research Center. 
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Many of our greatest technological artifacts are themselves fine art: the 
Great Pyramid at Giza, the Chartres cathedral, the Brooklyn Bridge. The 
engineers who designed these structures applied scientific principles, but 
they also used practical skills, cleverness in contrivance, and an innate sense 
of aesthetics. Until the Industrial Revolution, western societies recognized 
and appreciated the vital role of art in their technologies. With the arrival 
and widespread use of awesome new machines like the steam engine in 
the eighteenth century, however, more and more people in Europe and 
America began to assume, incorrectly, that the only thing that was going 
into engineering design and invention was science----a type of knowledge 
theretofore considered too complex, abstract, and even dangerous for the 
average person to comprehend, let alone command. Although science and 
mathematics together played an increasingly important role in engineering 
from the Italian Renaissance in the fifteenth century on, in truth artistic 
creativity continued to fix many of the outlines and fill in many of the 
details of our material surroundings through the Industrial Revolution. 1 
It was just harder to spot amidst all the operations of modern applied 
science. Today the mind's eye remains one of the most essential organs of 
technological creation. Visual conception and imagination help to shape 
everything from the next model Buick Skylark to the next generation IBM 
personal computer. 2 
Aerodynamic research also involves artistry. The mind's eye made 
important contributions to the success of various major programs at the 
NACA laboratory, particularly the design of the airfoil and cowling families 
in the late 1920s and 1930s. After World War II, the most outstanding 
examples of artistry at Langley involved the design of the first transonic 
tunnel, whose key component was a slotted-throat test section, and the 
discovery of the area rule, a new concept in the shaping of high-speed 
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aircraft. These two achievements by Langley researchers were products 
of intelligent guesswork, reasoning by intuition, and cut-and-try testing as 
much as products of numerical systems analysis, parameter variation, or 
theory. Both the slotted tunnel and the area rule derived largely from 
pictures in the mind. In a book about engineers in charge, this chapter will 
explore how visual images charged engineers. 
Model Support 
After calling for a transonic research aircraft in the early 1940s, Langley 
researchers had continued to grapple doggedly with the choking problem of 
their wind tunnels. They persisted even after procurement of the XS-1 and 
D-558-1 was assured in 1945. It would have been folly for them to have 
done otherwise, since there was no assurance that the research airplane 
program was going to provide the unique kind of new data about transonic 
aerodynamics that the military services, the aircraft manufacturers, and 
the NACA itself required. Moreover, John Stack and his associates were 
die-hard wind tunnel advocates anyway, by nature predisposed to go after 
the choking problem of the conventional closed-throat tunnel, the problem 
that had led to the concept of the "sound barrier" in the first place. In 
the minds of Stack's team., the research airplane was a stopgap superior to 
drop bodies and rocket models, but a stopgap nonetheless; they would have 
preferred a solution to the transonic impasse involving some discovery about 
the imperfect nature of their own precious ground-based type of facility. 3 
The first way that Langley researchers discovered to minimize the 
tunnel choking problem. was the small-model technique.* By early 1944 
choking data correlated from hundreds ofyrevious tests in the lab's various 
high-speed tunnels made it clear that the range of choked-out airflow speeds 
was primarily a function of the ratio of the cross-sectional area of the 
test model to that of the tunnel. Experiments demonstrated that if the 
lab reduced the size of its models correctly to one-tenth of one percent 
of the tunnel throat area, its high-speed tunnels would still choke, but at 
approximately Mach 0.95 instead of 0.80. The range of speeds unobtainable 
in wind tunnels would be substantially narrower.4 
* Langley veteran John V. Becker recalls the evolution of the small-model technique 
and other major innovations in transonic wind tunnel technology during the 1940s as part 
of The High-Speed Frontier: Ca.se Histories of Four NACA Programs (Washington, D.C.: NASA 
SP-445, 1980), pp. 98-118. This chapter extends Becker's highly technical story, based on 
oral testimony of other key participants in the developments and on further research into 
the archival record. 
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The strut system used conventionally into the 1940s to support models in large 
wind tunnels disturbed the airflow so much that many test results were questionable, 
especially at higher Mach numbers. In this photograph from August 1946, a strut-
supported model of the Bell XS-2 is being tested in the 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel. 
Langley's experts knew that it was necessary to come up with a correct 
model support system if the choking range of tunnels was to be narrowed 
in actual practice with the small-model technique, since, when a smaller 
model was used, the struts used conventionally to support a model in a test 
section would contribute more to the choking of the airstream than would 
the small model itself. These struts were large, asymmetric, and usually 
attached directly to the forward part of the model surface; they caused 
local accelerations and changes in the alignment of the flow relative to the 
model that could not be corrected by any known method of determining 
support interference. In sum, this meant that test data at the higher Mach 
numbers were questionable. 
Even before the advantages of the small-model technique were verified 
experimentally and expressed in an NACA report, John Becker, head of 
the 8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel section, was working to develop a new model 
support system that would eliminate the interference effects and thus permit 
wind tunnel testing at higher Mach numbers. In 1943, Becker's division 
chief, John Stack, had gotten the NACA's approval to repower the 8-Foot 
HST from 8000-horsepower to 16,000-horsepower drive for operation at 
higher subsonic speeds. (Langley had designed the tunnel in 1934 for Mach 
nmnbers approaching 0.8.) Becker knew that the conventional strut support 
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Center-plate support for a model of the Douglas D-558 reduced airflow blockage 
during this test in the 8-Foot HST, June 1947. 
system would not work in the repowered tunnel because of its choking 
limitation. After considering a number of alternative types of new support 
arrangements, Becker thought to suggest symmetry as the key to a practical 
solution. In the summer of 1944, he went to Stack and told him about his 
idea for a center-plate support. This support would consist simply of a long 
thin vertical plate mounted across the tunnel diameter and attached to the 
floor and ceiling of the test section, Becker said. Wing models would be 
mounted in the plate's plane of symmetry, half spans protruding from each 
side, to reduce blockage of the airflow. 
Stack decided to have the new type of model support installed in the 
8-Foot HST while it was shut down for repowering. When this tunnel began 
operations with its new 16,000-horsepower drive in the spring of 1945, it 
had a center plate. Langley now had a ground-based facility that provided 
reliable data to above Mach 0.9. The first models tested on the center plate 
of this facility represented wing and tail configurations under consideration 
by the Army Air Forces as design components for its first high-speed jet 
bombers.5 
The center-plate support proved particularly useful for studying the 
high-speed aerodynamic forces and pressures affecting isolated wings; it 
proved unadaptable, however, for investigating the performance of wing and 
body combinations and complete aircraft configurations. What was needed 
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to investigate the performance of these more detailed shapes was a sting 
support system. With this system there was less interference: the model 
was supported from behind by a rod protruding forward from a vertical strut 
downstream of the test section, instead of from below by a strut intruding 
in the airstream of the test section. 
Langley had tried stings before 1944, but it had done so for reasons 
other than to increase the Mach number at which a wind tunnel choked. But 
these stings contributed just as much to flow blockage as the conventional 
strut supports did, if for a different reason. Beginning in late 1944, a group 
of engineers in the 8-Foot HST led by Eugene C. Draley (Becker had since 
become head of the 16-Foot HST) began designing a new sting support 
system. Their specific intention was to eliminate the source of the choking 
problem of the earlier stings: the large strut extending to the tunnel walls 
downstream of the model. After intensive study and several false starts, 
Draley's group arrived at a solution: move the strut farther downstream into 
the diffuser section and install a specially contoured insert or liner within 
the tunnel's existing walls to create a new closed-throat section ahead of 
the strut. These two changes compensated for blockage and resulted in the 
production of a more uniform flow. Langley used an early version of its new 
sting support system in the spring of 1946 to test models of the XS-1 and 
D-558-1 in the 8-Foot HST, thus enabling the NACA to provide extremely 
important and reliable performance data for speeds up to about Mach 0.92 
a year before flight testing of the research airplanes began at Muroc.6 
Langley's small-model technique and its center-plate and sting support 
systems were only two episodes in the NACA's movement during the 
period 1942 to 1947 toward bridging the transonic gap in ground-based 
research capabilities. There were others. In late 1944 Langley engineer 
Coleman duPont Donaldson invented the Annular Transonic Tunnel, a ring-
shaped passage with a single-bladed axial fan that was driven to very high 
speed by a series of electric motors~in actuality, more of a whirling arm 
than a tunnel. This facility began operation in early 1947, and, though 
serious questions soon arose about the quality of its test results, it made 
an immediate impact by providing the first pressure distributions ever 
measured on an airfoil at Mach 1. 7 
A few months before Donaldson's invention, another group of Langley 
engineers was exploring the utility of a crude but remarkable tunnel modi-
fication known as the transonic bump in the 300-MPH 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel. 
In truth, the bump was used in a way similar to Gilruth's wing-flow tech-
nique, the controversial free-flight test method that some of Langley's more 
die-hard wind tunnel personnel had rejected for so long as unscientific: a 
carefully shaped wooden bump or wave about a foot high was placed on 
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A sting-supported model of the Bell XS-2 was tested in the 9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel 
in July 1947. 
the floor of a wind tunnel and the test model mounted in the region of 
the bump predicted to experience supercritical flow, just as in Gilruth's 
method a model surface was mounted in a precise location for airflow on an 
actual aircraft wing. As air flowed over the bump, it accelerated to tran-
sonic speeds even though the speed of the main airflow remained subsonic. 
Results thus gave "a qualitative indication of the type of effects encountered 
at transonic speeds, and fairly reliable indicatbns of trends." 8 The principal 
disadvantage of the bump test, like that of the wing-flow technique, was)ts 
low Reynolds number. Nevertheless, NACA researchers used the method 
until a better ground-based method was devised. Most configurations of 
the early X-series of aircraft, as well as of the D-558, went through tests on 
the bump. 
Achieving a Transonic Tunnel 
In 1946 Langley physicist Ray H. Wright conceived a way to do tran-
sonic research effectively in a wind tunnel by placing slots in the throat 
of the test section. The concept for what became known as the slotted-
throat or slotted-wall tunnel came to Wright not as a solution to the chronic 
transonic problem, but as a way to get rid of wall interference (i.e., the 
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Airflow over the bump in the 300-MPH 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel reached the speed of 
sound. 
mutual effect of two or more meeting waves or vibrations of any kind caused 
by solid boundaries) at subsonic speeds. 
For most of the year before Wright came up with this idea, he had 
been trying to develop a theoretical understanding of wall interference in 
the 8-Foot HST, which was then being repowered for Mach 1 capability. 
Wright had received this special individual assignment because as a member 
of John Stack's research division, which was "populated almost entirely by 
engineers," he had proved himself "an indispensable consultant on matters 
mathematical and theoretical." 9 In 1939 and 1940, for example, Wright had 
determined the critical speeds of a large number of existing airfoils and 
bodies from their low-speed pressure distributions.10 This determination 
helped Stack's group contribute to the design of the 16-series, a new family 
of soon-to-be-celebrated NACA airfoils with higher critical speeds.* 
The problem of wall interference facing Wright in 1945 was as old 
as wind tunnel technology itself. From the time Francis Wenham had 
built the first primitive tunnel in 1870, aerodynamicists had questioned 
exactly how airflow confined within solid wooden or metal walls could be 
* The 16-series airfoil sections were actually derived from the 1-series low-drag sections, 
which were developed by the Eastman Jacobs team and first described by Jacobs in his 1939 
Advance Confidential Report on laminar-flow airfoils (also published as Wartime Report 
L-345). 
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simulating the actual conditions of flight in free air. The distance between 
these walls and the scale-model aircraft under investigation was at most 
only a few feet. Real aircraft disturbed the surrounding air to distances 
several times the scale of that dimension. Soon experts had discovered 
that it was impossible, because of the proximity of the solid walls, for 
airflow to stream naturally over and near the models. The walls strangled 
the flow streamlines, producing misleading aerodynamic results. Some 
experimenters had tried to prevent wall interference effects by making the 
test models smaller, reducing them from five percent to one percent of the 
test section area. But as with later use of the small-model technique at 
Langley, reduction in model size often raised the choking speed but also 
lowered the Reynolds number, thereby actually increasing the discrepancy 
between the environments of simulated and real flight. Some had also tried 
getting rid of the walls altogether-as in the small open jets devised in 
the 1920s by Briggs and Dryden at the Edgewood Arsenal (mentioned in 
chapter 9). But not having walls just distorted the streamlines in other 
ways. 11 
In attacking the wall interference problem, Wright benefited not only 
from the collective knowledge and experience of the engineers working 
around him, but also from his own hard work, good intuitions, and artistic 
perspective. This combination caused Wright to wonder whether "since the 
interference velocities due to . . . walls are of opposite signs with free and 
solid boundaries, opposite effects might be so combined in a slotted tunnel as 
to produce zero blockage." 12 Theoretical methods were available for making 
wind tunnel wall corrections at Mach numbers well below the choking value. 
These methods were available for both closed- and open-throat tunnels. 
Wright's contribution would thus be in combining the corrections for the 
different types of throats in such a way as to eliminate the need for any 
correction at all. 
Such an idea dated back to theoretical papers by Prandtl and Glauert 
in Germany during the 1920s. Stack and Jacobs had tested it at Langley in 
1929 and 1930-by partially blocking an open throat with large models to 
reduce airstream choking-on the way to their final closed-throat configura-
tion of the 11-Inch High-Speed Tunnel. Considerable work on the problem 
was done by the British, Italians, Japanese, and Germans during World 
War II. Most noteworthy was the work by Carl Wieselberger in Germany. 
In 1942, Wieselberger suggested a specific configuration with 46 percent of 
the perimeter open ( via two wide longitudinal slots) as a means to reduce 
the blockage effect in certain German high-speed tunnels. 13 
NACA researchers did not find out about this work until Maj. Antonio 
Ferri arrived at Langley in September 1944 from the Italian aeronautical 
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After fighting the Nazis as chief 
of a partisan brigade, Antonio 
Ferri brought important new in-
formation to Langley in 1944 
about current German and Ital-
ian research in high-speed aerody-
namics. 
research center at Guidonia, where, until the fall of Mussolini's government 
one year earlier, the young doctor of engineering had been in charge 
of the Galleria Ultrasonora (supersonic tunnel).* Besides reporting on 
Wieselberger's studies, Ferri brought papers to America covering recent 
tests he had conducted in a tunnel whose sides were 43 percent open. 
Together, this information showed that "the Italians had already succeeded 
in obtaining airfoil force data [in this semi-open tunnel] . . . up to about 
Mach 0.94, and the Germans to about 0.92." 14 
Ferri's first job at Langley was to complete his tabulation of all the 
relevant Italian airfoil tests at speeds approaching Mach 1. When he finished 
in 1945, the NACA published his analysis as Wartime Report L-143; it 
demonstrated for the first time in America that "partly open arrangements 
could be used effectively." 15 In the following months, Langley tried to 
apply the Italian's semi-open principle, but the experimental configuration 
* Ferri held a doctorate in engineering from the University of Rome (1936). After 
the collapse of Mussolini's government in September 1943, Ferri had organized a band of 
partisans which fought the Nazis and Italian Fascists. In July 1944, when Allied forces 
took control of the Macerata province in which his partisan brigade ( the "Spartaco") was 
operating, Ferri was contacted by an agent of the U.S. Army's Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS). He signed an agreement to work for the U.S. and to put all information in his 
possession at the country's service. Among the documents he gave to the OSS were numerous 
top secret technical reports, both Italian and German, which he had taken from Guidonia 
before it was seized by the Germans. Soon after his arrival in the U.S., the War Department 
assigned Ferri to act as an aeronautical consultant for the NACA at Langley Field, where he 
stayed (at the engineer-in-charge's special request) until 1950, when as an American citizen 
he chose to begin a teaching career at the Polytechnical Institute of Brooklyn. 
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experienced large pulsations. The lab would achieve a successful version 
of Ferri's arrangement in 1948, but in 1945 and 1946, when Ray Wright 
was working to achieve zero wall interference in the 8-Foot HST, none of 
Langley's high-speed tunnel experts were yet sure that the concept of the 
semi-open tunnel was valid. 16 
Besides understanding the problem of flow pulsation, Wright knew 
that Ferri's and Wieselberger's semi-open schemes could not work for 
the 8-Foot HST for at least two other reasons: (1) the 8-Foot HST was 
a much larger facility-Ferri's tunnel was only 1.31 x 1.74 feet-and, if 
semi-open, would require considerably more power than was available; and 
(2) the test section of the 8-Foot HST was circular, not rectangular as were 
Ferri's and Wieselberger's. Finding the degree of openness and exact slot 
design required by the circular 8-Foot HST for zero blockage would take a 
completely different solution. 
Mathematical Analysis 
and First Test Programs 
Knowing that the excess power required by slots tended to be propor-
tional to the open area, Wright specified for analysis a configuration with ten 
narrow slots instead of the two wide slots of both the Wiesel berger and Ferri 
configurations. It is important to note that in attacking the problem, his 
main weapon was applied mathematics-the same tool used by Theodorsen 
in the 1930s to lift the cowling program beyond its experimental impasse. 
Much later Wright would concede, during a conversation with colleague 
John Becker, that "a systematic experimental attack [i.e., the method of 
parameter variation) might have been equally effective." 17 However, con-
sidering the key role of Theodorsen's applied mathematics when parameter 
variation had stalled in the cowling development, Wright's use of the term 
might should be underscored. 
As a result of a long series of tedious calculations, Wright discovered 
the optimum peripheral openness of the 8-Foot HST to be about 12 percent, 
or some 30 percent less open than the schemes of Wieselberger and Ferri. 
This delighted him because it meant that less additional power would be 
required. Wright reported his findings to Eugene Draley, his section head, 
in the late summer of 1946. Draley encouraged Wright to test his theory 
experimentally-the response Wright expected, as he was accustomed to 
pleasing engineers who wanted things demonstrated empirically. First, 
however, he was to report his findings to the division chief, John Stack. 
Stack received Wright's report enthusiastically. Starting from his 
experience in 1929 and 1930 working with different configurations of the 
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11-Inch High-Speed Tunnel, he had been aware that closed-throat and open-
throat tunnels had opposite characteristics in proceeding up toward Mach 1. 
But he had not since considered seriously how to design a high-speed tunnel 
half-open or half-closed and really make it work. Now, Wright was giving 
him good mathematical reasons to think that there was some way to do it. 
Stack possessed an open mind toward innovation; his attitude was 
usually "Let's try the damn thing and see if we can make it work." 
According to teammate Mark Nichols, Stack 
had an intuitive feeling for things that were important, and he was always 
very interested in all of the technical matters. He'd have some young engineer 
... come and give him a story and, no matter how scrambled the story, he'd 
look for a gem of new information or a new idea. And he had the faculty for 
picking these things out of nowhere and then pushing them. He'd say, "This is 
important, now, what can we do to develop this idea?" 
Stack's enthusiasm would then infect those around him. He would lead, but 
those who followed would be made to feel confident that they were just as 
vital to ultimate success as he was. 18 
After hearing Wright's concept, Stack worked up a full head of steam. 
He informed NACA research director George Lewis of the development, 
discussed its major implications with him, and then proceeded to build 
a test program. There is no documentary evidence, however, that Stack 
thought of slots in the wall of a tunnel's test section in 1946 or early 1947 
as a solution to the transonic problem. After all, Wright did not suggest it, 
or apparently even consider it, as such a solution; for him slots were just a 
means by which to get zero wall interference at high subsonic speeds. The 
same seems to have been true for Stack. 
The first team of researchers to get involved in testing a slotted-throat 
tunnel configuration worked not in the 8-Foot HST but in the 16-Foot HST 
section. "It was quite easy for us to add a test program for Wright's circular 
10-slotted arrangement," recalls John Becker, head of the 16-Foot HST, 
because "for some time we had been investigating blocking corrections" 
in small circular "parasite" test sections operated off the 16-Foot HST. 
(These parasite sections operated at speeds up to Mach 1.6 by sucking 
outside air through a long diffuser into the low-pressure test chamber of the 
16-Foot HST. For details, see Becker's High-Speed Frontier, pp. 76-78 and 
100-101.) Vernon G. Ward, the man who had been conducting the blockage-
correction study for the 16-Foot HST, was assigned as project engineer for 
the experiments. 
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Accidental Discovery, Deliberate Debate 
In the first test runs, which took place in early 1947, the slotted tunnel 
operating off the 16-Foot HST achieved a maximum speed, before choking, 
of Mach 0.97. Then, one day, one of the engineers wondered what would 
happen if he took the model out of the parasite test section and turned up 
the power of the driving fan. What happened excited this curious engineer 
and then excited everyone else at Langley who found out about it: the 
small experimental tunnel went up to and through the speed of sound just 
as beautifully as anyone could have imagined. (Which member of Stack's 
staff turned up the power is still uncertain, but Richard Whitcomb relates 
that it was definitely not Ray Wright. )19 
At a meeting of Langley's General Aerodynamics Committee on 
25 July 1947, Stack reported the unexpected success, discussed its impli-
cations, but mentioned no specific plans to install a slotted throat in any 
research tunnel. (The General Aerodynamics Committee was for the most 
part an informal discussion group of Langley physicists and engineers. It 
met once a month to take up major aerodynamic issues.) At that mo-
ment Stack was in fact leading his men in the 8-Foot HST section (Draley, 
Wright, Axel Mattson, Richard Whitcomb, and others) through the design 
of a 12-inch slotted-wall section to test Wright's concept, but he was keep-
ing plans to himself until the right time-when slotted-throat designs were 
proven effective beyond a reasonable doubt and funds were available for 
converting both the 8-Foot HST (maximum speed Mach 0.75 before the re-
powering) and the 16-Foot (maximum speed Mach 0.70 before repowering) 
into transonic tunnels. 
Stack faced "a very strong current of disbelief" at Langley about the 
efficacy of using slotted throats. The new tunnel design was known to 
involve problems for which no one yet had answers: "power requirements, 
the details of slot shaping, ... the quality of slotted tunnel flow, model 
size limitations, possible combinations of wall divergence and slots, shock 
reflection problems above Mach 1, slots versus porous walls, etc." 20 The 
strongest expressions of disbelief came from two of Langley's purer theorists, 
Antonio Ferri and Adolf Busemann, both of whom had arrived only recently 
from Europe. (Ferri's arrival from Italy and its impact on NACA history 
have already been mentioned. Busemann, whose "arrow-wing" theory was 
discussed in chapter 10 in relation to R. T. Jones's concept of a swept wing, 
came to work at Langley in early 1947 after having worked at the Luftwaffe 
laboratory near Brunswick, Germany. He was brought to this country soon 
after the end of the war as part of Operation Paperclip.) 21 
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The 16-F'oot HST began 
operations on S December 
1941, two days before the 
Japanese attack a.t Pearl 
Harbor. During the war, 
the tunnel tested various 
air-cooled afrcraft engines, 
cooling systems, high-speed 
propellers, and even the 
shapes of the first atomic 
bombs. This was the first 
tunnel to receive the 
NACA 's authorization for 
installation of a .slotted-
throat transonic test section 
(in 1947), but the second 
actually to get it done (in 
1950). The picture to the 
left shows the vanes that 
turn the airflow around one 
of the tunnel's corners. 
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Busemann and, in particular, Ferri felt sure that Wright's theory was 
wrong and that, if Stack continued charging forward with plans to convert 
the test sections of both the 8-Foot and 16-Foot HSTs into slotted throats, 
both he and the NACA would end up appearing foolish. Ferri took his case 
to at least one colleague, John Becker, who recalls that Ferri 
conceded that slots could be used to reduce the blockage effect, but to have 
zero blockage at Mach 1 was physically unlikely except for very small models. 
He felt that many mathematicians and physicists who had an understanding 
of transonic theory would regard any NACA claim of valid data at Mach 1 for 
sizable models as absurd. 
Unless someone could persuade Stack to at least use "some words of 
qualification when discussing slotted tunnels," Ferri advised, the NACA's 
international reputation would be permanently blemished. Becker's own 
opinion as head of the 16-Foot HST section was that more definitive answers 
to outstanding questions should be pursued in the model tunnel program 
"before any commitment was made to incorporate slots" in either the 16-
or 8-Foot HST. 22 
The slotted tunnel was the only item on the agenda for the Septem-
ber 194 7 meeting of the General Aerodynamics Committee. Ray Wright 
and Vernon Ward had been asked by Samuel Katzoff, committee chairman, 
to begin the meeting by presenting their most recent results briefly, which 
they did "in rather modest terms." Stack, who had only grudgingly agreed 
to attend, 
made a late entrance and sat down at the head of the table with a belligerent 
look on his face. Clearly it said, "Anyone who wants to argue about the slotted 
tunnel will have to take me on." 23 
After Wright and Ward finished their report, Busemann and Ferri had their 
chance to comment. Busemann reiterated his earlier conclusion that from 
the standpoint of theory an approach better than Wright's ten discrete 
slots was one involving a "homogeneous boundary" in which the slots were 
uniformly distributed about the periphery.24 Ferri's point, that slots could 
be used to achieve zero blockage but only with very small models, was 
lost on many participants "through a combination of poor English [whether 
he said 'subsonic' or 'supersonic,' people heard 'soup-sonic'] and extreme 
politeness." 25 
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John Stack was a hard-charging, persuasive man whose attitude toward unproven 
technology was usually "Let's try the damn thing and see if we can make it work." 
It is not clear whether Stack totally understood both points, because 
when both theoreticians had finished, Stack said in essence: 
OK, I get your point. So, there is a unique situation exactly at Mach 1. We'll 
make this thing work at Mach .995. We'll make it work at Mach 1.005. And 
we won't give a damn about that little thing in between.26 
Those who knew him best readily attest to the fact that Stack could be 
stubborn, and in this instance he had definitely already made up his mind. 
He was going to have his engineers roll up their sleeves and club away at 
the problem until it was solved. They were not to let the infinitesimal point 
in the middle stand in their way. A slotted tunnel would be built. 
As head of the Compressibility Research Division, Stack was in a 
position to block internal opposition from those who knew the most about 
high-speed aerodynamics. His division had grown tremendously in size 
and importance in the early postwar period as a result of the shifting 
emphasis from subsonic to supersonic flight. Three major new facilities-
the 4-Foot Supersonic Pressure Tunnel, the Gas Dynamics Laboratory, 
and the Induction Aerodynamics Laboratory-had been added to those 
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already under his supervision. Considering his experience, management 
responsibility, and great personal dynamism (some have compared him to 
a bull in a china shop), few subordinates risked opposing Stack once he had 
made up his mind. 
Moreover, Stack's prestige and influence within the NACA were now 
approaching a zenith. In one month the XS-1 would break the sound barrier, 
an achievement for which he would share a Collier Trophy. George Lewis, 
who had only just retired as director of research, remained on with the 
NACA as "research consultant"; Stack was one of his favorite boys. Hugh 
Dryden, Lewis's successor, would not have the same paternal feelings for 
Stack, but as slotted-throat tunnel development was unfolding, the two 
men were enjoying a honeymoon period.* 
In the fall of 1947 Stack had to decide which of the big tunnels to convert 
to a slotted throat, and then sell the idea to NACA headquarters. Only a 
hard-charging, persuasive man like Stack, willing to keep an idea alive at 
a time when most other experts would have preferred to kill it, could have 
accomplished this as quickly as he did. He decided to convert the 16-Foot 
HST first. This decision paved the way for quick approval by headquarters, 
which had just approved funding for a 60,000-horsepower repowering project 
that could be broadened to include conversion of the walls of the test 
section. (In fiscal year 1947 Langley had requested and gotten approval 
for 35,000-horsepower repowering. See appendix C. It should be noted that 
repowering was doubly relevant to this slotted-throat conversion, not only 
in terms of budgetary scheduling convenience, but because even a tunnel 
whose walls were 12 percent open required about twice as much fan power as 
one with solid walls.) Total conversion would require a special assignment 
of additional funds, however. On 10 January 1948, Langley submitted a 
formal "Description and Justification for Slotted Test Section" prepared by 
a member of the 16-Foot HST staff for consideration as part of the NACA's 
fiscal year 1949 budget request. Stack defended the justification vigorously 
and in person before top management in Washington. Management soon 
approved, but in doing so made clear that it could take two to three years 
to procure all the money needed for total conversion. 27 
* Stack and Dryden were individuals of conflicting backgrounds and personalities~ 
Dryden, a scientist, an introvert from a proper New England Protestant family; Stack, an 
engineer, the extroverted son of a first-generation Irish Catholic immigrant who had settled 
as a carpenter in the factory town of Lowell, Massachusetts. In October 1957, the differences 
between the two men came to a head: at an NACA dinner party hosted by NACA chairman 
James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, Stack called Dryden an old fogey~loud enough that most 
everyone in the room could hear; Dryden never forgave him for that. See Roland, Model 
Research, p. 292, and Walter A. McDougall, ... The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History 
of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), p. 165. 
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The entire 16-Foot HST staff was now "under heavy pressure to come 
up with the additional data" needed for an effective design. Stack assumed 
"personal supervision on a daily basis for the many interrelated slotted 
tunnel activities, ranging from expediting work on models in the shops, 
to working with the detail designers of the 16-foot section, and dealing as 
always with funding and approval problems." By holding frequent meetings, 
he not only made sure that researchers abided strictly by his schedules but 
also that they maintained as much enthusiasm for the project as he did 
himself.28 
A few researchers came cautiously to Stack with objections and alter-
natives to the slotted throat. Before a million dollars or more was spent 
modifying and perhaps ruining a proven research facility, they wanted him 
to make sure that the slot design was perfected. Antonio Ferri seems not 
to have been among them, however. After Stack, his division chief, had 
made the decision to convert the 16-Foot HST, Ferri went to him and asked 
if there was anything he could do to help. Stack admired this loyalty; the 
Italian soon became one of the most trusted members of the team and a 
close personal friend. 
Surprising Announcement 
In the spring of 1948 Stack announced at Langley that the test section 
of the 8-Foot HST would also be converted to a slotted throat. This news 
stunned critics and defenders of the slotted throat alike. Researchers in 
the 8-Foot HST had been focusing their attention recently on using the 
new closed throat together with the new sting support system for research 
at Mach 1.2 and "had given little thought to the next step." Stack was 
discouraged, however, with preliminary results in the reconfigured facility: 
the Reynolds numbers of the tests were lower than desired. Moreover, he was 
"very impatient at the prospect of two or three years of procurement time 
before the 16-foot tunnel would be operable." Convinced that alteration 
of the 8-Foot HST would be cheaper and quicker because less complex 
technically, especially with all fabrication and installation being done in-
house, he waved off all protests from his men for more time to study the 
problem. Before long it was clear to everyone inside the NACA that Stack 
had in fact transferred top priority for a slotted throat from the 16-Foot to 
the 8-Foot HST. 
Sometime in late 1948, the 8-Foot HST went through the speed of sound 
with a slotted throat, but the flow was awfully rough and uneven. Now 
engineers had to get down to the nitty-gritty and come up with the exact 
slot configuration for smooth transonic flow. Wright's theory guided their 
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Because the slots he 
was designing opened 
directly into the 8-Foot 
HST's hazardous igloo-
shaped test chamber, 
where high levels of 
pressure, temperature, 
and noise would be en-
countered, Ray H. Wright 
had to don a diving suit 
before venturing into the 
test section. 
pursuit, as did design data from tests in the 12-inch model slotted section 
operated off the 16-Foot HST, but neither source of information sufficed. 
What was needed was creative use of the mind's eye and the touch of a 
sculptor. This artistry was provided by physicist Ray Wright and engineers 
Virgil S. Ritchie and Richard Whitcomb. By shaping the slots meticulously 
and continually by hand over a span of seven months, this trio refined the 
details of the slotted throat until smooth transonic flow distributions were 
finally achieved.29 
The 8-Foot HST began regular transonic operation for research pur-
poses on 6 October 1950. Just three months later, the 16-Foot HST also 
became operational with a slotted throat for transonic research. What 
made this short turnover time possible, according to Becker, head of the 
tunnel section, was not only the immediate exchange of critical knowledge 
about the proper shape of slots from the 8-Foot to the 16-Foot HST design 
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groups, but also the 16-Foot group's separate pursuit of improved slot 
technology, which had continued even after Stack had given conversion of 
the 8-Foot HST priority. 
Despite limitations, the slotted tunnels became "best practice" in 
transonic research almost immediately. By the end of 1950, in fact, Langley 
engineers were busy planning a completely new slotted tunnel. The design of 
this facility, which became operational in early 1953 as the 8-Foot Transonic 
Pressure Tunnel, remedied three of the problems that had been plaguing the 
operation of the converted tunnels: (1) high humidity and fog, caused by 
the need to draw outside air into the main airstream for cooling purposes, 
(2) high turbulence, and (3) low Reynolds numbers.30 
A problem left unremedied in Langley's slotted-throat transonic tunnels 
was "the inability of the slots to alleviate significantly the reflection of 
pressure disturbances from the solid regions of the walls." The tunnels did 
not choke going through Mach 1, but test data "often exhibited significant 
discrepancies when compared to free air." 31 In the early 1950s, engineers 
at NACA Ames Laboratory in California designed a new type of transonic 
tunnel section to alleviate this reflection problem. Instead of slots, they 
incorporated a "mesh of holes" in the test section wall. Placed inside Ames's 
repowered 16-Foot HST ( which had been built, like its twin at Langley, 
in 1941), this ventilated or porous tunnel began routine operations in late 
1955 as the 14-Foot Transonic Tunnel. Tests in it helped solve the transonic 
stability problems of various missiles. 32 For all practical purposes, however, 
the porous wall tunnel at Ames did not solve the problem which had been 
plaguing the operation of the slotted tunnels at Langley-for it eliminated 
the reflection at only one specific Mach number. 
The military services and their contractors had been following Langley's 
slotted-throat developments closely since at the latest the fall of 1948, when 
they received the NACA's first confidential report on the transonic tunnel 
test sections. 33 In December 1948, for example, Air Materiel Command 
headquarters sent several representatives to the laboratory to discuss the 
possibility of using a slotted throat in a ten-foot wind tunnel at Wright-
Patterson AFB near Dayton, Ohio (formerly McCook Field, and later 
Wright Field). After meeting with Stack, Draley, Wright, and Ward, 
however, Bernhard Goethert, the air force's leading scientific brain at the 
meeting, concluded that because the NACA "was embarking on a program 
to obtain power measurements of large slotted throats," it would be unwise 
for military engineers to embark "on a systematic series of investigations on 
slotted-throat power considerations themselves." Rather, they should wait 
until the NACA's power requirements were available. 34 This conclusion, 
which Air Materiel Command seems to have endorsed, pleased everyone 
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The test section of the 16-Foot HST before (left, 1945) and after (right, 1951} 
installation of slotted walls. The 1945 photo shows the test section as seen through 
a window from the outside. (For another view of the 16-Foot HST's slotted test 
section, see the last picture in the Introduction.) 
at Langley. After all, though Stack had committed both the 8-Foot and 
the 16-Foot HST staffs to the slotted-wall concept, a successful design for 
research use had not yet been achieved. 
By the spring of 1949 rumors about Langley's transonic tunnel develop-
ments had circulated widely among those in the American aeronautics com-
munity who had not even been entrusted with the NACA's first confidential 
report. At its annual inspection held that May at Langley, the NACA had 
tried to divert attention from the slotted throat by having Stack deliver a 
talk in which he emphasized the Annular Transonic Tunnel. But the camou-
flage did not fool anyone, especially when, in the following month, Hugh L. 
Dryden, the NACA's new director of research, "took the unusual step of re-
questing other organizations to follow the Committee's policy of assigning 
a confidential classification to all information relating to the development 
of transonic wind tunnels." 35 Clearly Dryden did this in deference to the 
military, which was then planning new supersonic fighters and bombers that 
would have to fly through the mysterious transonic region. 
Classification meant that the NACA researchers responsible for the 
slotted throat had to sacrifice the personal advantages of quick and open 
publication. In 1950 when researchers at the University of Southern 
California reported work on their own slotted test section, Langley engineers 
reacted defensively. Eugene Draley complained in a memo that 
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this work, to date, is apparently being done without any security classification, 
which is in violation of the security principles established by the NACA on this 
type of work. It is therefore recommended that steps be taken to correct this 
situation . . . not only because of the primary considerations associated with 
basic security requirements, but also because these results are being reported 
without any reference to any work by the NACA. The inference created by such 
work is that the whole subject and idea of slotted throats has been originated 
at the University of Southern California, which is very far from the truth. 
In accusing USC researchers of misappropriating credit, Draley failed 
to mention that security regulations would have in fact prohibited the 
academics from making reference to anything they might have known about 
Langley's slotted-throat work. (Apparently USC did not know anything 
about it anyway.) He closed the memo by recommending that NACA 
headquarters "check into this matter and call the (USC] group's attention 
to the existence" of the NACA classified reports.36 
Though outsiders continued to report independent work with slotted 
and porous test sections, Langley researchers soon got all the credit due 
them-Stack and his associates won the Collier Trophy for 1951 (Stack's 
second in four years) for developing the slotted wall. Two years later, 
with the principles of transonic wind tunnel design "widely known through 
independent research" both inside and outside the United States, Dryden 
withdrew his request "for special treatment for information relating to 
transonic wind tunnels." All thirteen previously published NACA reports 
on the slotted throat were subsequently declassified and announced in the 
usual manner.37 In its Annual Report for 1954, the NACA admitted that 
advertising the potential of the Annular Transonic Tunnel at the 1949 
inspection had been subterfuge. 
In contemporary press releases, the NACA claimed that Langley's 
development of slotted-throat transonic tunnels gave the nation a two-year 
lead over all other nations in the design of supersonic fighters and bombers. 
This bold claim, as Becker points out in The High-Speed Frontier (p. 117), 
was based on projected good use of the area rule, a new concept in the 
shaping of high-speed aircraft. Ironically, considering his vivacity in the 
slotted-throat program, Stack would not be one of the area rule's staunch 
defenders. 
Whitcomb's First Clue 
Ever since his arrival at Langley in 1943, Richard T. Whitcomb, 
a 1943 graduate in mechanical engineering from Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute in Massachusetts, had worked under Stack in the 8-Foot HST 
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section. Management had tried to place him in the Instrument Research 
Division, but the young engineer made it clear that he wanted to work in 
aerodynamics. The building and testing of model airplanes, the mania of his 
boyhood, still fascinated him. The sandy-haired, blue-eyed engineer quickly 
established a reputation as a wunderkind, the rare engineer who was not 
only quite capable mathematically but also possessed a powerful intuition 
and unusual artistic talent for cut-and-try techniques. Though the 8-Foot 
HST did not go transonic until equipped with the slotted throat in 1950, it 
had been able to get up close to the speed of sound (up to Mach 0.95) after 
its repowering in 1945. Thus Whitcomb started to get a feel for transonic 
aerodynamics at least five years before starting the research investigation 
that led directly to his conception of the area rule. 
During this seminal period Whitcomb conducted research on the biggest 
problem facing the designers of supersonic aircraft-the large increase 
in drag ( associated with the formation of shock waves) that occurred 
at transonic speeds. He knew, first from laboratory wind tunnel tests 
and then from the flight of the Bell X-1 (no longer called XS-1), that 
small, lightweight rocket-powered configurations with limited missions could 
overcome the transonic drag problem; he knew also, however, that for 
operational turbojets, which would have to be considerably heavier than 
the X-1, the problem would be critical. If flying up to and through Mach 1 
took gradual acceleration because of high drag, there would be insufficient 
fuel left for the aircraft to sustain supersonic flight for long after achieving 
it. 
In July 1948, after analyzing all available transonic information from 
NACA ground facility and free-flight (including Wallops Island rocket-
model) tests, Whitcomb submitted a proposal for wind tunnel tests of 
a swept wing and fuselage combination. Fairly substantial progress in 
reducing transonic drag rise had been achieved by using sweepback and 
optimizing the shapes of fuselages, and he felt that with proper arrangement 
and shaping, the drag-producing disturbances caused by the wing and 
fuselage might be made to counteract each other. 38 
In late 1949 and early 1950 Langley tested models incorporating Whit-
comb's sweptback wing and body combination at high subsonic (Mach 0.95) 
and low supersonic (Mach 1.2) speeds. Results indicated very little favor-
able effect in reducing the drag. In fact, the results showed significantly 
higher total drag than transonic theory predicted for the drag of the wing 
and the drag of the body combined. Stymied, Whitcomb decided that he 
needed to know more about the fundamental nature of flow at transonic 
speeds before truly fruitful work on the major design problem of supersonic 
aircraft could begin.39 
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As soon as the slotted-throat section was placed inside the 8-Foot HST, 
Whitcomb and his colleagues employed "every available tool" to study in 
detail what happened in the flow field around wing and body combinations 
at transonic speeds. These tools included (1) the tunnel balance, which had 
been used by wind tunnel researchers for years as the standard means of 
measuring the aerodynamic forces on a model (i.e., lift, drag, and pitching 
moments); (2) orifices sensitive to pressures at various points on the surface 
of a model from whose measurements one could calculate local velocities; 
(3) tuft surveys, involving little pieces of cloth attached in various places 
on a model surface, by which observers could tell if the flow was smooth or 
disturbed; and (4) schlieren photographs, a method for seeing shock waves 
(discussed earlier in chapter 9). None of these four methods were new; for 
instance, researchers had used tufts on some of the earliest airplanes flown 
at Langley. By using these available tools together, however, the 8-Foot 
HST group began to understand that drag patterns at transonic speeds 
were "completely different than anything that anybody had ever predicted" 
theoretically. 40 
The schlieren photographs were most startling. Besides showing the 
well-known shock wave that formed where air was pushed aside to make way 
for the nose of a high-speed projectile, the photos indicated two "fascinating 
new types" of shocks-one that had apparently built up as the fuselage 
and wings began pushing more air out of the way, and another near the 
trailing edge of the wing. In comparison with the size of the wing and body 
combination being studied, the disturbed area of air was now understood 
to be much larger than previously conceived. Whitcomb wondered if the 
sharp rise in drag occurring in transonic flight was caused by losses from the 
strong extra shocks. After all, this was the first time that these particular 
disturbances in the transonic flow field had been observed. 
Whitcomb had his first clue to the area rule, but he did not yet know 
what to do with it. The conventional way to design high-speed aircraft was 
to follow Ernst Mach's advice. In the late nineteenth century Mach had 
shown that bullet-like shapes produced less drag in flight than any other 
known shape. Although no controlled, manned aircraft would attain that 
streamlined ideal-they required wings and a tail-designers of the first 
generation of supersonic aircraft still tried to mimic that shape as much 
as possible. As Richard P. Hallion, historian of supersonic aircraft, has 
explained: "They gave the fuselage a pointed nose, then gradually thickened 
the body-that is, increased the cross-sectional area-until the fuselage 
reached its maximum diameter near the middle." Only at the tail end did 
the designers begin to decrease the diameter of the fuselage. 41 This was the 
rule of thumb. 
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In November 1951 Langley put a systematic series of wing and body 
combinations through tests in the 8-Foot HST; models included swept, 
unswept, and delta wings, and bodies with various amounts of curvature 
in the region of the wing. The goal of the program was to evaluate 
the magnitude of the drag caused by the interference of the two shapes 
at transonic speeds. Results led Whitcomb to two important new ideas: 
(1) that variations in the shape of the fuselage, even small ones, could lead 
to pronounced changes in the drag of the wing, and (2) that in determining 
transonic drag, the drag of the wing and the drag of the body could not 
be considered separately; rather, the combination had to be considered as 
a whole, as a mutually interactive aerodynamic system.42 
Eureka! 
Beginning in college Whitcomb had made it his practice to leave some 
time each day just for thinking. As has often been the case in discovery 
of the unknown, it was precisely this type of freewheeling, looking-out-the-
window contemplation that led him to the area rule. One day late in 1951, 
while sitting at his desk trying to figure out why the shock waves were so 
different than anyone had expected, suddenly in his mind's eye he "saw" air 
passing over a body at transonic speed in a different way. A moment more of 
this creative visualization and . . . "Eureka, I've got it!"* He perceived that 
the ideal streamlined body for supersonic flight was not a function of the 
diameter of the fuselage alone, as the old rule of thumb had it; what really 
caused transonic drag rise was the total cross-sectional area of the fuselage, 
wings, and tail. Since wings added most to this area, designers could reduce 
drag significantly by tucking in or narrowing the fuselage where the wings 
attached and then expanding the fuselage at their trailing edges.43 
What opened his mind's eye was a physical analogy made a few 
weeks earlier by Adolf Busemann during an in-house technical symposium. 
Busemann, who had been working on theoretical aspects of transonic flow 
for some time, had told the Langley crowd to work "as pipe-fitters." Aero-
dynamicists were accustomed to working with streamlines and streamtubes, 
the German scientist had reminded his audience. A common approach to 
theoretical analysis of airflow problems was to isolate the streamtube (i.e., 
* The eureka phenomenon derives its name from an exclamation (heurika, meaning "I 
have found [it]") attributed to the ancient Greek engineer Archimedes (ca. 287-212 B.C.) 
on his discovery, while in his bath, of the method of determining the relation of weight 
to volume. Comic strips depict the eureka experience as a light bulb turning on over an 
inventor's head. 
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Richard T. Whdcomb exam-
ines a model based on his tran-
sonic area rule in the 8-Foot 
HST, April 1955. 
bundle of streamlines) containing the object under study. Wind tunnel re-
searchers should also visualize transonic problems in this way, Busemann 
said. Picture a problem in transonic aerodynamics, he urged, as "uniform 
pipes going over the surface of the configuration" being studied. 44 
That is exactly what Whitcomb was doing when he exclaimed 
"Eureka" -visualizing all the pipe lines affecting his swept wing and body 
combination. His mental plumbing job involved tinkering inside a transonic 
streamtube having a diameter greater than the wing span of the aircraft 
model. While imagining how the streamlines deviated as they passed across 
the nose, along the body, and finally up over the wings before reverting 
back to normal paths downstream, he got the idea that if air could be dis-
placed less violently, the waves and drag would diminish, enabling his plane 
to pass more easily through the transonic zone. Specifically, he thought to 
pinch the waist of the fuselage so that streamlines which otherwise would 
be brushed aside sharply would have more room. The same amount of air 
had to get out of the way to make room for the plane, he knew, but if the 
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plane had a trimmed-down "wasp waist," the air would not be displaced in 
such violent shock patterns. 
After jumping up from his desk, Whitcomb took Busemann's concept 
of what was happening aerodynamically at high speeds, as well as "every 
available bit of [transonic] data that [had] ever been gotten before, by drop 
tests and so forth," and compared the two sources of information with the 
pile of unexplained results from the slotted tunnel. As Whitcomb recalls, 
"It's been said the proof of a new theory is whether it will (explain] all of 
those pieces of information that you've been trying to fit together, and it 
did." 45 
His colleagues, in particular Stack, his boss, were not so sure. Still, 
Stack allowed him to present his area rule at the next meeting of Lang-
ley's elite technical seminar-perhaps, as one NACA veteran believes, so 
Busemann and the lab's other great mathematicians could prove it wrong.46 
Busemann, however, did just the reverse: 
At the end of [Whitcomb's 20-minute] presentation there was silence. Finally, 
Adolf Busemann stood up. Turning to his colleagues, the pioneer of sweptwing 
technology remarked, "Some people come up with half-baked ideas and call 
them theories. Whitcomb comes up with a brilliant idea and calls it a rule of 
thumb." 47 
With Busemann defending the rule, the skeptics retreated at least tem-
porarily. Stack reacted characteristically: he told Whitcomb to go prove 
it. 
Verification and Application 
The basis of the area rule concerned the cross-sectional areas of a wing 
and body combination. If these areas obeyed the rule by having the proper 
relationship to each other, the resulting shape should enjoy minimum tran-
sonic drag. To verify the rule experimentally, Whitcomb designed models 
with variously pinched waists and tested them in the 8-Foot HST. By the 
end of April 1952, enough data indicated that "very significant reductions in 
drag could be obtained by contouring the fuselage" for him to start writing 
a formal report confirming the theory.48 The NACA published this paper, 
"A Study of the Zero Lift Drag Characteristics of Wing-Body Combinations 
Near the Speed of Sound," as Research Memorandum L52H08 in Septem-
ber 1952, and made it available immediately to American industry on a 
secret basis. By that time, however, at least one aircraft manufacturer-
Convair-already had heard something about the area rule. 
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Recent data from Langley's now transonic 8-Foot HST had suggested 
that Convair's YF-102, a fighter-interceptor being readied for air force ser-
vice in defense of the continental United States, could not fly supersonically 
as planned-the transonic drag was higher than expected. Naturally this 
information disturbed Convair greatly. The company's designers had given 
the plane a bullet-shaped fuselage, knife-edge delta wings, the most pow-
erful jet engine in existence (the Pratt and Whitney J-57), and everything 
else that was currently thought essential for sustained supersonic flight. The 
company's production managers had set up an assembly line in San Diego 
for the manufacture of hundreds of F-102s. Now NACA test results indi-
cated that Convair's best-laid plans for an honest-to-goodness supersonic 
fighter had been insufficient. The company had good reason to fear that 
the air force might cancel the contract. 
In mid-August 1952, less than a month before the publication of 
Whitcomb's report, a visiting team of engineers from Convair witnessed 
the questionable performance of a scale model of the YF-102 in Langley's 
8-Foot HST. Someone asked Whitcomb what might be done to reduce the 
air resistance, and in response he described his surprising discovery of a new 
rule of thumb concerning transonic drag. 
The historical records do not make clear what if anything John Stack 
said to the Convair representatives about the area rule or anything else. 
However, a few subsequent memos from Stack's division suggest that Stack, 
either for fear of transonic theory or some personal reason, wanted the 
whole area rule business "put to bed." 49 This suggestion is supported by 
the recollections of several Langley veterans who knew Stack quite well. The 
company men flew home to California, taking the scale model with them for 
study. However, they were not totally convinced either by the theory or by 
the NACA's interpretation of the tunnel data that the YF-102 as originally 
contoured could not go supersonic in level flight. 
Over the next several months Whitcomb worked with Convair to apply 
the area rule to the YF-102 configuration-which apparently means that 
Stack's skepticism stopped short of obstructionism. New wind tunnel 
tests, which began in May 1953, indicated far less drag but left room for 
improvement. Three months later, after more area-rule-based modifications, 
Whitcomb traveled to San Diego to help the company's aerodynamic 
department finalize its recontouring of the airplane. In October the NACA 
reported that Convair's modified aircraft, later designated the YF-102A, 
met the air force specifications for supersonic flight. 50 
Still hoping that the YF-102 might fly supersonically, Convair had 
continued all the while producing the prototype. In late 1953 and early 
1954 the plane was test flown, but its performance mostly confirmed the 
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An area-rule-based model of the Convair F-102 being readied for testing in the shop 
of the 8-Foot HST, November 1953. 
NACA's pessimistic wind tunnel evaluation. Hating to delay receipt of the 
new aircraft but wanting it really t-o be supersonic, the air force called a halt 
to Convair's assembly line and advised the company to retool immediately 
for manufacturing the YF-102A. 
Because Convair's designers had, with Whitcomb's help, already re-
designed a model according to the area rule, it took less than seven months 
for a new prototype to be built. Besides the wasp-waist, the YF-102A was 
given a sharper nose and canopy, tail fairings, and a more powerful version 
of the J-57 engine. During a flight test five days before Christmas 1954, the 
YF-102A "slipped easily past the sound barrier and kept right on going." 51 
The area rule had helped to increase the plane's top speed by an estimated 
25 percent. Delighted with the superior performance, the air force eventu-
ally contracted with Convair for over 1000 F-102As. The advanced version 
of this model, designated the F-106 Delta Dart, flew as a vital part of the 
continental defense arsenal into the early 1980s. 52 
Whitcomb's discovery of the area rule was particularly timely. His 
eureka experience occurred at the very moment that virtually all military 
fighters 0aimed at sustained level supersonic flight seemed doomed to remain 
just below Mach 1 because of the incapability of the jet engines of the time 
to overcome the tremendous drag rise. No matter how skeptical Stack or 
anyone else might have been about the new theory, aircraft manufacturers 
stuck in this quandary had little choice but to explore the theory's potential 
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At Wall ops Island in 1953, Langley's Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARD) 
tested rocket-powered models of the delta-winged Convair F-102 before (left) and 
after (right) application of the area rule. 
applications. In large part their future depended upon it. Convair faced 
up to the problem, and so did Chance Vought (which redesigned its 
F-8U carrier-based interceptor according to the area rule), Grumman, and 
eventually Lockheed (in April 1956, its area-rule-based F-104 Starfighter 
was the first jet to exceed Mach 2 in level flight). 
Convair may have heard about the concept first, but Grumman built 
the first area-rule-based aircraft to fly supersonically. Just two weeks after 
receiving a copy of Whitcomb's September 1952 report, Grumman, under 
contract to the navy for a supersonic carrier-based fighter, sent a delegation 
to obtain further information. In February 1953, five months before his 
trip to Convair, Whitcomb visited the Grumman plant at the company's 
request to see the final design layout of the area-rule-based F9F-9 Tiger be-
fore slotted-tunnel and rocket-model tests at transonic speeds. By the end 
of the summer, results confirmed that this layout would have low enough 
transonic drag for supersonic speeds in level flight. So Grumman built the 
plane. On 16 August 1954, the flashy white F9F-9 Tiger (later to be called 
the FllF-1) "breezed through sonic speed in level flight without the use of 
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an afterburner, the first time this had been done." 53 Convair's improved 
F-102, the F-102A, took four more months to match the achievement. 
One month later, a story on the successful application of the area rule to 
the Grumman Tiger appeared in Aero Digest. In the eyes of the military and 
the NACA, the editor was in violation of that journal's written commitment 
to withhold publishing anything about this work until the veil of secrecy 
had been lifted officially. The editor had upset what had theretofore been 
considered "an object lesson in how a military scientific secret can be kept 
effectively to gain a time advantage over international competitors." 54 This 
transgression would have been serious even if the age had not been that of 
Joseph McCarthy. The war might have been cold, but the United States 
was then engaged in hot technological competition with the Soviet Union 
for supremacy in the air. 
One year later, in September 1955, the NACA released news of the 
area rule. The basic idea had been applied so widely among manufacturers 
and others that it made no sense to persist with secrecy. Articles praising 
the new aircraft design, dubbed for visible reasons the "Coke Bottle" and 
the "Marilyn Monroe," soon flooded the aviation journals and newspapers. 
Bold-faced headlines read: "NACA Formula Eases Supersonic Flight" 
(Aviation Week, 12 Sept. 1955); "Idea Called 'Major Key' To Supersonic 
Flights" (Newport News, Va., Daily Press, 12 Sept. 1955); "25 Per Cent 
Increase Made in Plane's Speed Beyond the Sonic Barrier" ( Daily Press, 
12 Sept. 1955); "The Area Rule: A Universally Applicable, Rule-of-Thumb 
Law for Transonic Design" (Flight, 30 Sept. 1955); and "How We're Beating 
the Russians through the Sound Barrier" (Look, 13 Dec. 1955). 
Five weeks after the public announcement, the National Aeronautic 
Association awarded Whitcomb its coveted Collier Trophy for the greatest 
achievement in aviation in 1955. The citation read: "Whitc;omb's area 
rule is a powerful, simple, and useful method of reducing greatly the 
sharp increase in wing drag heretofore associated with transonic flight, and 
which constituted a major factor requiring great reserves of power to attain 
supersonic speeds." As evidence of the value of the area rule, the citation 
asserted that the concept was being used currently in the design "of all 
transonic and supersonic aircraft in the United States." 
Whitcomb continued to refine and extend his basic concept, not only for 
the design of supersonic bombers but also hopefully for future commercial 
jets. For several years he worked full bore, first under Stack and then under 
Laurence K. Loftin, Jr., on the problems of designing a supersonic transport 
to fly beyond Mach 2-that is, an SST. Eventually he left the frustrating new 
field and returned to transonics, where he knew he could make things pay off. 
Shortly thereafter, at Loftin's instigation, he began a new research project 
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on the airfoil characteristics of a new vertical takeoff (VTO) design being 
studied by the Ling-Temco-Vought Company. In 1965, as a result of this 
investigation, Whitcomb conceived the supercritical wing, an airfoil shape 
whose primary attribute was improved performance at high subsonic speeds 
but which also proved to have excellent high-lift characteristics because of 
its rounded leading edge and sharply down-curved trailing edge. 55 
The Engineer as Artist 
Some analysts qualify Whitcomb's discovery of the area rule by men-
tioning that the concept was implicit in earlier theoretical works. Alex 
Roland, for example, in Model Research asserts that Whitcomb merely "pro-
vided the engineering data that turned [the rule] into useful applications ... 
and pointed out the adjustments needed to get the [Convair F-102] through 
the sound barrier." 56 
It is true that flow studies over the wing root of a sweptback wing 
and fuselage combination had led the German aerodynamicist Kuchemann 
to design a fighter plane with a tapered fuselage as early as 1944. The 
American intelligence teams that discovered this development tagged it 
the "Kuchemann Coke Bottle." Also, beginning in 1946, two British 
researchers, G. N. Ward of the University of Manchester and W. T. Lord of 
the Royal Aeronautical Establishment, had taken a mathematical approach 
to the transonic drag problem that, seen in retrospect, could have provided 
clues to the area rule. In the late 1940s, so did a doctoral thesis by 
Wallace D. Hayes at Caltech.57 But none of the forerunners recognized 
the potential of what they had. Perhaps because they reduced everything 
mathematically-which involves thinking with symbols-Ward, Lord, and 
Hayes had failed to see, as Whitcomb would, how to bring the physical 
elements together in a new aerodynamic combination. Whitcomb did 
not conceive the area rule by reading Hayes's theory, even if ( despite his 
denials) he had already read the young man's Ph.D. thesis. He conceived it 
independently, thanks to a highly individual nonverbal process of thinking 
that involved seeing shapes and changing them, not interpreting symbols. 
Whitcomb's introspective style of creativity was uncommon at Langley. 
Though he had a conservative, shy personality, he was a radical in the 
laboratory. In some respects, management did not know exactly how to 
deal with him. The best idea any of his supervisors came up with was 
to leave him alone except to help him through those administrative duties 
distracting him from what he really wanted to be doing. The best thing for 
a freewheeling mind, after all, was an open road. 
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12 
Hypersonics and the 
Transition to Space 
On 13 June 1944 Germany responded to the Allied invasion of Nor-
mandy by launching its first "Velgeltungswaffe Ein" ( or "Vengeance Weapon 
No. 1") missiles against England, followed by its first strike of V-2s on 
London in September. Because they flew at speeds of up to Mach 5 
(3400 miles per hour), the V-2 missiles were invulnerable to interception 
by even the fastest fighter planes. When the Allies captured the Baltic 
town of Peenemiinde in the summer of 1945, technical experts discov-
ered, among the various V-2 test facilities, a "super-supersonic" wind tun-
nel, which, though small (0.4-meter diameter), was operational-on an 
intermittent-flow basis-to Mach 5, as well as a larger, continuous-flow 
"super-supersonic" tunnel, which was under construction for a speed ten 
times that of sound. Nowhere else in the world were there high-speed tun-
nels like these two. Nazi engineers had built them for the purpose of testing 
long-range ballistic missiles, two of which (the A-9 and A-10) were planned 
for the aerial bombardment of the eastern United States.1 
Though there was early debate inside the NACA and elsewhere about 
whether ballistic missiles would ever amount to much in a military sense, 
the psychological effect of news of Germany's technically astounding V-2s 
falling on English civilians, and the fear of the same thing happening to 
people in the United States, made it urgent that the American aeronautics 
establishment explore the awesome potential of the new technology. Langley 
laboratory responded in 1944 and 1945 by setting up three new groups 
to study the problems of guided missiles and rockets: (1) the Special 
Flying Weapons Team, (2) the Auxiliary Flight Research Station at Wallops 
Island, to provide free-flight data from rocket-propelled test models (in 1946, 
this station became nerve center of Langley's Pilotless Aircraft Research 
Division, or PARD), and (3) a new supersonics branch, to explore the many 
new compressible-flow problems brought to light by early design studies of 
supersonic aircraft. 
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By 1945 it had become usual in discussing compressible flows to sub-
divide the fields into subsonic, transonic, and supersonic regimes. These 
divisions were logically derived from the type of differential equation that 
described each regime. Experimental research in compressible flows followed 
such division naturally, not only because experimenters furnished the physi-
cal guidance for theoretical development, but also because in this particular 
field the principal experimental tool, the wind tunnel, had major limitations 
in the transonic regime. 
There was no such clear-cut division yet between the supersonic and 
hypersonic ranges of flight. Generally speaking, aerodynamicists considered 
speeds above Mach 5 as hypersonic, since this was the supersonic speed 
at which aerodynamic heating seemed to become vitally important in 
aircraft design. Nor was there a clear-cut division between the experimental 
technologies of supersonic and hypersonic aerodynamics. Though it was 
clear to everyone by 1945 that subsonic and supersonic wind tunnels had to 
be designed very differently,* no one was yet sure whether supersonic and 
hypersonic tunnels could be designed similarly. 
An 11-lnch Pilot Tunnel 
One Langley researcher who was exploring the gray area between the 
supersonic and hypersonic speed ranges was John V. Becker, assistant 
chief of John Stack's Compressibility Research Division. On 3 August 1945 
Becker proposed the construction of a "new type supersonic wind tunnel for 
Mach number 7.0." Though a few of the smaller supersonic wind tunnels 
then in existence in the United States were capable of a maximum test 
Mach number of about 4.0, Becker reminded his chief of research that 
the large supersonic wind tunnels now under construction at Langley and 
Ames had been designed for a maximum Mach number of only about 2.0, 
with provision, in the case of the Langley tunnel, for future modification 
to permit Mach number 3.0 to be attained. Considering what was known 
about Germany's ballistic missile program at Peenemi.inde, these plans were 
grossly inadequate, Becker declared. Since it was plain that all of these 
* There are three important engineering design differences between subsonic and super-
sonic wind tunnels. First, the test section of a supersonic tunnel is placed downstream from 
the narrowest part of its circuit instead of at the narrowest part, as is the case in a subsonic 
tunnel. Second, supersonic tunnels require powerful multistage compressors capable of in-
creasing air pressure very dramatically in order to compensate for the large energy losses in 
the air circuit. Third, the air inside the circuit of a supersonic tunnel must be kept cleaner, 
that is, freer from oil, dust, and water vapor. See Donald D. Baals and William R. Corliss, 
Wind Tunnels of NASA, NASA SP-440 (Washington, 1981), pp. 49-50. 
344 
Hypersonics and the Transition to Space 
John V. Becker and h£s 11-£nch hypersonfr tunnel. The first successful run of the 
small facility, which was built in the shop of the old Propeller Research Tunnel, was 
in November 1947. 
American tunnels would "be used, to a large extent, to develop supersonic 
missiles and projectiles of types which [had] already been operated at Mach 
numbers as high as 5.0," it appeared to Becker that there was "a definite 
need" for equipment capable of hypersonic test Mach numbers. 
As the basis of his proposed design, Becker extrapolated from what he 
already knew about the proper design of supersonic tunnels. He knew, for 
example, that a Mach 7 tunnel would have to be fed with air through a 
smaller throat that expanded into a much larger test section, because the 
air beyond the nozzle diaphragm had to be accelerated so much more to go 
hypersonic.* He also knew that the power requirements for continuous-flow 
operation of a Mach 7 facility would be enormous. Equally enormous, he 
realized, would be the costs of the necessary compressor equipment.2 
This knowledge, and the uncertainty that enveloped it, pointed Becker 
towards a blowdown type of tunnel with a four-foot-square test section 
"sufficiently flexible in design to per1:1it easy modification." Mach 7 
* This was a more radical version of the expanding nozzle principle-which was the physical 
basis for originally achieving supersonic flow in a large wind tunnel. The energy pumped 
into a tunnel's airstream by a powerful multistage compressor, and stored in the forms 
of compression and heat energy, was converted thermodynamically to kinetic energy by 
the severe constriction and then sudden expansion of a tunnel's circuit. This conversion 
produced supersonic flow once the airstream had passed the point of smallest cross-sectional 
area. To provide for a range of test airspeeds, engineers designed the nozzle so that its 
shape could be varied systematically. Since the development of large supersonic tunnels in 
the 1940s, they have done this by using such things as interchangeable block nozzles and 
flexible nozzle walls. See Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, pp. 50-52. 
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flow would be moved through the circuit of this tunnel, the Langley 
engineer suggested, by supplying air from a 50-atmosphere pressure tank 
and exhausting it through the tunnel into a vacuum tank. (Thus the name 
blowdown.) With high pressure on one side and very low pressure on the 
other, tunnel operation could be maintained for about 90 seconds. Becker 
advised the NACA to construct a pilot model with an 11-inch test section 
and to operate it for a period of time to test the design before building the 
actual tunnel. 3 
Some at NACA headquarters and at Langley had reservations about 
building Becker's hypersonic tunnel. Jerome Hunsaker, the NACA's chair-
man, did not see the practical urgency of such a facility at the time, and 
Arthur Kantrowitz felt that wind tunnels could not go beyond Mach 4 or 
5 because of their serious liquefaction ( condensation of oxygen plus nitro-
gen) problem. But since the initial cost of the proposed pilot facility was 
relatively low ($39,500, compared with $350,000 for the actual tunnel), the 
opposing forces yielded to persuasion and the small 11-inch hypersonic tun-
nel was approved for construction. 4 
Becker immediately got together a design group headed by C. H. 
McLellan to do the job. This group soon discovered the truth of what 
Kantrowitz had foreseen: the job required more than extrapolations from 
supersonic tunnel design. During preliminary studies in the pilot facility, 
as tunnel air accelerated from supersonic to near-hypersonic velocities (at 
about Mach 4.5), and the air's latent heat transformed into energy of 
motion, the temperature in the test section dropped so low that the air in 
it liquefied. Experience with condensation in Langley's 9-Inch Supersonic 
Tunnel suggested that considerable "supersaturation" would probably exist 
in the air of a hypersonic tunnel; that is, the air would be far more dense 
with water vapor than normally. But no one knew for sure. (Some of 
Langley's theoreticians argued, in fact, that liquefaction should not even be 
occurring and would not occur once the tunnel achieved hypersonic airflow.) 
This uncertainty as to what would actually happen in hypersonic airflow led 
Becker's team to incorporate an electric heater in front of the test section 
of the small pilot tunnel. In November 1947 the 11-inch tunnel operated 
satisfactorily up to a speed of Mach 6.9~the first operation of a hypersonic 
tunnel in the United States.5 Thanks to the heater, the air temperature 
in the tunnel's settling chamber was high enough above saturation values 
to prevent liquefaction of the expanding air in the nozzle. The heater also 
enabled Langley's hypersonics experts not only to study the effects of heat 
in connection with the condensation phenomenon, but also to study heat 
transfer (i.e., the exchange of heat by radiation, conduction, or convection 
within a substance and its surroundings), knowledge of which was vital 
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in the design of supersonic aircraft and missiles. Engineers responsible 
for testing in the 11-inch tunnel soon developed an accurate technique of 
measuring heat transfer which they applied in a host of basic studies and 
configuration analyses.6 
Experience with the 11-inch tunnel suggested to Langley engineers that 
hypersonic tunnels using the intermittent blowdown scheme were preferable 
to the continuous-flow type tunnel, which, because of the necessary com-
pressor equipment, would be extremely costly.7 With sophisticated record-
ing instruments, short-duration test runs were sufficient. The 11-inch tun-
nel would itself achieve a remarkable record. Built as a pilot model for 
Becker's planned larger hypersonic tunnel-which was built some fifteen 
years later as the Continuous-Flow Hypersonic Tunnel-it operated for 
twenty-five years until 1973 when it was finally dismantled and given to 
the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia, for educational 
uses. At least 230 publications resulted from tests and related analyses in 
the 11-inch tunnel-or about one paper every five weeks for the twenty-five 
years. Few major wind tunnels designed for data production can equal this 
record. 
Though the 11-inch tunnel was a great success, Langley management 
knew that there were too many basic aerodynamic, heating, and fluid-
mechanical problems present in the hypersonic speed range to attack them 
all systematically in the single research facility. In 1947 John Stack proposed 
the design of an additional hypersonic facility that was radically different. 
Stack's idea was to use a single large spherical vessel (some hundred 
feet in diameter) with an array of blowdown jets located underneath. 
On demand, hot pressurized air could be parceled out in short bursts 
from this central source to individual test cells of small size (20 inches 
in diameter). 8 Different teams of Langley researchers could then conduct 
diverse experiments without tying down a tunnel for days or weeks. 
As preliminary design studies progressed, Langley· engineers found it 
more feasible and economical to reconfigure Stack's concept into a "farm" 
of many small high-pressure tanks-some of them salvaged from submarines. 
This Gas Dynamics Laboratory came into operation in 1951. It contained 
several different supersonic and hypersonic nozzles which together were 
capable of covering the speed range from Mach 1.5 to Mach 8.0. Work in this 
laboratory ranged from routine testing of scale-model aircraft components 
to esoteric basic studies in magneto-plasma-dynamics (the study of the 
interaction between a magnetic field and an electrically conducting fluid).9 
The first priority of hypersonics research at Langley in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s was to solve the major problems of the various long-range 
missiles then being developed by the American military and its contractors. 
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In the Gas Dynamics Laboratory, completed in 1951, researchers explored basic 
aerodynamic, heating, and fluid-mechanical problems in the speed range from 
Mach 1.5 to Mach 8.0. 
This was true also at Ames, where important missile-related research also 
began after the war. 10 
Long-range missile development challenged NACA researchers in a 
number of ways. A successful intercontinental ballistic missile would have 
to be accelerated to a speed of 15,000 miles per hour at an altitude of 
perhaps 500 miles and then guided to a precise target thousands of miles 
away. Sophisticated and reliable propulsion, control, and guidance systems 
were thus essential, as was the reduction of the structural weight of the 
missile to a minimum. Moreover, some method had to be found to handle 
the new and complicated technical problem of aerodynamic heating. As 
one of these nuclear-weapons carriers arched over and slammed back into 
Earth's atmosphere, the air around its nose-which carried the warhead-
heated up to tens of thousands of degrees, hotter than the surface of the 
sun. The part of this heat generated outside the boundary-layer surface 
by shock-wave compression, and which was not in contact with the missile 
structure, dissipated harmlessly into the surrounding air; but the part that 
arose within the boundary layer, and which was in contact with the missile 
structure, was great enough to melt the missile. Many dummy warheads 
burned up because they were unprotected from the effects o.f s.~pd~~c 
heating. ~;'~~;~ QUALlTY 
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In 1951 H. Julian "Harvey" Allen, chief of high-speed research at the NACA 's Ames 
laboratory. predicted that the aerodynamic heating problems of certain missiles and 
reentry vehicles could be avoided by changing thei'r nose shapes from sharp to blunt. 
In 1951 Harvey Allen, top man in high-speed research at Ames and 
former Langley employee in Eastman Jacobs's VDT group (1936 to 1940), 
found a practical solution to the serious aerodynamic heating reentry prob-
lem of the ICBM. In place of the traditional sleek rifle-shell configuration 
with a sharply pointed nose, an aerodynamic concept long since firmly im-
planted in the minds of missile designers, Allen proposed a "blunt-body" 
shape~familiar to us all now because of the rounded bottom side of the 
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space capsules, but a strange idea at the 
time. The blunt shape, when reentering the atmosphere, would force the 
buildup of a powerful bow-shaped shock wave, Allen predicted. The shape 
of this shock would deflect heat safely outward and away from the structure 
of the missile. 11 
Allen and his associate Alfred J. Eggers verified the blunt-body concept 
by studying the motion and aerodynamic heating of miniature missiles in 
an innovative supersonic free-flight tunnel, a sort of wind tunnel-cum-firing 
range which had become operational at Ames in 1949. Their report on these 
tests was published in August 1953 as a classified Research Memorandum; 12 
however, industry did not pick up on the blunt-body idea very quickly. 
People accustomed to pointed-body missiles remained skeptical of the 
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revolutionary blunt-body principle until the late 1950s, when the principle 
became crucial for missile design and for the design of the future blunt 
reentry capsules of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. 13 
In June 1952 the NACA Aerodynamics Committee recommended that 
Ames and Langley laboratories increase their emphasis on hypersonics 
research. This recommendation was partly a response to hearing first word 
of Allen's unanticipated discovery of the blunt-body concept; it was also 
partly a response to a special request from a group representing eleven 
guided missile manufacturers. The NACA Subcommittee on Stability and 
Control had invited this group to Washington in June 1951 to present its 
ideas "on the direction in which NACA research should move for greatest 
benefit in missile development." During the meeting, a representative of the 
Douglas Aircraft Company (which was busily engaged in the development of 
the Sparrow and Nike missiles) suggested that, because of the contemplated 
increase in the speed of interceptor aircraft to Mach 3, the NACA should 
begin immediately to explore the problems missiles were bound to encounter 
in the speed range from Mach 4 to Mach 10.14 
Most importantly, however, the recommendation reflected new interest 
in hypersonic aircraft stirred up in the NACA by a recent letter to the 
Committee from Robert J. Woods, designer of the X-1, X-2, and X-5 
aircraft for the Bell Aircraft Corporation. In a letter of 8 January 1952, 
Woods, a former Langley employee (1928 to 1929), proposed that the 
Committee direct some part of its organization to address the basic problems 
of hypersonic and space flight. Accompanying his letter was a document 
from Walter Dornberger, formerly commander of the German rocket test 
facilities at Peenemiinde and now employed by Bell, outlining the design 
requirements of a hypersonic aircraft. Dornberger was still intrigued by an 
elaborate concept for an "antipodal" rocket plane which had been proposed 
near the end of the war by his colleagues Eugen Sanger and Irene Bredt. 
This "winged V-2," according to the Sanger-Bredt study, would skip in 
and out of the atmosphere to drop its payload and land halfway around the 
world. 15 Dornberger's enthusiasm for the Peenemunde concept had captured 
Woods's imagination. As a final recommendation, the Bell engineer called 
for the NACA to define and seek to procure a manned research airplane 
capable of penetrating the hypersonic flight regime. 16 
The June 1952 recommendation by the NACA Aerodynamics Com-
mittee to accelerate exploratory hypersonics investigations "had little im-
mediate effect on existing Langley programs, with the exception that it 
inspired the PARD to evaluate the possibilities of increasing the speeds of 
their test rockets up to Mach 10." 17 But the recommendation did have one 
very important consequence for the future. In the final paragraph of the 
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recommendation, the NACA called for its laboratories "to devote a modest 
effort" to the study of the speed range beyond Mach 10 to the speeds of 
space flight. 
The Brown-Zimmerman-O'Sullivan Study 
In response to the recommendation of the Aerodynamics Committee 
to begin exploring concepts for high-altitude hypersonic flight, Langley 
management set up an ad hoc three-man study group. The group consisted 
of Clinton E. Brown, chairman, from the Compressibility Research Division; 
Charles H. Zimmerman, from the Stability and Control Division; and 
William J. O'Sullivan, Jr., from PARD. Curiously, none of the three 
had any significant background in hypersonics. Floyd Thompson, who 
became associate director of Langley lab in September 1952, had rejected 
a suggestion to include one of the lab's few hypersonic aerodynamicists 
or specialists in "hot structures" in the study group. Thompson's plan 
was to bring together creative engineers who could bring to the subject 
"completely fresh, unbiased ideas." Brown, Zimmerman, and O'Sullivan 
quickly educated themselves in hypersonics, asking Langley's experts for 
help when they needed it. The study group met periodically for the next 
several months. In late June 1953, Langley circulated internally the group's 
report, "A Study of the Problems Relating to High-Speed, High-Altitude 
Flight." 18 
Langley had asked Brown, Zimmerman, and O'Sullivan to assess hy-
personic problems and to develop research program ideas, but the trio chose 
to go further. After reviewing the potentialities of hypersonic systems 
at speeds up to orbital, the three researchers-all of whom had read the 
Woods-Dornberger documents-had become especially interested in defin-
ing a manned research airplane capable of penetrating the hypersonic flight 
regime, as well as in the commercial possibilities of that type of plane for 
long-range transport. The hypersonic airplane would be designed to fly to 
the limits of the atmosphere, then be boosted by rockets into space, re-
turning to Earth by gliding under aerodynamic control. Rand and Convair 
had by this time done some preliminary studies of "boost-glide" rockets in 
connection with their development of ICBMs;19 however, the scheme of the 
Brown group to incorporate such a system into an experimental airplane 
was one that no one had yet explored. 
Originally, the NACA's plan was to have an intercenter board review 
the findings of the Brown study group, but this was never carried out. 
Langley's hypersonics specialists did get a chance to talk frequently with 
Brown, Zimmerman, and O'Sullivan, of course, and in June 1953 to 
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The Brown hypersonic study group of 1952: Clinton E. Brown (top left) had 
worked with Eastman Jacobs during World War II on the Campini jet propulsion 
system and with Macon C. Ellis, Jr., in the Model Supersonic Tunnel studying 
the feasibility of the supersonic ramjet. Langley had recently named him head of 
the supersonic aerodynamics section in the Gas Dynamics Branch. Charles H. 
Zimmerman (center) had supervised tests during the mid-1930s in Langley's spin 
tunnel and had designed the lab's first free-flight tunnel. In 1937 he moved to a job 
with Chance Vought, where he was in charge of developing the F5U short-takeoff-
and-landing (or STOL) aircraft. Zimmerman returned to Langley in 1948. The 
field of his greatest aerodynamic expertise was the stabil£ty of radically new and 
different aircraft. William J. 0 'Sullivan, Jr., (right) had worked at Langley since 
1938. In the early days on Wallops Island, he had taken on the job of developing 
PARD 's rocket motor capabilities and rocket firing procedures. 
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hear Brown formally summarize his group's findings. When listening to 
this summary the specialists "felt a strong sense of deja-vu," especially 
at Brown's pronouncement that "the main problem of hypersonic flight 
is aerodynamic heating." They disagreed, however, with the group's 
conclusion that the NACA would have to rely on flight testing, rather 
than on ground-based approaches, for research and development beyond 
Mach 4. 20 
Brown, Zimmerman, and O'Sullivan had found it necessary to reject the 
use of traditional ground facilities for hypersonic research because they were 
''entirely inadequate" in accounting for the effects of high temperature. 21 
Anticipating significant differences between the "hot" aerodynamics of 
hypersonic flight and the "cold" aerodynamics of ground experimental 
technology, they "indicated that testing would have to be done in actual 
flight where the true high-temperature hypersonic environment would be 
generated." According to John V. Becker, "much of the work of the new 
small hypersonic tunnels was viewed with extreme skepticism," because they 
could not simulate the correct temperatures and boundary-layer conditions. 
To do this, Brown's study group recommended extending the rocket-model 
testing technique of the PARD at Wallops Island to much higher speeds. 
Perhaps, they suggested, it would be possible to recover the test models in 
the Sahara Desert of northern Africa. 22 
Here, again, was a case at Langley of free-flight versus wind tunnel advo-
cacy, similar to the debate that occurred in 1944 and 1945 over Gilruth's de-
velopment of the controversial wing-flow technique. Ground facilities could 
not simulate the high-temperature environment of flight at very high Mach 
numbers, admitted the hypersonics specialists, but wind tunnels like the pi-
lot 11-inch facility at Langley and the 10 x 14-inch continuous-flow facility 
at Ames had proved quite capable of "partial simulation." 23 Selective flight 
testing of the final article was desirable----just as it always had been-but, 
for the sake of safety, economy, and systematic parametric investigation of 
details, the hypersonics specialists argued, ground-based techniques must 
remain the primary tools of aerodynamic research. 
Concepts for a Hypersonic 
Research Airplane 
In January 1952 NACA headquarters sent copies of the Woods-
Dornberger documents to its different research staffs. At the N ACA High-
Speed Flight Station (HSFS) at Edwards Air Force Base (formerly Muroc) 
in California, these documents stimulated an unsolicited proposal for a large 
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supersonic airplane which would launch, at Mach 3, a small manned second-
stage vehicle to accelerate to hypersonic speeds. 24 At Langley, responsibility 
for evaluating these papers was given to David G. Stone, head of PARD's 
Stability and Control Branch. Within a few months Stone also submitted 
an unsolicited proposal for a hypersonic test vehicle. His idea was to equip 
the Bell X-2 research airplane with reaction controls and add two droppable 
solid rocket motors as boosters. 25 With such booster rockets, Stone claimed, 
an air-launched X-2 could be flown at a speed of about Mach 4.5 to orbital 
altitude. 
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Before formally submitting the findings of their study group to the 
NACA in July 1953, Brown, Zimmerman, and O'Sullivan had carefully ex-
amined Stone's research airplane proposal as well as the one from the HSFS 
for a supersonic carrier. The three men concluded that the Stone proposal 
was the more practical, and they endorsed it for further engineering study. 
This study proceeded rather leisurely for the next several months until Oc-
tober 1953, when the Aircraft Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory 
Board, of which Langley's Robert Gilruth was a member, pronounced that 
"the time was ripe" for looking into the feasibility of procuring a manned 
hypersonic research airplane. 
In response to this pronouncement and to news of progress on Stone's 
proposal to modify the X-2 for hypersonic flight, Hartley A. Soule, chairman 
of the interlaboratory NACA Research Airplane Panel, called for a meeting 
to be held in Washington on 4 and 5 February 1954. During this meeting, 
Soule's panel (which consisted at the time of Charles J. Donlan from 
Langley, Lawrence A. Clausing from Ames, Walter Williams from HSFS, 
W. Fleming from Lewis, and Clotaire Wood from NACA headquarters) 
rejected Stone's idea. The X-2 was too small to use for hypersonic research, 
the panel declared. What was needed, it said, was a completely new and 
larger vehicle built specifically for hypersonic research extending into the 
upper atmosphere and into space itself. 26 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the overwhelming majority of aero-
nautical engineers thought very little about manned space flight. Creating 
an efficient and safe supersonic airplane was difficult enough for them. Hy-
personic flight, if it proved feasible at all, they thought, would probably 
be restricted to missiles. Manned space flight, with its "multiplicity of 
enormous technical problems" and "unanswered questions of safe return" 
would be "a 21st Century enterprise." 27 In just a few short years, however, 
thinking changed. By 1954, a growing number of Am.erican aeronautical 
experts felt that hypersonic flight extending into space could be achieved 
much sooner, though very few of them had the foresight to see it coming, 
as it actually did, by 1960. The military had gotten involved in supporting 
future-directed hypersonic research and development. In 1952, for example, 
the air force had decided to sponsor a study of Dornberger's manned hy-
personic rocket-launched glider concept at Bell (Project BOMI). This study 
advanced and improved the Sanger-Bredt concept by developing, for the first 
time, a detailed "hot structures" concept. Non-load-bearing flexible metallic 
radiative heat shields ("shingles") and water-cooled leading-edge structures 
were to protect the wings while passive and active cooling systems would 
keep cabin temperature within human tolerance. NACA research sections, 
including the Brown study group, read the periodic progress reports of the 
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Bell study~classified secret by the air force---with great interest.28 In re-
sponse to the recommendation of Soule's Research Airplane Panel, NACA 
headquarters told its field installations to explore the requirements of a 
possible hypersonic research airplane. In addition to answering questions 
about stability, control, and piloting, which had been the concerns of pre-
vious research airplane designers, this vehicle would be designed to fulfill 
a major new objective: it would have to provide new information about 
high-temperature aerodynamics and structures.29 
NACA headquarters' directive prompted each installation to establish 
a special group of researchers to investigate different systems. A comparison 
of the work of these different NACA groups is illuminating because of 
their different approaches and findings. The Ames group concerned itself 
solely with suborbital long-range flight and ended up favoring a military-
type air-breathing, rather than rocket-powered, aircraft in the Mach 4 
to 5 range. The HSFS group at Edwards suggested a larger, higher-
powered conventional configuration generally similar to the Bell X-1 or 
Douglas D-558-I research airplanes it was familiar with. The staff at the 
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland recommended against a 
new manned research aircraft, arguing that hypersonic research could and 
should be done by expanding the Wallops Island rocket-model technique. 
It re1ninded the NACA that previous research airplane programs had been 
unduly burdened by anticipated military applications; there was no reason 
to think that anything different would happen in the case of a cooperative 
hypersonic research aircraft program. 30 
The intentions and conclusions of Langley's hypersonic aircraft study 
group of 1954 ( the successors of the Brown committee) differed substantially 
from those of the groups at the other three facilities. The original intent of 
the Langley group was to determine the feasibility of a hypersonic aircraft 
capable of a short (two- to three-minute) excursion out of the atmosphere 
into space. The idea was to create a brief period of weightlessness in order to 
explore its effects on space flight. Hugh Dryden, NACA director of research, 
would later liken this excursion to the leap of a fish out of water. 31 
Langley's ad hoc hypersonic aircraft study group consisted of John V. 
Becker, chairman, chief of the Compressibility Research Division and princi-
pal designer of the lab's pilot 11-inch hypersonic tunnel; Maxime A. Faget, a 
specialist in rocket propulsion from the Performance Aerodynamics Branch 
of PARD; Thomas A. Toll, a configuration and control specialist from the 
Stability Research Division; Norris F. Dow, a "hot structures" expert from 
the Structures Research Division; and James B. Whitten, test pilot. Un-
like the Brown study group, this group obviously included some researchers 
with previous experience in hypersonics. 
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Becker's group reached a consensus on the objectives of a hypersonic 
research aircraft by the end of its first month of study. Though study of 
the effects of weightlessness was the group's original goal, members soon 
realized "that the problems of attitude control in space and the transition 
from airless flight to atmospheric flight during reentry were at least equally 
significant." Becker, Faget, Toll, Dow, and Whitten each began to consider 
the dynamics of the reentry maneuvers ( and the associated problems of 
stability, control, and heating) as the most pressing research need.32 
By the end of April 1954, Becker's group finished a tentative design 
of the winged aircraft it had in mind, as well as an outline of proposed 
experiments. The group had kept the configuration as conventional as 
possible-on the grounds that it would minimize the need for low-speed and 
transonic research and development-without endangering its adequacy as 
a vehicle for the aerodynamic and structural experiments contemplated for 
hypersonic flight. In the absence of the rapid development of a major new 
engine, propulsion to hypersonic speed was to be provided, according to the 
tentative design, by a combination of three or four smaller rocket motors. 
(None of the larger missile engines then under development was thought by 
the Becker group to be satisfactory.) Launch of the aircraft would be by 
the proven air-drop method developed at the HSFS for the XS- I and refined 
during the flight test programs of the subsequent research airplanes. 33 
At this point Floyd Thompson, Langley's associate director, signifi-
cantly influenced the direction of the Becker study. He made a sugges-
tion that echoed John Stack's 1945 recommendation that Bell's XS-I tran-
sonic research airplane have a 12 percent thick wing that would force it 
to encounter exactly those drastic compressibility problems that aerody-
namicists were most interested in studying. Given that Thompson had op-
posed Stack's 1945 idea (see chapter 10), the similarity of his own 1954 idea 
seems ironic: since the hypersonic airplane would be the first in which aero-
thermal-structural considerations constituted the primary research problem, 
Thompson argued that the aim of the aircraft "should be to penetrate as 
deeply as possible into the region of [high aerodynamic} heating and to seek 
fresh design approaches rather than makeshift modifications to conventional 
designs." His suggestion became policy. Only the best available state-of-
the-art materials could be used in the design of the aircraft, however, if 
procurement time was to be kept reasonably short.34 
While performing the original heating analysis of the proposed air-
craft's reentry from space, Becker and co-worker Peter F. Korycinski from 
the Compressibility Research Division ran head-on into a major technical 
problem. At Mach 7-the critical speed coming back from orbit-reentry 
at low angles of attack appeared impossible because of disastrous heating 
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loads. (The dynamic pressures would quickly exceed by large margins the 
limit of 1000 pounds per square foot set by structural demands.) New tests 
in the 11-inch hypersonic tunnel of the force relationships provided Becker 
and Korycinski with a clue to a solution of this problem: if the proposed 
hypersonic vehicle's angle of attack and associated drag were increased, de-
celeration would begin at a higher altitude. Slowing down into the thinner 
(low-density) atmosphere would make the heat transfer problems much less 
severe. In other words, Becker and Korycinski surmised, by forcing decel-
eration to occur sooner, the increased drag associated with the high angle 
of attack would significantly reduce the aircraft's time of exposure to peak 
dynamic pressure and high heating rates. Thus, by using "sufficient lift," 
the Langley researchers had found a way to limit the heat loads and heating 
rates of reentry. 35 
On reflection it became clear to the Becker group that the "sufficient 
lift" idea was a "new manifestation" of Harvey Allen's blunt-body principle 
and that Allen's principle was as applicable to high-lift winged vehicle 
reentry as to the nonlifting missile cases he had studied at Ames in 1952. As 
the group increased the angle of attack of its vehicle in order to dissipate 
more of the kinetic energy through heating of the atmosphere ( and less 
in the form of frictional heating of the vehicle itself), the configuration 
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became more and more "blunt." Some form of dive-brake structure could 
also be employed, again in accord with Allen's concept, to increase drag 
and further ease the heating problem generated by high lift-drag ratio, the 
group suggested.36 
Throughout 1954 the heating problems of high-lift, high-drag reentry 
earned more and more consideration from key Langley researchers. An-
other problem outweighed the heating consideration, however: making the 
configuration stable and controllable in the necessary high-angle-of-attack 
reentry attitude (which was 11 to 26 degrees above horizontal, meaning that 
the descending craft's nose would be pointing upward by that amount). In 
the first stage of its design study, Becker's group came up with a vehicle 
concept that was really "little more than an object of about the right general 
proportions and the right propulsive characteristics to achieve hypersonic 
performance." 37 The planners did not know the exact hypersonic and con-
trol properties of such an arrangement; no one in aeronautics knew. Nor did 
anyone else know, for that matter, whether a structure could even be found 
that could survive the anticipated air temperatures ( estimated at approxi-
mately 4000 degrees Fahrenheit) affecting a winged vehicle during reentry. 
On the other hand, everyone did know that before the NACA would pro-
pose the procurement of a radical new research aircraft, it had to have solid 
answers to the stability and control question. 
The NACA's High-Speed Flight Station had forewarned Langley of the 
difficult problems of hypersonic stability. In December 1953 Maj. Chuck 
Yeager, USAF, pushed the Bell X-lA far beyond its normal transonic speed 
range to a speed of about Mach 2.5. (Wind tunnel tests of the X-lA had 
extended only to Mach 2.) As the experimental aircraft approached this 
speed, it developed large and completely uncontrollable lateral oscillations 
which nearly proved disastrous. While Yeager tried frantically to regain 
control, the airplane dived for over a minute, losing nearly 11 miles of 
altitude. At subsonic speed, the plane finally went into a spin from 
which Yeager managed a recovery. At Langley, this incident led to a 
systematic wind tunnel reinvestigation of the stability characteristics of the 
X-lA. By mid-1954 findings indicated that the life-threatening directional 
difficulties of Yeager's plane were almost certainly caused by the loss of 
lifting effectiveness of the X-lA's thin stabilizing surfaces as overall speed 
advanced higher within the supersonic regime.38 (In September 1956, air 
force test pilot Capt. Milburn G. Apt would be killed in a crash of the X-2 
rocket plane into California's Mohave Desert. The cause of this tragedy was 
similar to the cause of Yeager's 1953 near-disaster in his X-lA.) 
The Becker group faced a hypersonic stability problem that was a 
number of times more severe than that of the X-lA-after all, it was 
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designing an airplane not for Mach 2.5 but for Mach 7! Preliminary 
calculations based on data from the new X-lA tunnel tests indicated that 
the hypersonic configuration would require a vertical tail the size of one of 
the wings to maintain directional stability; but a tail of that magnitude was 
impractical. Stumped by this huge problem, Becker sought the advice of his 
11-inch hypersonic tunnel researchers. One of them, Charles H. McLellan, 
suggested changing the thin airfoil section of the tails, used conventionally in 
the design of surfaces for supersonic aircraft since the mid-1940s, to a thicker 
wedge-shaped section having a more blunt leading edge. Some time before, 
he had made a special study of the influence of airfoil shape on normal-
force characteristics; his findings had been lying dormant in the NACA 
literature. The calculations based on the findings of the previous study 
that McLellan now made for Becker indicated that, at Mach 7, the wedge 
shape "should prove many times more effective than the conventional thin 
shapes optimum for the lower speed." 39 By modifying the configuration in 
only this one detail, McLellan felt that the anticipated directional instability 
could be avoided.* 
A new experimental program in the 11-inch tunnel verified the predicted 
effectiveness of McLellan's scheme. It indicated that a tail with a large (ten-
degree) wedge angle would expand the ability of the proposed aircraft to 
achieve the range of attitudes ( required by heating considerations) for a safe 
high-drag, high-lift reentry; furthermore, it suggested that a variable-angle 
x-shaped tail would help this ( or any other) higher-speed supersonic airplane 
to recover from divergent maneuvers (i.e., those that caused deformation of 
lifting surfaces or other bodies as a result of aerodynamic loads being greater 
than elastic restoring forces, thus producing instability).40 
In deciding to add the x-tail to its configuration, the Becker group 
recognized that the design modification itself would present at least one 
major new problem: the wedges of the experimental x-tail projected into 
the high downwash regions both above and below the wing plane, causing 
a potentially serious loss of longitudinal effectiveness. t Wind tunnel tests 
* McLellan had outlined the findings of his original study in an "Investigation of the 
Aerodynamic Characteristics of Wings and Bodies at a Mach Number of 6.9," a paper he 
presented at an NACA conference on supersonic aerodynamics held at Ames laboratory in 
early 1950. A version of this paper appeared in the October 1951 edition of the Journal of 
the Aeronautical Sciences (vol. 18, no. 10, pp. 641-48). 
t Downwash is a small velocity component in the downward direction which is associated 
with the production of lift, as well as a small component of drag. At hypersonic speed, 
the flow behind a wing is characterized by a shock pattern. Immediately behind the shock 
is a region of high dynamic pressure and high downwash which intersected the lower tail 
surfaces of the original X-tail concept. (The upper tails were in a region of low dynamic 
pressure and low downwash.) This situation had the adverse effect of greatly increasing 
360 
Hypersonics and the Transition to Space 
began immediately at Langley to solve this new problem. In a few months, 
by late 1954, the lab had an engineering answer: locate the horizontal tail 
somewhere else besides far above or well below the wing plane-the locations 
which had been used conventionally in transonic and supersonic designs. 
Experimental data said to place the horizontal tail in the plane of the wing, 
between the regions of highest downwash.41 (In the final design of the X-15, 
North American Aviation would place the horizontal tail just slightly below 
the wing plane.) 
Up to this point in 1954, the history of Langley's work to develop the 
concept of a hypersonic research vehicle primarily demonstrated one thing: 
the need for flexibility. Since inception, the Brown and Becker groups had 
run into one major technical problem after another in the pursuit of a 
hypersonic aircraft capable of a "space leap." Conventional wisdom had 
provided experimental and theoretical guidelines for preliminary design 
of the configuration, but had fallen far short of giving final answers. 
The conventional wisdom of transonic and supersonic aircraft design had 
dictated that a horizontal tail surface be located far above or well below 
the wing plane, for example, but that wisdom was apparently wrong for 
hypersonic conditions. Ballistics experts committed to sharp-nosed missiles 
had continued to doubt the worth of Allen's blunt-body principle, but they 
too were wrong. Conversely, the instincts of Floyd Thompson, who knew 
very little about hypersonics but who was a 30-year veteran of the ups and 
downs of aeronautical research, had been sound. The design and research 
requirements of a hypersonic vehicle which could possibly fly into space were 
so radically new and different, Thompson had suggested, that only "fresh 
approaches" could meet them. 
The North American X-15 
By the end of June 1954, after three months of long and pressured 
work days, the Becker group reached a stage where it felt it could make a 
convincing case for the feasibility of a Mach 7 research aircraft. Those at 
NACA headquarters who followed the progress of their work, as well as of 
the parallel work on hypersonic aircraft concepts being done at the other 
NACA centers, agreed. It was time for the military to listen to a unified 
NACA presentation. 
Representatives of the navy and the Scientific Advisory Board of the 
air force assembled at NACA headquarters on 9 July 1954 for what became 
the yaw ( or side-to-side movement) of the lower tails relative to the upper tails, causing 
directional instability. See Charles H. McLellan, "A Method for Increasing the Effectiveness 
of Stabilizing Surfaces at High Supersonic Mach Numbers," NACA RM L54F21, Aug. 1954. 
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the first of many presentations on the possible new research vehicle. Hugh 
Dryden opened the meeting by outlining why he thought a hypersonic 
aircraft was now desirable. Hartley Soule, chairman of the NACA's 
Research Airplane Panel, then reviewed the history of the cooperative 
research airplane programs in the most favorable terms possible, and 
Walter Williams, chief of the High-Speed Flight Station, summarized recent 
activities at Edwards Air Force Base. When Soule and Williams finished, 
Becker and John E. Duberg-chief of the Structures Division, who was 
substituting for N. F. Dow-presented the results of the Langley study. 
The meeting concluded with agreement that the NACA should circulate 
a document setting forth the proposed details of a Mach 7 airplane to 
appropriate parties in the military and industry.42 Three months later, on 
5 October, the NACA Aerodynamics Committee met in executive session 
at the High-Speed Flight Station. (It had met in regular session the day 
before at the Ames lab, Moffett Field, California.) The purpose of the 
executive session was to come to some final decision about the desirability 
of a manned hypersonic research airplane. 
The session at the desert air base more or less followed the plan of the 
earlier Washington meeting, but the atmosphere was in more ways than one 
hotter than that of the Washington meeting. First, De Elroy Beeler of the 
HSFS staff discussed some of the more general results obtained previously 
with the various research airplanes. Then Milton B. Ames, the committee's 
secretary, distributed copies of a secret document entitled "NACA Views 
Concerning a New Research Airplane." Langley's associate director, Floyd 
Thompson, reminded the Aerodynamics Committee of the major conclusion 
expressed by the Brown-Zimmerman-O'Sullivan study group in June 1953: 
that it was impossible to study certain salient aspects of hypersonic flight 
at altitudes between 12 and 50 miles (such as "the distortion of the aircraft 
structure by the direct or indirect effects of aerodynamic heating" and 
"stability and control at very high altitudes at very high speeds, and during 
atmospheric re-entry from ballistic flight paths") in wind tunnels or other 
laboratory equipment. The high-velocity rocket program at Wallops Island 
could investigate aircraft design and operational problems to about Mach 10, 
the study had admitted, but this program of small unmanned flights was not 
an "adequate substitute" for full-scale manned flights. Having concluded 
that the Brown group was right, and that the only way known to solve 
these problems quickly was by using a manned aircraft, Thompson said that 
various NACA laboratories then had undertaken to examine the feasibility 
of designing and constructing such an airplane now. Trying to prevent an 
internal fight, he explained that the results from Langley to be presented 
during this executive session, and which were contained in the document 
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Ames had just distributed, though "generally similar" to the other NACA 
studies (which they were not), were more detailed than those of the other 
labs (which they were).43 
Walter Williams and HSFS test pilot A. Scott Crossfield followed 
Thompson's introduction with an outline of the performance required for 
a new research airplane and a discussion of some of the more important 
operational aspects of the plane. At that point Becker and N. F. Dow took 
over with a detailed presentation of their group's intensive six-month study. 
Lively debate followed this presentation. Most members of the Aerody-
namics Committee strongly supported the idea of the hypersonic research 
airplane. This group included Robert J. Woods, Bell's representative on 
the committee, who in the summer of 1954 had led one of the first industry 
teams to Langley to find out about the concept of the Becker group, and 
Clark B. Millikan of the California Institute of Technology, who emphasized 
the importance of obtaining flight experience, especially about the effects 
of the "no-gravity" condition on the pilot. 
However, Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson, Lockheed's representative, 
opposed any extension of the manned research airplane program. Johnson 
argued that experience with research airplanes from the D-558-II through 
the X-3 types had been "generally unsatisfactory" in that the aerodynamic 
designs were actually behind tactical aircraft designs by the time research 
flights could be performed.44 He felt that a number of research airplanes had 
developed "startling performances" only by using rocket engines and flying 
essentially "in a vacuum." These flights had mainly proved the bravery 
of the test pilots, Johnson charged. A great deal of data on stability 
and control at high Mach numbers had surfaced as a result of the test 
flights, Lockheed's chief engineer admitted, but aircraft manufacturers could 
not use much of this information because it was "not typical of airplanes 
actually designed for supersonic flight speeds." He recommended that 
instead of building a new manned airplane, an unmanned vehicle should 
first be constructed to obtain data on the structural temperature and the 
control and stability aspects of the proposed craft. If it were subsequently 
decided that the aeromedical problems were "predominant," Johnson said, 
a manned research airplane could then be designed and built. The airplane 
should be constructed in such a manner that it could be used as a strategic 
reconnaissance airplane. 45 
Various members of the NACA took issue with Johnson. Williams 
recalled that as early as 1947 the X-1 airplanes had made both climbing and 
level flight runs to about Mach 1.5 up to altitudes of some 55,000 feet. He 
pointed out that it took tactical airplanes from five to seven years longer to 
achieve flights at speeds and altitudes of this magnitude. Gus Crowley, the 
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NACA research contributed significantly to the development of the seven most 
important experimental aircraft designs of the 1950s. Parked (clockwise, from 
lower left) on the checkered tarmac at Edwards Air Force Base in California 
are: the Bell X-1A, the Douglas D-558-1, the delta-winged Convair XF-92, the 
Bell X-5 (the first aircraft to use a variable-sweep wing), the Douglas D-558-2, the 
Northrop X-4 (with no horizontal tail surface), and (in the center) the dart-shaped 
Douglas X-S. 
associate director for research at NACA headquarters, explained in response 
to Johnson that the NACA had developed its proposal convinced that the 
new research airplane should be based on the "X-1 concept." This was 
"to build the simplest and soundest aircraft that could be designed on 
currently available knowledge and put into flight research in the shortest 
time possible." In comparing manned research airplane operations to 
unmanned, automatically controlled flights, Crowley noted that the X-1 
and other research airplanes had made hundreds of successful flights, 
experiencing on numerous occasions excessive loading and buffeting and 
equipment malfunctioning. In spite of these difficulties-which, Crowley 
readily admitted, had occasionally put a plane out of control-research 
pilots had landed the aircraft successfully an overwhelming number of 
times. It was the human pilot that permitted further flights exploring the 
conditions experienced. In Crowley's opinion, automated flight could not 
be depended upon in similar cases.46 
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In summary, most of those present at this executive session of the 
Aerodynamics Committee believed that there were "no known limits in 
flight to which we will or can take human beings," that guided missiles would 
never eliminate the need for manned aircraft, and that recent studies showed 
that they were "so close to the achievement of the performance proposed 
by the NACA that we should proceed to accomplish these objectives in the 
shortest possible time," presumably within the next two years. After some 
further discussion, the Aerodynamics Committee passed a resolution: 
WHEREAS, The necessity of maintaining supremacy in the air continues 
to place great urgency on solving the problems of flight with man-carrying 
aircraft at greater speeds and extreme altitudes, and 
WHEREAS, Propulsion systems are now capable of propelling such air-
craft to speeds and altitudes that impose entirely new and unexplored aircraft 
design problems, and 
WHEREAS, It now appears, feasible to construct a research airplane 
capable of initial exploration of these problems, 
BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED, That the Aerodynamics Committee hereby 
endorses the proposal of the immediate initiation of a project to design and 
construct a research airplane capable of achieving speeds of the order of Mach 
number 7 and altitudes of several hundred thousand feet for the exploration 
of the problems of stability and control of manned aircraft and aerodynamic 
heating in the severe form associated with flight at extreme speeds and altitudes. 
Kelly Johnson was the only person to vote "Nay." Sixteen days after the 
meeting at Edwards Air Force Base, Johnson sent a "Minority Opinion of 
Extremely High Altitude Research Airplane" to secretary Milton Ames with 
a request (that was honored) that it be appended to the majority report.47 
With a strongly worded endorsement of the proposal from his presti-
gious Aerodynamics Committee in hand, Hugh Dryden immediately con-
ferred with air force and navy management on how best to move toward 
procurement. Quickly the three parties agreed that detailed technical spec-
ifications of the proposed aircraft, with a section outlining Langley's plan, 
should be produced mutually by the end of the year for formal presentation 
to the Air Technical Advisory Panel of the Department of Defense. 
On 14 December 1954, a team of NACA researchers and managers 
made this formal presentation to the Department of Defense panel. The 
panel approved the specifications and gave the NACA technical control 
of the project, but stipulated that the panel would have to be given the 
chance to review the design proposals submitted by industry. Just before 
Christmas the NACA, the air force, and the navy signed a "Memorandum 
of Understanding" setting up a new "Research Airplane Committee" to 
assume the responsibility for technical direction of the "X-15" project. On 
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The aerodynamics of air launching the North American X-15 being investigated in 
the High-Speed 7 x 10-Foot tunnel, about 1957. 
30 December, the Air Materiel Command invited aircraft manufacturers 
to a bidders' briefing to be held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on 
18 January 1955. At this briefing the NACA and the military informed 
potential contractors of the design and operational requirements of the 
hypersonic airplane. 
North American Aviation was awarded a contract in September 1955 
to develop the X-15, and another in June 1956 to build three prototypes. 
The Reaction Motors Division of Thiokol Chemical Corporation received the 
contract for development and production of the rocket engines. The original 
X-15 made its first flight, a powerless glide, in June 1959, 11 months after 
the dissolution of the NACA and the establishment of NASA. NASA's flight 
test program of the X-15 began in March 1960. One of the first NASA pilots 
to fly the plane was Neil Armstrong, who, within the decade, would be the 
first man to walk on the moon.48 
Between June 1959 and October 1968 the three X-15 aircraft involved in 
the joint NASA-air force-navy aeronautical research program made a total of 
199 flights. Until the first orbital flight of the space shuttle Columbia in 1981, 
the X-15 held the altitude and speed records for winged aircraft, with flights 
as high as 67 miles, and a maximum speed of 6. 7 times the speed of sound, 
or 4518 miles per hour. According to John Becker, the pioneering X-15 
reentry systems, their derivatives, and the X-15's reentry flight experiences 
"led directly" to the systems and techniques employed later in the shuttle. 
Though the public relations literature surrounding the impressive successes 
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Attitude control simulator for X-15 studies at Langley, 1958. 
of the winged shuttle has quite rightly emphasized the development of the 
reusable ceramic tile heat-protection system, the enormous boosters, and 
the automatic flight-control systems, Becker believes that too little has been 
said about the shuttle's aerodynamic design features and reentry operation 
modes, established by the NACA some 20 years before the shuttle's first 
orbital flight. The shuttle's reentry characteristics-the transition from the 
reaction controls used in space to aerodynamic controls, the use of high 
angles of attack to keep the dynamic pressures and the heating problems 
within bounds, and the need for artificial damping and other automatic 
stability and control devices to aid the pilot-are "similar in all important 
respects" to those of the X-15 conceived at Langley.49 
Project HYWARDS 
As Langley researchers began wind tunnel and structures testing of 
the X-15 in early 1956, they could take great satisfaction in the knowledge 
that NACA headquarters had pushed their radically new research airplane 
concept through the complex machinery of procurement as fast as they had 
found solutions to its difficult hypersonic design problems. One can imagine, 
then, how surprised the NACA researchers were in March 1956 when they 
heard rumors that the air force had established Project HYWARDS (an 
acronym for hypersonic weapon and Rand D system). The goal of Project 
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HYWARDS was to design and procure a successor to the X-15 capable of 
a speed of about Mach 12.50 
Although Langley's hypersonics specialists were busy in the spring 
of 1956 supporting the development of the X-15, Project HYWARDS 
also deserved high-priority attention. Floyd Thompson immediately set 
up another ad hoc interdivisional study group. Though larger, it was 
patterned directly after the successful pre-X-15 group.* Becker again acted 
as chairman. As a starting point, he decided to focus attention, for analytic 
purposes, on a design speed of Mach 15. Though none of the group was sure 
that Mach 15 would prove feasible, everyone believed that "it was about the 
lowest speed for which an attractive military boost-glide mission could be 
defined." 51 
The HYWARDS study group at Langley issued its first formal report 
in mid-January 1957. The most important recommendation in this report 
was to raise the design speed to 18,000 feet per second, or about Mach 18! 
The group had learned in the course of its heating analysis that 
at this speed boost gliders approached their peak heating environment. The 
rapidly increasing flight altitudes at speeds above Mach 18 caused a reduction in 
heating rates; at satellite speed, of course, on the outer fringe of the atmosphere, 
the heating rates became negligible. 
The step from X-15 to HYWARDS would thus be an enormous on~from 
Mach 7 to at least Mach 15 and possibly as high as Mach 18. In many areas, 
especially in high-temperature, internally cooled structures, the researchers 
would have to confront enormously complex developmental problems.52 
Becker's new group proposed the design of an advanced boost-glider 
prototype. In at least two respects the configuration it suggested differed 
importantly from the form of previously proposed boost gliders, as champi-
oned by Bell, which employed midwing arrangements. (That is, the fuselage 
crossed both above and below the wing.) Heating analyses carried out prin-
cipally by Korycinski and Becker himself had revealed "major advantages" 
for a restyled configuration having (1) a delta wing with a flat bottom sur-
face and (2) a fuselage crossing the relatively cool shielded region on the top 
* Members of the HYWARDS study group at Langley were: John Becker, chairman (also 
leader of the heating analysis subgroup); Max Faget, propulsion and configuration; L. Stern-
field and Frederick Bailey, stability, control, and piloting; Israel Taback, instrumentation, 
range, and navigation; Roger Anderson and Paul Purser, structures and materials; Philip 
Donely, loads and flutter; A. Vogeley, operations and X-15 coordination; Peter Korycinski, 
heating. As the work progressed, a number of other specialists were added, notably: Paul 
Hill, configuration and propulsion; and Eugene Love and Mitchel Bertram, configuration, 
aerodynamics, stability, and control. 
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In L957 Langley tested its HYWARDS design in the 11-inch hypersonic tunnel. 
( or lee) side of the wing. The flat-bottomed wing design had "the least possi-
ble critical heating area for a given wing loading," which translated into the 
need for "least circulating coolant, least area of radiative shields, and least 
total thermal protection in flight." 53 Here was the first clear delineation by 
the NACA or anyone else of design features that could significantly alleviate 
the aerodynamic heating problems of hypersonic flight, "space leap," and 
reentry. In the future, designers would incorporate these basic features in 
the air force's Dyna-Soar ( a program whose intent was to combine all post-
1953 feasibility studies on a boost-glide research vehicle into a single plan) 
and NASA's space shuttle. 
A Technical Debate with Ames Laboratory 
In the course of supporting HYWARDS, Becker's study group became 
engaged in a debate with a parallel group of researchers at Ames. A glimpse 
of this debate reveals specialists inside one overall organization arriving 
at different solutions to the same technical problem, and management 
mediating the consequent disagreements and rivalries. Results of the debate 
show how and why it is sometimes beneficial for two laboratories to work 
simultaneously but separately on the same problem. 
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The Langley study shed some new and surprising light on the require-
ments of lift-drag ratio (L/D ), an important gauge of the aerodynamic effi-
ciency of wings at different angles of attack, for hypersonic gliders.* Becker's 
group knew that regarding aircraft range at ordinary speeds this factor was 
as important as the weight and propulsion factors. But at the near-orbital 
launch speed required for "once-around" or global range, the group found 
theoretically that the glider weight would be carried initially almost en-
tirely by the centrifugal force produced by the launch. Considering this, 
the group perceived that aerodynamic L/ D lost most of its importance. 
Thus, for global range, the study showed that a certain glider design with 
low L / D would require only about three percent higher launch velocity 
than a design with L / D four times higher. Of course Becker and colleagues 
wanted to capitalize on the enormous configurational, weight, and heating 
benefits of the high-lift, high-drag glide trajectory mentioned previously. 
But it made sense to strive for high L/ D only for short ranges up to 2000 
or 3000 miles. For the intermediate range proposed for the Langley glider 
(1/4 global range, 70 percent of orbital speed), about half of whose weight 
would be carried by centrifugal lift, they judged that an intermediate design 
well below the ultimate high L/ D would be best.54 
Not everyone inside the NACA at first agreed with the conclusion of 
Becker's study group. When HYWARDS became a high-priority research 
item in the spring of 1956, Ames had also set up a study group. The 
motivations and findings of this group-headed by Harvey Allen and Al 
Eggers-were apparently quite different from those of the Langley group.t 
The Ames group was more intrigued by the possibilities for combining aero-
dynamic bodies-wing and fuselage, in particular-to produce beneficial 
interference effects. (This interest was perhaps stimulated by the great suc-
cess of Richard Whitcomb's area rule for transonic design; see chapter 11.) 
In the mid-1950s a number of Ames aerodynamicists were deeply involved in 
improving the performance of supersonic configurations through favorable 
interference ( the type that occurs when the pressure field of an underslung 
conical fuselage impinges on a wing). This involvement may have affected 
the outlook of the Allen-Eggers study group, for its members seemed to have 
* Since the ratio of drag to lift ( D / L) is expressed in very small fractions, it is customary 
to plot the reciprocal of D/L (i.e., that by which the given quantity is multiplied to produce 
unity; as, the reciprocal of xis 1/x) instead of D/L itself. This reciprocal, the lift-drag 
ratio (L/ D), is commonly called "Lover D." Typically, the shape of the L/ D curve is such 
that its maximum value occurs at the same angle of attack as where the D / L curve has its 
minimum value. 
t The other members of the Ames study group included Robert Crane, Glen Goodwin, 
and Lawrence Clausing. 
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worked hardest to identify a hypersonic boost-glide system that made use of 
favorable interference. In any case, the resulting Ames proposal called for 
a Mach 10 vehicle designed for the highest conceivable hypersonic lift-drag 
ratio. The Ames perception of the importance of high L/ D, a perception 
directly at odds with Langley's, was that it would optimize aerodynamic 
efficiency and thus allow the boost-glide vehicle to achieve a greater range 
than a ballistic vehicle for a given initial boost velocity. 55 
Ames and Langley tangled over the technical issues of Project 
HYWARDS on 14 and 15 February 1957 at the first meeting of the NACA 
"Round III" Steering Committee on New Research Airplanes. (The specific 
job of this subcommittee was to study the feasibility of a hypersonic boost-
glide research airplane. Round III was considered the third major research 
airplane program, the X-1 and D-558 series being the first and the X-15 
the second.) Langley spokesmen had two central objections to the Ames 
proposal besides the matter of high L/ D. First, in keeping with its pen-
chant fdr favorable interference effects, Ames had the fuselage crossing the 
high-pressure lower surface of the wing, the hottest region in the wing flow 
field. This location would increase aerodynamic efficiency, but it also re-
quired additional thermal protection, increasing the weight of the airplane. 
Second, and more importantly, Langley spokesmen questioned the low de-
sign speed of Mach 10 recommended by Ames, which was, in the opinion 
of Becker's study group, almost 50 percent less than the minimum velocity 
required for an attractive boost-glide mission. They were especially upset 
when advocates of the high-L / D approach suggested that the Ames vehicle 
would have a range advantage of some 1300 miles if launched at the same 
speed as the Langley vehicle (about Mach 18). Simple engineering calcu-
lations showed that the weight penalty associated with higher L / D would, 
for equal systems, nullify this range advantage.56 
The distance between the distinctively different design configuration 
philosophies of Ames and Langley on HYWARDS can perhaps be explained 
by a single fact about the NACA organization: Langley had a Struc-
tures Research Division that kept the aerodynamicists at the Virginia lab 
informed about trade-offs required by high-temperature structures and heat 
protection considerations; Ames did not. "Thus the Ames emphasis on 
high-L / D in the hypersonic research airplanes was simply a reflection of 
their established primary research interest [aerodynamics] rather than any 
special understanding or analysis of the real-life trade-offs that must be 
made between high-L/ D, structural weight, and, especially for hypersonic 
aircraft, heat-protection-system weight." 57 
Resolving the debate between the Ames and Langley study groups was 
up to NACA management at the two labs and in Washington. In the 
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interests of interlaboratory peace and cooperation, all three units opted 
for compromise. The HYWARDS team at Langley wrote a report for 
headquarters, for example, analyzing both the Langley and Ames vehicles 
in positive terms as essentially the results of alternative approaches: "low 
heating" (Langley's) and "high L/ D" (Ames's). Langley management and 
an officer in headquarters edited the report for impartiality, while Becker 
and members of his HYWARDS study group summarized its contents in 
presentations at Langley, at Ames, and at headquarters in May 1957, and 
at the Pentagon in July. Because of strong residual differences over how 
to configure HYWARDS, the NACA held an interlaboratory Round III 
meeting at Ames from 16 to 18 October 1957. Both working-level personnel 
and upper management attended. Again, compromise was the order of the 
day. The Langley and Ames study groups were ready to agree that it was 
"foolish" to be so "vociferously wedded" to present configurations. Each 
side knew that its own configuration fell far short of optimum. For its part, 
the Langley team recognized that it had simply selected "reasonable but 
arbitrary" values for some vital design factors. For example, it had originally 
determined the coolant requirements by merely assuming a particular wing 
loading and skin temperature.* The Langley team also now revealed 
that the complex internal coolant system it had planned for its glider 
configuration was "a highly undesirable complication," made necessary 
by the lack of a superior high-temperature material (which the Langley 
structures people dubbed "unobtainium").58 Considering the fact that the 
aircraft system it recommended would require new developments in every 
area of applicable technology, the team's forecast that the system could be 
developed and ready for flight in five years or less was far too optimistic. 
During his summary presentation at Round III on 16 October, Becker 
made exactly these points, if in a way that still meant to show the errors 
of the Ames high-£/ D approach. To do so, he predicted certain dramatic 
effects on the performance of the Langley glider that would result from 
* Two months before the Round III meeting at Ames, Becker and Korycinski had 
initiated a systematic parametric analysis of the coolant requirements of the Langley glider. 
Preliminary results were very exciting, for they indicated that if the glider employed a 
flat-bottomed wing designed for a particular loading and maximum lift, and if the glider 
were then operated at a specific high angle of attack (about 45 degrees) to produce a 
specific reentry attitude, the need for surface coolant would be virtually eliminated. This 
conclusion-which was reported in a 1959 confidential paper (see Becker and Korycinski, 
"The Surface Coolant Requirements of Hypersonic Gliders," NASA Memo. Rpt. l-29-59L, 
April 1959)-eventually helped to make it possible to design the metallic DS-1 vehicle of 
the Dyna-Soar Project without skin coolant. The space shuttle enjoys the same privilege 
because of its advanced ceramic tiles (see P. A. Cooper and P. F. Holloway, "The Shuttle 
Tile Story," Aeronautics and Astronautics, Jan. 1981, 19:24-34). 
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reductions in wing size and wing loading. He demonstrated that by using a 
wing that was 40 percent smaller, the range of the glider would be increased 
from 4 700 to 5600 nautical miles. Decreasing the size of the wing also 
reduced the L/ D by about 14 percent, but Becker emphasized that the 
associated 4000-pound reduction in glider weight more than compensated 
for this L/ D loss. The head of Langley's pre--X-15 and HYWARDS study 
groups concluded that "we should concentrate not on increasing L/ D by 
every known means, but rather on seeking optimized configurations," which 
meant, generally speaking, much smaller wings than those called for by 
high-L/ D designs.59 The Ames people seem to have accepted Becker's ideas 
with little question. Perhaps they realized by Round III that there were 
no quick and easy solutions to the enormous technical problems of heat 
protection in very high L / D design. 
Sputnik 
Langley and Ames had a more compelling reason, however, to compro-
mise over their different HYWARDS glider configurations than some new 
technical consensus over the optimum L / D or over structural heating re-
quirements. The first man-made satellite to orbit the Earth-the Soviet 
Union's Sputnik I-was moving overhead. Since Sputnik was launched on 
4 October 1957-only twelve days before Round III began-Americans had 
been huddling near radios and televisions straining to hear the "beep-beep-
beep" of the distant satellite. What they heard from the satellite alarmed 
them, but what they heard about the satellite bothered them even more. 
The Soviet achievement embarrassed American scientific and technological 
prestige, the politicians were beginning to say, and it posed a new commu-
nist threat to national security. 60 
Although the Main Committee took no official notice of it at its annual 
meeting on 10 October, Sputnik had captured the minds and imaginations 
of some within the NACA. Many attending Round III "felt mounting 
pressures" to solve the critical reentry problem of the ballistic vehicle and 
even to take on satellite research. Robert R. Gilruth, for example, recalls 
watching the sunlight reflecting off Sputnik I as it passed over his home 
on the Chesapeake Bay: "It put a new sense of value and urgency on the 
things we had been doing." Langley and Ames had been studying the 
problems and potentials of lifting bodies-that is, wingless bodies capable 
of generating lift-since the early 1950s. Theoretical and experimental 
results from ICBM research demonstrated very clearly by October 1957 
that ballistic operation-throwing a vehicle into the upper atmosphere or 
into space rather than flying it there and back-minimized both the launch 
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Comparison of equal-weight systems 
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19,750ft/sec 
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5600nm 
At the NACA 's Round III 
meeting at Ames laboratory 
in October 1951, John V. 
Becker used a chart like this 
one to show how Langley's 
hypersonic glider (to the 
right in the chart) could 
achieve increased range by 
using a smaller wing to re-
duce the lift-drag ratio from 
4.2 to 3.8. Above, a model 
based on Langley's concept 
of a hypersonic glider was 
test flown on an umbilical 
cord inside the Full-Scale 
Tunnel in 1951. 
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energy required and the reentry heat load. High reentry deceleration rates 
and the necessity of an uncontrolled parachute landing still handicapped the 
ballistic vehicle, but at least NACA labs had found a way to greatly alleviate 
the deceleration problem by designing, according to Allen's blunt-body 
principle, a wingless body with small L/D which was capable of significant 
lift.61 
During Round III, the Ames and Langley groups studying hypersonic 
gliders agreed that Sputnik made satellite research a high NACA priority; 
the two groups disagreed sharply, however, over whether the new priority 
of satellites should be placed higher on the NACA research agenda than 
the hypersonic glider. The majority of Ames people felt that satellites 
deserved higher priority. They said, in effect, that since the known science 
and technology of very low L/D seemed to suffice for satellite reentry, the 
NACA should decide to work on satellites rather than on more complicated 
and unknown HYWARDS-type winged configurations. The majority from 
Langley-some of whom had argued long and hard to convince their 
counterparts at Ames that high L/ D was not needed for HYWARDS-felt 
that the winged glider continued to deserve higher priority. 
Ira Abbott of NACA headquarters, a longtime Langley employee, 
mediated this new Langley-Ames dispute. At the close of the Round III 
meeting he voiced the majority opinion that the NACA should immediately 
begin to study the satellite reentry problem for nonlifting or slightly lifting 
vehicles. It should be "in addition to continuing R&D on the boost-glide 
system, however, not its alternate." 62 There was good reason for the NACA 
to think that its work on the boost-glide system was still, in spite of the 
growing reaction to Sputnik, more immediate and urgent from a military 
point of view than was work on satellites: after all, the air force had only 
two months earlier proposed Project Dyna-Soar to follow the X-15 project. 
On 3 November 1957 the Soviet Union launched a second Sputnik car-
rying a 500-kilogram payload many times heavier than the small Vanguard 
satellite then being contemplated for launching by the United States, which 
weighed less than two kilograms. This new Russian feat intensified the 
Cold War anxieties of many Americans, because the weight-lifting capabil-
ity confirmed the Soviet claim of an ICBM which could reach American 
cities. A genuinely concerned but politically shrewd Lyndon B. Johnson 
responded by convening a round of sensational hearings in the U.S. Senate 
during which the nation's apparently lagging and confused satellite and mis-
sile programs were thoroughly scrutinized. Facing a growing public demand 
for his administration to respond in some significant way to the challenge of 
the Sputniks, President Eisenhower was forced to insist that a test flight of 
Vanguard TV-3 scheduled for early December be billed as a fully developed 
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national attempt to orbit a satellite. This insistence backfired horribly: on 
the sixth of December, with hundreds of reporters from all over the world 
watching, the Vanguard rocket rose a mere four feet off its pad at Cape 
Canaveral, toppled over, and erupted into a sea of flames. The international 
press dubbed the failed American satellite "Kaputnik" and "Stayputnik." 
Cynical and embarrassed Americans drank the Sputnik cocktail: two parts 
vodka, one part sour grapes. At the United Nations, a Soviet delegate 
even asked if the U.S. was interested in receiving aid to underdeveloped 
countries. 63 
A revolution in public mentality was unfolding. Until the last ninety 
days of 1957, space had been a dirty word in American political arenas. 
Ira Abbott recalls that the NACA stood "as much chance of injecting 
itself into space activities in any real way [in the pre-Sputnik period] as 
an icicle had in a rocket combustion chamber." When he mentioned the 
possibilities of space flight to a House subcommittee in the early 1950s, 
Abbott was accused by one congressman of talking "science fiction." 64 Space 
had also had negative connotations in certain NACA quarters. The NACA 
had taken formal notice of space flight as early as 1952, but only as a 
natural extension of aerodynamic flight through the atmosphere into space 
and return. The predominant attitude of the Committee and leaders of its 
research organization during the period 1952 to 1958 was to avoid "Buck 
Rogers stuff." John Stack's support of the X-15, HYWARDS, and Dyna-
Soar projects, for example, was lukewarm in comparison with his ardent 
enthusiasm for supersonic transport and advanced military aircraft.* But 
now, in the wake of Sputnik, space was no longer a dirty word: rather, it 
represented a new field of battle in the Cold War. If the U.S. lost this battle 
in space, many in America and Europe began to believe, the entire world 
was perhaps doomed to communist hegemony. 
NACA leaders and researchers alike saw the development of the nec-
essary space technology not as a revolution requiring crash programs, but 
as an evolution fully within the capacity of the established aeronautical re-
search agency. So, in late November 1957, the NACA did "as it had been 
wont to do in any crisis throughout its 42 years"; it created a committee-----
* Stack resisted the space technology revolution long after the Sputnik crisis, probably 
because it threatened to drain away precious resources from aeronautical programs. In the 
early 1960s he told his colleagues that he did not buy the "to-the-moon-by-noon" stuff. After 
noting the enormous sizes of the Apollo rocket boosters ( "like the Washington monument"), 
Stack (who in November 1961 was appointed director of aeronautical research in the Office of 
Advanced Research and Technology at NASA headquarters) tried to persuade NASA to find 
a viable air-breathing, aircraft-like launch system. In June 1962 he left his high-level NASA 
post to become vice-president of Republic Aviation Corporation, where he could continue 
to work almost purely on aeronautical projects. 
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the Special Committee on Space Technology, which was chaired by H. Guy-
ford Stever, an associate dean of engineering at MIT, and included James A. 
Van Allen, the University of Iowa physicist who had developed satellite 
instrumentation for Project Vanguard, and Wernher von Braun, head of 
the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency 
(AB:MA) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama.65 A month later, 
on the day after Christmas, Hugh Dryden sent a letter to Henry Reid, re-
questing Reid to appoint a Langley committee of senior staff members for 
the purpose of "taking a critical look at the whole subject of aeronautical 
research as it was affected by space flight problems." This Langley com-
mittee, which was chaired by Robert Gilruth, reported back to Reid on 
31 January 1958. The principal finding was that Langley was already in the 
midst of "an extensive shift in emphasis towards the fields of hypersonic 
and space flight." 66 
What made the NACA so confident of its ability to assume the new 
and expanded roles in space research brought on by Sputnik was in large 
measure the promising and ambitious work and bold outlook of its X-15 
and HYWARDS study groups. And on no occasion was the confidence of 
these two groups more in evidence than at Ames in March 1958 during the 
opening session of the last NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics. 
The Last NACA Conference 
on High-Speed Aerodynamics 
The primary purpose of the NACA's periodic conferences on high-speed 
aerodynamics, begun in 1946, was to communicate the results of recent re-
search in supersonic aircraft and guided missiles and to stimulate discussion 
of those results. Through the 1950s attendance ranged approximately from 
200 to 500 people, about 90 percent of them from the NACA, the mili-
tary, and industry, the remaining 10 percent representing other government 
agencies, universities, and private research and consulting firms. 
As originally planned, the agenda of the last NACA Conference on 
High-Speed Aerodynamics would not explicitly include reentry vehicle 
concepts. This plan followed the longtime official NACA policy of leaving 
the design and development of specific aircraft to industry. A week 
after the December 1957 agenda-setting meeting, however, a contractor 
responding to the air force's interest in a manned minimum-orbit satellite 
(its "Man-in-Space-Soonest," or "MISS," project) visited Langley to discuss 
his company's candidate vehicle, a winged glider not altogether unlike the 
earlier HYWARDS configuration of the Becker group. The man's lack of 
understanding of how a long-range hypersonic glider should be drastically 
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reconfigured as a satellite reentry vehicle convinced Becker-who, after 
Round III, had turned to apply the surprising results of his and Korycinski's 
coolant study to the design of a one-man satellite vehicle with wings-that 
an NACA paper on the subject was needed at the forthcoming conference.67 
When the lab reopened after the Christmas holiday, Becker called on 
Robert Gilruth, who was coordinating Langley's conference papers, with a 
proposal for a paper on a winged satellite configuration. Noting that Ames 
researchers were quickly abandoning their winged reentry vehicle concept 
for new work on lifting-body satellites, Becker suggested that it was now up 
to Langley to provide the scientific, technological, and promotional support 
for winged vehicles. Gilruth agreed that all technical views needed airing 
and added that a study of a simple nonlifting satellite vehicle (which was to 
follow a ballistic path in reentering the atmosphere) by Max Faget, head of 
the Performance Aerodynamics Branch of PARD, also deserved presentation 
in a separate paper instead of being buried, as it was, in a general discussion 
of operational problems. Gilruth asked NACA headquarters if these two 
papers could be added to the conference agenda. 
Headquarters replied that the papers by Becker and Faget could be 
added to the agenda, and it notified Harvey Allen at Ames, who was to chair 
the relevant technical session, of the addition. Not wanting to be outdone, 
a team of Ames engineers led by Thomas J. Wong (under the conceptual 
direction of Al Eggers) now proposed to add a paper on their own best 
concept of a manned satellite-a blunt, lifting "half-cone." The organizers 
of the conference agreed to this third additional paper and scheduled all 
three for presentation early in the first session. 
The opening paper of the last full-dress conference under the NACA 
banner was a general "Study of Motion and Heating for Entry into Planetary 
Atmospheres" by Ames's Dean R. Chapman, an aeronautical engineering 
Ph.D. from Caltech. In his paper Chapman considered the special problems 
of entry into the atmospheres of Venus, Mars, Jupiter, as well as of Earth, 
and he introduced some exact and versatile mathematical tools for dealing 
with trajectory and heating problems.68 The three preliminary studies of 
manned satellites added to the agenda in early 1958 followed Chapman's 
presentation. Faget read his paper ( coauthored by Langley's Benjamin J. 
Garland and James J. Buglia) first. He highlighted several advantages of 
the simple nonlifting ballistic vehicle, a pet concept: 
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guidance, or control equipment. This condition not only results in a weight 
saving but also eliminates the hazard of malfunction. In order to return from 
orbit, the ballistic reentry vehicle must properly perform only one maneuver. 
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Maxime A. Faget was born 
in British Honduras in 1921, 
the son of an honored 
physician of the U.S. Public 
Health Serv£ce. In 1943 he 
earned a B.S. in mechanical 
engineering from Louisiana 
State University. After ser-
vice as a navy submarine 
officer, he joined the Lang-
ley staff in 1946 as a mem-
ber of the Pilotless Aircraft 
Research Division. His 
early work for PARD in-
volved the invention of chok-
ing inlets for ramjets and a 
flight Mach meter. 
This maneuver is the initiation of reentry by firing the retrograde rocket. Once 
this maneuver is completed (and from a safety standpoint alone it need not 
be done with a great deal of precision), the vehicle will enter the earth's 
atmosphere. The success of the reentry is then dependent only upon the 
inherent stability and structural integrity of the vehicle. 
Faget concluded that the state of the art in ballistics was "sufficiently ad-
vanced so that it is possible to proceed confidently with a manned satellite 
project" of the type he was proposing. He recommended specifically the 
design of a nearly flat-faced cone configuration 11 feet long, 7 feet in diam-
eter, and weighing 2000 pounds.69 Thomas Wong, a talented theoretician 
on Eggers's staff, followed with a paper ( coauthored by Charles A. Her-
mach, John 0. Reller, and Bruce E. Tinling) expressing the Ames position 
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Takeoff of a five-stage missile research rocket from Wallops Island in 1957. The 
first two stages propelled the model to about 100,000 feet; the last three stages were 
fired on a descending path to simulate the reentry conditions of balhstic missiles. 
on manned satellites. This was that lifting bodies-like the blunt half-cone 
conceived by Eggers after Round III-would prove superior to nonlifting 
bodies for use as manned satellites. Though his paper challenged many of 
Faget's claims, Wong did not push his group's high-lift, high-drag configu-
ration. As Eggers later explained, Ames people were not as enthusiastic as 
some Langley people were to participate heavily in a program to develop 
"hardware" and launch spacecraft of any kind, manned or unmanned. 70 
Becker read his paper last. He opened it with a brief discussion 
of "the general unsuitability" of high-L/ D gliders as reentry vehicles, a 
diplomatic restatement of Langley's previous critique of Ames's earlier point 
of view. Becker then compared the relative heating effects of lifting and. 
nonlifting reentry in order to emphasize the large reduction in heating 
rates and loads made possible by the low-L/D, high-lift operation of 
winged vehicles. The paper concluded with analysis of a small, winged 
satellite configuration embodying all of the desirable features identified by 
Langley during its previous X-15 and HYWARDS studies: low L/D for 
range control, hypersonic maneuvering, and the capability for conventional 
glide-landing; radiative solution of the heating problem by operation near 
maximum wing lift; use of a flat-bottomed wing-with a large leading-edge 
radius-and a fuselage crossing the protected lee area atop the wing. The 
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weight of the winged satellite was only 3060 pounds, Becker emphasized, 
merely 1000 pounds more than a small ballistic capsule. He argued that a 
launching system similar to the booster system described earlier by Faget 
for wingless, nonlifting satellites could thus also do the job for his winged 
vehicle. 71 
According to Becker, this paper, which dissented from the consensus 
within the NACA favoring a ballistic projectile, created more industry 
reaction- "almost all of it favorable" -than any other he had written. What 
ruled out acceptance of his proposal, however, was the fact that the Atlas, 
the only ICBM anywhere near ready for use in 1958, did not have sufficient 
lift capability. Analysis showed that any weight beyond that of Faget's 
small and simple ballistic capsule would surely require an extra stage to the 
Atlas-and even the stages it already had were testing out unreliably-or 
it would require some other yet-undeveloped rocket. If not for these facts of 
systems technology, Becker today believes, "the first U.S. manned satellite 
might well have been a [one-man] laudable winged vehicle," a miniature 
(3000-pound) version of the later (180,000-pound) space shuttle.72 
* * * 
The Langley engineers flying back to Hampton after the last NACA 
Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics ended in March 1958 knew that 
some basic, quick, and dependable vehicle like the one Faget recommended 
would 1nost probably carry the first man into space. Once home, they 
got researchers from PARD and other divisions busy brainstorming the 
problems associated with manned satellites. Through the spring and 
summer of 1958 these researchers performed tests and acted as consultants 
for the Man-in-Space-Soonest effort of the air force and the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency. Structures and materials experts-many of 
whom in the last five years had gone through a major transformation from 
"cold" to "hot" -worked to come up with satisfactory heat shield techniques 
and materials. Becker and his associates attacked the aerodynamic heating 
and hypersonic stability problems of variously shaped experimental space 
capsules in the 11-inch tunnel, while at the same time making the most 
of their opportunities to influence the X-15 and Dyna-Soar projects, thus 
sustaining the idea of winged hypersonic and reentry vehicles. 73 
If they had known that in less than four months, on 16 July, Congress 
would pass the National Aeronautics and Space Act, dissolving the NACA 
and establishing NASA, the Langley engineers flying home from Ames might 
have thought back with satisfaction on the quality of the 46 papers they 
had just heard at the NACA conference. These papers had dealt with 
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such important new subjects as hypersonics, satellites, reentry trajectories, 
retrorockets, boosters, and interplanetary flight. Taken as examples of the 
NACA's ability to fulfill its mandated advisory and research functions, the 
papers suggested the ability of engineers and scientists trained in aeronautics 
to push their research talents into the new disciplines of aerospace and 
astronautics. There was no need for the returning engineers to worry about 
their careers being cut short. Because the NACA would serve as the nucleus 
for NASA, their work would change but continue. 
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the NACA staff for 40 years of national service. 
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Epilogue 
In the hot early summer of 1958, before the creation of NASA, Hugh 
Dryden brought engineer Robert R. Gilruth from Langley to Washington 
to plan a man-in-space program "which would be acceptable not only to 
the NACA, but also to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, (or ARPA, 
which had been established by President Eisenhower in January 1958 to 
gather all antimissile and satellite activities in the Defense Department) 
and, of course, to the President's scientific advisors." 1 There, working 
less than ninety days in one large room on the sixth floor of the NACA 
building, a small task group of less than ten men, assembled by Gilruth 
over the telephone from the staffs of Langley and Lewis laboratories, came 
up with all of the basic principles of what would become Project Mercury.* 
The group's plan, which Gilruth outlined before the Senate Committee 
on Astronautics and Space Exploration on 1 August 1958, was to use an 
existing ICBM booster-the air force's Atlas rocket-to launch a small 
manned capsule into orbit. (The army's Redstone rocket, developed by 
von Braun's group in Huntsville, was to be used for early suborbital test 
flights of the Mercury capsule.) After a few passes around the earth, a 
retrorocket would be fired to slow the satellite down and thus initiate its 
descent from orbit. Following reentry into the atmosphere, which would be 
accomplished safely thanks primarily to the capsule's blunt heat shield, a 
large parachute would deploy, carrying the capsule and its human passenger 
on their final approach and landing into the open sea, where they would be 
recovered by helicopter and brought home aboard a naval vessel. 2 In essence, 
the plan for Mercury repeated what Langley engineer Max Faget, a member 
of Gilruth's task force, had proposed at the last NACA conference on high-
speed aerodynamics in March 1958. 
In the fall of the same year, after the establishment of NASA and 
ARPA's acceptance of the NACA's simple yet elegant plan for Project Mer-
cury, Gilruth returned to Langley and immediately began to put together 
* Gilruth 's original task group included Max Faget, Paul Purser, Chuck Mathews, and 
Charles Zimmerman from Langley, Andre Meyer, Scott Simpkinson, and Merritt Preston 
from Lewis, as well as a few part-timers who were brought in on an "as needed" basis. Later 
in the summer, under pressure to finalize a plan, Gilruth added Lewis's George Low and 
Warren North and Langley's Charles Donlan to his full-time staff. 
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In the mid-1950s Robert R. 
Gilruth, more than anyone else 
at Langley, began to push the 
idea that manned spaceflight 
was the next great challenge 
for aeronautical engineers. As 
head of NASA's Space Task 
Group, he was responsible for 
planning and carrying out 
Project Mercury, the country's 
first manned spaceflight pro-
gram. 
a larger and more formal group whose task was to rush implementation 
of the manned satellite project. Though to be located at Langley, this 
Space Task Group, or STG, was to report not to Langley management, 
but, in accordance with the instructions of NASA Administrator T. Keith 
Glennan, to Abe Silverstein in Washington, a veteran NACA engineer who, 
in the new NASA organization, had been made head of all space projects 
at headquarters. 
This novel situation of a kingdom within a kingdom troubled Langley 
managers, who had good reason to fear the loss of many of their best peo-
ple from the traditionally strong general research programs, but of course 
the feeling did not stop them from cooperating with the crash effort. In 
fact Floyd Thompson, the center's associate director, made things easy for 
Gilruth: "When I asked him how I could get men transferred from the re-
search center at Langley Field to my new Space Task Group, [Thompson] 
suggested that a simple memorandum to him, stating that I had been au-
thorized by the Administrator to draft people from Langley, would allow 
me to name those whom I wanted." 3 On 3 November 1958 Gilruth asked 
Thompson in writing for the transfer of 36 Langley personnel to STG, 14 
of whom belonged to the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARD) at 
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Wallops Island; the next day Thompson okayed all but one of the transfers~ 
the sole exception being a man the Instrument Research Division wanted to 
keep, and for whom Thompson found a replacement. He even found a way to 
use the staffing of STG to the center's advantage. Thompson told Gilruth, 
"Bob, I don't mind letting you have as many good people from Langley as 
you need, but from now on I am going to insist that for each man you want 
to take, you must also take one that I want you to take." In this way, the 
associate director was able to serve both the interest of those employees who 
felt unfulfilled in their current positions, and were thus eager to transfer, 
and the interest of the center as a whole, by getting rid of employees who 
were causing some problem or who were disliked where they were.4 
Although Thompson handled it well, the problem of staffing the Space 
Task Group signaled the start of a very intense and agitated era in Langley's 
history, that of the space technology revolution. The swift and enormous 
shift in emphasis from performing general aerodynamic research to planning 
and managing space hardware development and flight operations, a shift 
that began in association with Project Mercury, was a traumatic experience 
for Langley. 
In part, this trauma resulted from a new and unusually heavy reliance 
on outsiders. "Contracting out" to private industry for certain necessary 
goods and services ran counter to the lab's tradition of the engineer in 
charge, the treasured independence ( even from headquarters) and self-
sufficiency made possible only by a broad range of in-house capabilities. 
But Project Mercury was "of an entirely different dimension than anything 
the NACA had ever done before," Gilruth remembers. "We had to cover 
many fronts, not only in the manufacturing area and the launch vehicle 
area, but also in the operations area." This coverage included procurement 
of the Atlas launch rockets from the air force and of the Redstone launch 
vehicles from the army, plus arrangement of launch services, as well as 
development of a worldwide satellite tracking network, coordination of 
recovery operations with the navy and air force, and cooperation between 
the various NASA centers involved in preflight testing. Specifications had 
to be prepared for industry, project guidelines had to be established, bidders 
had to be briefed, proposals from contractors had to be evaluated, contracts 
had to be placed, and work under contract (particularly at McDonnell 
Aircraft of St. Louis, which, in January 1959, was named prime contractor 
for the Mercury spacecraft) had to be supervised. 5 And all of this had to 
be done in a hurry if the United States was going to put a man in space 
before the Soviet Union did. 
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Besides adjusting to this new need to rely on,outsiders, and besides 
absorbing the loss of talented personnel to the Space Task Group-which 
exploded in size from the original nucleus of 35 people in November 1958 to 
about 350 people in July 1959, over half of whom came from Langley-the 
center itself took on much of the direct responsibility for getting Mercury off 
the ground. Beginning in late November 1958, Langley provided extensive 
research and technical support for the development of the "Little Joe" 
launch vehicle, a new combination of four Sergeant solid rockets clustered 
in a single airframe, which had been conceived, even before STG was 
organized, by Langley engineers Faget and Purser as a means of testing 
the Mercury capsule configuration at Wallops Island before proceeding to 
the more expensive and difficult phases of testing at Cape Canaveral.6 Then 
came the job of constructing part of "Big Joe," a full-scale instrumented 
mockup of the proposed Mercury spacecraft, that was to be launched from 
Cape Canaveral on the top of an Atlas D booster in September 1959 
to prove the design of the Mercury capsule and its ablative heat shield. 
(Langley designed and fabricated the capsule's afterbody; Lewis constructed 
the forward, pressurized sections; General Electric built the heat shield.) 7 
In February 1959, NASA headquarters gave complete responsibility for 
planning and contracting for the Mercury's worldwide tracking network to 
Langley.8 During the same month, a number of the center's high-speed 
wind tunnel specialists accompanied STG members on a visit to the air 
force's Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tullahoma, Tennessee, 
to ascertain whether AEDC's facilities were equipped to test scale models of 
the Mercury spacecraft and, if the facilities were found equipped, to arrange 
a testing schedule.9 At midyear the center estimated that, not counting 
the dozens of people it had already transferred to STG, 119 of its 1150 
professional employees were spending 100 percent of their time working 
in support of Project Mercury. Many others were exploring hypersonic 
aerodynamics, reentry physics, and the Mercury escape tower configuration 
either in various tunnels at the center or with rocket models at Wallops. 
From the spring of 1959 on, Langley provided NASA headquarters with 
weekly progress reports on its extensive support of Project Mercury. 10 
Only once before in Langley history, during World War II, had so many 
parts of the laboratory's organization been driven by the need, and the 
will, to perform with such singleness of purpose. And, unlike the wartime 
requirement, Project Mercury involved Langley in everything from in-house 
basic research, to out-of-house hardware development, to planning and 
management of actual flight operations. 
The shift toward space technology development was also traumatic for 
Langley because it meant at least in part a shift away from aeronautics, 
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Besides losing many talented per-
sonnel to the Space Task Group, 
Langley itself assumed much of the 
dz'rect responsibility for getting 
ProJ·ect Mercury off the ground. 
Above, the Mercury space capsule 
was tested in the center's Full-Scale 
Tunnel in January 1959; left, the 
Little Joe launch vehicle, being pre-
pared here for a test launch from 
Wallops Island in January 1960, 
was conceived by Langley engineers 
Max Faget and Paul Purser even be-
! ore STG was organized. 
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the field which Langley engineers had been cultivating for over forty 
years. Veteran aeronautical engineer Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, who directed 
NASA's Office of Advanced Research and Technology from 1962 to 1966, 
put it mildly when he stated in a 1983 memoir that 
the formation of NASA ... had a dramatic, and at first deleterious, influence on 
the on-going program of aeronautical research [at the old NACA laboratories]. 
The new space tasks were often under scientists who worked on a space 
problem for one week and then switched back to aeronautics the next week. The 
work was done while the entire NACA staff was occupied with the problems of 
reorganization under NASA, with the pressure of expanding staff and facilities, 
and with the problems of contracting for and monitoring or managing programs 
with outside industrial contractors. 
The massive priority which the country, from the president on down, 
placed on eclipsing the Russian lead in space flight had a profound influence 
on the NACA aeronautical research staff as they assumed positions in the 
new agency. Many took advantage of opportunities to move to higher grades 
and levels of responsibility in space activities. As a result, many moved from 
aeronautical research tasks to space program management tasks. 11 
Others, like John Stack, were so sure that the first A in NASA was being 
erased forever that they decided to leave the space agency entirely. At the 
time, especially after NASA's annual R&D budget for aeronautics fell below 
a million dollars in 1962, these disillusioned aviation enthusiasts could not 
have known how extensively, or how successfully, NASA would rebuild its 
aeronautics program following its major buildup for space.* 
NASA's primary emphasis on building competence in space technology 
and on funding manned space flight caused some severe dislocations at 
Langley in the 1960s, to be sure. Moreover, it caused a major change 
in the way the public perceived the research center. Under the NACA, 
Langley was, relatively speaking, a low-key, mind-its-own-business type 
of organization whose activities were invisible to the average American. 
* During the 1970s NASA scientists and engineers would make significant contributions 
to aeronautical technology, including the development of the variable-sweep wing and of 
vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capabilities, the design of the supercritical airfoil, 
and the refinement of energy-efficient engines and fuels. Much of the work behind these 
contributions was done at Langley. Today, there is renewed interest at the center in the 
development of an American SST, a 250-passenger supersonic transport capable of cruising 
speeds in excess of Mach 2.5. See Richard H. Petersen and Cornelius Driver, "Readying 
Technology for a Super SST," Aerospace America 23 (July 1985): 56-59. Furthermore, Langley 
is also now spearheading the national effort to develop new technologies leading to a 
hypersonic transport, or HST, one proposed version of which is known as the "Orient 
Express." This vehicle would be capable of traveling twenty-five times faster than sound, 
going into orbit, or flying from Washington to Tokyo in two hours. 
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When residents of the Hampton area thought about Langley scientists 
and engineers, which was very rarely, they considered them as NACA 
nuts. But now, especially after the seven Mercury astronauts began their 
nationally publicized spaceflight training under STG direction at the center 
in April 1959, the area's residents perceived Langley's staff members more 
as wizards-technological magicians who could not only explain to them 
the meaning of the foreign objects orbiting ominously overhead, but who 
could also answer whatever challenges to the nation's security those objects 
implied.* ( Conjure the scene from The Wizard of Oz: the wicked witch 
flies over the Emerald City spelling out "Surrender Dorothy," and all 
the terrified citizens rush to the wizard to find out what it means. In 
an exaggerated way, this gives some idea of how the Sputnik crisis and 
the resulting American space program triggered the local public's feelings 
of wonder about, and admiration for, Langley.) When Mercury proved 
successful, and ultimately grew into Project Apollo, respect for the center 
grew even greater-especially among the young people, as was indicated by 
the dramatic increase in mail received from students seeking information 
about NASA and its space programs. But adults were also caught up in the 
wave of enthusiasm. Hamptonians were so pleased with the attention that 
the space programs were bringing to their city that they voted to change 
the name of "Military Highway" to "Mercury Boulevard" and to dedicate 
the town's bridges in honor of the astronauts. 
But despite the traumas in staffing and in reliance on outsiders, 
despite the professional dislocations for engineers and researchers, and 
despite the transformation in public perception, the space technology 
revolution of the 1960s did not destroy the legacy of the engineer in 
charge. There was a great deal about the place under NASA that 
remained virtually the same as it had been under the NACA. Those 
who had performed key research and supervisory jobs at the end of 
the NACA years played similar roles in the early NASA. Employees 
followed nearly all of the same procedures to initiate, monitor, and 
terminate work as had been followed in the last years of the NACA. Par-
tial autonomy from headquarters and resistance to central controls contin-
ued to flourish. This remained true at least through the time that Floyd 
* In The Good Old Days in Hampton and Newport News (Richmond, Va.: Dietz Press, 1986), 
local historian and newspaper columnist Parke Rouse, Jr., remarked: "We locals at first 
regarded the bearded NACA [Nuts] as weirdos, up to no good. They dressed and acted like 
kooks, and they worked at mysterious jobs. But years later, when that research produced 
trips to the moon, we had to take it all back" (p. 69). Rouse's reference to bearded NACA 
Nuts undoubtedly testifies to the impact of Eastman Jacobs on the local public. 
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The spaceflight training of the Mercury astronauts (front row from left, Virgil "Gus" 
Grissom, Scott Carpenter, Donald "Deke" Slayton, Gordon Cooper; back row, Alan 
Shepard, Walter Schirra, and John Glenn) at Langley caused a major change in local 
residents' perception of the research center. Instead of considering the laboratory as 
the home of NACA nuts, they now saw it as the home of NASA wizards. 
Thompson, engineer and NACA veteran of forty years, acted as director of 
the center ( l 960~ 1968). 
In May 1968 Edgar M. Cortright, age 45, succeeded Thompson, age 69, 
as Langley's director. In certain respects the coming of Cortright was 
in keeping with Langley tradition. Like Thompson and Henry Reid, he 
was an engineer whose first professional employment was with the NACA. 
After graduating with a bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineering from 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1947, Cortright had gone right to 
work at the NACA's Lewis laboratory, where he had specialized in the 
propulsion aerodynamics of supersonic aircraft and guided missiles. While 
in Cleveland, he had grown very close to Abe Silverstein, Lewis's dynamic 
associate director. Because Silverstein had worked at Langley from 1929 to 
1943, Cortright, his protege, was familiar with many of the traditions of the 
NACA's first laboratory. 
But the coming of Cortright also meant dramatic change. Unlike his 
two predecessors as engineer-in-charge, he had never worked at Langley. 
Instead of making his way to a high position through leadership in the lab-
oratory's general research program, Cortright had earned the directorship 
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Floyd L. Thompson {left), former center director retired since 1968, and Edgar M. 
Cortright {middle}, outgoing director, welcome Donald P. Hearth as the new director 
{and fifth engineer-in-charge) of Langley Research Center in August 1975. 
through his project management work at NASA headquarters*-where by 
the mid-1960s, a few key Langley veterans believe, there were some strong 
feelings at the top that Langley had gone its own way too often under 
Thompson's NACA style of management and needed to be brought under 
tighter central control. 
A complete historical analysis of Cortright's appointment, and of the 
style and substance of his subsequent administration (May 1968 through 
August 1975), belongs not in this book, however, but in its sequel. Here 
one need state only that by the end of the second year of his tenure Cortright 
had directed the most sweeping reorganization in the center's history. 12 
* vVhen Silverstein came to Washington in the summer of 1958 to help prepare the 
transition to NASA, he brought Cortright with him. For most of his years in Washington, 
Cortright was associated with the unmanned space program (including the Mariner, Ranger, 
and Surveyor projects), where his immediate boss was Homer E, Newell, a former chief 
scientist at the Naval Research Laboratory. In 1963 Cortright became NASA's deputy 
associate administrator for space science and applications. Just before coming to Langley, 
he became deputy associate director of the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF). 
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Thompson reflects back in time to the design of this DeHavilland DH-4, the only 
aircraft built (under license) in the United States to serve in combat during World 
War I. The National Air and Space Museum loaned this historic aircraft to Langley 
in the fall of 1967 on the occasion of the laboratory's fiftieth anniversary. 
Floyd Thompson retired from government service in November 1968, 
after serving for six months as administrator James Webb's special assistant 
and as chairman of a special group at headquarters whose task was to 
evaluate future manned spaceflight projects in the wake of Apollo. 13 He 
died on 10 July 1976, ten days before the first Viking lander touched down 
on the surface of Mars. 
In retirement, after a life devoted to the advancement of flight, Thomp-
son had looked back on the progress of American aeronautics in his time 
and had wondered: How was it that we were able to go from Kitty Hawk 
to the moon in the course of one man's lifetime? During World War I his 
high school science teacher had not been able to teach him anything about 
the principles of aeronautical engineering, because the teacher could not 
have known about them. His professors at the University of Michigan had 
informed him in the early 1920s that these principles had yet to be fully 
discovered, which meant that professional researchers still had to investi-
gate the difficulties of the past, collect facts, and then, after finding out the 
meaning of the facts, determine the principles of flight. That investigation 
was part of the mission Thompson had assumed when he accepted a job 
with the NACA in 1926. 
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Four months after reporting to work at Langley Field, Thompson had 
witnessed the Schneider Cup Race over Hampton Roads; a U.S. Navy pilot 
took second place in the race flying an R3C-2 at the "fantastic" average 
speed of 231 miles per hour. The following year, as Thompson was helping 
to conduct flight research on seaplanes and rigid airships, Lindbergh had 
crossed the Atlantic. American aviation had boomed. 
By the mid-1930s, Thompson's colleagues at Langley were beginning to 
explore the possibility of flight at more than 500 miles per hour. "And just 
as we got to the transonic field," Thompson exclaimed in a 1972 interview, 
"then all of a sudden we opened up with the supersonic field and find out 
that we're flying-militarily anyway-we're flying at speeds of [Mach] 2 and 
3. And you just about get that pretty well understood and, Holy Smoke, 
here we are going to the moon and things like that." 14 
Somehow, in less than seventy years, aviation had moved from the Jenny 
to the X-15, from the drone of propellers to the roar of jets and rockets, from 
wind tunnels generating a maximum airflow speed of 90 miles per hour to 
tunnels generating Mach 8, from flight a few hundred feet above the ground 
to flight in space. For Thompson, the most incredible fact of this altogether 
incredible history was this: it was work that he and other individuals like 
him had done that was largely responsible for it. 
How had these people been able to advance the technological front so 
far so fast? No doubt part of the answer rests-as Laurence K. Loftin, Jr., 
Thompson's longtime associate at Langley, points out in his 1985 book 
Quest for Performance: The Evolution of Modern Aircraft-in the unique 
nature of the airplane itself: "In no other type of machine, with the pos-
sible exception of space vehicles, do the often conflicting requirements of 
performance, safety, reliability, and economic viability place such a high pre-
mium on detailed design optimization." 15 But before this inherent motive 
for innovation could become a potent force driving the work of professional 
engineers, the airplane had to achieve a mission-and one recognized as im-
portant by a modern industrial society. This achievement was realized, of 
course, during World War I, as "the demands of combat aviation," together 
with the international struggle for air superiority, transformed the airplane 
from a "useless freak" into a highly practical and versatile vehicle whose 
every detail had to be designed rigorously if the total configuration was to 
prove successful.16 
From that time on, as more and different missions for aircraft were 
conceived, aircraft design criteria changed radically and almost without 
interruption. And no single organization of aeronautical engineers felt the 
pressures and exhilarations of this flux any more than did those who worked 
at Langley. Faced with the challenge of constantly looking ahead, probing 
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for problems, and establishing the feasibility of what the country's leaders 
wanted to be doing in relation to flight, the best NACA researchers made 
change into a habit, and the expectation of surprise into a rule of thumb. In 
many respects, this was a humbling experience, to learn over and over again 
that what they had not known at a given moment played as important a 
role in the evolution of an aircraft as what they had known, and to admit, 
both to themselves and to outsiders, that aerodynamic effects about which 
they had known absolutely nothing just a few years ago (such as the effects 
of boundary layer, in the late 1920s; of wind tunnel turbulence and of wing 
surface roughness, in the 1930s; and of the total cross-sectional area of 
wings, fuselage, and tail on transonic drag rise, in the late 1940s) were now 
among the most critical items on their research agenda.17 
But the humbling experience prepared them well for what was to 
come. As the golden age of atmospheric flight reached full maturity in 
the 1950s-with only a few major things (like a supersonic transport) left 
undone-many of these same researchers moved successfully from their 
mature aeronautical specialties into the new ones of spaceflight and reentry. 
This cross-flow came largely from the young field of hypersonics. 
The role of this cross-flow in the indisputable success of the overall 
American aerospace effort from the 1950s to the present should hold some 
meaning for those who are today educating and employing engineers. As 
Arthur L. Donovan, an historian of technology, wrote in a 1985 report for 
the National Research Council's Committee on Education and Utilization 
of the Engineer: 
The realization that the engineering manpower system possesses a high degree 
of resilience has important implications for engineering education. Because we 
are incapable of predicting with a useful degree of accuracy future shifts in the 
demand for engineers, and because the response times of universities are so slow 
in comparison with those of the marketplace for engineering labor, attempts to 
tie the content of engineering education closely to the needs of industry have 
been of little use in anticipating or responding to short-term stresses in the 
engineering manpower system. Indeed, attempts to forge a tight link between 
engineering curricula and specific employment opportunities have probably done 
more harm than good from the point of view of individual flexibility and the 
resilience of the system, for they have emphasized specialization at an early 
stage of education and have thereby reduced the breadth of understanding that 
in fact facilitates movement between specialties. 18 
One wonders if the young engineers who are undergoing early, highly 
specialized training today will be able to show the same conceptual and 
technical versatility that enabled Langley's engineers of the NACA period 
to move so fruitfully among old and new disciplines. 
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A Special Note on Appendixes 
History books have users as well as readers. Though my dearest wish is for this book 
to attract cover-to-cover readership, I also wish its contents to be useful to those who 
may wish to take it off the shelf in search of special information or a certain fact about 
the history of NACA Langley laboratory. The appendixes permit the dissemination of a 
wealth of useful information which cannot be included gracefully in the text. The appendix 
user should note that similar material is to be found in the appendixes of Alex Roland's 
Model Research. 
The following abbreviations have been used in the appendixes: 
ACR 
AERL 
AR 
BuAer 
HSFS 
LaRC 
Advance Confidential Report 
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory (Cleveland, Ohio) 
Annual Report of the NACA 
U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics 
High-Speed Flight Station (Muroc, California) 
Langley Research Center 
TM, TN, TR Technical Memorandum, Technical Note, Technical Report 
USAAC U.S. Army Air Corps 
WR Wartime Report 
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Law Establishing the N ACA 
(Public Law 271, 63d Congress, approved 3 March 1915) 
An Advisory Committee for Aeronautics is hereby established, and the President is 
authorized to appoint not to exceed twelve members, to consist of two members from the 
War Department, from the office in charge of military aeronautics; two members from 
the Navy Department, from the office in charge of naval aeronautics; a representative 
each of the Smithsonian Institution, of the United States Weather Bureau, and of the 
United States Bureau of Standards; together with not more than five additional persons 
who shall be acquainted with the needs of aeronautical science, either civil or military, or 
skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences: Provided, That the members of the 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, as such, shall serve without compensation: Provided 
further, That it shall be the duty of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to supervise 
and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight, with a view to their practical 
solution, and to determine the problems which should be experimentally attacked, and 
to discuss their solution and their application to practical questions. In the event of a 
laboratory or laboratories, either in whole or in part, being placed under the direction 
of the committee, the committee may direct and conduct research and experiment in 
aeronautics in such laboratory or laboratories: And provided further, That rules and 
regulations for the conduct of the work of the committee shall be formulated by the 
committee and approved by the President. 
That the sum of $5,000 a year, or so much thereof as may be necessary, for five years 
is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, 
to be immediately available, for experimental work and investigations undertaken by the 
committee, clerical expenses and supplies, and necessary expenses of members of the 
committee in going to, returning from, and while attending, meetings of the committee: 
Provided, That an annual report to the Congress shall be submitted through the President, 
including an itemized statement of expenditures. 
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Personnel 
This appendix provides information about the chairmen of the NACA, members 
of the NACA Main Committee, executive officers at NACA headquarters, growth of the 
Langley staff 1919-1958, Langley researchers during the NACA years, and Langley officers 
at the end of the NACA years. 
1. Chairmen of the NACA 
One of the founding principles and greatest virtues of the NACA was the idea that 
the Committee should be composed of individuals of such high character and distinction 
as to insulate it as much as possible from political and economic influence. The Main 
Committee had only eight chairmen: 
George Percival Scriven 
Brig. Gen., USA; Chief Signal Officer 
William Frederick Durand 
Professor and Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering, 
Stanford University 
John Ripley Freeman 
Consulting Engineer, Providence, R.I. 
Charles Doolittle Walcott 
Secretary, Smithsonian Institution 
Joseph Sweetman Ames 
Professor of Physics and President, Johns Hopkins University 
Vannevar Bush 
President, Carnegie Institution 
Jerome Clarke Hunsaker 
Chairman, Department of Aeronautical Engineering, MIT 
James Harold Doolittle (Lt. Gen., USAF, Ret.) 
Vice President, Shell Oil Company of New York 
1916-1918 
1918-1919 
1919-1927 
1927-1939 
1939-1941 
1941-1956 
1956-1958 
The average period in office of an NACA chairman was 6½ years. The three longest 
tenures were those of Walcott (8 years), Ames (12 years), and Hunsaker (15 years). The 
chairmen's lives spanned from 1850 to the present, from wooden ships to spacecraft. All 
eight were born before 1900, the youngest (Doolittle) in 1896, seven years prior to the 
Wrights' landmark flight at Kitty Hawk. The first five chairmen, in fact, were born before 
the end of the Civil War. Four (Durand, Bush, Hunsaker, and Doolittle) lived to see the 
creation of NASA in 1958. In 1986, Doolittle was still living. The average age of the 
Engineer in Charge OF POOR 
Meeting of the Main Committee in the NACA conference room, Washington, D.C., 1920. 
At the far right are three men who would serve as chairman of the NACA: (from right to 
left) Charles D. Walcott, Joseph S. Ames, and William F. Durand. Fourth from the left is 
Orville Wright. Standing by the chalkboard is John F. Victory, the NACA secretary. 
NACA chairmen at time of appointment was approximately 60, equivalent to the average 
age of new judges on the U.S. Supreme Court. Walcott chaired the Committee to the age 
of 77, Ames until 75. Bush was the youngest man to head the body; he was 49 at the 
time of his appointment. 
Half of the group were born and raised in New England, including Durand (a small 
farm near Beaver Falls, Conn.), Freeman (West Bridgton, Maine), Ames (Manchester, 
Vt.), and Bush (Everett, Mass.). Only Hunsaker (Creston, Iowa; raised in Detroit and 
Saginaw, Mich.) and Doolittle (Alameda, Calif.) came from outside the Northeast. All 
seem to have come from solid middle-class families. Bush was the son of a Protestant 
minister (he received the name "Vannevar" in honor of the clergyman who married his 
parents). Hunsaker's father was a newspaper editor and publisher. 
After Scriven resigned his chairmanship in 1916, no military man on active duty was 
chairman. However, Durand and Hunsaker had both graduated with high honors from the 
U.S. Naval Academy, the latter first in his class. Durand then served for seven years in the 
navy's new engineering corps, and Hunsaker spent a year at sea before being selected by 
the Construction Corps to study naval architecture at MIT. Doolittle rose to flag rank in 
his career as a military aviator. In the 1920s and 1930s he gained extensive experience in 
research and development in aeronautical research instruments and techniques. His most 
famous exploit, of course, was leading the bombing raid on Tokyo in 1942. 
Some chairmen had experience in industry. Freeman acted as a consulting engineer 
on water power and mill construction for various large manufacturing corporations in the 
United States and Canada. In the early 1900s he studied the water supply of Greater 
New York City and tested gun carriages for the War Department. He resigned within 
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NAGA chairman Jerome C. 
Hunsaker (left) chats with 
executive secretary John F. 
Victory during the NAGA 
inspection held at Langley 
in October 1956. 
James H. Dooli"ttle, the NACA 's last chairman, visited Langley in February 1928 in his 
Curtiss Racer, the plane in which he won the 1925 Schneider Trophy Race. 
a year to travel to the Orient, where he consulted with the Chinese government on the 
improvement of its canal system. Bush worked in 1913 with General Electric. Hunsaker 
was employed in the late 1920s with Bell Telephone Laboratories to develop airway wire, 
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radio. and weather services. and with Goodyear-Zeppelin to help build the Akron and 
Macon and to promote airships as transoceanic transportation. Doolittle worked for Shell 
Oil Company for many years, first as a manager of its aviation department and then as 
an executive officer. 
Several spent most of their professional lives in teaching and research. Durand's 
37 years of teaching began in mechanical engineering at Michigan State University in 
1887. Four years later, he moved to Cornell to take charge of its graduate school of marine 
engineering and naval architecture. He accepted the chair of mechanical engineering at 
Stanford in 1904, staying in it until the age of mandatory retirement (65) in 1924. Ames 
taught physics at Johns Hopkins University, his alma mater, from 1890 to 1926, when he 
became the school's provost; later he became the school's president. Four chairmen of 
the NACA had strong ties to MIT. In 1914 Hunsaker returned to MIT, his alma mater, 
as head of the departments of mechanical and aeronautical engineering, expanding those 
programs to include studies in supersonics, aeroelasticity, vibration, instrumentation, 
automatic control. and jct propulsion. Bush taught at MIT from 1919 to 1939, advancing 
from professor of electric power transmission to vice-president and dean of the school of 
engineering. Bush, Freeman, and Doolittle earned engineering degrees at MIT. 
The achievements, titles, and honors awarded this group, too numerous to list here, 
include some of the highest academic, civilian, and military awards presented in this 
country. 
Sources: Series of biographical profiles entitled "Meet the Committee," appearing in 
Langley Air Scoop, 1944-1958; Who's Who in Engineering: A Biographical Dictionary of the 
Engineering Profession. 6th ed., New York, 1945; American Men and Women of Science, 
10th ed., New York & London, 1960; McGraw-Hill Modern Scientists and Engineers, 3 vols., 
New York, 1980; Alex Roland, Model Research, NASA SP-4103, 1985. 
2. Members of the NACA Main Committee 
Public Law 271, 63d Cong., 1st sess., (see appendix A) set the number of NACA 
members originally at 12. Public Law 549, 80th Cong., 2d sess., raised the number to 15, 
and Public Law 908, 70th Cong., 1st sess., raised it to 17. 
To ensure the primacy of government interests in the new agency, the enabling act 
established a ratio of seven government members to five from the private sector. The 
government n:iajority was preserved in the subsequent increases in Committee size. The 
purpose of enlarging the NACA from 12 to 15 in 1929 was to make room for at least one 
representative of the new aeronautics section of the Department of Commerce, which 
had been created by the Air Commerce Act of 1926. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938 specified that at least two representatives of the Department of Commerce always 
sit with the Committee, guaranteeing government's predominance by a ratio of 9 to 6. 
Congress approved the 1948 increase in N ACA membership from 15 to 17 in order to add 
a representative of the new Department of Defense, setting the government-to-private-
interest ratio at 10 to 7. 
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From 1915 to the creation of NASA in 1958, a total of 120 men (and no women) 
served on the NACA: 
Most Committee appointments from government service were ex officio: i.e., the 
incumbent of a post like head of the air force or secretary of the Smithsonian 
Institution was automatically appointed to the NACA. Length of service ... 
depended on tenure in the {primary] government post, and this varied from 
agency to agency. Until 1938, appointments from private life were until the 
incumbent resigned; after 1938, they were for five years, though often renewed. 
(Roland, Model Research, app. B, p. 423.) 
Approximately half of the 120 members (58) were on active military duty; at least another 
5 had served as officers in the armed forces. Forty represented the civilian side of the 
federal government. There were 22 private citizens, 9 of whom were employed by large 
corporations at the time of their membership. 
Though the army and navy each had two seats, the frequent transfer of military 
members tended to weaken their influence. The average length of NACA service by ac-
tive military men was approximately three years. The NACA members averaging the 
longest tenures came from the Weather Bureau (14.5 years), the Smithsonian Institution 
(11 years), and the Bureau of Standards and the private sector (9 years each). Repre-
sentatives from other government agencies averaged only three years in office. Like the 
military services, however, the Department of Commerce was compensated for its high 
turnover rate by always having two men on the Committee. 
The following list of Main Committee members is arranged alphabetically. 
Abbot, Dr. Charles G. 1928-1945 
Secretary, Smithsonian Institution 
Adams, Joseph P. 1952-1956 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
Alison, John R. 1947-1949 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
Ames, Dr. Joseph S. 1915-1939 
Johns Hopkins University 
Arnold, Henry H. 1938-1946 
General of the Air Force 
Astin, Dr. Allen V. 1952-1958 
Director, Bureau of Standards 
Bane, Col. Thurman H. 1919-1922 
USA 
Bassett, Preston R. 1953-1958 
Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc. 
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NACA meeting, 19 October 1939. Left to right: Brig. Gen. George H. Brett; Clinton M. 
Hester; Rear Adm. John H. Towers; Lyman J. Briggs; Charles A. Lindbergh; Orville Wright; 
Jerome C. Hunsaker; George W. Lewis; Vannevar Bush, chairman; George J. Mead, vice-
chairman; John F. Victory, secretary; Charles G. Abbot; Edward P. Warner; Maj. Gen. 
Henry H. Arnold; Robert H. Hinckley; Capt. Sydney M. Kraus; Francis W. Reichelderfer. 
Brett, Lt. Gen. George H. 1939-1942 
USAAC 
Briggs, Dr. Lyman J. 1933-1945 
Director, Bureau of Standards 
Bristol, Capt. Mark L. 1915-1916 
USN, Director, Naval Aeronautics 
Bronk, Dr. Detlev W. 1945-1958 
Rockefeller Foundation for Medical Research 
Burden, Dr. William A. M. 1942-1947 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
Burgess, George K. 1923-1932 
Director, Bureau of Standards 
Bush, Dr. Vannevar 1938-1948 
President, Carnegie Institution 
Carmichael, Dr. Leonard 1953-1958 
Secretary, Smithsonian Institution 
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Cassady, Vice Adm. John H. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Clark, Col. Virginius 
USA 
Combs, Vice Adm. Thomas S. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Compton, Dr. Karl T. 
Research and Development Board 
Condon, Dr. Edward U. 
Director, Bureau of Standards 
Connoly, Donald H. (Maj. Gen., USA, Ret.) 
Administrator of Civil Aeronautics 
Cook. Rear Adm. Arthur B. 
USN, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 
Craigie, Lt. Gen. Lawrence C. 
USAF 
Craven, Capt. Thomas 
USN, Director of Naval Aviation 
Crawford, Dr. Frederick C. 
Thompson Products, Inc. 
Curry, Maj. Gen. John F. 
USAAC 
Damon, Ralph S. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
Davis, Thomas W. S. 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
Davis, Vice Adm. William V., Jr. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Doherty, Robert E. 
Carnegie Institute of Technology 
Doolittle, James H. (Lt. Gen., USAF, Ret.) 
Shell Oil Co. 
Duncan, Vice Adm. Donald B. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Durand, Dr. William F. 
Stanford University 
Echols, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. 
USAF 
Personnel 
1950-1952 
1917 1918 
1952 -1953; 1955-1956 
1948-1949 
1945-1951 
1940-1942 
1931-1934; 1936-1939 
1951-1954 
1919-1921 
1954-1958 
1924-1926 
1953-1956 
1950-1953 
1956-1958 
1940-1941 
1948-1958 
1947-1948 
1915-1933; 1941-1945 
1942-1945 
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Fagg, Dr. Fred D., Jr. 
Director, Bureau of Air Commerce 
Fechet, Maj. Gen. James E. 1928-1931 
USA, Chief of Air Service 
Fitch, Vice Adm. Aubrey W. 1944-1945 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Foote, Paul D. 1957-1958 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) 
Foulois, Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. 1929--1930; 1932-1936 
USA, Chief, USAAC 
Freeman, John R. 1918-1919 
Consulting Engineer, Providence, R.I. 
Furnas, Clifford C. 1956-1957 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) 
Gardner, Vice Adm. Matthias B. 1952-1953 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Gilmore, Brig. Gen. William E. 1926-1929 
USA 
Gregg, Willis R. 1934-1938 
Chief, Weather Bureau 
Guggenheim, Harry F. 1929-1938 
Long Island, N.Y. 
Harrison, Rear Adm. Lloyd 1953-1955 
USN, Deputy and Assistant Chief, BuAer 
Hayford, Dr. John F. 1915-1923 
Northwestern University 
Hazen, Ronald M. 1946-1954 
Allison Division, General Motors 
Hester, Clinton M. 1938-1940 
Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Authority 
Hinckley, Robert H. 1939-1942 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
Hines, Rear Adm. Wellington T. 1957-1958 
USN, Assistant Chief for Procurement, BuAer 
Hunsaker, Dr. Jerome C. 1922-1923; 1938-1958 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Kenly, Maj. Gen. William L. 1918-1919 
USA, Director of Military Aeronautics 
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King, Rear Adm. Ernest J. 1933-1936 
USN, Chief, BuAer 
Kinler, Brig. Gen. Walter G. 1939~1940 
USA 
Kraus, Rear Adm, Sydney M. 1936-1943 
USN, BuAer 
Land, Capt. Emory S. 1923-1929 
USN, BuAer 
Lindbergh, Charles A. 1931-1939 
New York City 
Littlewood, William 1944 1953 
American Airlines 
Lonnquest, Rear Adm. Theodore C. 1947-1952 
USN, BuAer 
McCain, Vice Adm. John S. 1942-1944 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
McCarthy, Charles J. 1957-1958 
Chance Vought Aircraft, Inc. 
MacCracken, William P., Jr. 1929-1938 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
Mchltosh, Col. Lawrence W. 1923 1924 
USA 
Marvin, Charles F. 1915-1934 
Chief, Weather Bureau 
Mead. George J. 1939 1943 
Hartford. Conn. 
Menoher, Maj. Gen. Charles T. 1919-1921 
USA. Chief of Air Service 
Mitscher. Vice Adm. Marc A. 1945 1946 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
MoffPtt. Rear Adm. William A. 1921 1933 
USN. Chief. BuAer 
Mulligan, Denis 1938 
Director. Bureau of Air Commerce 
Murray. Robert B., Jr. 1953 1954 
Under Secretary of Commerce 
Newton. Byron R. 1915-1918 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
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Noble, Edward J. 
Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Authority 
Nyrop, Donald W. 
Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board 
Ofstie, Vice Adm. Ralph A. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Pace, Rear Adm. Ernest M., Jr. 
USN, BuAer 
Patrick, Maj. Gen. Mason M. 
USA, Chief of Air Service 
Pfingstag, Rear Adm. Carl J. 
USN, Chief for Field Activities, BuAer 
Powers, Maj. Gen. Edward M. 
USAF 
Pratt, Maj. Gen. Henry C. 
USA 
Price, Vice Adm. John D. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Pupin, Michael I. 
Columbia University 
Putt, Lt. Gen. Donald L. 
USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development 
Pyle, James T. 
Administrator of Civil Aeronautics 
Quarles, Donald A. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Radford, Vice Adm. Arthur W. 
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 
Raymond, Dr. Arthur E. 
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. 
Reber, Lt. Col. Samuel 
USA, OIC Aviation Section, Signal Corps 
Reichelderfer, Dr. Francis W. 
Chief, U.S. Weather Bureau 
Reutzel, Delos W. 
Administrator of Civil Aeronautics; Under Secretary 
of Commerce 
Richardson, Capt. Holden C. 
USN, Naval Constructor 
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1938-1939 
1951-1952 
1953-1954 
1943-1944 
1921-1927 
1955-1957 
1945-1949 
1930-1935 
1948-1950 
1915 1922 
1949-1958 
1957-1958 
1954-1956 
1946-1947 
1946-1956 
1915-1916 
1939-1958 
1948-1951 
1915-1917 
Personnel 
Richardson, Rear Adm. Lawrence B. 
USN, BuAer 
Rickenbacker, Capt. Edward V. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 
Robins, Brig. Gen. Augustine W. 
USA 
Rothschild, Louis S. 1955-1958 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation 
Ryan, Oswald 1954 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
Sabine, Wallace C. 1918 
Bureau of Aircraft Production 
Saville, Maj. Gen. Gordon P. 1950-1951 
USAF 
Scriven, Brig. Gen. George P. 1915-1917 
USA, Chief Signal Officer 
Spaatz, Gen. Carl 1946-1948 
USAF, Chief of Staff 
Squier, Maj. Gen. George 0. 1916-1918 
USA, Chief Signal Officer 
Stevens, Rear Adm. Leslie C. 1946-1947 
USN, Assistant Chief, BuAer 
Stratton, Samuel W. 1915 1931 
Director, Bureau of Standards 
Taylor, Rear Adm. David W. 1917-1938 
USN, Chief Naval Constructor (civilian member from 1922) 
Towers. Rear Adm. John H. 1917-1919; 1929-1931; 1939-1942 
USN, Assistant and Chief, BuAer 
Twining, Gen. Nathan F. 
USAF, Chief of Staff 
Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt S. 
USAF, Chief of Staff 
Vidal, Eugene L. 
Director, Bureau of Air Commerce 
Walcott, Dr. Charles D. 
Secretary, Smithsonian Institution 
Warner, Dr. Edward P. 
Aviation magazine; industry consultant; later, Civil Aeronautics 
Board 
1954-1957 
1948-1950 
1933-1937 
1915-1927 
1929-1945 
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Webster. William 
Chairman. RPsearch and Development Board 
Westover. Maj. Gen. Oscar 
USA. Chief of Air Corps 
Wetmore. Dr. Alexander 
SPcretary, Smithsonian Institution 
Weyerbacher, Cdr. Ralph D. 
USN, BuAer 
WhitP. Gen. Thomas D. 
USAF. Chief of Staff 
Whitman. Walter G. 
Chairman. Research and Development Board 
Wright. Orville 
Dayton. Ohio 
Wright, Dr. Theodore P. 
Director of Aircraft Production: Administrator of Civil 
Aeronautics: Cornell University 
1950 1951 
1936-1938 
19451952 
1934 1936 
1957 1958 
1951-1953 
1920 1948 
1942 1953 
Source: Eugene M. Emme, Aeronauti:cs and Astronautics: An American Chronology of 
Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space. 1915-1960 (Washington: NASA, 1961 ), 
pp. 202-205. 
3. Executive Officers, NACA Headquarters 
Director of Research 
George W. Lewis 
Hugh L. Dryden 
Secretary /Executive Secretary 
.John F. Victory 
Assistant Secretary and Executive Officer 
Edward H. Chamberlin 
George W. Lewis 
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1919-1947 
1947 1958 
1915-1958 
1918-1958 
Personnel 
4. Growth of Langley Staff, 1919-1958 
Fiscal Year Professional Non professional Total 
1919 4 7 11 
1920 12 15 27 
1921 12 32 44 
1922 18 38 56 
1923 23 52 75 
1924 36 62 98 
1925 39 72 111 
1926 44 92 136 
1927 45 104 149 
1928 60 108 168 
1929 79 110 189 
1930 100 128 228 
1931 102 155 257 
1932 111 159 270 
1933 110 150 260 
1934 109 140 249 
1935 111 164 275 
1936 138 203 341 
1937 149 253 402 
1938 166 260 426 
1939 204 320 524 
1940 277 462 739 
1941 369 571 940 
1942 439 804 1243 
1943 594 1624 2218 
1944 937 2351 3288 
1945 832 2388 3220 
1946 692 2005 2697 
1947 734 2051 2785 
1948 899 2070 2969 
1949 1082 2183 3265 
1950 1]58 2230 3388 
1951 1235 2276 3511 
1952 1255 2302 3557 
1953 1189 2171 3360 
1954 1138 2134 3272 
1955 1072 2067 3139 
1956 1034 2222 3256 
1957 1093 2114 3207 
1958 1151 2145 3296 
Source: NASA chart, "Growth of Langley's Staff," 16 September 1965, LaRC Historical 
Archives. 
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5. Langley Researchers 
The following Langley researchers are mentioned in the text or notes of this book. 
In general, the list includes those researchers to whom more than mere passing reference 
is made. Some of the "researchers" included were in fact technical service employees who 
supported research. 
Name & year of birth 
Abbott, Ira H. (b. 1906) 
Alford, William L. (b. 1921) 
Allen, H. Julian (b. 1910) 
Ames, Milton B. (b. 1913) 
Ayer, Bruce E. (b. 1904) 
Baals, Donald D. (b. 1916) 
Babberger, Carl (b. 1909) 
Bacon, David L. (b. 1895) 
Bailey, Frederick J., Jr. (b. 1911) 
Bamber, Millard J. (b. 1898) 
Becker, John V. (b. 1913) 
Beeler, De Elroy (b. 1915) 
Biermann, Arnold E. (b. 1904) 
Biermann, David J. (b. 1907) 
Bioletti, Carlton (b. 1906) 
Bogdonoff, Seymour M. (b. 1921) 
Brevoort, Maurice J. (b. 1900) 
Brown, Clinton E. (b. 1920) 
Buckley, Edmund C. (b. 1904) 
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of Langley employment 
MIT, B.S. '29, aero. eng.; 
1929-1947 (detailed to NACA HQ) 
Wayne State, B.S. '49, aero. eng.; 
1949-NASA 
Stanford, A.B. '32, M.A. '35, mech. eng.; 
1936-1940 ( transferred to Ames) 
Georgia Tech, B.S. '36, aero. eng.; 
1936-1941 (detailed to NACA HQ) 
Univ. Illinois, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1941 (transferred to AERL) 
Purdue, B.S. '38, mech. eng.; M.S. '39, 
aero. eng.; 1939-NASA 
Stanford, B.S. '34, mech. eng.; 1936-1939 
Yale, B.A. '16, physics; 1920-1924 
MIT, B.S. '34, aero. eng.; 1934-1955 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '26, aero. eng.; 
1927-1944 
New York Univ., B.S. '35, mech. eng.; 
M.S. '36, aero. eng.; 1936-NASA 
Kansas St. Univ., B.S. '41, mech. eng.; 
1941-1954 (transferred to HSFS) 
Purdue, B.S. '28, mech. eng.; 1928-1942 
Purdue, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 1929-1943 
Univ. California, B.S. '30, mech. eng.; 
1930-1940 ( transferred to Ames) 
Rensselaer Poly. Inst., B.S. '42, aero. eng.; 
1942-1947 
Allegheny Coll., B.S. '22; Univ. Nebraska, 
M.A. '24, physics; 1930-1958 
Purdue, B.S. '41, M.S. '42, mech. eng.; 
1942-NASA 
Rensselaer Poly. Inst, B.S. '27, electr. eng.; 
1930-NASA 
Personnel 
The flight crew in front of a Fokker trimotor with experimental NACA .cowlings, March 1929. 
Front row, left to right: John Spivey, John Haines, Robert Hunt, Charles Shobe, Melvin 
Gough, Samuel Eakin, Walter Quigley, Siegfried Hunsecker, and Frederick Hunsecker. Back 
row: "Mac" McConnaha, George Bulifant, William McAvoy, Thomas Carroll, Ernest 
Johnson, Charles Wolf, Raymond Braig, and John Houston. 
Name & year of birth 
Busemann, Adolf (b. 1901) 
Butler, T. Melvin (b. 1917) 
Carroll, Thomas (b. 1890) 
Clay, William C. (b. 1903) 
Collier, Thomas M. (b. 1905) 
Conner, D. William (b. 1920) 
Corson, Blake W., Jr. (b. 1908) 
Crain, Percy J. (b. 1913) 
Crigler, John L. (b. 1905) 
Crowley, John W., Jr. (b. 1899) 
Davidson, Milton (b. 1917) 
College degree(s) & dates 
of Langley employment 
Tech. Hochschule Braunschweig, Ing. 
Dip!. '24, Dr. Ing. '25; 1947-NASA 
Virginia Poly. Inst., B.S. '39, indus. eng.; 
1939-NASA 
Georgetown, law '20; 1920-1929 
MIT, B.S. '28, aero. eng.; 1928-1939 
No degree; 1926-1932 
Ohio Northern, B.S. '42, mech. eng.; 
1942-NASA 
Univ. Richmond, B.S. '32, math; 
1935-NASA 
Georgia Tech, B.S. '35, mech. eng.; 
1939-NASA 
William and Mary, B.S. '27, math and 
physics; 1928-NASA 
MIT, B.S. '20, mech. eng.; 1921-1947 
(transferred to NACA HQ) 
Univ. Alabama, B.S. '38, aero. eng.; 
1940--1946 
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Dawson, John R. (b. 1909) 
Dearborn, Clinton H. (b. 1897) 
DeFrance, Smith J. (b. 1896) 
Delano, James B. (b. 1911) 
Demming, Arthur (b. 1905) 
Donaldson, Coleman duPont (b. 1922) 
Donely, Philip (b. 1909) 
Donlan, Charles J. (b. 1916) 
Draley, Eugene C. (b. 1916) 
Duberg, John E. (b. 1917) 
Ebert, John W., Jr. (b. 1913) 
Ellerbrock, Herman H. (b. 1906) 
Ellis, Macon C., Jr. (b. 1918) 
Faget, Maxime A. (b. 1921) 
Fairbanks, Andrew J. (b. 1901) 
Fairbanks, Karl J. (b. 1902) 
Fedziuk, Henry A. (b. 1916) 
Ferri, Antonio (b. 1912) 
Forrest, Marvin (b. 1906) 
Gardiner, Arthur (b. 1898) 
Garrick, I. Edward (b. 1910) 
Gerrish, Harold C. (b. 1891) 
Gilruth, Robert R. (b. 1913) 
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Rice Inst., B.S. '29, civil eng.; 1930-NASA 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '22, mech. eng.; 
1927-1950 (transferred to NACA HQ) 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '22, aero. eng.; 
1922-1940 ( transferred to Ames) 
New York Univ., B.S. '35, mech. eng.; 
1936-1953 
Univ. California, B.S. '30, electr. eng.; 
1930-1939 
Rensselaer Poly. Inst., B.S. '42, aero. eng.; 
1943-1952 
MIT, B.S. '31, aero. eng.; 1931-NASA 
MIT, B.S. '38, aero. eng.; 1938-NASA 
Catholic Univ., B.S. '38, aero. eng.; 
1938-NASA 
Manhattan Coll., B.S. '38; Virginia Poly. 
Inst., M.S. '40; Univ. Illinois, Ph.D. '48, civil 
eng.; 1943-NASA 
Johns Hopkins, B.S. '35, mech. eng.; 
1935-1947 (detailed to NACA HQ) 
Johns Hopkins, B.S. '27, mech. eng.; 
1930- 1942 ( transferred to AERL) 
Alabama Poly. Inst. (Auburn), B.S. '39, 
aero. eng.; 1939-NASA 
Louisiana St. Univ., B.S. '43, mech. eng.; 
1946-NASA 
Cornell, B.S. '24, mech. eng.; 1924-1927 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '24, aero. eng.; 
1924-1926 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '39, aero. eng.; 
1939-NASA 
Univ. di Roma, Dr. Ing. '36; 1944-1951 
No degree; 1927-NASA 
Swarthmore, A.B. '20, civil eng.; 1920-1927 
Univ. Chicago, A.B. '30, math and physics; 
1930-NASA 
Univ. Maine, B.S. '14, electr. eng.; 
1926-1943 ( transferred to Ames) 
Univ. Minnesota, B.S. '35, M.S. '36, 
aero. eng.; 1937-NASA 
Of POOH 
Personnel 
A jousting contest was one of the highlights of th1; NACA 's annual picni'c at Grandview Beach 
on Chesapeake Bay in July 1929. On the barrel to the left is Edward R. "Ray" Sharp, a 
future engineer-in-charge of the NACA 's Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory in Cleveland, 
Ohio. 
Name & year of birth 
Glass, Clindon (b. 1899) 
Goett, Harry J. (b. 1910) 
Gough, Melvin N. (b. 1906) 
Griffith, Leigh M. (b. 1882) 
Gustafson, Frederic B. (b. 1913) 
Harris, Thomas A. (b. 1903) 
Hartmann, Edwin P. (b. 1905) 
Heldenfels, Richard R. (b. 1920) 
Hemke, Paul E. (b. 1890) 
Herrnstein, William H., Jr. (b. 1905) 
Higgins, George J. (b. 1897) 
Hill. Paul R. (b. 1909) 
Hooker, Ray W. (b. 1906) 
College degree(s) & dates 
of Langley employment 
No degree; 1925-1940 
Holy Cross, B.S. '31, physics and math; New 
York Univ., B.S. '33, aero. eng.; 1936-1940 
Johns Hopkins, B.8. '26, mech. eng.; 
1926-NASA 
California Inst. of Technology, B.S. '02, mech. 
eng.; 1918-1924 
Univ. Kansas, B.8. '36, M.S. '38, mech. eng.; 
1938-NASA 
William and Mary, B.8. '29, physics; 
1927-NASA 
Marquette, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1930-1940 (transferred to Ames) 
MIT, B.S. '42, aero. eng.; 1947-NASA 
Univ. Chicago, A.B., M.A.; Johns Hopkins, 
Ph.D. '24, physics; 1924-1927 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '27, aero. eng.; 
1927-NASA 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '23, aero. eng.; 
1923-1928 
Univ. California, B.S. '36, mech. eng.; 
1939-NASA 
Purdue, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 1930--NASA 
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Name & year of birth 
Hoover, Herbert H. (b. 1912) 
House, Rufus 0. (b. 1907) 
Howe, Edward A. (b. 1918) 
Ruckel, Vera (b. 1908) 
Hulcher, Charles A. (b. 1910) 
Jacobs, Eastman N. (b. 1902) 
Joachim, William F. (b. 1893) 
Johnson, Caldwell C. (b. 1919) 
Johnson, Harold I. (b. 1920) 
Johnson, W. Kemble (b. 1911) 
Jones, Robert T. (b. 1910) 
Joyner, Upshur T. (b. 1908) 
Kantrowitz, Arthur (b. 1911) 
Kaplan, Carl (b. 1904) 
Katzoff, Samuel (b. 1909) 
l~effer, Percy R. (b. 1897) 
Kemper, Carlton (b. 1899) 
King, Paul B. (b. 1892) 
Kirschbaum, Howard W. (b. 1903) 
Knight, Montgomery (b. 1901) 
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Univ. Tennessee, B.S. '34, mech. eng.; 
1940-1952 (killed in crash of B-45 during 
research flight) 
William and Mary, B.S. '29, math; 
1927-NASA 
Syracuse, B.S. '43, aero. eng.; 1943-NASA 
Univ. Pennsylvania, B.S. '29, math; 
1939-NASA 
No degree; 1930-1954 
Univ. California, B.S. '24, mech. eng.; 
1925-1944 
Univ. Minnesota, B.S. '21, mech. eng.; 
1922-1929 
No degree (2 years at Univ. Virginia); 
1937-NASA 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '41, aero. eng.; 
1941-NASA 
Virginia Poly. Inst., B.S. '33, chem. eng.; 
1934-NASA 
No degree (took classes at Univ. Missouri and 
Catholic Univ.); 1934-1946 (transferred 
to Ames) 
William and Mary, B.S. '31, physics and 
math; 1931-NASA 
Columbia Univ., B.S. '34, M.A. '35, Ph.D. '45, 
physics; 1935-1946 
Johns Hopkins, B.S. '26, M.S. '28, chemistry; 
Ph.D. '30, physics; 1932-1956 
Johns Hopkins, B.S. '29, Ph.D. '34, chem-
istry; 1936-NASA 
No degree (Newport News Shipbuilding and 
Dry Dock Co. Apprentice School, 4 years); 
1920-NASA 
Univ. Pennsylvania, B.S. '23, mech. eng.; 
1924-1943 (transferred to AERL) 
No degree (took classes at Univ. Utah); 
1922-1927 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '27, aero. eng.; 
1927-1941 (transferred to Ames) 
MIT, B.S. '22, electr. eng.; 1925-1930 
Name & year of birth 
Koppen, Otto (b. 1900) 
Korycinski, Peter F. (b. 1917) 
Kotanchik, Joseph N. (b. 1903) 
Kraft, Christopher C., Jr. (b. 1924) 
Kuhn, Paul (b. 1903) 
Lindsey, Walter F. (b. 1910) 
Loftin, Laurence K., Jr. (b. 1919) 
Lorenzen, Coby (b. 1905) 
Lundquist, Eugene E. (b. 1907) 
McAvoy, William H. (b. 1896) 
McHugh, James G. (b. 1906) 
McLellan, Charles H. (b. 1915) 
Maher, Edward T. (b. 1920) 
Mattson, Axel T. (b. 1916) 
Mayo, William B. (b. 1910) 
Messick, J. Cabelle (b. 1909) 
Miller, Elton W. (b. 1881) 
Mixson, Robert E. (b. 1895) 
Morgan, William C. (b. 1880) 
Mueller, James N. (b. 1920) 
Munk, Max M. (b. 1890) 
Myers, Edward A. (b. 1884) 
Neihouse, Anshal I. (b. 1908) 
Nelson, William J. (b. 1916) 
Personnel 
College degree( s) & dates 
.of Langley employment 
MIT, B.S. '23, mech. eng.; 1924-1925 
Georgia Tech, B.S. '42, mech." eng.; 
1942-NASA 
MIT, B.S. '38, mech. eng.; 1938-NASA 
Virginia Poly. Inst., B.S. '44, aero. eng.; 
1945-NASA 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '30, aero. eng.; 
1931-NASA 
Virginia Military Inst., B.S. '30, electr. eng.; 
1931-NASA 
Univ. Virginia, B.S. '43, mech. eng.; 
1944-NASA 
Univ. California, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1931 
Univ. Nebraska, B.S. '28, Ph.D. '44, civil 
eng.; 1941-NASA 
No degree; 1921-1940 (transferred to Ames) 
North Dakota St. Coll., B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1956 
Univ. Washington, B.S. '37, aero. eng.; 
1938-NASA 
Pierce Business School '39; 1947-NASA 
North Carolina St., B.S. '41, mech. eng.; 
1941-NASA 
No degree; 1939-NASA 
No degree; 1928-NASA 
GeOTge Washington Univ., B.S. '08, mech. 
eng.; 1922-1948 
No degree; 1919-1957 
Cornell, M.S. '06, mech. eng.; 1921-1950 
Alabama Poly. Inst. (Auburn), B.S. '42, 
mech. eng.; B.S. '46, aero. eng.; 1946-NASA 
Hanover Poly., Dipl. Ing. '14; Univ. Gottingen, 
Ph.D. '18, physics; 1921-1927 
No degree; 1927-1933 
Virginia Poly. Inst., B.S. '30, M.S. '31, electr. 
eng.; 1935--NASA 
MIT, B.S. '38, aero. eng.; 1938-NASA 
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LMAL accounting office, 1936, with pictures of the Wright brothers on the wall. 
Name & year of birth 
Nichols, Mark R. (b. 1916) 
Norton, Frederick H. (b. 1897) 
Orlin. William J. (b. 1920) 
O'Sullivan, William J., Jr. (b. 1915) 
Parkinson, John B. (b. 1907) 
Parsons, John F. (b. 1908) 
Pearson, Henry A. (b. 1906) 
Phillips, William H. (b. 1918) 
Pinke!, Benjamin (b. 1909) 
Pinkerton, Robert M. (b. 1905) 
Platt, Robert C. (b. 1910) 
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Alabama Poly. Inst. (Auburn), B.S. '38, aero. 
eng.; 1940-NASA 
MIT, B.S. '18, physics; 1918-1923 
Rensselaer Poly. Inst., B.S. '42, aero. eng.; 
1938 NASA 
Notre Dame, B.S. '37, aero. eng.; 
1938-NASA 
Webster Inst. of Nav. Arch., B.S. '29, nav. 
arch.; 1931-NASA 
Stanford, B.S. '30, mech. eng.; 
1931-1940 (transferred to Ames) 
Worcester Poly. Inst., B.S. '30, mech. eng.; 
1930 NASA 
MIT, B.S. '39, M.S. '40, aero. eng.; 
1940-NASA 
Univ. Pennsylvania, B.S. '30, electr. eng.; 
1931-1942 (transferred to AERL) 
Bradley Univ., B.S. '28, physics; 
1929-1931, 1932-1941, 1949-1952 
MIT, B.S. '31, aero. eng.; 1931-1940 
OR1G\NAL F 
OF POOR QUft,UTY 
Name & year of birth 
Polhamus, Edward C. (b. 1921) 
Purser, Paul E. (b. 1918) 
Recant, Isadore G. (b. 1913) 
Reeder, John P. (b. 1916) 
Regier, Arthur A. (b. 1909) 
Reid, Elliott G. (b. 1900) 
Reid. Henry J.E. (b. 1895) 
Reiser, Walter H. (b. 1893) 
Rhode, Richard V. (b. 1904) 
Rihner, Herbert S. (b. 1913) 
Ritter, W. K. (b. 1906) 
Rizzo, Frank S. (b. 1886) 
Robinson, Russell G. (b. 1907) 
Rodert, Lewis A. (b. 1906) 
Rogallo, Francis M. (b. 1912) 
Rollin, Vernon G. (b. 1906) 
Rothrock, Addison (b. 1903) 
Rubert, Kennedy F. (b. 1906) 
Runckel, Jack F. (b. 1916) 
Personnel 
College degree(s) & dates 
of Langley employment 
Univ. Maryland, B.S. '44, mech. eng.; 
1944-NASA 
Louisiana St. Univ., B.S. '39, aero. eng.; 
1939-NASA 
New York Univ., B.S. '33, mech. eng.; 
B.S. '34, aero. eng.; 1937-NASA 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '38, aero. eng.; 
1938-NASA 
Kansas St. Univ., B.S. '33, electr. eng.; 
1938-NASA 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '22, M.S. '23, aero. eng.; 
1922-1927 
Worcester Poly. Inst., B.S. '19, electr. eng.; 
1921-NASA 
No degree; 1923-1951 
Univ. Wisconsin, B.S. '25, mech. eng.; 
1925-1950 (detailed to NACA HQ) 
California Inst. of Technology, B.S. '35; 
Washington Univ., M.S. '37, Ph.D. '39, 
physics; 1940-1949 (transferred to AERL) 
Univ. Oklahoma, B.S. '26, mech. eng.; 
1929-1943 ( transferred to AERL) 
MIT, B.S. '17, mech. eng.; M.S. '22, aero. 
eng.; 1922-1932 
Stanford, B.S. '28, M.S. '30, aero. eng.; 
1930-1939 (detailed to NACA HQ) 
Univ. Minnesota, B.S. '30, aero. eng.; 
1936-1940 ( transferred to Ames) 
Stanford, A.B. '32, M.S. '35, aero. eng.; 
1936-NASA 
Univ. Minnesota, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1943 (transferred to AERL) 
Penn St. Univ., B.S. '25, physics; 
1926-1942 (transferred to AERL) 
Cornell, B.S. '27, M.S. '33, Ph.D. '35, mech. 
eng.; New York Univ., B.S. '28, aero. eng.; 
1941-NASA 
Univ. Wisconsin, B.S. '39, mech. eng.; 
1940-NASA 
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Engineer in Charge 
Name & year of birth 
Schey, Oscar W. (b. 1897) 
Schultz, Fred W. (b. 1903) 
Seidman, Oscar (b. 1909) 
Sherman, Albert E. (b. 1910) 
Shoemaker, James M. (b. 1902) 
Shortal, Joseph A. (b. 1908) 
Silverstein, Abraham (b. 1908) 
Soule, Hartley A. (b. 1905) 
Stack, John (b. 1906) 
Stickle, George W. (b. 1906) 
Stone, David G. (b. 1919) 
Strailman, Gilbert T. (b. 1900) 
Theodorsen, Theodore (b. 1897) 
Thompson, Floyd L. (b. 1898) 
Toll, Thomas A. (b. 1914) 
Tozier, Robert E. (b. 1908) 
Truscott, Starr (b. 1886) 
Truszynski, Gerald M. (b. 1921) 
Tucker, Virginia (b. 1909) 
Turner, Harold R., Sr. (b. 1894) 
Turner, Harold R., Jr. (b. 1919) 
Turner, Lindsey I., Jr. (b. 1912) 
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College degree(s) & dates 
of Langley employment 
Univ. Minnesota, B.S. '23, mech. eng.; 
1923-1943 ( transferred to AERL) 
Kansas St. Univ., B.S. '26, agriculture; 
1929-1930 
Rutgers, B.S. '29, M.S. '31, math and chem-
istry; 1931-1945 
New York Univ., B.S. '31, aero. eng.; 
1931-1943 
Purdue, B.S. '25, mech. eng.; MIT, M.S. '28, 
aero. eng.; 1925-1927, 1931-1935 
Texas A&M, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-NASA 
Rose Poly. Inst., B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1943 (transferred to AERL) 
New York Univ., B.S. '27, aero. eng.; 
1927-NASA 
MIT, B.S. '28, aero. eng.; 1928-NASA 
Purdue, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 1929-1951 
Univ. Washington, B.S. '41, aero. eng.; 
1941-NASA 
No degree; 1927-1954 
Univ. Trondheim, Dr. Ing. '22; Johns 
Hopkins, Ph.D. '29, physics; 1929-1946 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '26, aero. eng.; 
1926-NASA 
Univ. California, B.S. '41, mech. eng.; 
1941-NASA 
Linfield College (Ore.), B.S. '30, physics; 
1930-1943 ( transferred to AERL) 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '09, mech. eng.; 
1926-1946 
Rutgers, B.S. '44, electr. eng.; 
1944-1954 ( transferred to HSFS) 
Univ. North Carolina, A.B. '35, math; 
1935-1947 
No degree; 1922-NASA 
No degree (attended Univ. Virginia night 
school extension); 1938-1953 
Georgia Tech, B.S. '34, aero. eng.; 
1937-NASA 
Personnel 
Test pilots James B. Whitten (left) and John P. "Jack" Reeder prepare to investigate the 
handling qualities of a tandem helicopter in .1951. 
Name & year of birth 
Underwood, William J. (b. 1916) 
von Doenhoff, Albert E. (b. 1910) 
Waldron, Clyde D. (b. 1907) 
Ward, Kenneth E. (b. 1903) 
Ward, Vernon G. (b. 1919) 
Ware, Marsden (b. 1896) 
College degree(s) & dates 
of Langley employment 
Georgia Tech, B.S. '40, aero. eng.; 
1940-1948 
Columbia Univ., B.S. '30, electr. eng.; 
1931-·NASA 
Univ. Arkansas, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1942 (transferred to AERL) 
Univ. California, B.S. '29, mech. eng.; 
1929-1940 
Syracuse Univ., B.S. 43, mech. eng.; 
1943-1951 
Rensselaer Poly. Inst., B.S. '18, mech. eng.; 
1918--1927 
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Engineer in Charge 
Name & year of birth 
Weick, Fred E. (b. 1899) 
Wenzinger, Carl (b. 1903) 
Wetmore, Joseph W. (b. 1909) 
Wheatley, John B. (b. 1908) 
Whitcomb, Richard T. (b. 1921) 
Williams, Walter C. (b. 1919) 
Wilson, Herbert A., Jr. (b. 1914) 
Windler, Raymond (b. 1902) 
Wood, Donald H. (b. 1898) 
Woods, Robert J. (b. 1904) 
Wright, Ray H. (b. 1907) 
Young, Pearl I. (b. 1895) 
Zimmerman, Charles H. (b. 1907) 
College degree(s) & dates 
of Langley employment 
Univ. Illinois, B.S. '22, mech. eng.; 
1925-1929, 1930-1936 
Swarthmore, A.B. '25, M.S. '29, rnech. eng.; 
1927-1946 
MIT, B.S. '31, aero. eng.; 1931-NASA 
Stanford, B.S. '30, mech. eng.; 1930-1937 
Worcester Poly. Inst., B.S. '43, mech. eng.; 
1943-NASA 
Louisiana St. Univ., B.S. '39, aero. eng.; 
1940-1954 (transferred to HSFS) 
Georgia Tech, B.S. '34, aero. eng.; 
1937-NASA 
Univ. Missouri, B.S. '24, mech. eng.; 
1928-NASA 
Rensselaer Poly. Inst., B.S. '20, rnech. eng.; 
1924-1941 ( transferred to Ames) 
Univ. Michigan, B.S. '28, aero. eng.; 
1928-1929 
Univ. Kentucky, M.S. '33, physics; 
1935-NASA 
Univ. North Dakota, B.A. '19, physics; 
1922-1943 (transferred to AERL) 
Univ. Kansas, B.S. '28, mech. eng.; 
1929-1937, 1946-NASA 
Source: NACA/NASA biographical files, LaRC Historical Archives. 
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6. Langley Officers at the End of the NACA Years 
Director: Henry J.E. Reid 
Associate Director: Floyd L. Thompson 
Executive Assistant and Budget Officer: Rufus 0. House 
Chief, Research Reports Division: Henry A. Fedziuk 
Assistant Director: John Stack 
Chief, Compressibility Research Division: John V. Becker 
Chief, Full-Scale Research Division: Eugene C. Draley 
Chief, Theoretical Mechanics Division: Clinton E. Brown 
Chief, Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel Division: Herbert A. Wilson, Jr. 
Assistant Director: Robert R. Gilruth 
Chief, Dynamic Loads Division: I. Edward Garrick 
Chief, Pilotless Aircraft Research Division: Joseph A. Shortal 
Chief, Structures Research Division: Richard R. Heldenfels 
Assistant Director of Research: Hartley A. Soule 
OF POOR 
Chief, Flight Research Division: Melvin N. Gough 
Chief, Hydrodynamics Division: John B. Parkinson 
Chief, Stability Research Division: Thomas A. Harris 
Chief, Instrument Research Division: Edmund C. Buckley 
Chief of Technical Services: Percy J. Crain 
Chief, Engineering Service Division: John C. Messick 
Chief, Mechanical Service Division: William B. Mayo 
Chief, Maintenance Division: Marvin Forrest 
Chief, Electrical Services Division: Joseph Getsug 
Chief, Administrative Services: Elton W. Miller 
Fiscal Officer: Edward A. Howe 
Chief, Office Services Division: Edward T. Maher 
Personnel Officer: T. Melvin Butler 
Chief, Photographic Division: Harry H. Hamilton 
Procurement and Supply Officer: Sherwood L. Butler 
Personnel 
From left to right, John W. "Gus" Crowley, Edward H. Chamberlin, Smith J. DeFrance, 
Henry J. E. Reid, and Edward R. "Ray" Sharp at the NACA 's J,Oth anniversary party at 
the Smithsonian Institution, April 1955. At the time of this anniversary, the five men had 
a total of nearly 170 years NACA experience and three were laboratory directors: DeFrance 
( Ames), Reid (Langley), and Sharp (Lewis). 
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Appendix C 
Budget 
In its 45-year lifetime, the NACA received just over $1 billion in federal funds, an 
average of almost $25 million a year. But the first time its annual budget actually reached 
$25 million was 1943-the middle of World War II. It was more money in one year than 
the NACA had received in its first 25 years combined. Clearly, World War II separated 
the NACA's budgetary history into two very unequal parts. 
Table C-1, besides reporting the amounts appropriated to the NACA for each of 
its 45 years, demonstrates this two-part history. The left side of the table shows annual 
amounts for 1915 to 1940 in thousands of dollars; the right side shows annual amounts 
for 1941 to 1959 in millions of dollars. The left side indicates the fiscal modesty and 
slow growth of the NACA's early history, when the Committee almost never asked for 
any more money than it was sure it could get. Notice that appropriations reached the 
million-dollar level only in 1930. Not until the hard Depression years of 1932 and 1933 
did Congress authorize less than the NACA had requested. Only about 3 percent of the 
billion-dollar NACA lifetime total came to the NACA in the 26-year period preceding 
American involvement in World War II (the period covered in the left side of table C-1). 
The right side of table C-1, covering 18 years, suggests the tremendous inflation of the 
NACA mission during World War II and in the Cold War that followed it, as the agency 
contributed to major national defense programs. The explanation for the peak in 1950 
($128 million) is the Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1950 (approved 29 June 1950). This 
act provided $75 million for the construction of wind tunnels authorized in the Unitary 
Wind Tunnel Plan Act of 1949 (Public Law 415, 81st Cong., approved 27 Oct. 1949). 
Nearly $15 million of this deficiency appropriation was allotted to Langley. 
Langley's budgetary history is also divided clearly by World War II. Figure C-1, 
which traces the laboratory's annual expenditures throughout NACA history, confirms 
the periodization: the first phase is represented by a virtually horizontal line showing 
comparatively modest annual amounts, always less than $2 million; in the second phase, 
spending rises in a rapid 45-degree ascent to $34 million in 1958. 
Table C-2 shows how expenditures were distributed among the major branches of the 
NACA between 1940 and 1958. Before 1940, there were only two branches, Langley and 
headquarters. One may estimate, from the known spending distribution during World 
War II and from analysis of Langley's prewar budget and accounting correspondence 
(LaRC Central Files, 077-1 and 083-1), that Langley spent about 90 percent of total 
NACA expenditures in the period 1917 to 1939, compared to 40 percent in the period 
1940 to 1958. 
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Engineer in Charge 
1915-1940 
Table C-1 
NACA Appropriations 
1941-1959 
Fiscal year Thousands$ Fiscal year 
1915 5.0 1941 
1916 5.0 1942 
1917 87.5 1943 
1918 112.0 1944 
1919 205.0 1945 
1920 175.0 1946 
1921 200.0 1947 
1922 200.0 1948 
1923 225.6 1949 
1924 307.0 1950 
1925 470.0 1951 
1926 534.0 1952 
1927 513.0 1953 
1928 550.0 1954 
1929 836.7 1955 
1930 1300.0 1956 
1931 1321.0 1957 
1932 1051.0 1958 
1933 920.0 1959 
1934 953.6 Subtotal 
1935 1255.7 
1936 2543.8 
1937 1630.5 
1938 1280.8 
1939 4063.9 
1940 4180.0 
Subtotal 24 926.1 
Millions $ 
11.2 
19.9 
25.4 
38.4 
40.9 
24.0 
30.7 
43.4 
48.6 
128.0 
63.1 
69.0 
66.3 
62.4 
55.9 
72.7 
76.7 
117.3 
101.1 
1095.0 
Total $1.12 billion 
Source: "NACA Budget Files, 1915 1958," LaRC Historical Archives. 
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Figure C-1. Graph of Langley expenditures, 1917-1958, in millions of dollars. 
Table C-2 
Expenditures by NACA Branches 
1940-1958 
Langley: 
Lewis: 
Ames: 
NACA HQ: 
HSFS: 
Wallops Island Flight Center: 
$282,759,760 = 40% 
$258,759,760 = 37% 
$120,523,020 = 17% 
$ 17,566,001 = 2.5% 
$ 14,246,147 = 2.2% (1949-1958) 
$ 964,308 = 1.3% (1949-1958) 
Source: Financial report sections of NACA annual reports, 1940-1958. 
The NACA submitted its annual budget requests to Congress only after Langley 
and the other branches had prepared comprehensive budgetary estimates, supported 
by long and detailed explanations of current and projected expenses. As an example 
of the work involved in preparing budget requests, Document C-1 is the summary of 
operating expenses projected by Langley in August 1944 for FY 1946. The laboratory 
estimated that operating expenses would nearly double from FY 1944 to FY 1946. The 
field centers provided detailed justification for every piece of planned construction and 
new equipment. Document C-2 is Langley's estimate of construction and equipment 
costs for FY 1946. Document C-3 is the full text provided by Langley to justify over 
$2 million for construction of the most expensive single item requested for FY 1946, a 
new 35,000-horsepower drive system and housing unit for the 16-Foot High-Speed Wind 
1\mnel. 
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Engineer in Charge 
Phantom drawing of the 16-Foot Transonic Tunnel, 1950s. The new 35,000-horsepower drive 
system and its housing unit are at the right end of the facility. 
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01 SERVIC~S 
LIINGLEY MEMORIAL AERONAUTICAL LABORATORY 
FISCAL YEAR 1946 ESTIMATES 
SUMMARY - OPF.ali,TING EXPENSES 
Positions •·•·••••·••··•··•·••••••·•···•·•·••• 
Mo.n-yeo.rs ...-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Cost of regular services •••••···••····••···•• 
Cost of overtime services •··••·•······•···••• 
Cost of overtime services in excess of 48 hours 
Total cost. personal services ••••···••• 
02 TRAVEL 
03 TRANSPORTJ,TION 
04 COMMUNICATION 
05- UTILITY SERVICES 
07 (a) REPAIRS 1.ND ,lLTERJ.TI OMS •••••••••••••••••••• 
(b) OTHER CONTRACTUAL SERVICES ••••••••••••••••• 
08 SUPPLIES illID MATERIALS 
09 ~UIPMENT 
TOTAL, OPERATING EXPENSES 
F.Y, 1946 
Estinio.ted 
4,562 
4,172.9 
9,110,240 
1,822.048 
-
10,932,288 
34,000 
45.000 
20,000 
303,140 
550,090 
30,735 
1,476,892 
3,796,421 
17,188,566 
F,Y. 1945 
Estirauted 
3,097 
2,972.9 
6,133,010 
1,226,602 
-
7,359,612 
19,000 
12,000 
11,750 
152,000 
109,038 
15,575 
753,552 
534,351 
8,966,878 
3 
F.Y. 1944 
Expended 
3,018 
2,39El.3 
4,846,673 
1,012,464 
37,336 
5,896,473 
26,229 
29,685 
15,988 
126,656 
141,824 
22,345 
743,598 
654,208 
7,657,006 to 
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744 
747 
749 
754 
756 
763 
765 
768 
772 
776 
779 
785 
790 
796 
798 
801 
806 
809 
814 
IJ.lTGLEY MEMORIAL AERONAUTIC;u. Lil.BORATORY 
FISCi.L YEAR 1946 ESTIMATES 
SU11MARY. NEW ITEMS, CONSTRUCTION JJm EqUIP!lfulNT APPROPRIATION 
Estinnted Cost 
Addition and Alterations to Flight Research Laboratory •~••••••••·••••••••$ 278,000.00 
Construction of West Iu-ea Cafeteria and Auditorium Building •·••····•··•·· 817,000.00 
Construction of Addition to Equipment Housing Building, 
Supersonic Wind Tunnel, West Area ••···•······•····•·•·····•···•• 205,250.00 
Construction of High-Capacity Testing !Juchine and Housing, 
Structures Research Laboratory ••••••••••·••••••••••·••••••••••••l,012,000.00 
Construction of Gasoline Distribution System, Propeller Research 
Tunnel ••••••·•••··•••·•·•·•···••··••···••·••···••···•·•····•···· 5,500.00 
Construction of New 35,000 HP Drive and Equipment Housing, 16-Foot 
Wind Tunnel, West Area •••··•••••···· •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2~039,470.00 
Construction of Extension to the Existing Seawall and a New Concrete 
R.oad •. • •. •. • ••••• • •• • • •••• •. • • • •••••• • •••••••••..•••••••••• • •••• • 
Construction of Two-Story Addition to tho Stability Tunnel Laboratory 
Additions to Structures Research Laboratory •··•·····•··•···•····•·•·•···· 
Construction of a Model Devolopment Auxiliary• 16-Foot Wind Tunnel 
Construction of a Concrete Pit for Airplane Scales, Aircraft 
Loads Building •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Construction of Additions to 16-Foot Hind Tunnel Office Building ........ . 
Construction of Office and Shop Addition to the Induction Aerodynamic 
La.boratory, 1'iest Area. ......................................... . 
Construction of Pluid and Gas Dynru-.iics imo.lysis Lo.boro.tory Building 
and Appo.ro.tus •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Additional Utilities, West .'.reo. ••••••• , ................................. . 
Construction of lliintun::.nce Buildi.ni:;, West Area ....................... , •• 
Construction or Additiono.l Power Facilities for existing reseo.rch 
80,500.00 
55,522.00 
139,500.00 
695,000.00 
45,370.00 
51.359.00 
50,000.00 
589,000.00 
301,365.00 
266,000.00 
facilities end equipment ••·•···••••···············•·······••··• 607,050.00 
Construction of Reseurch I;quipt1ent Building, W0st Area ................... 1, 136,500.00 
Construction of Now .Adr.li.nistre.tion Building • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • •• • • • • .. • • 840,000.00 
Construction of Engineering Service Building ••••••···•·••·•··•····•··•··· 860,500.00 
TOTJ,L •••••••••••••••••••• Ql0,054,886.00 
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1. DES CRI PTI CN : 
JUSTIFICATION OF NEED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 
NEW 35,000 H.P. DRIVE AND EQtTifll,!ENT HOUSING, 
16-FOOT vmrn TUNNEL, WEST AREA 
756 
This project consists of the insto.llntion of e. 35,000 H.P. Drive in the 16-Foot 
Wind Tunnel to replace the existing 16,000 H,P. instnllo.tion, The construction of motor 
o.nd equipment housings ~.nd modifying the existing wind tunnel shell is t1lso necess~.ry. 
The attnched Dro.wing, LD-28011 shows the location, elevntions o.nd genernl detnils of 
the proposed project. 
The propellers o.nd nncelles for the new drive will be locnted in o. new tunnel 
section which will be constructed ns nn o.ddition to the northwest section of the existing 
timnel structure. A portion of the existing tunnel structure will be dismo.ntled nnd 
removed, the new o.ddition taking its place. The new tunnel section will be of steel 
nnd reinforced concrete construction with concrete foundr.tions on piles. 
The motors will be located in two housings nt the east nnd west ends of the new 
tunnel section o.nd cnch will be 24- by 24-feet in size o.nd 49-feet high. The equipment 
housing will be 33-feet high nnd located ndjo.cent to the cast motor housing. The motor 
housings cmd equipment building will be of brick construction vrith concrete foimdntions 
on piles. The floors will be reinforced concrete and the roof of concrete construction 
with built up roofing on insulation, The equipment building ~rill house the motor-
genero.tor sets, switch goo.rand controls for the new motors, 
The new tunnel section, motor housine;, nacelles nnd propellers will be constructed 
o.nd inst<1ll0d before the existing tunnel shell is ~-ltered, The old motor, ne.celles, propellers, 
etc. ,·rill be removed through the open end of the tunnel shell after the existing northwest 
section i~ removed and before the new section is joined to the present tunnel, 
The new power instnlbtion will give o. J:;ltcch number of .9 with the nvercge model 
in plo.co. The propeller nrnmgomont vrill consist of two counter rotating: propellers, 
oliminnting the necessity for counter vo.nos nnd will mo.lee it possible to obtnin a very 
symr,etricnl nrrangen,ont for tho betcrinr support struts. 
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It is planned to encase tho section of tho tunnel in the region of the propellers 
vlith reinforced concrete, in order to give tho nocessnry mass and rigidity to this section 
of the Tunnel. 
Tho proposed design is considered tho most practical from the standpoint of shaft 
instnllc.tions, propeller weight c.nd other similar considcre1tions. A considerable increase 
in propeller efficiency over the existing installntions will be mo.de possible. 
JUSTIFICATIONS: 
The prosent 16,000-horsopower drive in the I.MAL 16-Foot High-Speed Tunnel affords o. 
mc.xinrum speed of npproximo.tely 500 mph P.nd n 1!ttch number of about 0,68. This :s:peod seriously 
limits the study of compressibility effects which arc increasingly serious in the operation 
of high-speed o.ircro.ft, since those effects become important at speeds slightly over tho maxi-
mum now attainable in the tunnel. The existing ttmnol structure a.nd equipment o.re inherently 
suito.blc for opera.tion at higher speeds, so tho.t no mo.jor changes other tho.n o.n increase in 
drivo power a.re nocesso.ry to ado.pt the present tunr,cl to rcso~,rch o.t high air spocds. 
A recent investigation of wind-tunnel performance ho.s shown thc.t for nny tunnel 
of o. gi von type, there is o. limiting or "choking" Mo.ch number that cnn be obtained, regardless 
of the power avuilable. It, thus, becomes logicr,l and c.ppropria.tc, from both thcoroticc.l 
and oxperimento.l considere.tions, to provide o.ny tunnel that purports to be o. "high-speed" 
tunnel with sufficient powor to rec.ch this limiting condition. A study of tho LHAL 16-
Foot High-Speed Tunnel indicates tlmt o.n incrcc.se in the drive power to 35,000-horsepower 
would permit the testing of models tip to this maximum value of speed, thus fully re!J.lizing 
the cnpc.bilities of the equipment. Such c.n incrcnsc in porforlll!\ncc is essentic.l to the correct 
nnd o ffocti vo solution of tho problems of high-speed c.ircre.ft. 
At tho present time, there is but one wind tunnel in tho country cecpable of rcnching 
speeds compnrc.ble to dive speeds of modern pursuit aircraft o. t high values of Reynolds number. 
This tunnel is occupied full time vii.th direct development testing of specific military aircraft. 
As the flow problems associated vii th these high speeds c.ro entirely new types of' phenomena. 
involving compression shocks, little is known of the fundo.mental flow character o.nd,hcnce, 
prncticnlly nothing is known of the aerodynamic forms suitnble for such speeds, Equipment to 
e,ccclero.te nircro.ft model development testing is required es well e.s addi tionnl fo.cili ties 
to permit originnl reseo.rch o.t these speeds. The existing UIAL 8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel will 
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be capable of reaching the necessary high speeds when the installation of a new drive motor 
(now in progress) is complete, and the AAL 16-Foot High-Speed Tunnel has a high maximum 
speed, but these two tunnels, in addition to being already o·verburdened, do not constitute 
a full complement of high-speed large-scale reseo.rch equipment o:r(Y more than only two low-
speed tunnels would be adequate in their fiald. 
A lo.rgc high-speed tmmel with a maximum at-ro.inable Mach number of the order of 
O.9 is required for investigo.tions of full-scale o.ircro.ft components at speeds now being 
atta:ined in dives. In tho immediate future, level flight speeds o.t Mach numbers approaching 
O.8 app0ar to be possible. The .principal full-scale airplane components requiring intensive 
b reseo.rch and development o.t these high speeds are as follows: 
C 
2 1.- Propellers. 
~ 2.- Control surfaces (both ailerons and tail controls). 
~ 3.- Wing sections. 
0 
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Propellers.- The preliminary data available to date indicate tbi).t there are differences 
in the aerodynamic results obtained in high-speed wind tunnel tests of model propellers as 
compared with full-scale propellers. These differences become of incrcasini:; importance at 
high Mo.ch numbers. Since the propeller problem becomes acute o.t Mo.ch numbers above o.7, it 
is of prime importc.nce to carry the tests of full-scale propellers in the 16-foot high-speed 
tmmcl at least to Mach numbers of O.8 to adequately evaluate those high-speed effects. 
Tests of o. 1O-foot diameter propeller recently completed in the 16-foot high-speed 
tunnel revealed severe flutterofthe propeller blade at certain opera.ting conditions. This 
condition caused o. crack to develop in the blo.de. However, previous tests of a 4-foot 
dio.metor model of this propeller did not reveal tho so.me flutter condition. The necessity 
for high-speed research using full-scale propellers is ago.in indico.ted~-
In invcstigo.ting the propeller problem for a given pursuit or fighter type airplane, 
it is possible through full-scale tests in tho 16-foot high-speed turmel to determine the 
characteristics so obtained may then be used in analyzing flight test do.to. obtained with the 
propeller insto.lled in the airplane. It is obviously important that the wind-tunnel data 
extend over the so.mo Ho.ch number range as the flight tests• 
In determining the effects of modifications to an existing propeller, such as the 
addition of an opening near the blade tip to allow hot air for de-icing purposes to flow 
through a hollow-blade, it is necessary to use a full-scale propeller. Modifications of 
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this type o.re too smnll to permit accuro.te sinrulo.tion on a mcdel propeller. In the exa1,1ple cited 
involving the use of o. hollow blade, it would also be impossible to construct a suitable model 
without very great difficulty. 
Another aspect of the high-speed propeller problem that is requiring increasing study 
involves the determination of the vibration stresses set up in pusher propellers due to periodic 
passage of the propeller blades through the wake of the airplane wing. It is believed that such 
vibration stresses greatly increase when the wing wake enlarges at or above the critico.l compres-
sibility speed of the wing which is reached at Mach numbers ranging from about 0.55 to 0.85. The 
use of full-scale propellers in vibration studies of this kind is required both because of the im-
possibility of installing o.dequo.te strnin go.ge instrumento.tion on Liodel propellers and because of 
the :question o.s to whether the vi bro.ti ons will be correctly simulated on smo.11 models. 
Control Surfo.ces. - Actuo.l control surfaces differ from the solid models tested in 
small high-speed wind tunnels in several important respects in addition to the scale differences. 
Structurally, the full-scale surfaces are much loss stiff than the models, with the result that 
under high-speed fl:4;ht loads the surfaces undergo large deflections. If tho surfaces are fabric 
covered, the fabric either bulges or is depressed at high speed, thereby changing the shape of 
the control surfaces from that originally intended by the designer. Thus, while data from SLlll.11 
solid Hodols may servo as o. guide, the determinution of actual control characteristics for a high-
speed airplane requires high-speed tests of tho full-sec.le control surface. Such tests are made 
in the 16-foot high-speed tunnel of both o.ilerons o.nd tail controls by mounting o. section of the 
wing or tail containing the complete control surface from one wall of the tunnel. The inadequacy 
of the present speed rango of the tunnel is emphasized by present tests for the Army Air Forces of 
the horizontal tail of the XP-83 airplane. The maximum Mach number attainable in the tests is 
o.68, while the design level flight Mo.ch number of the airplane is 0.76. 
vving sections. - Present research oh the development of airfoils for high-speed . 
airplanes is carried on (1) in a low-turbulence, low-speed pressure tunnel using full-size models, 
or (2) in small high-speed wind tunnels necessarily requiring smnll models. Recent measurements 
of relative airstream turbulence have indicated that the airstream of the 16-foot high-speed 
tunnel has a low turbulence level even at high airspeeds. Significant airfoil data may thus be 
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obto.ined on lo.rge models in high-speed teats in which both the flight Mnch number o.nd the flight 
Reynolds number a.re simultnneously obto.ined. 
The effects on dro.g of the surfo.ce condition of the airfoil can bo accuro.toly de-
termined only by high-speed tests of a sDJ:1ple section of the actuo.l production wing of a given 
airplnne. Such effects become increasingly importo.nt o.s the o.irspeed is increased, both o.s a 
result of the thinning of the boundo.ry layer o.nd also o.s a result of reductions in the critico.l 
corapressibility speed of tho airfoil duo to departures fror,1 the specified contour. As previously 
stated, o.irfoil critical speeds usuo.lly lie in the Mo.ch number ro.nge from 0.55 to 0,85, It is 
essential, therefore, in tests of production o.irfoil samples tho.to. maximum tunnel speed corresponding 
to M • 0.85-.be atto.innble. 
Various schemes ho.ve been proposed for reducing the ro.pid increase in drai; tho.t 
occurs when nn airfoil is operated po.st its critical speed. The most promsing of those plo.ns 
involve the control of tho airfoil boundary lo.yer by suction through suito.ble slot o.rro.ngements 
it111odio.tely behind the shock wo.ve, Tests of this type require the employment of large airfoil 
models so thnt the correct Reynolds number and boundary lo.yor conditions will be obtained. The 
use of a large model is o.lso required to pcrtdt o.ccuro.te design of tho suction slots. In tests 
of this kind, it will be desirable to reach o. maximum effective Mach number of the order of 0,9. 
Couparison of wind-tunnel o.nd flii:;ht do.to., - The restriction to the airflow c.bout 
o. model imposed by tho wind-tunnel walls requires that corrections of varying magnitude be 
o.pplied to wind-tunnel do.to.. These corrections become inereo.singly large as the l\iJach nunlber is 
advanced, Tho ultirote determination of the corrections requires o. comparison of flight o.nd wind-
tunnel do.to.. In me.king such o. correction, it is very highly dosirable that the identical o.rticlo, 
for exo.mple o. propeller, be tested both in the wind tunnel nnd in flicht, For this purpose, a 
large high-speod wind tunnel such o.s the 16-Foot High-Speed Tunnel is necosso.ry. With the speed 
range extended to M • 0,9, tho tunnel wo.11 effects could be established over the complete ro.nge 
of usefulness of sub-sonic wind tunnels by direct co11pnrison with flight, 
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3. COST ESTIMATE: 
Building: 
181,600 cu. feet at .75 ••••••••·••·•••••·••••••••·•·•• 
Foundations for M.G. sets end motors •••••••••••••••••••• 
Ventilating equipnent for motors •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Venti lo.ting equipnent for M.G. sets ••••••••••••••••••••• 
136~200.00 
100,000.00 
20,000.00 
20,000.00 
Total ••.••.••.....•.•.•••••• •••••• •......••.•• •••• •...••• •• ••.•• •• 
Tunnel: 
Reinforcing existing test chamber••••••••••••••••••••·•• 
}Ii.is cellaneous tunnel reinforcing ............. -. •••••• ••• •• 
Removal of existing motor; supports !llld rurmel sections. 
New ttn1nel section, steel o.nd cxm. crete •••. • ;. ••••....•••• 
Mecho.nico.l equipment-drive shafts, bearings, etc. •••••• 
Electrical equipmmt-35,000 H.P. at $25.75•••••••••·•••• 
50~000.00 
25,ooo.oo 
30~000-.00 
314~000.00 
135~000.00 
900,000.00 
Total ••• •·• •..••• .•• , ••.•.•••••••.•....•••......•...•.•.••.•..•...• 
Electrical equipnent: 
23,000 volt bus structure ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
23 ~ 000 volt switchgear ................................. . 
23,000 volt cable •••••••.•...••.....•••.•• ••• •.••..•...• 
Du::ts ond mo.hholos for 23,000 volt co.ble ••• -............. . 
Transformers, 2-12,000/16,000 kva 22,000:11,000 volts ••• 
Transformer foundo.tions and installations ••••••••••••••• 
Ducts o.nd manholes for 11,000 volt co.ble •••••••••••••••• 
11,000 volt cable ......................... ~ •.•••• ···•·•·• 
Control cnblo md tolemotoring ................. ••• ..... . 
l 15,000 kvo., 11 kv to 22 kv trnnsformer ............... . 
l 110 kv circuit brro.ker .............................. .. 
2 110 kv dis connect switches •• , •• ",,, ••••••••••••••••••• 
2 22 kv circuit brcakers•••·••~•~•••~~·•••••••••··••••·• 
2 22 kv disconnect sv..ritches ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Installation of transformers and cir cni t brer.kors •••• , •• 
6,000.00 
12~000.00 
24,000.00 
18,400.00 
64,000.00 
7,000.00 
s;ooo.oo 
4,ooo;oo 
3~000.00 
40,000.00 
12,000.00 
4,020.00 
6,000.00 
850.00 
5,000.00 
Totnl •••••• •..•.•.•.•••...•..••.••.••••.•••••.•..••••..•••.••••••• 
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Additional electrical fncilitics to increc~e the gunrnnteed 
power supply to NACA by the Vir gini n Electric nnd Power Co. 
from 15,000 kw to 25,000 kw off peak •••••••••••••••••••• 100,000.00 
(There will be a rebate of 10 percent of the gross 
electric bill cnch month mnde by the Virginia Electric 
and Power Company to pny for these extraordinary 
service connections) • 
7G2 
Total............................................................. 100,000,00 
Total cost of project •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• $2,039,470,00 
ESTIVA.TED C<NSTRUCTICN SCHEDULE: 
Preparations of plans nnd specifications•••••••••••••••• 3 months 
Procurement of equipment 
Construction of equipnent 
Construction of tunnel 
) 
)••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10 months ) 
Tunnel shut-do'WD. period •.•• -., ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• :SO do.ys 
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Appendix D 
Facilities 
Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory (in July 1948, "Memorial" was dropped) 
was located at Langley Field in Elizabeth City County, Virginia, just north of the town 
of Hampton and some 100 miles south of Washington, D.C. By 1958, the lab occupied 
773 acres divided into two areas by the runways of Langley Air Force Base. The original 
east area consisted of 23 acres, which the NACA used under War Department permit. 
The west area, developed in the early 1940s, consisted of 750 acres, 430 owned by the 
NACA and 320 by the army (later, by the air force). Runways, some utilities, and other 
facilities were used by the NACA and the military jointly. 
Aerial view of Langley Field, 1950. The NACA 's original east area is at the bottom of the 
picture, along the Back Ri·ver. The west area, developed early in World War II, is at the 
top. The largest building in the west area, next to the woods, is the aircraft hangar. 
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Engineer in Charge 
The success enjoyed by NACA Langley as a research organization depended in large 
measure on the creative design and use of a variety of experimental equipment. This 
equipment included towing tanks (NACA Tank No. 1, operational 1931; Tank No. 2, 
operational 1942); a seaplane impact basin (1942); aircraft engine (1934), structures 
(1940), loads (1945), and instruments (1946) research laboratories; a helicopter apparatus 
(1944); and landing loads track (1955). By far the predominant type of facility, however, 
was the wind tunnel. 
The following is a digest of the major research facilities at Langley in chronological 
order of their coming on line. Design features are summarized, as well as the purpose, cost, 
major modifications, and disposition of the equipment. Whenever possible, key members 
of the facility design teams are identified. Different NACA employees offer firsthand 
insights into the significance of the facilities. 
The sournes for this appendix are: Langley (Memorial) Aeronautical Laboratory 
building cost schedules, 1942-1958, (copies in LaRC Historical Archives); "Characteristics 
of Major Active Wind Tunnels at the Langley Research Center," NASA TM X-1130 
(Washington, 1965); Alex Roland, Model Research, appendix E; Donald D. Baals and 
William R. Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, NASA SP-440 (Washington, 1981); George W. 
Gray, Frontiers of Flight: The Story of NACA Research (New York, 1948), pp. 34-62; other 
sources as named and quoted below in specific cases. 
5-Foot Atmospheric Wind Tunnel (AWT) 
Purpose: To give NACA engineers some fast firsthand experience with a proven tunnel 
design and to inaugurate in-house aerodynamic testing of scale models for comparison 
with full-scale, free-flight results. 
Initial cost: $38,000 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, atmospheric 
Test section: 5' diameter, closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 200-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 89 MPH 
Special equipment: None 
Key members of design team: Edward P. Warner and Frederick H. Norton 
Authorized: 6 October 1917 
Operational: 11 June 1920 
Significance: "With relatively minor changes, the first Langley wind tunnel was patterned 
after one located at the British National Physical Laboratory. [The tunnel] was 
therefore obsolete when it was built . . . . From the standpoint of research, tunnel 
no. 1 was relatively unproductive." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, 
pp. 14-15. 
Disposition: Dismantled in 1930 after a series of minor revisions. Replaced in Decem-
ber 1929 and June 1930, respectively, by the 5-Foot Vertical Tunnel and the 7 x 
10-Foot Atmospheric Wind Tunnel. 
References: F. H. Norton, "National Advisory Committee's 5-Foot Wind Tunnel," Journal 
of the Society of Automotive Engineers (21 May 1921): 1-7; TR 195. 
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Variable-Density Tunnel, 1923. 
Variable-Density Tunnel (VDT) 
Purpose: To conduct aerodynamic investigations at high Reynolds numbers. 
Initial cost: $262,000 
Circuit and pressure: Continuous, annular return; 20 atmospheres 
Test section: 5' diameter, closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 250-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 51 MPH 
Facilities 
Special features: 85-ton pressure shell with walls made from steel plate lapped and riveted 
according to a practice standard in steam-boiler construction. Built at Newport News 
(Va.) Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. 
Key members of design team: Max M. Munk (proposed design); Frederick H. Norton, 
David L. Bacon, Smith J. DeFrance 
Authorized: 4 March 1921 
Operational: 19 October 1922 
Major modifications: Converted to open throat in April 1928 after serious fire damage in 
August 1927. Because the new open throat did not work properly, returned to closed 
throat in December 1930. 
Significance: "This tunnel represented the first bold step by the NACA to provide its re-
search personnel with the novel, often complicated, and usually expensive equipment 
necessary to press forward the frontiers of aeronautical science." Jerome C. Hun-
saker, Forty Years of Aeronautical Research, Smithsonian Institution Publ. No. 4247 
(Washington, 1956), p. 256. 
Disposition: Used from the early 1940s as a high-pressure air storage tank. Thoroughly 
inspected in 1954. Closed for recertification in 1981. In 1983 the LaRC Pressure 
Systems Committee recommended that the vessel no longer be used due to its age 
and riveted construction. 
References: TRs 185, 277, 391, 416; TN 60 
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Propeller Research Tunnel (PRT) 
Purpose: To make possible accurate full-scale tests on aircraft propellers, fuselages, 
landing gear, tail surfaces, and other aircraft parts, as well as on model wings of 
large size. 
Initial cost: $291,000 
Circuit and pressure: Double return, atmospheric 
Test section: 20' diameter, open throat 
Drive system: Fan; two 1000-HP diesel engines (from naval submarine) 
Maximum speed: 110 MPH 
Special features: 8-bladed fan, 27' long 
Key members of design team: Max M. Munk (proposed design); Fred E. Weick, Elton W. 
Miller, Donald H. Wood 
Authorized: April 1925 
Operational: July 1927 
Major modifications: Changed to electric drive in 1933. 
Significance: "The demonstrated inadequacies of theory, plus the failure to obtain a 
consistent correlation between model and full-scale results, made it clear that 
propeller data must ultimately come from tests at full scale. It was equally clear [that] 
full-scale testing in flight was slow and expensive. The only alternative was to build 
a wind tunnel large enough to take a full-sized propeller." Walter G. Vincenti, "The 
Air-Propeller Tests ofW. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Study in Technological 
Methodology," Technology and Culture 20 (1979): 739. 
Disposition: Torn down in 1950 to make way for the 8-Foot Transonic Pressure Tunnel. 
Reference: TR 300 
P RT engineer Donald H. Wood ponders the unlikely trans/ er of a submarine engine from 
railcar to NACA truck, May 1926. Two such diesel engines powered the PRT. 
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Facilities 
Neither the Hampton nor the Newport News generating plant was powerful enough to supply 
the electricity needed to drive the Propeller Research Tunnel, so the NACA arranged to use 
two 1000-horsepower diesel engines salvaged from a navy T-2 submarine. Langley installed 
the two engines end-to-end, with their crankshafts connected to a large sheave, or pulley, 
between them. This sheave assembly was connected by belts to another sheave, 55 feet away, 
which turned the shaft of the propeller fan and drove the air through the tunnel. Here the 
engines are being readied for installation in the PRT building. 
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11-Inch High-Speed Tunnel (11-Inch HST) 
Purpose: To lwgin the investigation of dynamic phenomena occurring as the flow of air 
approached Mach 1 over small models. 
Initial cost: Under $10,000 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, atmospheric 
Test section: 11" diameter, closed throat 
Drive system: Induction; compressed air from Variable-Density Tunnel injected at annular 
port immediately downstream from test section. 
Maximum speed: Mach 1 (with no model in throat) 
Key members of design team: Eastman N. Jacobs (open-throat design, 1928); John Stack 
and W. F. Lindsey (closed-throat design, 1932) 
Authorized: ca. 1927 
Operational: Open throat, 1928; closed throat, 1932 
Major modifications: Closed-throat test section, 1932 
Significance: "The injection scheme permitted runs of only about one minute before the 
pressure plummeted to useless values. These short runs, however, were sufficient 
to demonstrate the sharp rise in drag, the loss of lift, and the changes in pitching 
moments that occur near Mach 1." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, 
pp. 23-24. 
Disposition: Replaced by 4 x 18-Inch High-Speed Tunnel in August 1940 and by 
4 x 19-Inch High-Speed Tunnel in August 1949. 
Reference: TR 463 
5-Foot Vertical Wind Tunnel 
Purpose: To investigate the spinning characteristics of aircraft. 
Initial cost: $8000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 5' diameter, open throat 
Drive system: Fan; 50-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 80 MPH 
Special features: A vertical-axis balance 
Key member of design team: Charles H. Zimmerman 
Authorized: ca. 1928 
Operational: December 1929 
Major modifications: Changed to 4 x 6-foot, closed throat in 1938. 
Significance: "By creating conditions that caused models to spin in the tunnel, spin-
recovery procedures could be worked out on the ground without danger to pilots and 
planes." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, p. 19. 
Disposition: Deactivated 
References: TR 387, TN 734 
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7 x 10-Foot Atmospheric Wind Tunnel 
Purpose: To study general aerodynamic effects with particular reference to stability and 
control problems and the improvement of the lifting power of wings. 
Initial cost: $64,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 7' x 10', closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 200-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 80 MPH 
Special features: Six-component, floating-frame balance that could measure forces and 
moments exerted along and about spatial axes of the tunnel airstream. 
Authorized: 1928 
Operational: 8 July 1930 
Significance: "[This tunnel) was a simple, plain workhorse. [It] went on, for some 
15 years, to handle an ever increasing workload of essential low-speed testing-~ 
including noteworthy systematic studies of stability, control, and high-lift devices. 
The 7-by-10 proportions were known from theory to minimize certain tunnel-wall 
correction factors . . . . The flat 10-foot wide 'floor' and the 7-foot high 'ceiling' 
allowed researchers and technicians easy access for model adjustments. [These 
dimensions] were retained in the early 1940s when four new atmospheric tunnels 
having increased speeds were procured for Ames and Langley." John V. Becker to 
author. 
Disposition: Deactivated ca. 1946. 
Rdereuces: TRs 412. 664 
Full-Scale Tunnel (FST) 
Purpose: To make possible wind tunnel research into areas that could be explored best 
with full-scale models or with actual aircraft. 
Initial cost: $900,000 
Circuit and pressure: Double-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 30' x 60'. open throat 
Drive system: Two fans; two 4000-HP electric motors 
Maximum speed: 118 MPH 
l{Py members of design team: Smith J. DeFrance, Abraham Silverstein, Clinton H. 
Dearborn 
Authorized: February 1929 
Operational: 27 May 1931 (formally dedicated during the 6th Annual Aircraft Engineering 
Conference) 
::VIajor modifications: Equipped for free-flight dynamic model studies in 1960s. Underwent 
major rehabilitation in 1977. 
Significance: "The FST is perhaps the best example of a major NACA facility that found 
a multitude of additional uses not visualized in the beginning. In 1962, for example, 
it had an extended study of the handling problems of hypersonic aircraft and space 
reentry vehicles like the shuttle, using large free-flying models." John V. Becker to 
author. 
Disposition: Operational 
Rderence: TR 459 
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Construction of the Full-Scale Tunnel, 1930. 
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The P-51 Mustang is tested in the Full-Scale Tunnel, 1943. 
In 1950 Langley tested the drag characteristics of what was then the world's fastest submarine, 
the Albacore, in the FST. 
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NACA Tank (No. 1) 
Purpose: To study the hydrodynamic resistance and other performance features of water-
based aircraft. 
Initial cost: $649,000 
Dimensions: 2060' x 28' (avg. width) x 26' (avg. height) 
Special features: Wave suppressors 
Key member of design team: Starr Truscott 
Authorized: March 1929 
Operational: 27 May 1931 
Major modifications: New higher-speed (80-MPH) carriage installed, 1936-1937. Tank 
extended by 900 feet to 2960 feet in 1936. 
Significance: "The original research program at Langley made no provision for airplane 
hydrodynamics, and during its first decade the efforts of the staff were concentrated 
almost entirely on problems of the landplane. Many of the studies in wind tunnels 
were applicable to seaplanes, and they in common with landplanes benefited from 
improvements in wings, propellers, engine cowlings, and other developments of the 
1920s. But it was recognized that the airplane on the water has problems that are not 
shared by the airplane in the air or on the landing strip, and in 1929 the Committee 
in Washington decided to enlarge the organization and equipment at Langley to 
provide for research in hydrodynamics." George W. Gray, Frontiers of Flight (New 
York, 1948), p. 65. 
Disposition: Turned over to U.S. Navy in 1959. 
References: TR 470, TN 513, TM 918 
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory 
Purpose: To study methods (like supercharging) by which to increase the power and 
efficiency of aircraft engines and to improve ignition, cooling, and fuel economy. 
Initial cost: $352,000 
Description: Building with three dynamometer rooms, two fuel-spray research rooms, and 
a two-stroke-cycle test bed. 
Ifoy members of design team: Carlton Kemper, Addison Rothrock, Oscar W. Schey 
Authorized: August 1933 
Operational: September 1934 
Significance: "The small but expert power plant staff made some important contributions, 
in addition to their cooperation with the wind-tunnel people in developing the 
remarkable NACA cowling for air-cooled engines. One recalls improved finning for 
air-cooled engine cylinders, methods to decrease the octane requirements of high-
compression engines, and work on such fundamental matters as the behavior of 
fuels-how they ignite, how they burn, and how this burning corrodes critical parts 
of the engine." Jerome C. Hunsaker, Forty Years of Aeronautical Research, p. 264. 
Disposition: Converted to office space after engine research moved to AERL in Cleveland 
in 1942. 
References: TN 634: TRs 634, 644 
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The seaplane towing channel 
under construction in 1930 
(top and middle} and during a 
test of a flying boat model in 
1945 (bottom). 
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24-Inch High-Speed Tunnel (24-Inch HST) 
Purpose: To investigate phenomena occurring as air near Mach 1 flowed over airfoils and 
fuselages at twice the Reynolds numbers of the 11-Inch HST. 
Initial cost: $12,600 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, atmospheric 
Test section: 24" diameter, closed throat 
Drive system: Blowdown of compressed air from the VDT through annular injection nozzle 
Maximum speed: Mach 1 (with no model in throat) 
Special features: Langley's first schlieren photographic system to show compressibility 
burbles and shock waves in air at high speeds; an improved manometer. 
Key members of design team: Eastman N. Jacobs, John Stack, Ira H. Abbott, W. F. 
Lindsey, Kenneth Ward 
Authorized: ca. 1933 
Operational: 3 October 1934 
Major modification: Enclosure in August 1949 to reduce problem of water-vapor conden-
sation. 
Significance: "The complex phenomena of the compressibility burble were seen for the first 
time with the new schlieren system and correlated with the pressure distributions 
for various wing sections. This new understanding led quickly to the development of 
improved high-speed airfoils." John V. Becker to author. 
Disposition: Replaced by 20-Inch Transonic Tunnel in 1953. 
References: TR 646, ACR L4LO7 A 
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15-Foot Spin Tunnel 
(Free-Spinning Tunnel) 
Facilities 
A technician mounts a model 
on a balance for testing in the 
Free-Spinning Tunnel, August 
1935. 
Purpose: To conduct research on the general problems of spinning and stability and to 
test models of aircraft for which the spinning and stability characteristics were either 
unknown or known to be unsatisfactory. 
Initial cost: $64,000 
Circuit and pressure: Vertical nonreturn, atmospheric 
Test section: 15' diameter, open throat; 12-sided polygon, closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 150-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 40 MPH, variable to rate of falling aircraft model 
Special features: Clockwork contained within the model automatically set the controls for 
recovery from a spin. Motion picture camera recorded the effects. 
Key member of design team: Charles H. Zimmerman 
Authorized: 8 June 1933 
Operational: 3 April 1935 
Significance: "During World War II, every fighter, light bomber, attack plane, and 
trainer~over 300 designs--had to be tested in Langley's spin tunnels. Subsequently, 
over half of these aircraft were modified in some way to ensure that their controls 
would be able to pull them out of a spin." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, 
p. 42. 
References: TR 557; Aero Digest (June 1935): 20-22. 
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8-Foot High-Speed Tunnel (8-Foot HST) 
Purpose: To test complete models of aircraft and aircraft components in a high-speed 
airstream approaching the speed of sound. Visualized as a full-speed companion to 
the low-speed Full-Scale Tunnel. 
Initial cost: $266,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 8' diameter, closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 8000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 575 MPH (Mach 0.75) 
Special features: Because of the Bernoulli effect, the test chamber had to withstand 
powerful, inwardly directed pressure. An igloo structure with concrete walls a foot 
thick housed the test section. Operating personnel located inside the igloo were 
subjected to pressures equivalent to 10,000-foot altitude and had to wear oxygen 
masks and enter through airlocks. A heat exchanger removed the laTge quantities of 
heat generated by the big fan. 
Key nwmbers of design team: Russell G. Robinson and Manley J. Hood; idea for tunnel 
first suggested by Eastman N. Jacobs. 
Authorized: 17 July 1933: approval of funds by Federal Administrator of the Public 
Works Administration, under the authority of the National IndustTial RecoveTy Act 
of 1G June 1933. 
Operational: 28 March 1936 
Major modifications: Repowered to 16,000 HP (Mach 1 capability), Feb. 1945. Mach 1.2 
contoured nozzle installed, Dec. 1947. Slotted-throat test section installed, 1950. 
Significance: "Perhaps the most important contribution of this trailblazing tunnel came 
from its investigations of complete aircraft models (made possible for the first time 
by its large size) in which the causes and cures for the severe adverse stability and 
control problems encountered in high-speed dives were first delineated. This tunnel 
also produced the high-speed cowling shapes used in World War II aircraft, and the 
new family of efficient air inlets used in jet aircraft. The first 500-MPH investigations 
of propellers were made here early in the war. After repowering, with new support 
systems, the 8-Foot Tunnel produced precise transonic data up to Mach numbers as 
high as 0.92 for such aircraft as the X-1, D-558, and others. Its final achievement was 
the development and use in routine operations of the first transonic slotted throat. 
The investigations of wing-body shapes in this tunnel led to Whitcomb's discovery 
of the transonic area rule. Surely, this is one of the most impressive records in the 
NACA or anywhere else of what can be accomplished in the hands of imaginative, 
competent researchers." John V. Becker to author, 18 Oct. 1984. 
Disposition: Deactivated in 1956. 
Reference: AR 1936 
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The concrete walls of the igloo-like structure around the test section of the 8-Foot High-Speed 
Tunnel were one foot thick. 
The windmill power of an experimental propeller is tested in the 8-Foot HST in May .1939. 
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In the tiltable 5-Foot Free-Flight Tunnel, unpowered models flew stationary in a rising 
airstream, much like a hawk or buzzard hovers in natural air currents. The man piloting the 
model in this May 1937 photo is Charles H. Zimmerman, the tunnel's designer. 
5-Foot Free-Flight Tunnel 
Purpose: To study spinning and stability characteristics in free flight without the expense 
of building, testing, and modifying full-scale aircraft. 
Initial cost: $120,000 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, atmospheric 
Test section: 5' diameter 
Drive system: Fan; 5-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 25 feet per second 
Special features: With one hand an engineer adjusted the speed of the tunnel and with 
the other hand he tilted the tunnel up, down, or around to follow the motion of the 
model. The basic idea was to get the model to remain stationary and horizontal in 
the rising airstream of the tilted tunnel, constantly adjusted to match the aircraft's 
glide angle. The engineer piloted the model's control surfaces via electrical signals 
sent through thin wires trailing behind the model. 
Authorized: 1936 
Operational: 20 April 1937 
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Significance: "Wind tunnel research has developed problems which required entirely new 
instrumental applications. One such problem originating at Langley came from the 
group which [operated] the free-flight tunnel. In this tunnel, instead of installing 
the airplane model on balances, the engineers actually fly it in the windstream while 
records are made of the effectiveness of the controls .... In early studies with [this 
tunnel] the model all too often would swerve to one side and crash into the tunnel wall. 
The Instrument Research Division was asked to correct this erratic performance ... 
and shortly produced an automatic control device which responded to a light placed 
at the end of the tunnel. By this means the model is caused to seek the light, and 
through its use the smash-ups have been reduced to a low figure." George W. Gray, 
Frontiers of Flight, pp. 55-56. 
Disposition: Replaced by 12-Foot Free-Flight Tunnel in 1939. 
Two-Dimensional Low-Turbulence Tunnel 
Purpose: Ostensibly ( that is, as stated for funding purposes) to study ice formation on 
airplane models and parts, but actually to assess the performance of airfoils in an 
airstream of very low turbulence level, approaching that of the smooth air of free 
flight. 
Initial cost: $103,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 1-10 atmospheres 
Test section: 3' x 7.5', closed throat. Contraction ratio 19.6 to 1. Screening to reduce 
turbulence. 
Drive system: Fan; 200-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 155 MPH 
Special features: To fulfill the announced purpose, icing research, Langley insulated the 
walls of this tunnel with a thick wrapping of crude insulation ( kapok from life 
preservers) and added makeshift refrigeration equipment ( consisting of an open tank 
of ethylene glycol cooled by blocks of ice). A pump circulated the cold mixture 
through coils that cooled air drawn from the tunnel. 
Key members of design team: Eastman N. Jacobs and Ira H. Abbott 
Authorized: 28 May 1937 
Operational: 15 June 1938 
Major modifications: After the completion of a perfunctory series of icing tests, the 
refrigeration equipment was removed and an array of honeycombs and screens was 
installed upstream of the test section to homogenize the airflow. Testing of the 
low-drag potential of various airfoils then began. 
Significance: "[This tunnel] was built as an experimental model to try out the idea of 
radical contraction and screening, to see if the combination would really lower the 
turbulence. It did, and the researchers began to plan a larger and still more radical 
tunnel [the Low-Turbulence Pressure Tunnel]." George W. Gray, Fronti'ers of Flight, 
p. 48. 
Disposition: Dismantled, 1947-1948 
Reference: TN 1283 
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Testing a 1/12th-scale model in the 12-Foot Free-Flight Tunnel, 1940, 
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12-Foot Free-Flight Tunnel 
Purpose: To study spinning and stability characteristics of aircraft models in free flight, 
improve airplane safety, and test radically new aircraft design types. 
Initial cost: approx. $250,000 
Circuit and pressure: Annular return, atmospheric 
Test section: 12' diameter, 12-sided/8-sided polygon 
Drive system: Fan; 600-HP electric motor (5-minute rating) 
Maximum speed: 50 MPH 
Special features: As the model rose from the tunnel floor, climbed, dived, and banked, a 
camera recorded a motion picture of its responses to remote controls. 
Key member of design team: Charles H. Zimmerman 
Authorized: 1937 
Operational: 1939 
Significance: "[This tunnel was] useful with radically new aircraft where no reservoir of 
flight experience was available, namely, tailless aircraft, planes with delta and skewed 
wings, and vertical takeoff and landing/short takeoff and landing (VTOL/STOL) 
vehicles." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, p. 28. 
Disposition: Used into the early 1950s; supplanted by powered models flown in the Full-
Scale Tunnel. 
Reference: TN 810 
19-Foot Pressure Tunnel 
Purpose: The high Reynolds number study of propellers and three-dimensional wings, as 
well as the stability and control characteristics of models of complete aircraft. Built 
in response to continued concern over the problem of scale effects. 
Initial cost: $1,100,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 2. 7 atmospheres (0-40 psia) 
Test section: 19', closed throat 
Drive system: 34'6" fan; 8000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 330 MPH 
Special features: Researchers had to enter their working quarters through a decompression 
chamber. 
Key members of design team: Smith J. DeFrance, John F. Parsons, Arthur A. Regier, 
James G. McHugh, John C. Messick 
Authorized: 22 June 1936 
Operational: 20 June 1939 
Major modifications: Converted to Transonic Dynamics Tunnel, 1955--1959, to study 
aeroelasticity, flutter, buffeting, vortex shedding, gust loads, and other dynamic 
characteristics. The TDT incorporated a slotted test section, new mounts, a quick-
stop drive system, a gust-maker or airflow oscillator, and a Freon-12 test medium 
system. 
Significance: "[The 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel] was the first attempt anywhere to combine 
large size and high pressure in a single facility." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of 
NASA, p. 29. "This tunnel was originally visualized as a 'super PRT,' but it became 
apparent before it was finished that its speed was too low for high-speed propeller 
research; this part of its intended usage was transferred to the new Langley 16-Foot 
High-Speed (500-MPH) Tunnel. The 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel conducted a great 
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Construction of the 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel, September 1937. 
The original test chamber of the 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel, 1939. 
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Phantom drawing of the 19-P'oot Pressure Tunnel, February 1945, 
Aerial view of the Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT), a greatly modified version of the 
original 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel. Between the TDT and the Back River stands the Full-
Scale Tunnel. 
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deal of useful testing of complete aircraft models at higher Reynolds numbers than 
other low-speed Langley tunnels, but did not produce any landmark results like the 
original PRT." John V. Becker to author. 
Disposition: Operational as Transonic Dynamics Tunnel. 
Reference: NASA TN D-1616, March 1963. 
Structures Research Laboratory 
Purpose: To provide an experimental capability for investigating the problems encountered 
in the design of advanced aircraft structures. 
Initial cost: $803,000 
Special equipment: NACA Combined Loading (six components) Testing Machine; many 
tension and compression testing machines; optical and electrical strain measuring 
equipment; large, strong testing floor and vertical backstop; carbon-rod and quartz-
tube radiators for simulating aerodynamic heating. 
Key members of design team: Joseph N. Kotanchik and Norris F. Dow 
Authorized: 23 August 1939 
Operational: 18 October 1940 
Major modifications: Addition of power supply and control system for radiant heating of 
structures, 1958. 
Significance: "This general-purpose structures research laboratory was designed to be 
adaptable to a variety of testing requirements. Initial experimental and theoretical 
research concentrated on the strength of structures in compression and the stress 
distribution in redundant structures. Fatigue testing began in 1943, long before 
metal fatigue became a major factor in airplane design. A major transition in research 
began about 1950 to the structural problems of supersonic aircraft and missiles. This 
laboratory led the development of radiant heating devices used worldwide for the 
laboratory simulation of aerodynamic heating of structures. Support of ballistic 
missile programs led to the early development and research use of electric-arc-
powered jets for testing thermal protection materials for reentry vehicles." Richard R. 
Heldenfels to author. 
Disposition: Operational 
References: R. W. Peters, "The NACA Combined Loading Testing Machine," Proceedings 
of the Society for Experimental Stress Analysis, 13, 1955; Richard R. Heldenfels, "High 
Temperature Testing of Aircraft Structures," NATO AGARD Report 205, Oct. 1958; 
NASA TM X-1129, July 1965. 
20-Foot Spin Tunnel 
Purpose: To investigate spinning characteristics of aircraft, especially those with high 
wing loading factors. 
Initial cost: $100,000 
Circuit and pressure: Vertical with annular return, atmospheric 
Test section: 20' diameter 12-sided polygon, closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 400-HP electric motor (1300-HP overload) 
Maximum speed: 66 MPH 
Special features: Tiny electric servo-actuators drive the model's control surfaces, activated 
electromagnetically to initiate recovery from a spin. 
Key member of design team: Oscar Seidman 
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Interior of the Structures Research Laboratory, 1947, 
Authorized: March 1939 
Operational: 5 March 1941 
Facilities 
Major modifications: Minor changes to accommodate study of capsules and recovery 
devices in vertical descent, late 1950s. 
Significance: "Out of [investigations in this and Langley's other spin tunnels came] three 
methods of modifying an airplane to make it controllable in a spin; first, enlarge the 
vertical tail by extending it back, thus providing more surface to act against the air; 
second, lift the horizontal tail and set it at a higher level on the body of the airplane; 
third, extend the fin forward on the underside of the tail, that is, put in a ventral 
fin." George W. Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 156. 
Disposition: Operational 
Reference: NACA L-86258 
A model of the Northrop XB-35 flying wing was tested in the 20-Foot Spin Tunnel in 1943, 
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Two-Dimensional Low-Turbulence 
Pressure Tunnel (LTPT) 
Purpose: To provide reliable airfoil data at high Reynolds numbers and, more specifically, 
to develop low-drag airfoils. 
Initial cost: $611,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 1-10 atmospheres (1-150 psia) 
Test section: 7'6" x 3', closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 2000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 300 MPH (1 atm.), 220 MPH (4 atm.), 160 MPH (10 atm.) 
Special features: Eleven screening elements to reduce turbulence levels; high-contraction-
ratio entrance cone; unusual method of measuring lift and drag. 
Key members of design team: Eastman N. Jacobs, Ira H. Abbott, Albert E. von Doenhoff 
Authorized: 1938 
Operational: Spring 1941 
Major modifications: Converted for use with Freon, 1947--1948; converted to slotted throat 
in 1953. (Neither of these modifications was very successful, however.) 
Significance: "When the LTPT commenced operation in the spring of 1941, it began war 
work on a crash basis. With its unique low-turbulence-flow characteristics, it was an 
ideal tool with which to explore the capabilities of a revolutionary type of wing~the 
newly conceived laminar-flow airfoil." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, 
p. 40. 
Disposition: Served on a standby basis as a pressure vessel for the 26-Inch Transonic 
Blowdown Tunnel after 1955; reactivated in early 1970s because of interest in low-
speed characteristics of new types of supercritical airfoil. 
Reference: TN 1283 
16-Foot High-Speed Tunnel (16-Foot HST) 
Purpose: To investigate various aerodynamic problems of airplanes, including cowling and 
cooling of full-size engines and propellers, at high speeds. 
Initial cost: $1,422,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 16' diameter, closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 16,000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: Mach 0.7 
Special features: 2000-HP and 6000-HP dynamometers for full-scale propeller testing 
Key members of design team: David J. Biermann and Lindsey I. Turner, Jr. 
Authorized: 1939 
Operational: 5 December 1941 
Major modifications: Changed to 14-foot slotted-throat test section with octagonal throat 
and repowered to 60,000-HP drive, 1950; 35,000-HP plenum suction blower, 1969. 
Significance: "Tests of full-scale aircraft nacelles with operating engines and propellers 
during the first two years of operation encountered many difficulties: choking of 
the tunnel at Mach numbers of about 0.6, with the associated distortions in the 
flow; inadequate angle-of-attack ranges, etc. This type of testing was terminated 
in 1943. But this tunnel proved ideal for investigating full-scale propellers with 
the high-powered electric dynamometers at airspeeds up to low supersonic speeds. 
With its relatively large-size test models it has been possible in more recent years to 
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The 16-Foot High-8peed Tun-
nel at the time of its dedication 
in 1941. Left, a scale model 
of a jet airplane being tested in 
the tunnel during the 1950s. 
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simulate effectively jet engine exhaust on aircraft models using hydrogen peroxide or 
compressed air." John V. Becker to author. 
Disposition: Operational as 16-Foot Transonic Tunnel. 
Reference: RM L52E01, July 1952. 
Stability Tunnel 
Purpose: To study the individual aerodynamic components of rotational motion in flight. 
Initial cost: $295,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: Dual (interchangeable): 75" diameter or 6' x 6'; closed throats 
Drive system: Fan; 600-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 250 MPH 
Special features: Rotating paddles started air swirling in test section; sides of 6 x 6-foot 
section were adjustable to different radii of curvature so that models could be tested 
in curved flow. 
Operational: June 1942 
Significance: "For many years the stability tunnel provided data for predicting the 
maneuvering performance of aircraft and missiles. Its eventual demise was hastened 
by the perfection of oscillating model techniques." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels 
of NASA, p. 44. 
Disposition: Deactivated and transferred to Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1958 for use 
as an educational tool. 
Reference: TN 2483 
Tank No. 2 
Purpose: To test models of floats for seaplanes and hulls for flying boats by dragging them 
through seawater. 
Initial cost: $429,000 
Description: Basin 1800' long, 18' wide, 6' deep; 60-MPH carriage 
Design team: Starr Truscott, John B. Parkinson, John R. Dawson 
Authorized: 2 May 1939 
Operational: 18 December 1942 
Significance: "(In this tank, researchers] experimented with radical departures from 
accepted hull design, trying to find the specifications for a seaplane body that would 
combine freedom from porpoising and skipping, low water resistance, and superior 
performance in the air. Out of these experiments [came] a novel design known as the 
hull with a planing tail." George W. Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 80. 
Disposition: Deactivated in 1960s; carriage used in wake-vortex studies in 1970s. 
References: TR 753; WRs L-584, L-687 
Seaplane Impact Basin 
Purpose: To measure impact loads on seaplane hulls. 
Initial cost: $311,000 
Description: Basin 360' long, 26'8" wide, 8' deep; made waves up to 3'. 
Authorized: 2 May 1939 
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Operational: 10 November 1942 
Significance: This facility led to the development of various aircraft ditching aids, such as 
hydroflaps and hydrofoils. 
Disposition: Building used from 1950s as LaRC photographic laboratory. 
Reference: TR 795 
9-Inch Supersonic Tunnel 
Purpose: To explore supersonic flight problems and fundamental supersonic flow phenom-
ena. 
Initial cost: Indeterminate, but probably less than $100,000. 
Circuit and pressure: Atmospheric intake, nonreturn; stream pressures from 1/5 to 
1/3 atmosphere 
Test section: 9" x 9" 
Drive system: Axial-flow compressor; variable-speed 1000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: Mach 2.5 
Key members of design team: Eastman N. Jacobs, Macon C. Ellis, Clinton E. Brown, 
Arthur Kantrowitz 
Authorized: 1939 
Operational: July 1942 
Major modifications: Changed to closed-circuit dry air operation in mid-1940s; repowered 
to 3500-HP drive ca. 1946. 
Significance: "This pioneering little supersonic tunnel provided timely education and 
experience for the NACA in the 1941-1945 period immediately preceding the major 
drive for large supersonic tunnels." John V. Becker to author. 
Disposition: Dismantled 
300-MPH 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel 
Purpose: To reduce the backlog of work in Langley's 7 x 10-Foot Atmospheric Wind 
Tunnel (operational 1930) caused by World War II. 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 7' x 10', closed throat 
Drive system: Fan; 1600-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 300 MPH 
Special features: Remote-control survey apparatus permitting rapid exploration of airflow 
behind models; six-component balance system. 
Key members of design team: Thomas A. Harris and Charles J. Donlan 
Authorized: 1942 
Operational: February 1945 
Major modifications: 17' x 17' test section installed in settling chamber upstream of 
original test section, 1956. 
Significance: The modified tunnel provided conditions appropriate for testing of aircraft 
in transition from hovering to cruising flight. 
Disposition: Dismantled 1970 
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The V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing) Tunnel, shown here in 1949, was a 
modified version of the 300-MPH 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel of 1945. 
Gust Tunnel 
Purpose: To investigate aircraft loads produced by atmospheric turbulence and other 
unsteady flow phenomena and to develop gust alleviation devices. 
Initial cost: Indeterminate 
Circuit and pressure: Reversible single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 8' x 14', open throat, adjustable angle (jet type) 
Drive system: 75-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 100 MPH 
Special features: Apparatus consisted of a catapult for launching dynamically scaled 
models into steady flight, a jet of air for simulating a gust, curtains for catching 
the model after it traversed the gust, and instruments for recording the model's 
responses. 
Key members of design team: Philip Donely and Mike Goldberg 
Authorized: June 1943 
Operational: August 1945 
Significance: "Often the gust [revealed] values that were not found by the best known 
methods of calculation. In one instance, for example, the gust tunnel tests showed 
that it would be safe to design the airplane for load increments 17 to 22 percent less 
than the previously accepted values." George W. Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 174. 
"The gust tunnel was one of a breed of facilities (like the spin tunnel, free-flight 
tunnel, and impact basin) that provided information to verify basic theories and 
concepts. The gust tunnel became obsolescent because its Reynolds number and 
Mach number capabilities were low." Philip Donely to author. 
Disposition: Dismantled in 1965 after being used as a low-velocity instrument laboratory 
and noise research facility. 
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A speed-flash photograph of a scale model of a seaplane flying in the Gust Tunnel, April 
1946. 
Flutter Tunnel 
Purpose: To study the serious and poorly understood problem of aeroelasticity and the 
effects of flutter on aircraft. 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 0 to 1.8 atmospheres (air or Freon-12 as test medium) 
Test section: 4'6" diameter, closed throat. Dual (interchangeable): four-component 
hydraulic balance section; flutter test section with 17 viewing portals. 
Drive system: 1000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: Mach 1 
Authorized: 1944 
Operational: September 1945 
Significance: "Transonic aerodynamics further complicated an already complex aeroelastic 
problem. . . . Aircraft designers needed definitive wind-tunnel tests to assure them 
that their thin-winged aircraft would not experience flutter under any anticipated 
flight conditions." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, p. 79 
Disposition: Operational 
High-Speed 7 x 10-Foot Tunnel 
Purpose: To investigate general aerodynamic effects at high speed, especially stability and 
control problems into and through the critical speed range. 
Initial cost: $2,052,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, atmospheric 
Test section: 7' x 10', closed throat, adjustable 
Drive system: Fan; 14,000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: 675 MPH (approx. Mach 0.9) 
Key members of design team: Thomas A. Harris and Charles J. Donlan 
Authorized: 1943 
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The portable test section of the Flutter Tunnel being inspected in the Physical Research 
Laboratory, 1945. 
Operational: November 1945 
Major modifications: Transonic bump installed, ca. 1946; slotted test section, ca. 1953, 
increased maximum speed to Mach 1; connected to 35,000-HP compressor of 16-Foot 
HST in mid-1950s, increasing speed to Mach 1.2. 
Significance: "Whereas the test area of the 300-MPH tunnel was expanded for low-speed 
work, the test section of its high-speed twin was constricted by a carefully designed 
'bump.' Air flowing over the bump was accelerated to the transonic range even 
though the main airflow remained subsonic. This modification, though crude, led 
to a qualitative exploration of the transonic range that was just opening up after 
[World War II]." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, p. 37. 
Disposition: Operational under direction of Full-Scale Research Division, but no longer 
has Mach 1 capability. 
References: TN 3469, NASA TM X-1130 
Induction Aerodynamics Laboratory 
Purpose: To conduct research on the aerodynamics of subsonic and supersonic internal 
flows, such as the optimum methods of inducing air and supplying it to conventional 
and jet engines. 
Special equipment: Air supply provided initially by three 1000-HP blowers. 
Key members of design team: Kennedy F. Rubert and J. R. Henry 
Authorized: 1944 
Operational: March 1946 
Major modifications: Underwent major upgrading in 1950s involving use of the replaced 
16,000-HP motors from the repowered 16-Foot HST to drive larger blowers. 
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Significance: "Like the original concept of the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory 
in Cleveland, this small laboratory was originally aimed at piston engine problems 
and had to be reoriented towards jet engines and ramjet combustion research. 
Eventually it was connected to the central air supply of the Gas Dynamics Laboratory 
at Langley and applied to hypersonic ramjet research." John V. Becker to author. 
Disposition: Operational under NASA, in part as a high-intensity noise research facility. 
Test cells now devoted to hypersonic ramjet propulsion research under High-Speed 
Aerodynamics Division. 
Helicopter Apparatus 
Purpose: To investigate fundamental factors affecting the performance, stability and 
control, and vibration characteristics of helicopters. 
Description: Worked on the old principle of the whirling arm. Apparatus consisted of a 
cone-shaped steel tower 40 feet high with a drive shaft in its center for mounting a 
helicopter rotor. Strain gauge measured the torque and thrust on the shaft. Cameras 
recorded action of whirling rotor. 
Key member of design team: Frederic B. Gustafson 
Authorized: 1944 
Operational: March 1946 
Disposition: Deactivated in 1960s, but reactivated ca. 1970. Dismantled 1976 when NASA 
· shifted helicopter work to Ames Research Center. 
11-Inch Hypersonic Tunnel 
Purpose: To explore the potential of flight at high Mach numbers. Inspired by Allies' 
discoveries concerning Nazi Germany's V-2 ballistic missile program at Peenemiinde. 
Served as pilot model for large Continuous-Flow Hypersonic Tunnel. 
Initial cost: approx. $200,000 · 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, 36 atmospheres (540 psia) 
Test section: 11" x 11" 
Drive system: Blowdown. To reach high pressure ratios, air from a 50-atmosphere pressure 
tank was blown through the test section into an evacuated tank. With high pressure 
on one side and very low pressure on the other, generated pressure ratios could be 
maintained for about 100 seconds. 
Maximum speed: Mach 7 
Special features: Electric resistance heater raised temperatures in settling chamber to 
900°F. 
Key members of design team: John V. Becker and Charles H. McLellan 
Authorized: 1945 
Operational: 1947 
Significance: "Small pilot tunnels of the NACA were often used for other purposes, but the 
11-Inch Hypersonic Tunnel went far beyond this to become a star in its own right .... 
Our experience with this remarkable tunnel and other 'blowdown' or 'intermittent' 
hypersonic tunnels suggested clearly that they are preferable to the continuous-flow 
type-which is extremely costly in drive compressor equipment. Long runs are not 
essential with modern instrumentation." John V. Becker to author. 
Disposition: Operational under direction of Aero-Physics Division until 1973 when it was 
dismantled. Later given to Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 
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Reference: John V. Becker, "Results of Recent Hypersonic and Unsteady Flow Research 
at the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory," Journal of Applied Physics 21 (July 1950): 
619-628. 
4 x 4-Foot Supersonic Pressure Tunnel 
Purpose: To investigate supersonic aerodynamics problems on models large enough to 
permit installation of extensive instrumentation, and to provide detailed information 
on viscous and interference effects unobtainable in smaller supersonic tunnels. 
Initial cost: $909,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 1/4 atmosphere 
Test section: 4'6" x 4'6" 
Drive system: 6000-HP electric motor driving a seven-stage axial compressor capable 
of handling 860,000 cubic feet of air per minute at a compression ratio of 2. The 
compressor was the key to the whole design. 
Maximum speed: Mach 2.2 
Special features: Flexible walls in test section; adjustable contour nozzle; drying and 
cooling equipment to reduce moisture content of tunnel air. 
Key members of design team: Donald D. Baals and Kent Horton. The compressor was 
designed by M. F. Miller and J. R. Runckel of the 16-Foot HST staff. 
Authorized: 1945 
Operational: 1948 (construction halted for nearly two years by strike of the industrial 
contractor assigned the mechanical design and actual fabrication) 
Major modifications: Repowered in 1950 to 45,000 HP (continuous) and 60,000 HP (for 
30 minutes). 
Significance: "Finally on the line, the 4 x 4-foot supersonic tunnel made up for lost time. 
Many well-known military aircraft and space vehicles were tested through the years: 
the famous Century Series fighters (F-102, F-105, etc.), the B-58 supersonic bomber, 
the X-2 research aircraft, and so on." Baals and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, 
p. 51. 
Disposition: Dismantled in 1977, but drive motors, cooling tower, and some support 
facilities incorporated into new National Transonic Facility (built on the same site 
and operational in 1983). 
Reference: NASA TM X-1130 
26-Inch Transonic Blowdown 
Tunnel (26-lnch TBT) 
Purpose: To study aerodynamic effects in the troublesome transonic speed range and to 
investigate flutter characteristics. 
Initial cost: $135,000 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, 7 atmospheres 
Test section: 26" octagonal, slotted top and bottom walls 
Drive system: Induction; compressed air from LTPT (150 psia) 
Maximum speed: Mach 1.45 
Key members of design team: Albert E. von Doenhoff, and Laurence K. Loftin, Jr. 
Authorized: ca. 1948 
Operational: 1950 
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The key to the design of the 
4 x 4-Foot Supersonic Tun-
nel was the powerful multi-
stage axial compressor. 
Significance: "The validity of flutter data obtained in the 26" TBT was substantiated 
in 1951 by comparative tests. Studies were made in this tunnel with models, 
appropriately scaled, similar to those for which flutter data had been obtained 
beyond Mach 1 by the free-fall drop-model technique. Agreement between results 
obtained from the two different test techniques was gratifyingly close. Following 
these comparative investigations, systematic studies of the effect of such wing 
planform variables as aspect ratio and sweepback angle on flutter in the Mach 
number range between 0.8 and 1.4 were undertaken in the TBT. The results of 
these studies began to appear in 1953. Shortly thereafter, the TBT was in great 
demand for investigations of the flutter characteristics of various aircraft and missile 
configurations." Laurence K. Loftin, Jr., "Notes on Flutter Investigation of Republic 
F-105 Tail Surfaces in the NACA 26-Inch Transonic Blowdown Tunnel," 12 January 
1983, copy in LaRC Historical Archives. 
Disposition: Deactivated in 1970s. 
Gas Dynamics Laboratory 
Purpose: To research basic aerodynamic, heating, and fluid mechanical problems in the 
speed ranges upwards from the conventional supersonic tunnels to hypersonic and 
space-reentry conditions. 
Initial cost: $5.5 million 
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Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, 200 atmospheres 
Test section: Typically 20" 
Drive system: Induction. Central 3000-psi tank farm provided heated air to several small 
cells. 
Maximum speed: Mach 8 
Special features: Huge steam and electric resistance heaters warm air to 680° and 1040°F, 
respectively, and prevent liquefaction in the test cells. 
Key members of design team: Antonio Ferri, Macon C. Ellis, Clinton E. Brown 
Authorized: ca. 1949 
Operational: 1951 
Major modifications: Under NASA, when models of various spacecraft had to be tested at 
reentry Mach numbers, pure nitrogen aµd helium were used as test medium instead 
of heated air. 
Disposition: Operational 
8-Foot Transonic Pressure Tunnel (8-Foot TPT) 
Purpose: To further the study of transonic aerodynamics at high Reynolds numbers, and 
in particular to investigate flutter and buffeting in the transonic regime. 
Initial cost: $5,495,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 0.1 to 2.0 atmospheres 
Test section: 7'1" x 7'1", slotted throat 
Drive system: Fan; 25,000-HP electric motor 
Maximum speed: Mach 1.2 
Special features: Fine grid water-cooled coil in airstream removed excess heat but added 
no moisture to the circulating air. 
Key members of design team: John Stack., Eugene C. Draley, Ray H. Wright, Axel T. 
Mattson 
Authorized: ca. 1951 
Operational: 1953 
Major modifications: Plenum suction added, 1958, increasing speed to Mach 1.3. 
Significance: Langley engineers designed this tunnel from its inception using the new 
concept of the slotted wall. 
Disposition: Operational 
Unitary Plan Supersonic Tunnel 
Purpose: To contribute force, moment, pressure-distribution, and heat-transfer studies of 
high-speed airflow. 
Initial cost: $15,427,000 
Circuit and pressure: Single-return, 150 psia. (Normal operating temperature approx. 
150°F with heat bursts of 300-400°F for heat-transfer studies.) 
Test section: Dual. Both 4' x 4'; one capable of Mach 1.5 to 2.9 and the other capable of 
Mach 2.3 to 4.6. 
Drive system: Family of electric motors rated at 100,000 HP, plus four compressor units 
Maximum speed: Mach 4.6 
Special features: Asymmetric supersonic nozzle developed at Ames Research Center 
Key member of design team: Herbert A. Wilson 
Authorized: 27 October 1949 (Unitary Plan Act) 
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In 1951 the reentry flight path of this nose cone model of a Jupiter intermediate range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) was tested in the Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel. 
Operational: 1955 
Significance: "A long series of missiles passed through the 4 x 4-Foot Unitary Tunnel, 
where they were tested for high-speed performance, stability and control, maneuver-
ability, jet-exhaust effects, and other performance factors . . . . Despite the original 
dedication of this tunnel to missile development, it had been in operation scarcely 
a year before the now-famous McDonnell F-4 Phantom was being tested in model 
form. Later, the X-15, the F-111, and various supersonic transport configurations, as 
well as models of space vehicles, could be found mounted in the test section." Baals 
and Corliss, Wind Tunnels of NASA, pp. 68-69. 
Disposition: Operational 
Reference: Manual for Users for the Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel Facilities of the NACA, 
1956. 
9 x 6-Foot Thermal Structures Tunnel 
Purpose: To provide a capability to test aircraft and missile structural components under 
the combined effects of aerodynamic heating and loading. 
Initial cost: $3,723,000 
Circuit and pressure: Nonreturn, 3.4 to 13.6 atmospheres (stagnation pressure to 200 
psia), 300° to 660°F 
Test section: 8'9" x 6', solid walls with numerous viewing ports 
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In the early 1960s the 9 x 6-Foot Thermal Structures Tunnel (top, in 1956) tested the effects 
of reentry heating on various space capsule materials as part of Project Fire. 
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Hot-air jets employing ceramic heat exchangers played an important role at Langley in the 
study of materials for ballistic missile nose cones and reentry vehicles. Here a model is being 
tested in one of these jets at 4000 degrees Fahrenheit in 1957. 
Drive system: Induction; 600-psia air stored in a tank farm filled by a high-capacity 
compressor located in an adjacent facility; exhausted to the atmosphere. 
Maximum speed: Mach 3 
Special features: 9 x 6-Inch Model Tunnel (1960) 
Key members of design team: Richard R. Heldenfels and E. Barton Geer 
Authorized: FY 1953. (In response to recommendations of its advisory committees, NACA 
management had decided in 1951 that a large, high-temperature structures research 
laboratory should be constructed at Langley to conduct experiments on structures 
for supersonic aircraft and missiles. A heated test chamber equipped with loading 
devices was proposed in June 1951, but further study and some spectacular test 
results in 1952 revealed that a ground facility that more nearly duplicated the flight 
environment was needed.) 
Operational: September 1957. (Construction was delayed by a federal budget reduction 
action and by studies required to solve a few design problems.) 
Major modifications: Additional air storage, 1957; high-speed digital data system, 1959; 
subsonic diffuser, 1960; Topping compressor, 1961; boost heater system (2000°F hot 
core provided by propane burners in the settling chamber), 1963. 
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Significance: "Research use of this facility was primarily concerned with the effects of 
aerodynamic heating and loading in combination on the structural integrity of vehicle 
components with emphasis on panel flutter. The many specific components tested 
included the vertical tail of the X-15 research airplane, the heat shields of the Centaur 
launch vehicle and the Project Fire entry vehicle, and elements of the Hawk, Falcon, 
Nike, Sam-D, and Minuteman missiles. The high-intensity noise field (162 db) at 
the tunnel exit was used occasionally to test the response of humans, equipment, 
and structures that included the Project Mercury capsule." Richard R. Heldenfels 
to author. 
Disposition: Deactivated on 30 September 1971 as a result of metal fatigue in the air 
storage field which caused an accident that destroyed part of the facility and damaged 
other property. The failure resulted from wind-induced oscillations of a manifold 
loop between bottles. In the mid-1970s, all tunnel equipment was removed and the 
buildings converted to other uses. 
References: NASA TNs D-517, D-907, D-921, D-1358; NASA TM X-1130 
20-Inch Hypersonic Tunnel 
Purpose: To investigate heat transfer, pressure, and forces acting on inlets and complete 
models in the hypersonic regime. 
Initial cost: $1,409,000 
Circuit and pressure; Nonreturn, 220-550 psia; running time over 15 minutes 
Test section: 20" diameter 
Drive system: Induction 
Maximum speed: Mach 6 
Special feature: Electrical resistance heater 
J{ey mernbers of design team: John V. Becker and Eugene S. Love 
Authorized: 1957 
Operational: 1958 
Disposition: Operational under direction of High-Speed Aerodynamics Division. 
Reference: NASA TN D-6280 
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Langley laboratory conducted both wind tunnel and free-flight testing. Sometimes 
the NACA researchers studied a problem first in flight and then moved on to explore it in 
a tunnel under a more extreme aerodynamic condition, such as higher speed. Other times 
the researchers made the initial investigation in a tunnel and then checked the accuracy of 
the simulation in flight. Such confirmation was essential to aeronautical progress because 
there were reasons to suspect the accuracy of tunnel data. No one knew, for instance, the 
exact effect of Reynolds number on test results. Walls, struts, supports, and other tunnel 
structures affected the aerodynamic performance of a test model in ways that could not 
be compensated for exactly. 
The following is a catalog of the aircraft assigned to NACA Langley in order of 
receipt. Some of the aircraft were subjected to extensive research probes, others served 
as test beds for the study of specific innovations, some were given merely cursory flight 
evaluation, and still others were only visitors at the lab or military base at Langley Field. 
NACA Langley's aircraft numbering system may be confusing because it does 
not conform sequentially to the order of receipt. Some aircraft had multiple NACA 
designations depending upon the type of arrangement by which the aircraft had been 
assigned to Langley (e.g., ownership, indefinite loan, temporary loan). An example is the 
P-S0A-5, serial 44-85352, acquired on 5 November 1946, which was listed in early records 
as "NACA 281" but continued to carry the USAAF designation "PN-352" until transfer 
of ownership to the NACA on 1 May 1950, when it was designated "NACA 112." Over 
a period of years, in fact, more than one aircraft could have the same number. (The 
current NASA numbering system begins with 1 for the transports, but the research and 
support aircraft carry 3-digit numbers, the first digit of which indicates the center to which 
the aircraft is assigned. For instance, "NASA 1" is a transport operated by Langley for 
the NASA administrator in Washington, whereas Langley's other aircraft have numbers 
beginning with 5, such as "NASA 515," a research Boeing 737.) During the years of 
the NACA, many military aircraft were temporarily assigned to Langley lab for specific 
programs requested by the services. Rather than paint NACA numbers on most of these, 
Langley used the last three digits of the military number for the identification. If the 
aircraft was held over an appreciable time for research, or transferred in ownership to the 
NACA, Langley then applied NACA numbers. Aircraft purchased by the NACA carried 
NACA numbers from the start. 
Order of 
receipt 
at Langley 
1 
Aircraft type 
and serial no. 
Curtiss JN4H 
(N6249) 
NACA 
Arrived Departed 110. 
1919 Nov. 1923 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type 
at Langley and serial no. 
2 Curtiss JN 4H 
(AS 44946) 
3 Curtiss JN 4H 
(AS 38131) 
4 Vought VE-7 
(A 5669) 
5 British Royal Aircraft 
Factory (RAF) SE-5A 
(AS 8049) 
6 DeHavilland 4 
(AS 22830) 
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Arrived 
1919 
1919 
Apr. 1921 
Sept. 1922 
Sept. 1922 
Top, the original NACA 
hangars, 1931. The aircraft 
parked to the right is the 
Fairchild owned by the NACA. 
Just outside the hangar door is 
a modified Ford Model A that 
was used to start aircraft pro-
pellers. 
NACA 
Departed no. 
Nov. 1923 
Apr. 1923 
July 1929 4 
Sept. 1926 
July 1927 
ORIGii'~!\L PPG~ IS 
Of POOR QUALiTY 
Aircraft 
What interested the NACA most about the famous Fokker D- VII was the German fighter 
plane 's thick, internally braced cantilever wings. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed 110. 
7 Fokker D-VII 1923 7 
(6328) 
8 Martin MO-1 Sept. 1922 Nov. 1923 
(AS 63335) 
9 DeHavilland 9A Sept. 1922 Dec. 1927 
(AS 31839) 
10 SPAD VII Sept. 1922 Feb. 25 
(AS 7142) 
No number Nieuport 23 1922 
No number Thomas-Morse MB-3 Jan. 1923 1924 
11 Douglas DT-2 May 1923 June 1925 
(A 6425) 
12 Curtiss JN6H Sept. 1923 Aug. 1924 
(AS 44946) 
13 Consolidated CBS 1929 
14 Vought VE-7 1929 14 
(A 5950) 
15 Curtiss TS-1 Nov. 1923 Dec. 1928 
(A 6249) 
16 Sperry M-1 Messenger Jan. 1924 1927 
(AS 68473) 
17 Supermarine Vickers 1923 1924 
Viking IV 
(A6073) 
18 Curtiss F4C-1 
(6689) 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
19 Curtiss JNS-1 Nov. 1924 June 1926 
(AS 24232) 
No number Martin MB-2 1924 
20 Sperry M-1 Messenger Jan. 1925 
(AS 64226) 
21 Vought UO-1 
22 Boeing PW-9 Jan. 1927 
23 Curtiss F 4C-1 
(6690) 
24 Douglas M3 Mailplane 1927 1931 
25 DeHavilland 4-B Dec. 1927 Jan. 1930 25 
(AS 31839) 
26 Fairchild FC-2W2 1928 1 
27 Curtiss XF7C-1 Seahawk 
(A 7653) 
28 Atlantic Fokker C-2A 
(AC 28-123) 
29 Douglas O-2H Jan. 1929 1935 
(AC 29-168) 
30 Curtiss H-16 Feb. 1929 July 1929 
31 Stearman C3B 
(NS 7550) 
32 Curtiss P-lA Marine Hawk July 1929 
(AC 25-411) 
33 Consolidated NY-1 
34 Doyle 0-2 Oriole 34 
35 Vought O2U-1 
36 Consolidated/Fleet XN2Y-l 1929 
(A 8019) 
37 Boeing F3B-l 
38 Boeing F2B-1 
39 Boeing XF 4B- l 
(A 8128) 
40 Consolidated NY-2 
41 Verville Sportsman 
42 McDonnell Doodlebug 
43 Vought O3U-l 
44 Pitcairn PCA-2 Autogiro July 1931 Sept. 1933 44 
45 Curtiss O2C-1 
46 Loening XSL-1 
(BuNo. 8696) 
47 Fairchild C-7 A 47 
48 Martin XBM-1 
(BuNo. 9212) 
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Fokker trimotor with experimental NACA cowlings in flight over Langley, 1929. 
Curtiss Bleeker helicopter in front of the NACA hangar, July 1930 
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The NACA 's new hangar in the east area, 1932. 
Martin XBM-1 equipped with experimental heated wing for icing research, 1939. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed 110. 
49 Douglas YO-31A 
50 Fleet N2Y-l 
51 Detroit/Lockheed XRO-1 
(BuNo. 9054) 
52 Curtiss F6C-4 
53 Curtiss O2C-1 Aug. 1932 Feb. 1933 
(BuNo. 8455) 
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The NACA 's Fairchild 22 with an experimental flap and spoiler installation, October 1940. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
54 Boeing F4B-2 July 1932 June 1934 
(BuNo. 8628) 
55 Boeing P-12C 
56 Curtiss P-6E 
57 Fleet N2Y-l Sept. 1932 
58 Vought O2U-l 
59 Pitcairn PAA-1 Autogiro 
60 Fairchild 22 May 1933 60 
61 Fairchild C-7 A June 1936 47 
62 Boeing F3B-l 
63 Consolidated NY-2 
64 Vought 
65 Vought XO4U-2 Apr. 1933 May 1933 
(BuNo. 8641) 
66 Boeing F4B-l 
67 Boeing P-12C 
68 Curtiss P-6E 
69 Vought XF3U-1 
(BuNo. 9222) 
70 Weick W-lA Feb. 1934 Apr. 1935 
(NS-67) 
71 Boeing P-26A June 1934 
(AC 33-56) 
72 Grumman JF-1 June 1934 Aug. 1934 
73 Northrop XFT-1 June 1934 July 1934 
(BuNo. 9400) 
74 Martin T4M-l 
75 Vought SU-2 
76 Boeing F4B-4 
(BuNo. 8912) 
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Fred Weick's homebuilt W-1A of 1934, one of the first aircraft to employ tricycle landing 
gear. Weick and a group of nine other Langley engineers built this small experimental 
airplane in their spare time to study the special needs of the private flyer. The plane was 
eventually purchased by the Department of Commerce. After leaving the NACA (for a second 
and final time) in 1986, Weick incorporated many elements of the W-1 into his design of 
the famous Ercoupe, a small, simple-to-fly airplane built first by the Engineering Research 
and Development Corporation (ERGO) of suburban Washington, D. C. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type 
at Langley and serial no. 
77 Boeing XBFB-1 
(BuNo. 8975) 
78 Curtiss N2C-2 
79 Vought O2U-2 
No number Consolidated XB2Y-l 
(BuNo. 9221) 
80 Boeing YP-29A 
(AC 34-24) 
81 Kellet KD-1 
No number Bellanca Pacemaker 
82 Fairchild XR2K-l 
(BuNo. 9998) 
83 Curtiss BF2C-1 
(BuNo. 9586) 
84 Great Lakes XTBG-1 
(BuNo. 9723) 
85 Grumman XSF-2 Scout 
(BuNo. 9493) 
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Arrived 
Aug. 1934 
Nov. 1934 
1934 
Mar. 1935 
Apr. 1935 
Apr. 1935 
Sept. 1935 
Oct. 1935 
Nov. 1935 
Dec. 1935 
NACA 
Departed no. 
July 1940 
July 1940 
Apr. 1935 
1946 82 
Dec. 1935 
Nov. 1935 
Jan. 1936 
OF POOR QUJ:\UTY 
CfliGJ0~;t\L. 
OF POOR Aircraft 
Boeing P-26A fighter mounted in the Full-Scale Tunnel, 1934. This aircraft, known as the 
Peashooter, was the first army fighter to be constructed entirely of metal and to employ 
the low-wing monoplane configuration. The wings, though, were externally braced, and the 
landing gear was fixed. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
86 Taylor E-2 Cub Dec. 1935 
(NC13Y) 
87 Taylor E-2 Cub Dec. 1935 
(NC12117) 
88 Kellett YG-2 Autogiro Dec. 1935 Mar. 1936 
(35-279) 
89 Kellett YG-1 Autogiro Jan. 1936 May 1936 
(35-278) 
90 Curtiss XBFC-1 Jan. 1936 
(BuNo. 9219) 
91 Aeronca Ell3A Jan. 1936 
(NR13089) 
92 Franklin PS-2 Glider Apr. 1936 
(BuNo. 9615) 
93 Franklin PS-2 Glider Apr. 1936 
(BuNo. 9614) 
94 Stinson Reliant SR-8E July 1936 1951 94 
95 Aeronca C-2N 95 
96 Ryan ST Aug. 1938 1947 96 
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Kellett autogiro, April 1936. This type of aircraft could make extremely short takeoffs and 
landings, but it was not capable of the helicopter's hovering or vertical flight. In theory the 
autogiro's main advantage over the conventional airplane was that, in the event of engine 
failure, its autorotation permitted safe descent. 
The NACA equipped one of the navy's Curtiss XBFC-1 fighter-bombers with a nose slot 
cowling in October 1931. 
Order of 
receipt 
at Langley 
97 
98 
99 
100 
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Aircraft type 
and serial no. 
Curtiss XSBC-3 
(BuNo. 9225) 
Cunningham-Hall X14324 
Grumman XSBF-1 
(BuNo. 9998) 
Pitcairn XOP-2 
NACA 
Arrived Departed 110. 
1936 
Aircraft 
I 
Stinson Reliant model SR-7 on floats moored in the Back River, 1936. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed 110. 
101 Vought O2U-4 Mar. 1937 
(BuNo. 8104) 
No number Consolidated PB2A May 1937 
102 Curtiss SOC-1 
103 Boeing P-26A 
104 Curtiss XF13C-3 
(BuNo. 9343) 
105 North American BT-9A 
106 Martin B- lOB 
107 Vought SB2U-1 
108 Douglas DC-3 
(NC16070, United Air Lines) 
109 Douglas XB-7 
(AC30-228) 
110 Seversky P-35 
(X1254 and X1390) 
111 Grumman F3F-2 
112 Fairchild F -46 
113 Douglas B-18 Bolo 
114 Kellett YG-lB Autogiro 
No number Brewster XF2A-1 
115 Stearman-Hammond Y 
(NS73) 
116 Wilford XOZ-1 Autogiro Aug. 1937 1941 
117 Grumman XF4F-2 
(BuNo. 0383) 
118 Northrop A-17 A 
(AC 85) 
119 Grumman F3F-2 
(BuNo. 0967) 
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This twin-engine Douglas Dolphin amphibian was unusual in that it employed a nose wheel 
instead of a tail wheel, January 1937. 
Stearman-Hammond Model Y, January 1939, winner of the $700 safe airplane competition 
sponsored by the Department of Commerce in the mid-1930s. Only a few of these aircraft 
were produced, and at a cost far in excess of $700. 
Order of 
receipt 
at Langley 
120 
121 
122 
123 
490 
Aircraft type 
and serial no. 
Fairchild XC-31 
(AC 34-26) 
Vought SB2U-l 
(BuNo. 0726) 
Douglas OA-4A 
(AC 32-404) 
Curtiss AT-5 
(AC 28-66) 
NACA 
Arrived Departed no. 
June 1938 
ORIGir•~1~l 
OF POOR QUAUTY 
ORiGiNf\L 
OF POOR Aircraft 
Langley tried a center fin to improve the directional stability of its Lockheed Model 12 
executive transport, June 1940. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
124 North American BT-9B Aug. 1938 Feb. 1941 
(AC 37-227) 
125 Ryan 
126 North American BC-1 Aug. 1938 Sept. 1938 
127 Vought XSB3U-1 Aug. 1938 Jan. 1939 
(BuNo. 9834) 
128 Vought SB2U-2 Nov. 1938 Mar. 1939 
(BuNo. 1326) 
129 Vought SB2U-1 Nov. 1938 Dec. 1938 
(BuNo. 0770) 
No number Sikorsky XPBS-1 1938 
(BuNo. 9995) 
130 Douglas XBT-2 
131 Lockheed 12 Jan. 1939 Oct. 1940 97 
( transferred to Ames lab) 
(NCl 7396) 
132 Northrop A-17 A Feb. 1939 June 1939 
(AC 36-184) 
133 Brewster XSBA-1 Feb. 1939 
(BuNo. 9726) 
134 Lockheed XR4O Model 14 Feb. 1939 
(BuNo. 1441) 
135 Curtiss P-36A Mar. 1939 Nov. 1939 
491 
Engineer in Charge 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
136 Curtiss XP-40 Mar. 1939 Mar. 1944 
(AC 38-10) 
137 Seversky P-35 Apr. 1939 
138 Seversky XP-41 May 1939 Apr. 1942 
(AC 36-430) 
139 Fairchild May 1939 Apr. 1942 
(NX18689) 
140 Bell XP-39 June 1939 
(AC 38-326) 
141 Grumman XF4F-3 Aug. 1939 
(BuNo. 0383) 
142 Aeronca 65-C Aug. 1939 Sept. 1939 
143 Douglas B-18 Sept. 1939 Nov. 1941 
144 Kellett YG-lB Autogiro Sept. 1939 Jan. 1940 
(AC 37-635) 
145 Piper Cub Sept. 1939 Oct. 1947 98 
(NC26899) 
146 Piper Cub #2 Sept. 1939 Oct. 1939 
147 Taylorcraft Oct. 1939 
148 Douglas R2D Dec. 1939 1941 
149 Stinson 105 Jan. 1940 Mar. 1940 
150 Beechcraft June 1940 June 1940 
(NC20780) 
151 I3eechcraft June 1940 June 1940 
(NC19494) 
152 Curtiss P-40 June 1940 July 1940 
153 Bellanca Crusair June 1940 July 1940 
(NC15690) 
154 Bellanca Crusair July 1940 July 1940 
(NC25303) 
155 Douglas C-39 July 1940 July 1940 
156 Curtiss P-40 June 1940 July 1940 
157 Curtiss XP-42 Sept. 1940 Nov. 1942 
(AC 38-4) 
158 Curtiss XSO3C-1 Sept. 1940 Nov. 1940 
(BuNo. 1385) 
159 St. Louis PT-LM-4 Sept. 1940 Oct. 1940 
(NX25500) 
160 Lockheed XC-35 Oct. 1940 Feb. 1943 
(AC 36-353) 
161 Brewster XF2A-2 Oct. 1940 June 1941 
(BuNo. 0451) 
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Curtiss XP-42 fighter with various test modifications in flight over Langley, 1945. 
The NA CA used this Lockheed XC-35 in 1943 to 8t·udy cabin pre8surization at high altitude8. 
Order of 
receipt 
at Langley 
162 
163 
Aircraft type 
and serial no. 
Grumman F4F-3 
(I3uNo. 1845) 
Curtiss P-360 
Arrived 
Nov. 1940 
Dec. 1940 
Departed 
May 1942 
June 1941 
NA.CA 
no. 
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This Martin B-26 crashed at the end of an NA CA test flight in December 1941 when its nose 
wheel failed to extend. 
Order of 
recPipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
164 Republic XP-41 Dec. 1940 Apr. 1942 
(AC 36-430) 
165 Douglas A-20A Jan. 1941 Aug. 1941 
166 Brewster XSBA-1 Jan. 1941 Sept. 1945 
(BuNo. 9726) 
167 Republic YP-43 Feb. 1941 Feb. 1941 
168 Bell YP-39 Feb. 1941 July 1944 
169 Curtiss YP-37 Feb. 1941 Jan. 1942 
(AC 38-474) 
170 Grumman F4F-3 Apr. 1941 May 1942 
(BuNo. 2538) 
171 Lockheed 12A May 1941 Mar. 1960 99 
172 Vought XF4U-1 June 1941 Mar. 1943 
(BuNo. 1443) 
173 Fleetwing 33 Oct. 1941 Dec. 1941 
174 Martin B-26 Nov. 1941 Dec. 1941 
175 Hawker Hurricane Nov. 1941 Dec. 1941 
(25017) 
176 Spitfire R7347 Nov. 1941 Jan. 1943 
(35497) 
177 Lockheed YP-38 #2 Nov. 1941 Feb. 1942 
(AC 39-690) 
178 Spitfire W3119 Dec. 1941 Feb. 1942 
(37147) 
179 North American XP-51 Dec. 1941 Dec. 1942 
(AC 41-38) 
180 Grumman F4F-3 Feb. 1942 May 1943 
(BuNo. 3990) 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed 110. 
181 Curtiss P-40E Mar. 1942 July 1942 
(AC 41-5534) 
182 Republic P-47B Mar. 1942 Oct. 1942 
(AC 41-5897) 
183 Curtiss SNC-1 Apr. 1942 May 1942 
(BuNo. 6295) 
184 Grumman XTBF-1 May 1942 June 1943 
(BuNo. 2540) 
185 Curtiss P-40K-l July 1942 Oct. 1944 
186 Republic P-47B #2 July 1942 Oct. 1942 
(AC 41-5901) 
187 Curtiss P-40E July 1942 Sept. 1942 
(AC 42-45801) 
188 Brewster F2A-2 July 1942 June 1944 
(BuNo. 1426) 
189 Curtiss P-40F July 1942 Sept. 1942 
(AC 41-13600) 
190 Fairchild 24 Sept. 1942 Oct. 1942 100 
( transferred to Ames) 
191 Republic P-47C Oct. 1942 Dec. 1942 
192 Republic P-47C Oct. 1942 Dec. 1942 
(AC 41-6102) 
193 Vought F4U-1 Oct. 1942 Mar. 1943 
194 Republic P-47C-1 Oct. 1942 Aug. 1944 
(AC 41-6130) 
195 Curtiss SB2C-1 Dec. 1942 May 1943 
(BuNo. 00014) 
196 North American SNJ-3C Dec. 1942 July 1945 
(BuNo. 01847) 
197 Bell P-39D-l Jan. 1943 Apr. 1943 
(AC 41-28378) 
198 Grumman F6F-3 Feb. 1943 June 1946 
(BuNo. 04776) 
199 Curtiss SB2C-1 Feb. 1943 July 1943 
(BuNo. 00056) 
200 Republic XP-47F Feb. 1943 Oct. 1943 
(AC 41-5938) 
201 Japanese Zero Mar. 1943 Mar. 1943 
( 4593) 
202 North American XP-51 Mar. 1943 Jan. 1944 
(AC 41-39) 
203 Curtiss SB2C-1 May 1943 Nov. 1943 
(BuNo. 00140) 
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A captured Japanese Zero was evaluated (with new markings)at Langley in March 1943. 
A Consolidated B-24D Liberator rests outside the Langley airship hangar in July 1943. The 
air force dismantled this hangar in 1947 and 1948. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type 
at Langley and serial no. 
204 Martin RA-30 
(AC 41-27687) 
205 Consolidated B-24D 
(AC 42-40223) 
206 Vought F4U-1 
(BuNo. 02161) 
207 Bell P-63 
(AC 42-68861) 
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Arrived Departed 
June 1943 Mar. 1944 
June 1943 Apr. 1944 
July 1943 Sept. 1943 
July 1943 Nov. 1943 
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NACA 
no. 
OR!G!NtU. F' 
OF POOR QUAUTY Aircraft 
The army's Bell P-63 Kingcobra fighter employed one of the NACA 's laminar-flow airfoil 
sections, May 1944-
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
208 Curtiss P-40F July 1943 Feb. 1945 
(AC 41-14119) 
209 General Motors '1'BM-l Aug. 1943 Nov. 1943 
(BuNo. 24820) 
210 North American P-51B Aug. 1943 Jan. 1951 
(AC 43-12105) 
211 North American P-51B-l Sept. 1943 Oct. 1943 104 
212 Republic P-47D-3-RE Oct. 1943 Mar. 1944 
(AC 42-8207) 
213 North American XP-51 Jan. 1944 July 1945 
(AC 41-38) 
214 Sikorsky YR-4B Jan. 1944 Oct. 1948 
215 Bell P-63A-1BE Feb. 1944 June 1944 
(AC 42-68889) 
216 Douglas A-26B-2-DL Mar. 1944 June 1944 
(AC 41-39120) 
217 Grumman XF6F-4 Apr. 1944 Mar. 1945 
(BuNo. 02981) 
218 Sikorsky HNS-1 Apr. 1944 
(BuNo. 39034) 
219 Curtiss SB2C-1C Apr. 1944 June 1945 
(BuNo. 18294) 
220 Bell P-63A-l-BE May 1944 1946 
(AC 42-68881) 
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Langley test pilots, 1945. To the far left is chief test pilot Melvin N. Gough. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
221 Cessna UC-78-18-1-CE June 1944 Aug. 1945 
(AC 43-31957) 
222 Republic P-47D-15-RA July 1944 July 1945 
223 Republic P-47D-28-RE July 1944 Apr. 1948 
(AC 42-28541) 
224 Grumman TBM-3 Aug. 1944 Aug. 1944 
(BuNo. 22857) 
225 Brewster F3A-1 Aug. 1944 Sept. 1945 
(BuNo. 11213) 
226 Spitfire Aug. 1944 Nov. 1944 
(EN-474) 
227 DeHavilland F-8 Aug. 1944 Jan. 1945 
(AC 43-34928) 
228 DeHavilland F-8 Aug. 1944 Jan. 1945 
(AC 43-34960) 
229 Douglas A-26B-10-DT Sept. 1944 Oct. 1945 
(AC 43-22280) 
230 Douglas SBD-5 Sept. 1944 Oct. 1945 101 
(BuNo. 28373) 
231 Curtiss ,SC-1 Oct. 1944 Feb. 1945 
(BuNo. 35324) 
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Sikorsky's HNS-1 helicopter was test flown at Langley i·n March 194.'i. 
The NACA used this Grumman JRF-5 Goose amphibian to shuttle workers back and forth 
between Langley and Wallops Island. 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
232 Grumman XF8F-1 Dec. 1944 Feb. 1945 
(BuNo. 90460) 
233 North American P-51D-5 Dec. 1944 May 1957 108 
(AF 44-13257) 
234 Curtiss SB2C-3 Jan. 1945 June 1945 
(BuNo. 19332) 
235 General Motors FM-2 Jan. 1945 Apr. 1945 
(BuNo. 74507) 
236 Culver PQ-14B Jan. 1945 Apr. 1949 
(AF 44-21896) 
237 North American P-51D-5 Jan. 1945 June 1952 102 
(AF 44-14017) 
238 Republic P-47N-1-RE Jan. 1945 July 1945 
(AF 44-87790) 
239 Republic P-47D-30-RA Jan. 1945 Oct. 1948 
(AF 44-33441) 
240 Vought F4U-1 Feb. 1945 Mar .. 1945 
(BuNo. 82716) 
241 Beechcraft UC-45F Mar. 1945 1951 
(AF 44-47264) 
242 Sikorsky JRS-1 Apr. 1945 Nov. 1946 
(BuNo. 1063) 
243 Boeing B-29B May 1945 Sept. 1946 
(AF 44-83927) 
244 Grumman XF8F-1 May 1945 Apr. 1946 
(BuNo. 90461) 
245 North American P-51B June 1945 July 1945 
(AF 43-12114) 
246 North American P-51B June 1945 Oct. 1945 
(AF 43-12491) 
247 North American P-51H June 1945 Sept. 1946 
(AF 44-64164) 
248 Grumman JRF-5 July 1945 Apr. 1946 103 
(BuNo. 34094) 
249 North American SNJ-3 July 1945 Oct. 1948 
(BuNo. 05475) 
250 Boeing TB-29 July 1945 Nov. 1950 
(AF 44-69700) 
251 Vought F4U-1D Aug. 1945 Aug. 1945 
(BuNo. 50378) 
252 Consolidated PBY-5A Aug. 1945 Sept. 1945 
(BuNo. 2473) 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
253 Republic P-47N-25-RE Aug. 1945 Dec. 1950 
(AF 44-89303) 
254 North American TP-51D Aug. 1945 Apr. 1946 
(AF 44-63826) 
255 Douglas C-47-DL Aug. 1945 Oct. 1945 
(AF 41-18392) 
256 North American P-51D-25 Aug. 1945 July 1957 126 
( AF 44-84864) 
257 Douglas BTD-1 Aug. 1945 Apr. 1946 
(BuNo. 09060) 
258 Curtiss SC-1 Aug. 1945 Apr. 1946 
(BuNo. 93334) 
259 North American P-51D-25 Sept. 1945 June 1952 127 
(AF 44-84900) 
260 North American P-51D-25 Sept. 1945 June 1952 128 
(AF 44-84944) 
261 North American P-51D-25 Sept. 1945 June 1952 129 
(AF 44-84953) 
262 North American P-51D-25 Sept. 1945 Aug. 1950 148 
(transferred to Muroc HSFS) 
(AF 44-84958) 
263 Douglas C-47A-25-DK Oct. 1945 Apr. 1946 
(AF 42-93791) 
264 Douglas BTD-1 Oct. 1945 Nov. 1945 
(BuNo. 09058) 
265 Curtiss SB2C-4E Nov. 1945 Oct. 1946 
(BuNo. 82877) 
266 Boeing B-29-96-BW Nov. 1945 Dec. 1955 124 
(AF 45-21808) 
267 Grumman F8F-1 Jan. 1946 Feb. 1946 
(BuNo. 90448) 
268 Beechcraft UC-45 Jan. 1946 May 1947 105 
(transferred to Muroc HSFS) 
(AF 44-47110) 
269 Douglas C-47B-51-DK Jan. 1946 Oct. 1971 106 
( transferred to Lewis 
Research Center) 
(AF 43-49526) 
270 Northrop P-61C Feb. 1946 Feb. 1946 
(AF 43-8327) 
271 Grumman JRF-5 Apr. 1946 June 1948 103 
(BuNo. 34088) 
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The L-89 was a purely experimental version of the Bell P-63 Kingcobra fighter designed to 
study the low-speed handling characteristics of swept wings, December 1946, 
The east area hangar, 1947, with a Douglas C-54 and two B-29 Superfortresses and, in the 
background, the 19-Foot Pressure Tunnel and the Full-Scale Tunnel. 
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Langley modified a Stinson L-5 to show that a quiet airplane could be developed. During the 
lunchtime of the NA CA 's annual inspection in 1946, the modified (lower photograph) and the 
standard aircraft were flown separately over the conference building. Those who witnessed 
the demonstration were astonished by the relative quiet of the modified L-5. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
272 Grumman F8F-l May 1946 Apr. 1947 
(BuNo. 94812) 
273 Fairchild PT-19A May 1946 1950 
( AF 42-83595) 
274 Grumman F8F-1 June 1946 1951 
(BuNo. 94873) 
275 North American AT-6 July 1946 Jan. 1959 117 
(AF 44-81682) 
276 Douglas R4D-6 Aug. 1946 Oct. 1946 
( transferred to Lewis) 
(BuNo. 50795) 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed 110. 
277 Douglas R4D-6 Aug. 1946 Dec. 1948 
(BuNo. 50826) 
278 Douglas R4D-6 Aug. 1946 Oct. 1946 
( transferred to Ames) 
(BuNo. 50812) 
279 Bell L-39-1 Aug. 1946 Dec. 1949 
( transferred to Lewis) 
(BuNo. 90060) 
280 Douglas C-54D Sept. 1946 Aug. 1947 
(AF 42-72713) 
281 Lockheed P-80A-5 Nov. 1946 July 1954 112 
282 Bell L-39-2 Dec. 1946 Dec. 1.949 
(BuNo. 90061) 
283 Vultee L-5E-1 VW Mar. 1947 Oct. 1947 
(AF 44-17984) 
284 Vultee L-5E- l VW Mar. 1947 Nov. 1947 
(AF 44-17939) 
285 Grumman J4F-2 Aug. 1947 June 1951 
(BuNo. 32972) 
286 Sikorsky HO3S-1 Feb. 1948 Sept. 1961 201 
(BuNo. 122520) 
287 Grumman J4F-2 May 1948 1951 
(BuNo. 32976) 
288 North American XP-82 June 1948 Oct. 1955 114 
(AF 44-83886) 
289 Grumman JRF-5 June 1948 July 1958 103 
(BuNo. 37778) 
290 Cessna 190 Aug. 1948 June 1958 104 
(N3477V) 
291 North American B-45 Oct. 1948 Aug. 1952 121 
(AF 47-21) 
292 North American SNJ-5 Oct. 1948 June 1957 
(BuNo. 84839) 
293 Douglas R4D-6 Nov. 1948 July 1952 
(BuNo. 50831) 
294 Bell H-13B May 1949 Apr. 1950 
(AF 48-839) 
295 Lockheed TO-1 May 1949 Oct. 1949 
(BuNo. 33870) 
296 Beechcraft C-45F Aug. 1949 Mar. 1959 125 
(AF 43-35906) 
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In 1948 this Cessna 190 was used by the NACA to test new ways of controlling the boundary 
layer at the wing's leading edge. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
297 Republic YF-84 Aug. 1949 Nov. 1949 134 
(transferred to Muroc HSFS) 
(AF 45-59490) 
298 Vought F4U-4B Mar. 1950 1951 
(BuNo. 97392) 
299 Vultee L-5 May 1950 Nov. 1950 
( AF 45-34927) 
300 Beechcraft Bonanza 35 Aug. 1950 Nov. 1950 
(N5094C) 
301 McDonnell F2H Oct. 1950 June 1951 
(BuNo. 122540) 
302 Grumman F9F-2 Jan. 1951 July 1960 215 
(BuNo. 122560) 
303 Lockheed TO-2/TV-2 Jan. 1951 Feb. 1960 
(I3uNo. 124933) 
304 Piasecki HRP-1 Feb. 1951 1951 
(BuNo. 111813) 
305 North American F-86A-1 Feb. 1951 July 1958 136 
(AF 47-620) 
306 McDonnell F2H-1 Aug. 1951 Sept. 1959 214 
(BuNo. 122530) 
307 Boeing B-4 7 A July 1952 Mar. 1953 
(AF 49-1900) 
308 Sikorsky HRS-1 Mar. 1953 Aug. 1964 211 
(BuNo. 127783) 
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Congestion in the west area hangar, 1952. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
309 McDonnell XF -88B July 1953 Sept. 1958 
(AF 46-525) 
310 Hiller HTE-1 July 1953 Feb. 1956 
(BuNo. 128646) 
311 Bell H-13G Sept. 1953 July 1967 
( AF 52-7834) 
312 Lockheed F -SOB Dec. 1953 Oct. 1958 152 
( AF 45-8683A) 
313 Grumman F9F-7 Jan. 1954 Nov. 1959 
(BuNo. 130864) 
314 Vertol H-25A/HUP-l Feb. 1954 Jan. 1960 
(51-16574G) 
315 McDonnell F2H-3 July 1954 Sept. 1959 210 
(BuNo. 126300) 
316 Grunvnan JRF-5 Aug. 1954 Nov. 1954 103 
(BuNo. 37816) 
317 Vertol H-25 Sept. 1954 Feb. 1955 
(51-16637) 
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The navy's Vought XFBU-3 supersonic fighter was an entirely new design as compared to the 
earlier F8 U Crusader series. This jet plane lost in competition with the McDonnell F 4H, 
however, and was never put into production. Langley used the XFBU-3 in some of the first 
flight measurements of sonic boom intensity. 
Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
318 Grumman JRF-5 Feb. 1955 Mar. 1960 202/103 
(replaced #103, which was 
lost in crash at Wallops 
Island, 3 Nov. 1954) 
(BuNo. 87748) 
319 McDonnell XF-88A Feb. 1955 July 1958 
(AF 46-526) 
320 Beechcraft C-45F Mar. 1955 Mar. 1959 
(AF 44-47106) 
321 North American EJF -86D Feb. 1956 May 1960 204 
(AF 50-459) 
322 North American F-86D-31 Mar. 1956 Sept. 1958 
(AF 51-5959A) 
323 North American JF-86D-5 Apr. 1956 July 1960 205 
(AF 50-509) 
324 Sikorsky HSS-1 June 1956 Feb. 1957 
(BuNo. 137855) 
325 McDonnell F-lOlA Aug. 1956 Mar. 1960 219 
(AF 53-2434) 
326 Hiller YH-32 Nov. 1956 Nov. 1958 
(55-4968) 
327 Hiller YH-32 Nov. 1956 Nov. 1958 
(55-4970) 
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Two views of the McDonnell XF-88B experimental jet fighter. Langley used this aircraft in 
the mid-1950s to explore the potential of a supersonic propeller. In the overhead view, note 
the survey rake mounted just behind the prop. 
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Order of 
receipt Aircraft type NACA 
at Langley and serial no. Arrived Departed no. 
328 Vought F8U-1 Dec. 1956 Feb. 1959 
(BuNo. 141354d) 
329 Grumman FllF-1 Jan. 1957 Aug. 1961 
(BuNo. 138623) 
330 Grumman SA-16A May 1957 Mar. 1958 
(AF 49-088A) 
331 North American T-28A June 1957 Mar. 1959 
(AF 50-279A) 
332 North American F-lO0C-25 Sept. 1957 Oct. 1959 
(AF 54-2024A) 
333 Lockheed T-33A Nov. 1957 Feb. 1958 
(AF 49-939A) 
334 McDonnell F-101A Apr. 1958 Dec. 1958 220 
(AF 54-1442A) 
Sources: Log books, Aircraft Operations Branch, Bldg. 1244, LaRC; Airplane and Engine 
Records, 1939-1958, LaRC Historical Archives; Robert L. Burns, "Aircraft Assigned 
to Langley Aeronautical Laboratory," unpublished typescript with handwritten notes, 
Aug. 1986, copy in LaRC Archives. 
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Organization 
This appendix contains seven organization charts arranged chronologically. They are 
based on the actual organization charts, but shortened to include only the higher levels, 
and rearranged to facilitate the readers comparison from chart to chart. The first shows 
the relation of NACA Langley management to the rest of the NACA. The remaining six 
trace the evolution of Langley's internal organization. 
Standing 
Committees 
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory 
Moffett Field, CA 
1941 
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory 
Cleveland, Ohio 
1942 
(renamed Lewis Flight Propulsion 
Laboratory, 1948) 
NACA 
Qhairmfil]_ 
George P Scriven, 191 5-1916 
William F. Durand, 1916--1918 
John R. Freeman, 1918-191 9 
Charles D. Walcott, 1919-1927 
Joseph S. Ames, 1927-1939 
Vannevar Bush, 1939-194 1 
Jerome C. Hunsaker, 1941. 1956 
James H. Doolittle, 1956-1958 
Washington Office (Headquarters) 
Directors Qf Aeronautical Research 
George W. Lewis, 1919-1947 
Hugh L. Dryden, 1947·1958 
~xecutive Secretary_ 
John F. Victory, 1915-1958 
Executive Officfil: 
Edward H. Chamberlin, 1918-1958 
L.MAL 
Langley Field, VA 
!;,rrgineers-in-Chargg 
Leigh M. Griffith, 1920-1925 
Henry J.E. Reid, 1926-1958 
Special 
Committees 
Pilol/ess Aircraft Research Station 
Wallops Island, VA 
1945 
High-Speed Flight Station 
Edwards, CA 
1946 
Organization of the NACA, 1915-1958. 
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I L.M.A.L. I Langley Field, Va. 
I 
I I I 
Power Plant Committee Aerodynamic Committee Personnel Committee 
Senior Staff Engineer Chief Physicist Chief Clerk 
Langley organization chart at the time of the lab's dedication, June 1920. 
Power Plants 
Division 
L.M.A.L. 
Langley Field, Va. 
Engineer-in-Charge 
Technical Service 
Division 
Aerodynamics 
Division 
Property and Clerical 
Division 
Langley organization chart at the time of Lindbergh's flight, May 1927. 
Power Plants 
Division 
L.M.A.L. 
Langley Field, Va. 
Engineer-in-Charge 
Physical Research 
Division 
Technical Service 
Division 
Aerodynamics 
Division 
Hydrodynamics 
Division 
Administrative 
Division 
Langley organization chart at the time of the Volta Congress on High-Speed Aeronautics, 
October 1935. 
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L.M.AL 
Langley Field, Va 
Administrative Department 
Fiscal 
Division 
Office Service 
Division 
Personnel 
Division 
Procurement 
Division 
Training 
Division 
Research Department 
Aircraft Loads 
Division 
Compressibility 
Research 
Dlvision 
Physical Research 
Division 
Full-Seate Research 
Dlvision 
Hydrodynamics 
Divfsion 
Flight Research 
Division 
Stabi/lty Research 
Division 
Structures Research 
Division 
Technical Service Department 
Engineering Service 
Division 
Instrument Research 
Division 
Maintenance 
Division 
Mechanical Service 
Division 
Instrument Service 
Division 
Langley organization chart at the time of the Allied invasion of Normandy, June 1944-
LAL. 
Langley Field, Va. 
Director 
Assistant to Director 
Administrative and Technical 
Service Department Research Department 
Engineering Fiscal 
Service Div1s1on 
Division 
General 
Instrument Services 
Research Division 
Division 
Mechanical 
Maintenance 
Service Division 
D1v1s1on 
Personnel 
Procurement Division 
D1vis1on 
Research 
Services 
Aircraft Loads 
Division 
Com pressib1Hty 
Research 
Division 
flight 
Research 
Division 
Hydrodynamics 
Division 
Physical 
Research 
Division 
Stab1hty 
Research 
Division 
Structures 
Research 
Division 
Full-Scale 
Research 
Division 
Pilot!ess Aircraft 
Research 
Division 
Langley organization at the time of the first supersonic flight, October 194 7. 
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Assistant Director 
Compressibility 
Research 
Division 
Full-Scale 
Research 
Division 
Theoretical 
Mechanics 
Division 
Unitary 
Wind Tunnel 
Division 
Assistant Director 
Dynamic 
Loads 
Division 
Pi!otless Aircraft 
Research 
Division 
Structures 
Research 
Division 
Budget Office 
Research Staff 
Scientist 
LA.L 
Langley Field, Va 
Director 
Associate Director 
Planning 
Safety Office 
Research Services 
and Control 
• Research Staff 
• Research Records 
• Editorial 
• Computing 
Chief of Technical Services 
Engineering 
Service 
Division 
Mechanical 
Service 
Division 
Maintenance 
Division 
Chief of Administrative Services 
Fiscal 
Division 
General 
Services 
Division 
Personnel 
Division 
Procurement 
Division 
Langley organization chart at the time of the NACA 's 40th anniversary, June 1955. 
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Notes 
Introduction 
1. 63 Stat. 410. _For the full text of this law, see Alex Roland, Model Research: The Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, 
1985), 2:399-400. 
2. Bush's remark was recalled by Ralph E. "Mike" Cushman, Special Programs Co-
ordinator, Office of the Comptroller, NASA HQ, during my telephone conversation 
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fade for me into insignificance. 
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report elaborating the proposed tunnel's novel aerodynamic principles; second, a 
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mental setup, together with a list of tests proposed; and third, a complete set of plans 
and specifications for the final design. Munk, who had trained himself in patent law, 
then closed his proposal with three carefully composed clauses involving proprietary 
rights; they were meant to prevent the NACA from canceling the final and best-
paying ($10,000) item after having learned his tunnel's major design features. Munk 
to NACA, 20 Apr. 1940. 
In a second critique of Munk's proposal, LMAL engineer DeFrance wrote to 
Lewis: "I will not say that we know all of the aerodynamic principles involved in 
wind-tunnel design, but it is believed that the experience ... at Langley Field in the 
design and operation of wind tunnels is greater than that . . . in any other place in 
the world." DeFrance recommended that the Committee not contract with Munk 
"on the basis of information supplied so far," and then he especially advised it not to 
obtain any additional information from Munk because of the patent rights referred to 
in his proposal, to avoid possible litigation. DeFrance to engineer-in-charge, 2 May 
1940. 
It should be noted that there usually was heated debate inside Langley over 
what new type of wind tunnel was most needed at a specific moment in time, and 
that DeFrance had strongly opposed Jacobs's idea for a new VDT in 1935. 
56. Bush to Munk, 1 July 1940. 
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57. Congruence Surds and Fermat's Last Theorem (New York: Vantage Press, 1977). 
One of the most memorable works left behind by the French lawyer Pierre 
de Fermat (1608-1665) was his copy of Claude Bachet de Meziriac's 1621 translation 
of Diophantus of Alexandria's Arithmetica. In the margin of one page of this ancient 
book, which dealt with algebra, Fermat wrote: 
It is impossible to write a cube as the sum of two cubes, a fourth power as 
the sum of two fourth powers and in general any power beyond the second 
power as the sum of two similar powers. For this I have discovered a truly 
marvelous proof, but the margin is too small to contain it. 
From the end of the seventeenth century, this mysterious handwritten notation has 
been known as Fermat's Last Theorem. 
More than 200 years later, in the early twentieth century, a learned citizen of 
the German town of Darmstadt bequeathed a small fortune (100,000 gold marks) 
to anyone who might solve Fermat's problem. So long as a correct solution did not 
come to light, the trustees of the bequest were entitled to devote the interest on the 
fund to any object they chose: the trustees chose to use the money to hold annual 
guest lectures at Gottingen. Among the prominent mathematicians and physicists 
who came to speak at the university on these occasions were Henri Poincare, Max 
Planck, and Niels Bohr. As a sideshow, really~since Fermat's Last Theorem had no 
practical application~each tried his hand at solving the problem. Although many of 
them were elegant, all the attempts failed. (This delighted the trustees at Gottingen, 
because failure meant funding for the lecture series would continue.) 
While at Gottingen as a doctoral student, Munk attended these lectures and 
made his own private attempts at solving the perennial problem. Sixty years later, 
Prof. Gabriel Bohler, Munk's former student at Catholic University, sent Munk 
an article from Science (vol. 178, 6 Oct. 1972) entitled "Fermat's Mathematics: 
Proofs and Conjectures," by Michael S. Mahoney, a historian of science at Princeton 
University. Mahoney concluded that Fermat's "proof" was probably no proof at all, 
"because Fermat could not be bothered with detailed demonstrations of theorems 
his superb mathematical intuition told him were true" (p. 35). Munk apparently 
misread Mahoney's conclusion to mean that the Last Theorem was fundamentally 
incapable of proof (which it may be). This misreading upset Munk so much that he 
began writing, as a rejoinder to Mahoney's article, Congruence Surds and Fermat's 
Last Theorem. 
After visiting Munk with me on 20 Aug. 1985, Dr. Feri Farassat, a NASA 
Langley aeroacoustics specialist who is familiar with number theory, looked very 
carefully at the alleged proof published by Munk. What Mahoney says about Fermat, 
Farassat repeats about Munk: he states that Munk's proof "is no proof at all," since 
all Munk has done is to replace Fermat's conjecture with some vague and imprecise 
conjectures of his own. At most, then, what Munk believes intuitively to be the 
"proof" is very close to the same mysterious thing that Fermat thought he had 
grasped through an intuitive process over 320 years ago. 
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The Cowling Story: Experimental 
Impasse and Beyond 
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specialization into their curricula. Instead, they should continue to emphasize basic 
skills and interdisciplinary study" (p. 73). Langley's history certainly supports this 
recommendation. 
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Guide to NACA Historical 
Sources at Langley 
Since this book is amply footnoted by chapter, and since so little is generally known 
about the recently constituted archives that provided most of my source material, I have 
chosen to provide readers with the following general-purpose guide to the major sources 
for research into NACA history at NASA Langley Research Center instead of with the 
traditional bibliographic essay. Those seeking guidance about historiography relevant to 
the NACA or about other archival collections with significant NACA materials in them 
should consult Alex Roland's Guide to Research in NASA History, 4th ed. (Washington: 
NASA History Office, 1984), or the extended bibliographic essay in Roland's Model 
Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, NASA SP-4103 
(Washington, 1985), 1:300-305, both of which are richly informative and analytical. 
Langley Research Center, the oldest laboratory of the NACA and NASA, possesses 
an historical collection that in combination with its technical library rivals any archives 
for aerospace history in this country. In Langley's archives (see diagram) are collections of 
rare books and photographs, technical reports, office memoranda, flight and wind tunnel 
logs, programs and minutes of major technical conferences, personal papers, transcripts of 
interviews with key personnel, as well as scale models of aircraft and spacecraft and other 
illuminating artifacts. Besides storing Langley's own historical records, the archives also 
include important files of the Wallops Island (Va.) rocket test range, created in 1945 as 
an auxiliary base of Langley laboratory and managed by Langley as part of the Pilotless 
Aircraft Research Division (PARD) until 1958, when Wallops achieved independent status 
as a NASA center. 
The four most important collections in the Langley archives are (1) the NACA 
correspondence files, (2) the NACA research authorization files, (3) the Milton Ames 
Collection, and (4) the personal papers of Floyd L. Thompson and John Stack. Since 
they are so important, these four collections will be described fully below. Key aspects of 
Langley's Floyd L. Thompson Technical Library are also discussed. 
Correspondence Files 
Anyone who plans to do research in an organization's archives should first ask some 
questions about the correspondence policy in force for that organiz9,tion's employees: 
Could they send letters directly to outside addresses? Did all letters have to go through a 
central office? What management official, if any, had to "sign off" the letters? Knowing 
the peculiarities of the correspondence policies will make it much easier to evaluate and 
utilize the records. 
In Langley's case, a superb historical archive was created as the by-product of a 
tight-to-the-vest correspondence policy and a highly centralized filing system. Largely as 
a result of the early and continuing control by NACA executive secretary John F. Victory 
over the lab's bureaucratic affairs (see chapter 2), all of its outgoing correspondence was 
reviewed and revised up through the division level until sanctioned in its final form by 
the office of the chief of research; then it was signed by the engineer-in-charge, the top 
Engineer in Charge 
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• 
Diagram of the Langley Historical Archive ( on the second floor of the Floyd L. Thompson 
Technical Library at NASA's Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia}: (1) NACA 
research authorization (RA} files. (2) Panels depicting early aviation, painted at Langley 
in the 1940s and formerly displayed in the rotunda of the NACA Langley headquarters 
bui"lding. (3) NACA and NASA correspondence files from 1917 through early 1960s; special 
photographic collections; NACA and NASA visitor registers; index and cross-reference card 
files for NACA research authorizations. (4) Special file with index cards of technical reports 
produced by NACA Flight Research section. (5) Aircraft flight logs. (6) Special model and 
artifact displays. (7) Special model and document displays. (8) Complete collection of 
bound NACA annual reports. (9) Historian's office; five-foot shelf of NACA and NASA 
history books. (10} Milton Ames Collection: very early NACA photographs (many unique}; 
complete collection of Langley Air Scoop; special NACA files on various matters including 
personnel, facilities, and congressional activities. {11} Telephone directories; special aircraft 
files; special collection on hydrodynamic research; special collection on Viking Project; 50th 
anniversary photographic and administrative file; annual inspection files from 1926 on. 
(12} Floyd L. Thompson's personal papers; John Stack's personal papers; Max M. Munk's 
book collection. 
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man in the laboratory organization. Incoming letters to individuals were routed directly 
to them, but only after being opened by the mail clerks. Copies of all letters, incoming 
and outgoing, were made for central files. Each letter was placed into one or more subject 
files, which were organized according to an alphanumeric code unique to Langley. Within 
each subject, papers were then arranged by date. 
There are two catalogs to the correspondence file codes in the Langley archives, one 
that is alphabetical by subject and the other that follows the alphanumeric code; both are 
the products of the lab's mail filing operation. To illustrate the nature of these catalogs, 
the contents of their respective first pages are reproduced below. 
Subject Guide, Alphabetical 
Subject Code Number 
Aberdeen Proving Grounds Bl0-3 
Accelerometers A184-8A 
Accident Investigation Board-Langley El-11 
Accidents-Ames El-12 
Accidents~Lewis El-17 
Accidents-Edwards AF252-2 
Accidents-Langley AF252-1 
Acoustics A313-l 
Administrative Policy and Procedure E30-12C 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) E20-6 
Advisory Group for Aeronautical R&D (AGARD) E2-12B 
Aerial Spraying Bl0-1 
Aeroelasticity A178-2 
Aero Medical Association E34-17 
Aeronautical Symbols El-13 
Aerospace Industries Association E6-7 
Agriculture Department Bl0-1 
Air Force Bl0-2 
Aircraft Companies-General A173-4 
Alsos Mission E2-12C 
Altimeters A184-8H 
Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys A311-2 
Ames Research Center Bl0-6 
Angle of Attack-Instruments A184-8D 
Antennas (Radio) A173-7 
Apprentice Program C48-25 
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Code 
Al70-1 
A172-1 
Al73-1 
A173-1A 
Al 73-2 
A173-2A 
Al 73-5 
A173-5A 
A173-5B 
A173-5C 
A173-5D 
A173-5E 
Al73-5F 
A173-5H 
Al73-5J 
A173-5K 
Al73-5L 
A173-5M 
Al73-5N 
A173-5P 
A173-5R 
Al 73-6 
Alphanumeric Guide 
Subject 
Aerodynamic Theory 
Aerodynamics Committee -Langley 
Airfoils 
Wings-Swept (Back and Forward) 
Research Equipment Facilities (American Non-NACA) 
Equipment (NACA) on Loan to Outside Sources 
Airplanes-General 
Hypersonic Aircraft 
Helicopters-General 
Privately Owned, Personal or Light Aircraft 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Airplanes-Disposition 
Windshields and Cockpit Visibility Problems 
Coupled Airplanes 
Convertiplanes (Vertically Rising Aircraft, Except Helicopters) 
Quarterly Status Reports on Projects Relating to Research Airplanes 
Ground Cushion Phenomena 
Use of Center Airplanes 
NASA Aircraft Utilization Reports 
Air Traffic Control 
Integrated Programs for Aerospace Vehicle Design (IPAD) 
Bombs 
Langley's correspondence files are a largely untapped reservoir for aerospace history. 
Only a few weeks before this book went to press I found in this collection, for example, 
the following letter, dated the eighth of July 1920. It was addressed to Leigh Griffith, 
Langley's first engineer-in-charge, and was written by a young man in California who was 
just getting into the aircraft business: Donald W. Douglas, the soon-to-be-famous airplane 
designer. 
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Dear Leigh: 
2331 Fifth Street 
Ocean Park, Calif. 
July 8, 1920 
I suppose that you know that I am out here in your old town trying to 
make a go of the aircraft business here now. I left Martin the end of March, and 
spent some time trying to get something in a large way going here. I found this 
impossible at this time as the financial situation is rather uncertain. Luckily 
however I found a young chap with money here to back me in a small way. We 
are organizing under the name of the Davis-Douglas Co. 
I am at work now on the engineering of our first job, and expect to start 
construction of it in a shop that I have rented down town, before the end of 
the month. We have hopes that we will have it in the air in November. The 
ship that I am laying out is a commercial type around a single Liberty motor, 
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and embodies several new schemes that on paper seem to add a great deal to 
the efficiency and cheapness of it. This first ship is going to be made special 
to do some record and stunt tricks with. I am carrying 600 gallons of gasoline 
and hope to be able to make the trip from here to New York non-stop, in about 
thirty hours. This will be quite an achievement and should give us the necessary 
advertising to help us to get further business. 
I have thought that if we were able to equip the plane with a supercharger 
and an adjustable pitch propeller, we might be able to pick up enough speed at 
about 18,000 feet to make the trip in considerably less time. I wrote the Army 
bunch in Dayton and they told me that they would not give the General Electric 
Co. permission to sell us or loan us one of the Moss superchargers at this time. 
Some weeks ago I went in to see your father [owner of a machine works from 
which Douglas's company was getting machined parts] and he told me that they 
had built a supercharger for the National Advisory committee. I am wondering 
if it is at all possible that the Advisory committee might regard our attempt 
seriously and take the opportunity of getting some long distance data on their 
supercharger, by lending it to us for the flight. There is no question but that 
we will make the attempt with or without it, and I really would imagine that 
we might be able to get some very valuable dope on the supercharger and its 
use in this sort of work, for the Advisory Committee. I wish that you would let 
me know if there is any possibility of them considering such an arrangement, 
and if they do, that you would send me the data on it, as soon as possible. I 
am at a stage now where I could allow room for its installation if I knew what 
it was like. Also tell me what you think of this particular supercharger, and 
what tests it has been put to. 
I certainly do enjoy being back here, and the kids and the wife are of course 
getting a lot out of it too. I hate to make you homesick, so I won't tell you 
how much the same as old times it seems back here. I miss you at the Vidamar 
noons when I get in there, but Tiny is back on the job again, and so it looks 
much the same as ever. Why don't you come back out to God's country again. 
I sure hope that I can make a living out here and get things humming again in 
an aeronautical way here. 
Well Leigh I would appreciate very much having some news about your 
personal welfare, as well as the dope on this supercharger stuff. Charlotte joins 
me in sending the best of regards to you and Mrs. Griffith. 
As ever, yours sincerely 
[Signed] Donald W. Douglas 
Brief further research indicates that Griffith went out of his way to help Douglas 
find a suitable supercharger. He sent the young airplane designer an assembly drawing 
showing the NACA Root-type supercharger as applied to a Liberty engine (an application 
which had never actually been made), but he advised him against using this particular 
device on Douglas's proposed airplane because the device was still in a preliminary test 
phase of design. 
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The information in this letter very likely fits into the history of Douglas's round-the-
world biplanes, the famous "World Cruisers" of 1924, which constituted his company's first 
big order. In any case, the letter exemplifies the valuable and yet-to-be-used historical 
information in the correspondence files of the Langley archives. 
Research Authorization Files 
Although the correspondence files are tremendously valuable, the single most im-
portant source for aeronautical history at Langley is the NACA research authorization 
files. These files permit the historian to recreate the entire NACA research procedure for 
a given project from the raw research idea through the final polished report. 
What exactly was an NACA research authorization? Whenever a project for research 
at Langley was approved by NACA headquarters, a research authorization (or RA) was 
signed by the chairman of the executive committee and forwarded to the lab for execution. 
Technically Langley was supposed to have an RA for each of its investigations, and each 
RA was expected to lead to the publication of an NACA report. Each RA had a title 
and a number, and each included information on the how and why of the investigation. 
Sometimes this information was stated very briefly and rather vaguely; other times it was 
expressed at great length and in detail. From the time of the authorization on, a copy of 
any letter or document, incoming or outgoing, that in any way concerned the subject of 
the RA was filed chronologically in the specific RA folder ( as well as in the appropriate 
correspondence files). Thus by studying the RA files one can get a pretty clear idea 
of how the NACA went about its business. The files shed light on such things as the 
respective roles of headquarters and the lab in selecting and conducting research projects, 
the publications policies of the Committee, and the relations of NACA staff members with 
clients and colleagues. 
Since there are over 2000 research authorization files, this collection provides virtually 
virgin territory for historical research. I looked in detail only at two or three dozen RA 
files. In preparation for Model Research, Alex Roland examined, I presume, about the 
same number. Clearly scholars have so far only scratched the surface of this prime source 
for NACA history. 
The RA files are maintained in sequence in the archives from RA No. 1, "Comparison 
of mathematical analysis and model tests of air propellers," issued 18 July 1918, through 
RA No. 1584, "Free-fall tests to determine stability derivatives of Dove guided missile," 
issued 24 November 1950. (RAs after 1950, at present stored elsewhere, will be moved 
into the archives.) In the archive there is also a card file to the RA collection that cross-
references subjects and titles of technical reports with RA numbers and the file codes of 
correspondence. 
Still, the RA files are not easy to work with. Because of the vague and rather 
indiscriminate nature of the majority of RA titles and the built-in flexibility of RA 
procedure (discussed in chapter 2), it can be very hard now for anyone, even the talented 
and experienced Langley file clerks and librarians, to match individual research projects 
to the specific RA, or RAs, that covered them administratively. The best example of 
this difficulty during research for this book was my attempt to find the RA covering the 
preparation of the "Theory of Wing Sections of Arbitrary Shape," an important paper 
written by Langley physicist Theodore Theodorsen in 1931 and published by the NACA 
as tech. rpt. (TR) 411. (The contents of this paper are analyzed in chapter 4.) 
On the day I was working on this problem, veteran Langley engineer Axel T. Mattson 
visited my office, and I enlisted his help to solve it. The logical first step was to identify all 
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RAs originating before 1931 whose titles most closely matched the subject of Theodorsen's 
paper. With Mattson's help, I narrowed down the possibilities to nine RAs, all of which 
in one way or another concerned airfoils or wing sections: 
No. 43-"Pressure distribution for thick airfoil sections" 
No. 77-"Pressure distribution over tapered thick airfoils" 
No. 203-"Study of characteristics of very thick airfoil sections" 
No. 206-"Investigation of airfoils tapered in form and section" 
No. 217-"Investigation of a series of wing models with flat lower surfaces and varying 
upper cambers" 
No. 254-"Investigation of methods of developing airfoil shapes to obtain desired 
characteristics" 
No. 290-"Investigation of effect of thickness and mean camber line shape on airfoil 
characteristics" 
No. 350-"Determination of standard design characteristics for certain airfoils" 
No. 351-"Investigation of compressibility effects on airfoils" 
We deemed RA 254, "Investigation of methods of developing airfoil shapes to obtain 
desired characteristics," our best chance, as it matched the subject of Theodorsen's paper 
most closely, and then ranked the other eight RAs in order of our evaluation of their 
relevancy. 
One by one we pulled dusty RA files down from their shelves, with no success. 
Having spent about an hour exhausting our list of nine RAs, Mattson and I went back to 
the complete list of RA titles I had prepared early in my research. We found ten more RAs 
that we thought might have covered Theodorsen's wing-section analysis, but none of their 
titles actually looked anywhere as promising as had those of our first nine. We examined 
the first RA on this second list-No. 236, "Investigation of wing flutter"-because we 
knew that its subject was one of Theodorsen's specialties. When RA 236 also proved a 
washout, we gave up the idea of proceeding further with our method. 
I then asked Mattson which research section Theodorsen had worked in during 1929 
and 1930; I knew that Theodorsen became head of the Physical Research Division when 
it was created in 1931, but was unsure where he had worked previously. Though Mattson 
did not come to work at Langley until just before World War II, he knew the older crowd 
and replied that he thought Theodorsen had been a member of the Atmospheric Wind 
Tunnel (AWT) section. 
Having failed to find anything in the RA files, I now decided to look into the 
correspondence files for contemporary records of the A WT section. Entry into these 
records was easy, thanks to the alphabetized subject guide discussed above. Mattson and 
I looked through some letters from the late 1920s and early 1930s, and though we saw 
nothing dealing with Theodorsen's paper, we did see in the upper left-hand corners of 
many of the letters, in parentheses next to the Central File code, the numbers 88 and 237. 
We knew that these numbers were cross-references to RA numbers where other copies 
of the same document had been filed by Langley clerks. The numbers meant that the 
administration of much of the work being done in the AWT section during this period had 
been covered by RAs 88 and 237. 
RA 88, "Investigation of scale effect on airfoils," and RA 237, "Investigation of lateral 
stability with particular reference to rotary stability at large angles of attack," did not 
seem to match the subject of Theodorsen's paper. Of the two RAs, however, No. 88 looked 
closer to it. So we got a few folders of 88 down from the shelf and started looking through 
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them. We found a memo with a note penciled in at the bottom, "TR 411 changed to 
RA 237." 
TR 411 was the published NACA technical report by Theodorsen which we were 
looking for, so Mattson and I knew that our hunt was over. Mattson was astonished 
to find where it had led, for RA 237, "Investigation of lateral stability with particular 
reference to rotary stability at large angles of attack," had nothing whatever to do with 
the subject of Theodorsen's paper. In fact, Mattson noted (and I agreed completely) 
that RA 237 would have been just about the last place we would have looked for the 
administrative records of Theodorsen's work. RA 237 covered TR 411 simply because it 
was an RA which was generally blanketing a number of diverse research projects then 
being conducted at Langley by the AWT section. Scholars wishing to use the NACA 
research authorization files may benefit by keeping our experience in mind. 
Milton Ames Collection 
A third important collection of historical documents in the Langley archives is the 
Milton Ames Collection. In the early 1970s Ames, an ex-Langley engineer who had served 
as chief of aerodynamics at NACA headquarters from 1949 to 1958, began research for 
what he hoped would be a complete and publishable history of the laboratory. Although 
he did not achieve his goal, Ames did pull together hundreds of significant documents. 
Organized into folders which he titled and deposited into seven oversize boxes, the Ames 
Collection is stored~according to the original box scheme and folder titles~in file cabinets 
in the LaRC archive. 
The Ames Collection is especially enlightening because it was created by an old 
NACA hand, a product of the institutional culture under investigation. The documents 
he found significant enough to include for research tell us something about both Ames's 
identity as a member of the NACA "corporation" and his approach as an engineer to 
historical understanding. Furthermore, since Ames was one of the NACA's most talented 
and forward-looking aerodynamicists, his choice of key technical papers for historical 
examination is very helpful to the nonspecialist. 
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The entire collection, comprising seven boxes, is outlined below. 
Contents of Box No. 1 
WRIGHT BROTHERS 
Articles on early flights from: 
The Croatan Courier, 17 Dec. 1936 
Journal of the American Historical Society, Fall 1966 
Collier's, 25 Dec. 1948 
Air Scoop [Langley in-house newsletter], 22 June 1953 
Air Scoop, 22 Dec. 1944 
LMAL Bulletin, 18-24 Dec. 1943 
Reprint from Above and Beyond, 1968 
Folder, Kill Devil Hill National Memorial 
Original army contract with Wright brothers, 1907-1908 
Miscellaneous photographs, Wright Flyer 
ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 
Papers, notices, 1909 interim report, 1909--1911 report 
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NEED FOR AN AERONAUTICAL LABORATORY IN AMERICA 
From Dr. Zahm's papers, nos. 33, 34, 40, and 54 
SMITHSONIAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE LANGLEY AERODYNAMICAL 
LABORATORY 
Dr. Zahm's paper no. 53 
SURVEYS OF AERONAUTICAL LABORATORIES IN EUROPE, 1913-1920 
Papers by: 
Dr. Zahm, nos. 42, 43, and 55 
Dr. Hunsaker, articles from Flying, 1914 
William Knight, NACA Technical Note 17, 1920 
AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH IN CANADA 
AGARD paper by J. H. Parkin, June 1955 
"First Wind Tunnel Constructed and Placed in Operation," 1919 
EARLY HISTORY OF AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH IN GERMANY 
Schlichting letter listing references [Hermann Schlichting, Univ. of 
Gottingen] 
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS ON AVIATION UP TO ESTABLISHMENT OF NACA 
Dr. Zahm's paper no. 49 
Three memoranda from Lee Dickinson to Milton Ames 
Washington newspaper clippings 
LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO NACA, AND APRIL 1958 SUMMARY 
ESTABLISHMENT OF NACA 
Articles from Flying, April and July 1915 
War Department letter calling for first meeting of NACA 
Letter from acting chairman to comptroller of Treasury, 27 July 1915 
Dr. Walcott letter to Lt. Richardson, 8 April 1915 
Letter from first chairman to president, 23 April 1915 
Letter from Department of Commerce to Lt. Richardson, 19 October 1915 
Miscellaneous papers, 1941-1950 
NACA MEMBERSHIP, CHAIRMEN, ETC. 
Articles from Flying, 1915 
Summary of NACA membership, 16 March 1960 
FIRST MEETING OF NACA 
Minutes and photographs of members, 1915 
LANGLEY SITE SELECTION AND TRANS7ER OF LAND TO NACA 
NACA STATEMENT OF POLICY, OCTOBER 191 7, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 
DATED 20 MAY 1918 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ARMY RE USE OF LANGLEY FIELD 
BY NACA, 1919 
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SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN EARLY HISTORY OF NACA, 1915-1917 
( SUMMARY PREPARED DECEMBER 192 9) 
NACA PARIS OFFICE (ESTABLISHED MAY 1919) 
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS ON AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH IN USA, 1921-1925 
"Aeronautical Research in USA," Edward P. Warner, May 1921 
"Making America Independent in the Air," Mechanical 
Engineering, September 1923 
"Aeronautics in the Government-The National Advisory Committee," 
Charles D. Walcott, June 1925 
"A Chronology of U.S. Aviation," Aircraft Year Book, 1949 
EARLY REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES--NACA AND LANGLEY 
NACA library reference listing regarding NACA, Nov. 1943 
Early talks by E. R. Sharp regarding origins of NACA and Langley 
LMAL chronology through 1933 
British view of NACA, by Sir Roy Fedden 
John F. Victory interview with representative from Langley AFB 
historical office, 1944 
NACA press release regarding need for national aeronautical policy, 1922 
Chapters from various versions of John F. Victory's NACA history: 
"History and Development of the NACA" 
"Some Direct Accomplishments of the NACA" 
"Accomplishments" 
MISCELLANEOUS LANGLEY BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Murals in the Administration Building 
House organization 
Miscellaneous papers 
LANGLEY FIELD, VIRGINIA - -HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION 
( AIR CORPS VIEWPOINT) 
Aviation Edition, Hampton Monitor-July 1918 
Commanding officers, Langley Field, 1917-1946 
Excerpt from Look Homeward, Angel (reference to construction of 
Langley Field during World War I) 
Photographs-Mitchell bombing results 
"Langley Field 1917-1945," Journal of the American 
Aviation Historical Society, Spring 1965 
Colonel Carl F. Greene, AF liaison officer 
"Early Langley Field Aircraft," Journal of the American 
Aviation Historical Society, Fall 1966 
LANGLEY LAND RECORDS AND DEEDS 
Original land records (Elizabeth City County) 
Early deeds regarding Langley 
Langley plats-photographs of clerk of court's documents 
George Wythe birthplace 
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EARLY CONSTRUCTION, LANGLEY RESEARCH STATION 
Correspondence regarding White Engineering Company, 1918-1919 
Atmospheric Wind Tunnel, papers about land allotment and construction 
DEDICATION OF LANGLEY ( 11 JUNE 19 2 0) 
Correspondence regarding official opening of the wind tunnel 
and dedication of the laboratory 
Invitation list 
Speech of Rear Adm. David W. Taylor 
Expenditures for entertainment 
Official designation of field station as "Langley Memorial 
Aeronautical Laboratory" 
Photographic copies of 12 July 1920 editions of Newport News 
(Va.) Daily Press and Times Herald 
VARIABLE DENSITY WIND TUNNEL-CONSTRUCTION 
Land allotment 
1924 report on design and operation 
Copy of VDT logbook entry, 1 Aug. 1927, regarding wind tunnel fire 
1931 and 1935 papers regarding VDT modifications 
Contents of Box No. 2 
LANGLEY ORGANIZATION CHARTS 
Correspondence on organization, and original organization chart 
John Victory's draft chapter, "The Langley Laboratory" 
( discussing early organization and difficulties with the army) 
Folders on papers regarding early organization 
Files on Langley organization prior to 1952 
Langley organization chai·ts, in order from 1952 
Miscellaneous selected files regarding Langley organization 
LANGLEY PERSONNEL AND PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES 
Folder on early personnel 
General background material and personnel statistics 
(complement 1919 1965) 
Statistics regarding personnel 
Personnel training 
NACA emblems 
Bond drives, etc. 
Cafeterias 
Green Cow [early social club] 
Community cooperation 
Activities building and related material 
Miscellaneous material on personnel 
Recruiting brochures 
577 
Engineer in Charge 
578 
ESTIMATES OF LANGLEY PLANT COSTS 
1934 estimates 
1936 estimates 
1943 estimates 
ECONOMIC VALUE OF NACA RESEARCH (SUMMARY, 1937) 
PRELIMINARY (LANGLEY) DATA ON NACA BUDGET (1915-1952) 
EFFORTS TO TRANSFER NACA FROM INDEPENDENT AGENCY TO OTHER AGENCIES 
Proposed transfer to Bureau of Standards and War and 
Navy departments, 1921 
Proposed transfer to Commerce Department, 1925 
Proposed transfer to Commerce (Bureau of Standards), 1932-1933 
McKeller Bill (S-5044), proposed abolishment of NACA and transfer of 
its laboratories to War Department, 1933 
LANGLEY INSPECTIONS (ORIGINALLY CALLED MANUFACTURERS' CONFERENCES) 
Joseph Ames's papers-First Manufacturers's Conference at Langley, 
24 May 1926 
Henry Reid's papers----conference books, 1926-1935 
Edward P. Warner's proposal for additional industry representatives 
on NACA committees and subcommittees 
Folder on post-World War II inspections and anniversaries 
Contents of Box No. 3 
PHOTOGRAPHIC FILES 
Early pictures selected from Air Scoop 
Miscellaneous photographs, 1919-1935 
H.J. E. Reid photographic albums: 
1. Flight section 
2. Wind tunnel section 
Selected correspondence on Langley photographs 
LOGBOOKS OF EARLY EXHIBITS 
LANGLEY VISITORS' REGISTER, 1926-1934 
Contents of Box No. 4 
WILBUR WRIGHT MEMORIAL LECTURES 
List of lecturers from 1913 through 1935 
1918, William F. Durand, "Some Outstanding Problems in 
Aeronautics" 
1923, Joseph Ames, "Relation Between Aeronautics Research 
and Aircraft Design" 
1932, H. E. Wimperis, "New Methods of Research in Aeronautics" 
1939, George W. Lewis, "Some Modern Methods of Research in the 
Problems of Flight" 
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1949, Hugh L. Dryden, "The Aeronautical Research Scene: 
Goals, Methods, and Accomplishments" 
1961, Abe Silverstein, "Researches in Space Flight Technology" 
FOLDERS ON KEY INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH LANGLEY HISTORY 
Ames, Joseph S. 
Dryden, Hugh L. 
Durand, William F. 
Hunsaker, Jerome C. 
Langley, Samuel P. 
Lewis, George W. 
Lindbergh, Charles A. 
Reid, Henry J.E. 
Sharp, Edward R. 
Stack, John 
Thompson, Floyd L. 
Victory, John F. 
Walcott, Charles D. 
Zahm, Albert F. 
Biographical material-miscellaneous 
CLIPPINGS (1925-1930) 
1933 HURRICANE 
SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS-ANNIVERSARIES, HISTORIES 
CONFERENCES, CEREMONIES, INSPECTIONS, VISITORS 
ECONOMIC STUDY OF 1933 AND "NOTES ON AVIATION PROGRESS 
THROUGH RESEARCH" 
LANGLEY HISTORY ( COLLECTION OF PAPERS AND TALKS ON LANGLEY HISTORY) 
MISCELLANEOUS PRESS RELEASES ON LANGLEY RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING EARLY HEADQUARTERS-LANGLEY 
RELATIONSHIP 
LANGLEY TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES, JAN. 1963 TO MAY 1971 
Contents of Box No. 5 
EARLY ENGINE COMPETITION (1920) 
FATAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, JN-6 44946, 20 AUGUST 1924 
FORD RELIABILITY TOUR, 1926 
CRASH OF THE "AMERICAN LEGION" AT LANGLEY, 26 APRIL 1927 
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES DURING l 920S 
Early model airplane use 
Early noise study 
Complaints on early flight reporting 
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Langley documents on early research programs 
Cowling research 
Lockheed Air Express 
Propeller Research Tunnel 
"Little America" (telegram regarding NACA cowling and modified 
propellers) 
Background to boundary-layer-control research 
Eastman Jacobs's laminar-flow work 
Rotary-wing aircraft 
NACA PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II 
Policy regarding laboratory in time of war (George Lewis's 
memorandum dated 1 Dec. 1936 for chairman of special committee 
on policy regarding membership of employees in military reserves) 
Westover Committee report to NACA chairman, 19 Aug. 1938; subject: 
Relation of the NACA to national defense in time of war 
Initial report of Air Corps-NACA committee making recommendations 
for priority of research projects in LMAL program, 22 Dec. 1939 
Authorization to the NACA's director of aeronautical research 
from the NACA executive committee to carry out investigations 
for the army and navy for the duration of the war, and to issue 
research authorizations as required 
John F. Victory letter to NACA laboratories regarding views of 
high government officials on the NACA, 17 Feb. 1943 
NACA library listing of references pertaining to NACA preparation 
for war and support of World War II 
LANGLEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMES AND LEWIS LABORATORIES 
Ames Laboratory 
Lewis Laboratory 
LANGLEY ACTIVITIES DURING WORLD WAR II ERA 
NACA studies for U.S. Army Air Forces of factors affecting 
performance of advanced military aircraft 
Langley contributions to controlled bombs 
Miscellaneous files, World War II era 
Research studies for Army Air Forces and navy on supersonic 
aircraft (by Macon C. Ellis, Jr., and Clinton E. Brown) 
Wallops Island and miscellaneous related material 
MEAD COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION--ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE 
U.S. Senate special committee investigating the national defense 
program, 1946 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH POLICY, 21 MARCH 1946 
POST-WORLD WAR II RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
National program of transonic and supersonic research 
Transonic ( slotted throat) wind tunnels 
Guide to NACA Historical Sources at Langley 
Flight research 
Research airplane program 
GAO SURVEY OF NACA, 1953 
2 5TH ANNIVERSARY OF LANGLEY TOWING TANK AND FULL-SCALE 
WIND TUNNEL, 19 5 6 
NATIONAL AWARDS TO LANGLEY 
Collier trophies 
Air Medal for Herbert Hoover {NACA test pilot] for 
research airplane flight testing 
EXTRA COPIES OF "AIR SCOOP" 
MISCELLANEOUS AIRSHIP PHOTOGRAPHS FROM MELVIN N. GOUGH 
Contents of Box No. 6 
AREA RULE AND RICHARD WHITCOMB 
LANGLEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO B-58 
V / STOL RESEARCH 
Summary papers, various authors 
Charles Zimmerman's V-173 
HIGH-SPEED SUBMARINE "ALBACORE" RESEARCH FOR U.S. NAVY 
RESEARCH ON FLEXIBLE WINGS 
LANGLEY SPECIAL GROUP ON RESEARCH FOR GUIDED MISSILES 
( Only copy of file in existence) 
LANGLEY RESEARCH FACILITIES 
Wind tunnels, other facilities, and research techniques 
Miscellaneous files on facilities 
"NACA RESEARCH INTO SPACE," 1957 
"ECHO I" AND WILLIAM J. O'SULLIVAN 
EARLY MANNED SPACE FLIGHT 
1958 proposals 
Early Project Mercury articles 
Project Mercury tracking range 
Mercury astronauts 
PROJECT APOLLO 
Langley contributions 
Genesis of lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) concept 
Miscellaneous material on LOR concept, including letters 
from John C. Houbolt to Dr. Robert Seamons 
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Langley working paper, "Preliminary Geologic Evaluation 
and Apollo Landing Analysis of Areas Photographed by 
Lunar Orbiter II," March 1967 
Contents of Box No. 7 
PAPERS AND TALKS RELATING TO HISTORY OF LANGLEY 
Papers by Jerome C. Hunsaker, 1941-1942 
Talks by John F. Victory, Hugh L. Dryden, Floyd L. Thompson, 
Arthur Regier, John Stack, and Axel Mattson, 1945-1954 
Talks by Langley and NACA officials 
Talks by Floyd L. Thompson 
Talks-miscellaneous 
Langley's 50th Anniversary 
Floyd L. Thompson's opening remarks 
Miscellaneous 
Photographs 
Anniversary plaque 
Miscellaneous publicity information 
Outside publications 
"America's Race for the Moon," story of Apollo Project in 
New York Times 
Miscellaneous technical papers by Langley authors 
Langley flight projects reference manual 
Personal Papers 
The Floyd L. Thompson Collection. Actually this collection holds more for the 
space historian than it does for the aeronautical historian. Most of its contents postdate 
the NACA; they derive from Thompson's term as director of the NASA Langley Research 
Center, 1960-1968. Box C of this collection, though, contains some important documents 
on NACA research dating back to the 1930s. (Thompson began working for the NACA at 
Langley in July 1926.) The entire collection &( papers was donated to the LaRC archive 
in 1980 by Thompson's widow, Mrs. Jean Thompson. The following reproduces Floyd 
Thompson's own inventory of the subjects of the collection. 
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Box A 
MORL (Manned Orbital Research Laboratory) 
LUNAR ORBITER (historical notes) 
APOLLO 
MERCURY 
SCOUT 
X-15 
SST 
PASSIVE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE 
LARGE BOOSTERS 
MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL PROPOSALS AND MEMOS 
Guide to NA CA Historical Sources at Langley 
Box B 
EARLY SPACE PROGRAM PLANNING: MEMOS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
VISITS AND EVENTS 
Mercury 
University of Tennessee 
IC ASE (Institute for Computer Applications in Science and 
Engineering)-Munich 
Martin Plant-Denver, Colorado 
University of Michigan 
Boeing anniversary 
AGARD (Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and 
Development, NATO)-Athens, Greece 
British flying display 
West Coast visits (Boeing, Lockheed) 
Miscellaneous 
NEWPORT NEWS CYCLOTRON AND VARC (Virginia Associated 
Research Campus) 
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS 
Elliot Committee regarding industrial funding 
Consultations on aeronautical development 
President's Advisory Council on Management Improvement 
ARPA workshop, May 1970 
NRC panel on hydrodynamics of submerged bodies 
NRC panel on submarines 
Committee for disposition of NASA artifacts 
Test site for space shuttle engine 
Box C 
OLD LANGLEY FLIGHT RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
HISTORICAL NOTES ON FLYING QUALITIES WORK 
OLD CONFERENCE MEMOS AND HISTORICAL NOTES ON DYNAMIC LOADS AND 
STRUCTURES RESEARCH 
TRANSONIC RESEARCH 
NOTES, COMMENTS, STATEMENTS ON MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY 
AERONAUTICS POLICY, 1970 
LANGLEY'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY 
ROTARY CLUB TALKS 
LOCAL AFFAIRS 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HONORARY DOCTORATE 
WILLIAM AND MARY HONORARY DOCTORATE 
583 
Engineer in Charge 
RETIREMENT PARTY, 17 OCT. 1968 
PERSONAL MATTERS, INCLUDING CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING 
APPOINTMENT AS CENTER DIRECTOR 
NOTES ON OTHER PERSONS 
MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL REPORTS AND PAPERS 
BoxD 
COPIES OF PUBLIC TALKS, PUBLICITY STATEMENTS, PHOTOS 
LETTER TO NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING 
NUMEROUS TECHNICAL ARTICLES AND PAPERS, MOSTLY PUBLISHED 
The John Stack Collection. This collection is more valuable to the aeronautical 
historian than is the Thompson collection because it includes a greater number and wider 
chronological range of older business correspondence and research program files~many of 
which concern Stack's pioneering work in transonic and supersonic technology. The papers 
were donated to the Langley archives by Stack's son, Peter, who, like Mrs. Thompson, 
chose to keep several of the more private letters in the family's possession, at least for the 
time being. The papers, which are in folders labeled by John Stack, have been organized 
into sections of file drawers according to categories: 
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Section No. 1 
Wind Tunnel Design, Operation, and Test Techniques 
CROCCO CURVE 
KOCHEL ULTRA-SUPERSONIC WIND TUNNEL DEVELOPMENT 
NEW TYPES OF TUNNELS 
USES OF GAS OTHER THAN AIR IN WIND TUNNELS 
HODOGRAPH REPORT 
8-FOOT HIGH-SPEED TUNNEL OPERATIONS 
SUPERSONIC WIND TUNNEL AT WRIGHT FIELD 
4-FOOT SUPERSONIC TUNNEL 
MISCELLANEOUS WIND TUNNEL DATA 
SPECIAL TYPE TUNNELS~SLOTTED TEST SECTIONS 
REPOWERING 16-FOOT HIGH-SPEED TUNNEL 
UNITARY PLAN WIND TUNNEL 
REVISED UNITARY PROGRAM 
GAS DYNAMICS LABORATORY 
FLUTTER TUNNEL 
Guide to NACA Historical Sources at Langley 
SUPERSONIC COMPRESSOR 
ABERDEEN SUPERSONIC WIND TUNNEL 
MADELUNG HIGH-PRESSURE WATER TUNNEL 
PROPOSED AIR ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
NATIONAL SUPERSONIC RESEARCH CENTER 
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY 
REFRIGERATION 
SCHLIEREN PHOTOGRAPHS 
MISCELLANEOUS OPTICAL SYSTEMS 
SCHLIEREN PHOTOGRAPHS- BRITISH NATIONAL PHYSICAL LABORATORY 
AFTERGLOW PHOTOGRAPHS 
SPHERE PHOTOS OVER A RANGE OF MACH NUMBERS 
Section No. 2 
Research Problems 
JET ANALYSIS, INDUCTED 
INTERACTION OF SHOCK AND BOUNDARY LAYER 
SHROUDED PROPELLERS 
DATA ON VARIOUS NACA AIRFOIL SECTIONS 
DRAFTS OF STACK'S WRIGHT BROTHERS LECTURE, "COMPRESSIBLE 
FLOWS IN AERONAUTICS," 17 DEC. 1944 
MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL REPORTS 
Section No. 3 
Reports of Meetings, Conferences, and Study Groups 
GAS TURBINE CONFERENCE AT GENERAL ELECTRIC, 1945 
HIGH-SPEED AERODYNAMICS CONFERENCE, NACA-NAVY-ARMY, 13 JULY 1945 
STACK'S REPORT ON ABERDEEN CONFERENCE, 1 7 JAN. 1946 
AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY MEETING, 25 APRIL 1946 
NACA CONFERENCE ON SUPERSONIC AERODYNAMICS, AMES LAB, 4 JUNE 1946 
LANGLEY CONFERENCE ON HIGH-SPEED AERODYNAMIC THEORY, 3 FEB. 194 7 
LANGLEY CONFERENCE ON SUPERSONIC AERODYNAMICS, 19~20 JUNE 1947 
AMES CONFERENCE ON SUPERSONIC AERODYNAMICS, 31 AUG. 1948 
AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY MEETING, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, DEC. 1949 
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MISCELLANEOUS CONFERENCE REPORTS 
CONFERENCES 
MINUTES OF MEETINGS 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGH-SPEED AERODYNAMICS 
COMMITTEE ON ADVANCED STUDY 
AD HOC PANEL ON LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES 
DRAPER COMMITTEE 
DOD TECHNICAL ADVISORY PANEL ON AERODYNAMICS, AD HOC GROUP ON 
WATER-BASED AIRCRAFT 
Section No. 4 
Memos and Correspondence 
HENRY J. E. REID'S TRIP TO EUROPE, 1944 
DEVELOPMENTS IN HIGH-SPEED AERONAUTICS DURING WORLD WAR II 
RIPARBELLI REPORT 
LETTERS FROM COLEMEN DUPONT DONALDSON ON GERMAN SCIENTISTS AT 
WRIGHT FIELD, 1946 
BELL TELEPHONE LAB 
PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE 
MEMOS FOR ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 
LETTERS BETWEEN PROF. CARLO FERRARI, UNIVERSITY OF TURIN, 
AND ANTONIO FERRI, NACA, 1947~1948 
MEMOS ON AIRFOILS 
MEMO FROM HARTLEY SOULE, 1948 
MEMOS FOR FILES 
MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE 
Section No. 5 
Aircraft Development Projects 
NORTH AMERICAN P-51 
HIGH-SPEED BOMBER PROGRAM, 1945 
SUPERSONIC AIRPLANE 
PROJECT 506 
WATER-BASED AIRCRAFT 
REPUBLIC P - 4 7 B 
Guide to NACA Historical Sources at Langley 
B-35 ELEVON 
PROPELLER FOR SPITFIRE 21 
XP-69 HORIZONTAL TAIL 
EAGLE 
REPUBLIC AVIATION CORPORATION 5-YEAR PLAN 
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT (SST) 
GROUND EFFECTS MACHINES 
V /STOL 
MUTUAL WEAPONS DEFENSE PROGRAM (MWDP) 
VTOL-FAA PROJECT "HUMMINGBIRD" 
NATO BRIEFING, 13 OCT. 1960 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BRIEFING, 28-31 OCT. 1960 
TRAINING CENTER FOR EXPERIMENTAL AERODYNAMICS, BRUSSELS 
STACK'S TRIPS TO EUROPE ON MWDP, JUNE-OCT. 1959 
MISCELLANEOUS DATA FROM 1959 
MISCELLANEOUS DATA FROM 1960 
CORRESPONDENCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1961 
ITALY'S HYPERSONIC TUNNEL 
BRITISH HAWKER P-1127 AIRCRAFT 
BE-53 ENGINE DATA INCLUDING SWALLOW AND HAWKER P-1127 
TFX DEVELOPMENT 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
SOURCE SELECTION BOARD 
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
UNITED KINGDOM TSR-2 
MISCELLANEOUS PHOTOGRAPHS 
BLUEPRINT DRAWINGS 
Section No. 6 
Miscellaneous 
"STACK'S STUFF," MISCELLANEOUS 
The Floyd Thompson Technical Library 
What really makes Langley one of the very best places in the country for re-
search in aeronautical history is the technical library in which the historical archives 
are located. Besides holding major collections (over 3.8 million volumes) in the phys-
ical sciences and engineering with emphasis in aerospace science and technology, aero-
nautics, structures, materials, acoustics, energy, electronics, and the environment, and 
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besides holding supporting collections in physics, chemistry, mathematics, and manage-
ment, the library also preserves the complete NACA publications series-over 16,000 re-
ports in more than 1000 bound and nearly 2000 unbound volumes-including Techni-
cal Reports (TRs), Technical Notes (TNs), Technical Memorandums (TMs), Wartime 
Reports (WRs), Aircraft Circulars (ACs), Research Memorandums (RMs), Advance 
Confidential Reports (ACRs), Advance Restricted Reports (ARRs), Confidential Bul-
letins ( CBs), Restricted Bulletins (RBs), and Memorandum Reports (MRs). (For an anal-
ysis of the NACA publications series, see Roland, Model Research, app. G, pp. 551-567.) 
What gives the library its unparalleled strength as a place for historical research, 
though, is the fact that its staff maintains the same index to aeronautical literature that 
was begun by the NACA in the 1920s. Cards reference tens of thousands of aeronautical 
papers from all over the world by subject, author, title, and, in the case of NACA 
reports and research authorizations, by number. Many of these papers are unpublished 
or classified. This makes the NACA card file one of this country's most treasured guides 
to aeronautical information. Langley's file is all the more precious because it is the only 
set extant. 
The library is accredited and open to the public. 
Photographic Collection. Langley's collection of photographs (housed separately 
from the library) runs to roughly 100,000 negatives, all of which are logged by date and 
by subject. The motion picture film collection (part of which is housed in the library and 
part in the separate photographic laboratory in building 1155) is also extensive, but most 
of the films are not in any shape to be loaned out for exhibition. There is a subject card 
file to this motion picture collection. 
* * * 
Anyone interested in conducting historical research at Langley should contact 
Richard T. Layman, Historical Program Coordinator, Mail Stop 123 
(telephone 804/865-3688), or Sue K. Seward, reference librarian, Mail Stop 185 
(804/865-2634), Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 23665. 
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Index 
A-9 missile (German), 343 
A-10 missile (German), 343 
A-17A (Northrop), 138ill., 489,491 
A-26 Invader (Douglas), 251, 497, 498 
Abbot, Charles G., 7ill., 405, 406ill. 
Abbott, Ira H., 61ill., 113, 116,217,375, 
376,414,452,457,464,515,524, 
526,529,537,540,544,548,559, 
563 
acceleration effects on drop-body testing, 
262 
accelerometer, 520 
Acker, Otto, 550 
Adams, Charles F., 160 
Adams, Joseph P., 405 
Adams, Porter, 519 
Adams, William, 43ill. 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA), 381, 385 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(British), 3, 5 
Aero Club of America, 11, 532 
Aero Digest, 119, 120, 133, 144-146, 340 
Aerodrome (Samuel Langley's), 2, 4ill. 
aerodynamic heating. See heating, aerody-
namic. 
aerodynamical researchers, development 
of, 47 
aerodynamics, 2, 6, 41, 43, 47, 49, 55, 57, 
66,250,253 
aeroelasticity, 404, 459, 469. See also 
flutter. 
aeronautical engineering programs, U.S., 
47-49 
aeronautical engineers, 
civil service examination, 46, 49 
development of, 47, 53 
Aeronautical Research Committee 
(British), 553 
Aeronautical Society of Great Britain, 66, 
78 
aeronautics, 
as perceived by Joseph S. Ames, 74 
as perceived by Sir George Cayley, 78 
in the 1920s and 1930s, xxviii 
aeronautics community (U.S.), NACA's 
understanding of, 141 
afterburner, 222, 235, 239 
Air Commerce Act of 1926, 50, 145, 148, 
404 
Air Express (Lockheed), 129, 130 
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 355 
Air Force, U.S., 306, 338, 355 
Air Materiel Command, 260, 279, 283, 
286,289,329,366,540,549,550, 
555, 558. See also Liaison Office, 
Air Materiel Command (AAF), 
at Langley Field; and Army Air 
Forces (AAF). 
Air Scoop, 210, 211, 214, 216, 264, 287, 
303,383 
Air Technical Advisory Panel, 365 
Airacobra (Bell P-39), 51, 196, 199-202, 
200ill., 239, 260, 299, 492, 494, 495, 
542,550 
Airacomet (Bell P-59), 224, 233, 239, 241, 
242ill., 243, 247, 251, 271-273, 297 
Aircraft Development Corp., 152 
Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory 
(AERL), 187, 194, 207, 239, 246, 
247, 294, 301, 450, 547. See also 
Lewis Flight Propulsion Labora-
tory. 
aircraft numbering system (Langley's), 
479 
Aircraft Production Board, Council of 
National Defense, 8, 19 
airfoil cascades. See cascades. 
airfoil research, 78, 118, 311 
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early success of NACA's, 84 
NACA's pattern of, 135 
Wright brothers', 67, 78, 79 
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airfoil sections, 79-81, 100 
1-series low-drag, 317 
2-series low-drag, 114 
3-series low-drag, 114 
4-series low-drag, 114, 117 
4-digit series, 97, 98ill., 101, 104, 105 
5-digit series, 104, 105 
5-series low-drag, 114 
6-series low-drag, 116, 529 
16-series, 111, 317 
230-series, 542 
characteristics, 75, 81, 83, 526 
Clark Y, 35, 81, 173, 534 
Gi.ittingen, 81, 167, 178 
Joukowski, 113 
laminar-flow, xxxiii, xxxvi, 39, 65, 106, 
109, 111, 113-118, 115ill., 236,317, 
464,497,527,528,529 
Munk, 83, 84 
N.A.C.A 0012, 114 
N.A.C.A. 0015, 97 
N.A.C.A. 2415, 97 
N.A.C.A. 661-212, 115il/. 
N.A.C.A. 747A315, 115ill. 
R.A.F. 15, 81, 167, 174, 178 
symmetrical, 97 
thick vs. thin, 79, 275-277 
U.S.A. series, 79, 167, 171, 173-175, 178 
airfoil theory. See theory, airfoil. 
airfoils, 63, 78-84, 97, 98, 101, 107, 108, 
111-118, 251,256,464 
historical evolution of, 78-81 
negative camber, 251 
numerical code, 97, 98, 116 
parameters, 75, 80, 83, 97, 98, 101, 113, 
114 
pressure distribution, 80, 82, 102, 105, 
106, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 116, 
315, 452, 474 
supercritical (Whitcomb's), 249, 341, 
390, 464 
theory of oscillating, 105 
airplane-airship competition, 55 , 57 
airships, 3, 47, 55, 56ill., 57ill., 59, 74, 75, 
127,207,404,521,522 
airships, 19th Airship Squadron (Langley 
Field), 55, 521 
airspeed indicator, 73 
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Akimoff, Nicholas W., 546 
Akron (U.S.S.), 56, 57ill., 404,521,522 
Albacore submarine, 449ill. 
Alexander Airplane Co., Colorado, 119 
Alford, William L., 414 
Alison, John R., 405 
Allen, Edmund T. "Eddie", 538 
Allen, H. Julian "Harvey", 53, 113, 253, 
291, 349ill., 350, 358, 370, 375, 378, 
414,528,560,563 
Allen-Eggers study group (Ames lab), 370 
Allis-Chalmers, 221, 233, 242 
Allison Engineering Co., 152 
Allison V 1710 engine, 239 
Alsos mission, 267 
Altitude Wind Tunnel at AERL, 246 
American Aeronautical Society, 1, 516 
American Brown Boveri Electric Corp., 
Camden, N.J., 119 
American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA), 121, 277 
American Physical Society, 560 
American Telephone and Telegraph 
(AT&T), 2 
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory (AAL), 53, 
120,187,193,219,250,251,329, 
348-350, 356,358,378,362,471, 
528,536,545,550,560,563 
Ames, Joseph S., 7ill., 21, 22, 24, 37, 74, 
75, 76ill., 92, 119, 120, 130ill., 145, 
152ill., 169, 193, 401, 402ill., 405, 
519,520,525,529,536,538,541 
Ames, Milton B., 42, 291, 362, 365, 414, 
555,561,562,574 
Anderson, R. F., 537 
Anderson, Roger, 368 
Annular Transonic Tunnel, 315, 330, 331, 
557 
"antipodal" rocket plane (Sanger-Bredt 
concept), 350 
Antoinette monoplane, 524 
Apache (Wright), 124, 125ill., 127, 532 
Apollo program, 349, 350, 391, 394 
Apt, Milburn G., 359 
Archimedes, 334 
area rule, xxxvi, 311, 312, 331, 332, 
336-341, 370,454,559 
Arizona (U.S.S.), 546 
Armstrong, Neil, 366 
Army Air Corps, 53, 192, 193, 199--202, 
204,224,227,230,231,234,240 
Army Air Corps Enlisted Reserves 
(ACER), 204. See also army-navy-
NACA plan of 1944. 
Army Air Forces (AAF), 240, 274, 275, 
281,286,296,297,299,314 
Army Air Service, 10, 19, 20, 22, 59, 128, 
143, 160, 161, 166, 167, 170, 172, 
174,538 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 
377 
Army Corps of Engineers, lOill. 
Army Signal Corps, 10 
Army, U.S., 2, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 46, 
132, 148, 181-183, 241, 242, 245, 
260·262, 271-273, 289, 301. See 
also Army Air Corps, Army Air 
Forces, Army Air Service. 
army-navy-NACA plan of 1944, 204, 205, 
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Arnold Engineering Development Center 
(AEDC), Tullahoma, Tenn., 388, 
564 
Arnold, Henry H. "Hap", 199, 201, 223, 
224,230,231, 241-243, 260,405, 
406ill., 539, 542, 547 
Arnstein, Karl, 152ill., 522 
"Arsenal of Aeronautics" (McCook Field), 
143 
art, role of, in creating technology, xxxv, 
311, 312, 341 
Astin, Allen V., 405 
AT-5A Hawk (Curtiss), 128, 129ill., 130, 
490 
Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Co., 14 
Atlas booster, 381, 38.5, 387, 388. See also 
ICBMs. 
Atmospheric Wind Tunnel, 50, 81. See 
also NACA Tunnel No. 1. 
atmospheric wind tunnels, 21, 120, 170 
Auteuil, France, wind tunnels at, 3, 68 
autogiros, 156, 162ill., 482, 485, 487, 
488ill., 489, 492 
Auxiliary Flight Reseai·ch Station. See 
Wallops Island, Va.; and research 
Index 
Auxiliary Flight Research Station ( contin-
ued): 
divisions (Langley), Pilotless Air-
craft Research Division (PARD). 
AVCO Research Laboratory, 39, 51 
Aviation, 148, 279 
Aviation Corp., 152 
axial-flow compressors. See compressors, 
axial-flow. 
Ayer, Bruce E., 414 
B-9 (Boeing), 534 
B-10 (Martin), 534 
B-17 Flying Fortress (Boeing), 99, 132 
B-18 (Douglas), 117 ill. 
B-24 (Consolidated), 545 
B-26 Marauder (Martin), 235ill., 494ill. 
B-29 Superfortress (Boeing), 262, 263ill., 
286, 296, 300, 301, 500, 501, 502ill. 
B-45 (North American), 246ill., 504 
B-52 Stratofortress (Boeing), 561 
B-58 (Boeing), 472 
Baals, Donald D., 414, 472, 522, 526, 527, 
544,557,559,560 
Babberger, Carl, 53, 414 
Back River. See Hainpton, Va. 
Bacon, David L., 41, 43ill., 44ill., 46, 87, 
83ill., 414, 443, 525, 538, 539 
baffles, engine, 128, 135, 138 
Bailey, Frederick J., Jr., 368, 414, 537, 
Baker, C. W., 517 
balances, wind tunnel. See instruments, 
wind tunnel balances. 
Bamber, Millai·d J., 35, 46, 414 
Bane, Thurman H., 19, 143, 405, 518 
Barling NB-3 bomber, 279 
Bassett, Preston R., 405 
Bateman, H., 528 
Bauernker, Adolf, 541 
Becker, John V., xxxvii, 54, 254, 286, 306, 
313-315, 320,321,324,328,331, 
344, 345ill., 346, 353, 356, 357, 
360-363, 368-374, 377,378,380, 
381,414,424,447,452,454,462, 
466,467,471,472,478, 519-523, 
534,537,544,548,550,551,553, 
557,558, 560-563 
Beeler, De Elroy, 301, 362, 414 
Beisel, Rex, 534, 536 
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Bell Aircraft Corp., 51, 199, 200, 202, 224, 
233, 273-279, 286,288,296,298, 
299,306,350,542,552,553,555 
"Buck Rogers" project, 233 
turbojet projects, 246 
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